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ABSTRACT 
 
St. Mary’s University 
Nathan L. Shedd 
“The Beheading of John the Baptist in the First Three Centuries: Memory, Violence, and 
Reception” 
 
 
This study focuses on the reception of John the Baptist’s beheading in the first three 
centuries. The primary question that drives this investigation is: What impact did John’s 
beheading have on its reception during this time period? To answer this question, the study 
breaks into five chapters. Chapter one reviews previous scholarship on John’s death and asks 
how the question of reception compares to other scholarly efforts. This review shows that 
scholars have largely overlooked this question. Chapter two asks how historians might 
conceptualize and approach reception history. I argue that social memory theory offers 
helpful theoretical and analytical frameworks in this regard. Specifically, traditions of bodily 
violence become sites of contestation in commemorative activity. Those who harness a 
violent past in identity formation often transform the degrading potential of bodily mutilation 
so that the symbolically freighted violence is not debilitating to present needs. Chapter three 
traces the symbolic potential of beheading in John’s general context. I argue that beheading 
constituted a degrading form of bodily violence that not only emasculated the victim, but also 
interrupted proper burial and reincorporation in life in the hereafter. Chapters four and five 
proceed to ask how early recipients of John’s beheading engage this social script. Chapter 
four argues that Mark contests the degrading potential of John’s beheading. Although Mark 
acknowledges the degrading social script of beheading, he brings it into tension with other 
elements that cast John and Herod respectively as positive and negative figures: (i) the moral 
corruption of the Herodian court as those whose “will” is opposed to God’s will; (ii) the 
emasculation of Antipas and the masculinity of John the Baptist; (iii) the keying of John’s 
beheading to Jesus’ crucifixion; (iv) the portrayal of Herod as entertaining the ludicrous 
notion of a beheaded man’s resurrection (or the depiction of Herod as paranoid because of 
John’s improper burial). Chapter five argues that the contest over John’s degrading death 
takes anti-Jewish turns. Particularly salient in this respect are Justin Martyr’s Dialogue with 
Trypho and Origen’s Commentary on Matthew. Both authors redeploy the tradition so that 
Herod Antipas’ actions against the prophet become symbols for contemporary Jewish action. 
Justin and Origen activate the negative characterization of Antipas, making Antipas’ moral 
coloration emblematic of “the Jews.” In so doing, they perpetuate an image of “the Jews” as 
killers of God’s prophets. What impact, therefore, did John’s beheading have on its early 
reception history? In light of these commemorative maneuvers underlying the tradition’s 
history, this study argues that the impact of John’s death is characterized by a dangerous 
synchroneity. On the one hand, John’s beheading was a salient image that early recipients 
harnessed and contested in their works of self-definition. On the other hand, as part of the 
work of identity formation, the tradition developed in anti-Jewish directions. In this respect, 
the memory of John’s beheading became “violent.”  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Immediately, the king ordered the executioner 
 to bring his [John the Baptist’s] head.  
Having departed, he beheaded him in the prison 
 and brought his head on a platter and gave it to the girl; 
 and the girl gave it to her mother.  
When his disciples heard, 
 they came and took his body and placed it in a tomb.1 
 
Because history is about effects and consequences 
 as much as it is about the causes and conditions, 
 an account of its impact and aftermath is indeed  
an integral part of all good historiography.2 
 
Focus, Inquiry, and Argument 
This study concentrates on the memory of the beheading of John the Baptist in the first three 
centuries. “Memory surrounds us and defines us.”3 As J. Assmann claims: “There is no 
understanding without memory, no existence without tradition.”4 The present’s mobilization 
of the apical past is essential to the formation and preservation of collective identities (tribes, 
families, nations, religious groups, etc.). Individuals and collectivities invoke their salient 
past to solidify social bonds and reinforce boundary demarcations in their present horizons.5 
As the past can be approached only from the vantage point of the ever-shifting horizon of the 
present, significant social memories are in constant fluctuation. In this regard, the salient past 
resembles “moving pictures,” to borrow Capps’ metaphor.6 Archetypal memories thus 
iteratively shape—and are repeatedly (re)shaped in—the present, as they are re-presented.  
 
 1 Mark 6:27–29. All translations of primary sources are my own unless otherwise indicated. 
 2 Markus Bockmuehl, Seeing the Word: Refocusing New Testament Study, STI (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2006), 168. 
 3 J. Shawn Landres and Oren Baruch Stier, “Introduction,” in Religion, Violence, Memory, and Place, 
ed. Oren Baruch Stier and J. Shawn Landres (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 1. 
 4 Jan Assmann, Religion and Cultural Memory, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2006), 27. 
 5 Bruce Lincoln, Discourse and the Construction of Society: Comparative Studies of Myth, Ritual, and 
Classification (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 20. 
 6 Walter H. Capps, Religious Studies: The Making of a Discipline (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 
343. 
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 Because our view of the past is always in motion (by virtue of our coterminous 
relationship with the present), history is not merely about a static image of the “actual past.” 
Nor is historiography only about the reconstruction of originating stimuli of the past. History 
must also be about the reverberations of the past in multiple presents. Historians, 
consequently, must give attention to dynamic temporalities, not merely stationary time.7 Put 
otherwise, scholars must offer an account of the reception of the past in its previous presents. 
 In this vein, this study focuses on the reverberations of the beheading of John the 
Baptist in its early reception history. The principal question that drives this investigation is: 
What impact did John’s beheading have on its reception?8 This question does not imply 
isolating, in distinction from other socio-cultural influences, the empirical effectiveness of a 
text (Mark 6:17–29) on a receiver.9 Nor is this question primarily concerned with charting the 
Auslegungsgeschichte (“exegetical history”) or the potential meanings of the textualized 
traditions of John’s death.10 Rather, in recognition of the observation that present social 
conditions activate and frame individuals’ and groups’ recollections of salient pasts—
especially in efforts of self-definition—the question of reception, for this study, is concerned 
with early appropriations of John’s beheading in identity articulation.11  
 Particularly since the time Ulrich Luz began publishing his four-volume commentary 
on Matthew in the series Evangelisch-Katholischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament, an 
 
 7 Jeffrey K. Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Daniel Levy, “Introduction,” in The Collective 
Memory Reader, ed. Jeffrey K. Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Daniel Levy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 37. 
 8 My employment of the unqualified “John” in this study will be in reference to “John the Baptist” 
unless otherwise made explicit. 
 9 Cf. Heikki Räisänen, “The Effective ‘History’ of the Bible: A Challenge to Biblical Scholarship?,” 
SJT 45 (1992): 303–24. 
 10 See, Hans Robert Jauss, Toward an Aesthetic of Reception, trans. Timothy Bahti (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 30, who suggests that in the reception of a literary work one can discern 
“the successive unfolding of the potential for meaning.” 
 11 In other words, I focus on the Wirkungsgeschichte of John’s beheading—the negotiation between (or 
the co-presence of) the past and the present in the instances in which John’s decapitation is recalled. On 
Wirkungsgeschichte as a principle of the interconnection between the past and the present—and not a method of 
investigation—in Gadamer’s usage, see, Robert Evans, Reception History, Tradition and Biblical 
Interpretation: Gadamer and Jauss in Current Practice, STr 4; LNTS 510 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 
2014), 1–9. On treating receptions of the past as instances of memory, see chapter two of this study. 
 11 
explosion of “reception” publications has surfaced in biblical scholarship.12 For example, in 
1995, Bockmuehl traced the reception of Phil 2:5–11 in patristic literature.13 In his 1999 
study Blomquist focused on patristic interpretations of Luke 14:1–24.14 Parris’ 2009 
monograph included analysis of the post-history of Matt 17:15 and Matt 22:1–14.15 In 2011, 
Joynes examined the post-history of the silence of the women at the tomb (Mark 16:8).16 In 
2012, Edwards studied the reception of the ransom logion (Mark 10:45//Matt 20:28).17 In his 
2014 monograph, R. Evans traced the reception of a series of texts containing the Pauline 
imperative “be subject to.”18 In 2018, Akiyama tracked the post-history of Lev 19:18 in 
Second Temple Jewish and NT texts.19 Also in 2018, Crossley produced a monograph on the 
reception of the Bible and religion in English political discourse.20 
 These works are just the “tip of the iceberg” of scholarly research on the reception of 
the Bible. In 2002, Christopher Rowland and Christine Joynes founded Oxford University’s 
Centre for Reception History of the Bible.21 By my count, sixteen volumes have emerged in 
the Blackwell Bible Commentary series, a series chiefly dedicated to the reception of the 
 
 12 Ulrich Luz, Das Evangelium Nach Matthäus, 4 vols., EKKNT (Zürich/Neukirchen-Vluyn: 
Benziger/Neukirchener, 1985–2002). Interest in the influence of the NT, of course, predates Luz. See, e.g., Ernst 
von Dobschütz, “Bible in the Church,” ed. James Hastings, Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1909), 2:579–615. 
 13 Markus Bockmuehl, “A Commentator’s Approach to the ‘Effective History’ of Philippians,” JSNT 
60 (1995): 57–88. 
 14 Gregory L. Blomquist, “Patristic Reception of a Lukan Healing Account: A Contribution to a Socio-
Rhetorical Response to Willi Braun’s Feasting and Social Rhetoric in Luke 14,” in Healing in Religion and 
Society From Hippocrates to the Puritans, ed. J. Kevin Coyle and Steven C. Muir (Lewiston: Mellen, 1999), 
105–34. 
 15 David Paul Parris, Reception Theory and Biblical Hermeneutics, PrTMS 107 (Eugene: Pickwick, 
2009), esp. 202–74. 
 16 Christine E. Joynes, “The Sound of Silence: Interpreting Mark 16:1–8 through the Centuries,” Int 65 
(2011): 18–29. 
 17 J. Christopher Edwards, The Ransom Logion in Mark and Matthew, WUNT 327 (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2012). 
 18 Evans, Reception History, Tradition and Biblical Interpretation. 
 19 Kengo Akiyama, The Love of Neighbour in Ancient Judaism: The Reception of Leviticus 19:18 in the 
Hebrew Bible, the Septuagint, the Book of Jubilees, the Dead Sea Scrolls, and the New Testament, AGJU 105 
(Leiden: Brill, 2018).  
 20 James G. Crossley, Cults, Martyrs, and Good Samaritans: Religion in Contemporary English 
Political Discourse (London: Pluto, 2018). 
 21 For a report on the Centre’s activity since its inception see, Christine E. Joynes, “Changing 
Horizons: Reflections on a Decade at Oxford University’s Centre for Reception History of the Bible,” JBRec 1 
(2014): 161–71. 
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Bible. The appearance of the Encyclopedia of the Bible and its Reception, the Journal of the 
Bible and Its Reception, Bloomsbury’s annual volume in their Biblical Reception series, and 
the 2018 launch of the Visual Commentary on Scripture online project (funded by a two-
million USD donation by billionaires Roberta and Howard Ahmanson) all attest to this 
burgeoning area of inquiry. As Joynes rightly claims, reception history is no longer “‘terra 
incognita’” as Bockmuehl had previously described it in 1995.22  
 Although reception history captivates much scholarly interest, the early reception of 
John’s beheading has received little attention by NT scholars (see chapter one). This gap is 
not indicative of John’s insignificance as a historical figure. The historical Baptist, as many 
scholars suggest, was “the prime mover of the Jesus movement.”23 Nor does this gap suggest 
that John’s importance waned in the decades and centuries following his death. In the preface 
of his 2018 monograph, John the Baptist in History and Theology, Marcus rightly recognizes 
that “John the Baptist was a key figure in the parting of the ways.”24 He proceeds to confess, 
however, that he does not know “how to make the parting-of-the-ways project gel into a 
book” and so he “wrote this book” instead.25 The present study does not steer clear of John’s 
impact on the “parting of the ways,” but steps into these tumultuous waters. I propose, 
moreover, that social memory theory offers a helpful way to navigate this terrain (see chapter 
two). 
 
 22 Joynes, “Changing Horizons,” 168, quoting Bockmuehl, “A Commentator’s Approach,” 60. 
 23 Knut Backhaus, “Echoes from the Wilderness: The Historical John the Baptist,” in Handbook for the 
Study of the Historical Jesus, ed. Tom Holmén and Stanley E. Porter (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 2:1747. See also, 
Jens Schröter, Jesus of Nazareth: Jew from Galilee, Savior of the World, trans. Wayne Coppins (Waco: Baylor 
University Press, 2014), 86: “The encounter with John is the first historically certain event of the life of Jesus.” 
On the problems of asserting—by means of the criterion of embarrassment—the historicity of Jesus’ baptism by 
John, see, Rafael Rodríguez, “The Embarrassing Truth About Jesus: The Criterion of Embarrassment and the 
Failure of Historical Authenticity,” in Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity, ed. Chris Keith and 
Anthony Le Donne (London: T&T Clark, 2012), 132-151. For a recent study that questions the historian’s 
ability to access the historical John the Baptist, see, Rivka Nir, The First Christian Believer: In Search of John 
the Baptist, NTMo 38 (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2019). 
 24 Joel Marcus, John the Baptist in History and Theology (Columbia: University of South Carolina 
Press, 2018), ix. 
 25 Marcus, John the Baptist in History and Theology, ix. 
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 The question of reception arises with respect to John’s death in particular because of 
the violence of his demise. As chapter four will observe, the earliest written account of John’s 
death (Mark 6:17–29) fixates on the bodily harm applied to John’s person during Herod’s 
birthday banquet: (1) Herodias compels her daughter to ask Herod for John’s “head” 
(κεφαλήν, 6:24); (2) the girl requests Herod to give her “on a platter, the head (κεφαλήν) of 
John the Baptist” (6:25); (3) Herod obliges and orders an executioner to deliver John’s 
“head” (κεφαλήν, 6:27); (4) the executioner “beheads” (ἀπεκεφάλισεν) John in prison (6:27); 
(5) the executioner brings “his head (κεφαλήν) on a platter” (6:28); (6) Herod (or the 
executioner) delivers “it [the head]” (αὐτήν) to the girl (6:28); (7) the girl “gives it [the 
head]” (αὐτήν) to Herodias (6:28); (8) John’s head is separated from its body’s 
entombment—John’s disciples take his “body” (πτῶμα) and entomb “it [the body]” (αὐτό, 
6:29). Mark 6:24–29 employs no less than nine finite verbs to describe the desired or 
implemented action taken with respect to John’s whole person, bodiless head, or headless 
body. Mark’s introduction of the story, moreover, portrays Herod contemplating the bodily 
violence of John’s death (“He whom I beheaded [ἀπεκεφάλισα], John,” 6:16).  
 Memory and identity readily orbit around such narratives of violence. Many instances 
of bodily injury and violent catastrophes have a seemingly intrinsic gravitational pull in this 
direction.26 “Powerful collective memories—whether real or concocted—can be at the root of 
wars, prejudice, nationalism, and cultural identities.”27 This study will show that the tradition 
of John’s beheading constituted a “powerful” social memory. Its early reception history, I 
argue, is characterized by a dangerous synchroneity. On the one hand, the memory of John’s 
 
 26 See, e.g., Steven D. Brown, Matthew Allen, and Paula Reavey, “Remembering 7/7: The Collective 
Shaping of Survivors’ Personal Memories of the 2005 London Bombing,” in Routledge International Handbook 
of Memory Studies, ed. Anna Lisa Tota and Trever Hagen (London: Routledge, 2016), 428–41. For further 
examples and discussion, see chapter two. 
 27 James W. Pennebaker, “Introduction,” in Collective Memory of Political Events: Social 
Psychological Perspectives, ed. James W. Pennebaker, Dario Paez, and Bernard Rimé (New York: Psychology 
Press, 1997), vii. 
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beheading is a key locus of early “Christian” expressions of identity. For instance, John’s 
severed head on a platter, for Justin Martyr, is a salient image that demonstrates John’s 
identity as Elijah and reinforces Jesus’ identity as the Christ. On the other hand, however, 
recipients also exploit John’s beheading to inscribe anti-Jewish sentiments as rememberers 
wield the beheading in the social context of early “Jewish-Christian relations.” Both Justin 
and Origen, for example, ascribe Antipas (the “king/tetrarch” [cf. Mark 6:14–29; Matt 14:1–
12]) a “Jewish” identity—even though the Herodian dynasty’s Jewish identity was disputed 
in antiquity—and perpetuate an image of “the Jews” as killers of God’s prophets. In this 
respect, the memory of John’s beheading becomes invisibly violent.28 
 
Structure 
This argument develops across five main chapters. The first chapter asks how the present 
investigation compares to previous research on the death of John the Baptist. I argue that 
three questions tend to pull the weight of scholarly efforts: the question of “function,” the 
question of “historical accuracy,” and the question of “chronology.” By comparison, a fourth 
question—the question of “reception”—has failed to receive the attention it deserves, 
especially as it pertains to the first three centuries. Accordingly, I position the present work as 
one that fills this lacuna and thus, I limit the scope of analysis to textual receptions of John’s 
beheading in the pre-Constantine era. This chapter also highlights three lines of scholarly 
discourse that I return to in subsequent chapters: (1) Mark’s characterization of the Herodian 
court, (2) the interconnection between John’s beheading and Jesus’ crucifixion, and (3) 
John’s death as distinguishing the Baptist from Jesus.  
 
 28 Throughout this work, I employ the metaphor of “invisible violence” to describe (1) other forms of 
violence besides bodily harm and (2) the social conditions that structure and enable violent conflict. 
Specifically, I use the term in reference to “anti-Jewishness” to highlight the inherent dangerousness of anti-
Jewish ideology as an enabler of violent conflict. See further, chapter two.  
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 Having identified the early reception of John’s death as underexplored terrain, chapter 
two asks how scholars might conceptualize and approach this landscape. I argue that social 
memory theory—with its discourse acutely devoted to understanding the complex 
relationship between the past and the present—is especially helpful for conceptualizing an 
investigation of the past’s reception in the present. Thus, I also claim that the social contours 
involved in the remembering of violence provide a useful heuristic framework for analyzing 
the impact of John’s beheading. I set forth four features that underlie the social remembering 
of violence: identity formation, interpretive keying, the violence of memory, and 
contestation.  
 While some violent events resist integration in individual and collective memory, 
many violent events are the locus of self-definition precisely because of their perceived threat 
to the stability of the self. In the formation of identity, memories of violence often take on 
normative significance as individuals and groups attempt to overcome a difficult past by 
redeploying it as a didactic frame of reference to exemplify, and thereby direct, good or bad 
behavior. An important commemorative maneuver in understanding, and thus overcoming, a 
violent past is interpretive keying: the pairing of an event with a significant symbol.29 Keying 
is not merely a comparison of one event to another event; it is the infusion of one primary 
event with the semantic and moral coloration of a known cultural script.  
 Memories of violence can also become invisibly violent. The commemorative 
resonances of a violent past carry along in their wake—and thus inscribe in shifting present 
horizons—the social conditions (e.g. moral configurations, group estrangements) that enable 
violence. As B. Lincoln notes, invoking a figure from the past in present moments of 
 
 29 On interpretive “keying,” see, Barry Schwartz, Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 225–29. 
 16 
recollection involves evoking “a correlated social group.”30 This correlation between the past 
and the present holds the dangerous capacity to recreate violence as opposing group identities 
in the present are separately infused with positive or negative characteristics from the past. 
Finally, at work in many constructions of identity is the contest over the memory of bodily 
mutilation. Extreme forms of bodily violence are often perceived as freighted with degrading 
symbolic potential. Those who harness past instances of such violence in the work of self-
definition, therefore, are often compelled to reframe (i.e. contest) the script of degradation so 
that the script is not debilitating to the needs of the present. I close the chapter by suggesting 
that the reception history of John’s beheading similarly possesses these commemorative 
features. 
 Before proceeding to demonstrate how the reception of John’s beheading bears these 
marks, chapter three asks what the social script of beheading consisted of in John’s general 
context. Two observations motivate this effort. First, many NT scholars have surprisingly 
overlooked understanding John’s death in light of ancient discourses on beheading. Second, 
historians frequently categorize beheading in the Greco-Roman world as a method of death 
that “honored” the beheaded individual. The ensuing discussion then proceeds to offer seven 
points of qualification to this commonplace assertion. I argue that the severed head signified 
a degrading form of bodily violence that not only emasculated the victim, but could also 
interfere with proper burial and interrupt the dead’s reincorporation in life in the hereafter.  
 Chapters four and five shift the focus to the reception history proper. These chapters 
proceed to ask how early recipients of John’s beheading engage the social script of beheading 
in their commemorative operations. The penultimate chapter concentrates on the memory of 
John’s beheading in the Gospel of Mark (6:14–29). In the first main section, I argue that at 
 
 30 Lincoln, Discourse and the Construction of Society, 20. Although Lincoln makes this assertion to 
claim that this correlation can enable the “reawaken[ing]” of group “affinity,” his discussion presumes that it 
can also recreate “estrangement” and “hostility.”  
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work in Mark’s narration is the contest over the degrading potential of John’s bodily 
mutilation. In one respect, Mark acknowledges the degrading potential of John’s beheading 
by stressing features of his decapitation that typically highlight the emasculation of the 
victim. But Mark also counterbalances these features by bringing them into tension with 
other narrative elements that characterize John and Herod Antipas as positive and negative 
figures, respectively. Specifically, Mark keys John’s beheading to Jesus’ crucifixion, infusing 
his death with the semantic and moral coloration of Jesus’ death. Mark’s Herod, furthermore, 
affirms John’s masculinity: “Herod knew him [John] [to be] a righteous and holy man 
(ἄνδρα)” (6:20). In short, Mark creates a distance between the characterizations of John and 
Herod. 
 The second main section of the chapter critiques two streams of scholarly 
argumentation regarding the function of Mark 6:17–29 (which I initially highlight in chapter 
one). First, I respond to Kraemer’s argument that Mark 6:17–29 functions to subvert the idea 
that Jesus is John raised from the dead.31 Kraemer likens this function to Luke 9:9 (“John I 
beheaded, but who is this about whom I hear such things?”), which clearly differentiates John 
from Jesus on the basis of John’s beheading: a beheaded person cannot be resurrected. I 
counter by observing that Mark 6:16 can be understood as depicting either Herod questioning 
the efficacy of John’s beheading (“He whom I beheaded, John, has this one been raised?”) or 
affirming that the beheading did not work (“He whom I beheaded, John, this one has been 
raised!”).32 Second, I respond to Crossley’s gendered reading of Mark 6:17–29, which he 
 
 31 Ross S. Kraemer, “Implicating Herodias and Her Daughter in the Death of John the Baptizer: A 
(Christian) Theological Strategy?,” JBL 125 (2006): 321–49. 
 32 The former option acknowledges that beheading under normal circumstances rendered the 
resurrection of the beheaded as an impossibility (see chapter three). To portray Herod as doubting the efficacy 
of beheading may reveal a hint of Markan mockery in that Herod inexplicably considers that John overcame a 
method of death designed to violate the integrity of the body. The latter option raises the possibility that the 
separation of John’s head from its body’s burial (Mark 6:27–29) propelled Herod to fear that John had returned 
to the land of the living. As chapter three observes, improper burial ran the risk of not securing safe separation 
from the dead. 
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(rightly) regards as a pre-Markan tradition.33 Crossley argues that the tradition is apologetic 
toward Herod and lays the blame for John’s death principally on the shoulders of the 
Herodian women. I counter by arguing that Herod’s apologetic posture toward John is 
designed to sharpen the portrayal of Herod as a “king” who lacked (self-)control: Mark 
emasculates Herod (who is controlled by women) while affirming the masculinity of John. 
Both discussions, moreover, reinforce that Mark characterizes Herod in negative terms. The 
negative characterization of the Herodian court—and particularly Herod—becomes 
significant in its reception. 
 Chapter five contributes the final piece to this study’s argument that the memory of 
John’s beheading is characterized by a dangerous synchroneity: in their projects of self-
definition, recipients begin to morph John’s beheading into an anti-Jewish story. Like chapter 
four, chapter five asks how early handlers of the tradition engage the social script of John’s 
beheading. I divide the chapter into three main parts, with a preliminary section dedicated to 
delineating the chapter’s employment of the term “anti-Jewish” (and “anti-Jewishness”). The 
first main part briefly discusses the reception of John’s beheading in the Gospels of Matthew 
and Luke. I concentrate the majority of attention, however, on Justin Martyr’s Dialogue with 
Trypho and Origen’s Commentary on Matthew in the second and third main parts, because 
they show clearly how later readers could capitalize on the tradition’s portrayal of the 
Herodian court. I argue that Justin and Origen redeploy the tradition in anti-Jewish directions.  
 Justin’s contestation of John’s beheading takes anti-Jewish turns in two ways. First, 
he imposes on Antipas (who is merely a “king” or “tetrarch” in the Synoptic Gospels) an 
explicit Jewish identity (cf. Mark 6:14–29//Matt 14:1–12). In effect, he perpetuates a motif of 
contemporary Jews as those who kill God’s prophets. Second, John’s severed head on a 
 
 33 James G. Crossley, Jesus and the Chaos of History: Redirecting the Life of the Historical Jesus, 
Biblical Refigurations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 147–62. 
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platter—which for Justin proves that John was Elijah—forms a key part in Justin subverting 
the adoptionistic Christology of his Christian rivals. Justin is careful to assign John this 
Elijanic identity without lending credence to the idea that John (as Elijah) anointed (i.e. 
adopted) Jesus as the Christ. This takes an anti-Jewish turn because Justin aligns his 
competitors’ ideology with Jewish ideology (which held that Elijah would anoint the Christ): 
Justin makes denigrating Jewish ideology an essential component of his establishing the 
superiority of his own version of Christian identity over competing versions. 
 Origen’s contestation of John’s beheading also takes on anti-Jewish layers. Similar to 
Justin’s commemorative maneuver of assigning Herod a Jewish identity, Origen 
superimposes a Jewish identity onto the entire Herodian court: Herod, Herodias, the dancing 
girl, and even the banquet guests at Herod’s birthday celebration all function as symbols of 
contemporary Jews. These figures’ moral fiber, their actions, and the consequences their 
actions incur are emblematic of the ethical character, actions, and status of the present Jewish 
people. I show the contours of these maneuvers by means of a sweeping analysis of five 
passages in Comm. Matt. 10.21–22. In short, Origen perpetuates an image of contemporary 
Jews as the killers of prophets/prophecy who stand below Christians who possess “the [gift] 
greater entirely than [the gift of prophecy]” (Comm. Matt. 10.22).  
 To close the present investigation, I offer a conclusion that summarizes the main 
argument. With the main contours of this discussion in place, I now turn to asking how the 
question of reception compares to previous research on John’s death.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
PREVIOUS SCHOLARSHIP ON THE BEHEADING OF JOHN THE BAPTIST 
 
In [the] account of John’s execution, 
 the narratee is prompted 
 to see this depiction of John’s fate 
 as a precursor of Jesus’ fate.34 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Scholarship on John the Baptist concentrates on various facets of this figure, including: his 
infancy and youth;35 his possible connection to the Essenes (and relatedly the Qumran 
community);36 his socio-religious identity as a prophet;37 the context and meaning of his 
 
 34 Gary Yamasaki, John the Baptist in Life and Death: Audience-Oriented Criticism of Matthew’s 
Narrative, JSNTSup 167 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 132. 
 35 See, e.g., A.S. Geyser, “The Youth of John the Baptist: A Deduction from the Break in the Parallel 
Account of the Lucan Infancy Story,” NovT 1 (1956): 70–75; Paul Winter, “The Proto-Source of Luke I,” NovT 
1 (1956): 184–99; Raymond E. Brown, The Birth of the Messiah: A Commentary on the Infancy Narratives in 
Matthew and Luke (Garden City: Doubleday, 1977); Stephen Farris, The Hymns of Luke’s Infancy Narratives: 
Their Origin, Meaning, and Significance, JSNTSup 9 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993). 
 36 See, e.g., W. H. Brownlee, “A Comparison of the Covenanters of the Dead Sea Scrolls with Pre-
Christian Jewish Sects,” BA 13 (1950): 50–72; Geyser, “Youth of John the Baptist”; W.H. Brownlee, “John the 
Baptist in the New Light of Ancient Scrolls,” in The Scrolls and the New Testament, ed. K. Stendahl (London: 
SCM, 1958), 33–53, 252–56; Jean Daniélou, The Dead Sea Scrolls and Primitive Christianity (Baltimore: 
Helicon, 1958); Jean Steinmann, Saint John the Baptist and the Desert Tradition, trans. Michael Boyes 
(London: Longmans, 1958), esp. 49–79; Charles H. Scobie, John the Baptist (London: SCM, 1964), 58–59; 
Otto Betz, “Was John the Baptist an Essene?,” BRev 6 (1990): 18–25; Hershel Shanks, “Understanding the 
Dead Sea Scrolls,” in Was John the Baptist an Essene?, ed. Otto Betz (New York: Random House, 1992), 205–
16; Joan E. Taylor, “John the Baptist and the Essenes,” JJS 47 (1996): 256–85; Joan E. Taylor, “John the 
Baptist,” EDEJ, 819–21; Hartmut Stegemann, The Library of Qumran: On the Essenes, Qumran, John the 
Baptist, and Jesus (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998); J. I. H. McDonald, “What Did You Go Out to See? John 
the Baptist, the Scrolls and Late Second Temple Judaism,” in The Dead Sea Scrolls in Their Historical Context, 
ed. T. H. Lim et al. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 53–64. For a recent study that argues that John once 
belonged to the Qumran community, see, Marcus, John the Baptist in History and Theology, 27–45. 
 37 See, e.g., Richard A. Horsley and John S. Hanson, Bandits, Prophets and Messiahs: Popular 
Movements in the Time of Jesus (Minneapolis: Winston, 1985), 135–89; Robert Webb, John the Baptizer and 
Prophet: A Socio-Historical Study, JSNTSup 62 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1991), esp. 219–378; 
Michael Tilly, Johannes der Täufer und die Biographie der Propheten: die synoptische Täuferüberlieferung und 
das jüdische Prophetenbild zur Zeit des Täufers, BWANT 7 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1994); Joan E. Taylor, 
The Immerser: John the Baptist within Second Temple Judaism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 101–54; 
David E. Aune, Prophecy in Early Christianity and the Ancient Mediterranean World (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 
2003), 129–32. 
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baptism;38 the relationship between John and Jesus;39 and—the general subject of this current 
study—his imprisonment and execution during the tetrarchy of Herod Antipas (tetrarch of 
Galilee and Perea, c. 4 BCE–39 CE).40 
 This chapter sets forth previous research on John’s death and divides into three main 
sections. Each section is devoted to a general question that drives critical discussions of 
John’s death, namely, the questions of (1) function, (2) “historical accuracy,” and (3) 
chronology. Cumulatively, this review demonstrates that, while a considerable amount of 
scholarly research has focused on matters of “origin,” by comparison the matter of 
“reception” has received far less attention. Throughout, moreover, I will identify how 
 
 38 See, e.g., Ernst Lohmeyer, Johannes der Täufer (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1932), 67–
81; Webb, Baptizer and Prophet, 95–216; Taylor, The Immerser, 49–100; James D. G. Dunn, Jesus 
Remembered, vol. 1 of Christianity in the Making (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 355–79; Daniel W. 
McManigal, A Baptism of Judgment in the Fire of the Holy Spirit: John’s Eschatological Proclamation in 
Matthew 3, LNTS 595 (London: T&T Clark, 2019). 
 39 See, e.g., Maurice Goguel, Au seuil de l’Évangile: Jean-Baptiste, BibH 40 (Paris: Payot, 1928), 235–
57; John A.T. Robinson, Twelve New Testament Studies, SBT (London: SCM, 1962), 28–52; Scobie, John the 
Baptist, 142–62; Jürgen Becker, Johannes der Täufer und Jesus von Nazareth, BibSN 63 (Neukirchen-Vluyn: 
Neukirchener Verlag, 1972); Morton Scott Enslin, “John and Jesus,” ZNW 66 (1975): 1–18; Pierson Parker, 
“Jesus, John the Baptist, and the Herods,” PRSt 8 (1981): 4–11; Paul W. Hollenbach, “The Conversion of Jesus: 
From Jesus the Baptizer to Jesus the Healer,” ANRW 2.25.1:196–219; Josef Ernst, Johannes der Täufer: 
Interpretation, Geschichte, Wirkungsgeschichte, BZNW 53 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1989); William B. Badke, “Was 
Jesus a Disciple of John?,” EvQ 62 (1990): 195–204; Jerome Murphy-O’Connor, “John the Baptist and Jesus: 
History and Hypotheses,” NTS 36 (1990): 361–66; Knut Backhaus, Die “Jüngerkreise” des Täufers Johannes: 
Eine Studie zu den religionsgeschichtlichen Ursprüngen des Christentums, PaThSt 19 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 
1991), 22–112; John P. Meier, A Marginal Jew: Rethinking the Historical Jesus. Vol. 2, Mentor, Message, and 
Miracles, ABRL (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 116–30; Robert Webb, “John the Baptist and His Relationship 
to Jesus,” in Studying the Historical Jesus: Evaluations of the State of Current Research, ed. Bruce Chilton and 
Craig A. Evans, NTTS 19 (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 179–229; Laurent Guyénot, “A New Perspective on John the 
Baptist’s Failure to Support Jesus,” JUS 1 (1997): 71–92; John W. Pryor, “John the Baptist and Jesus: Tradition 
and Text in John 3.25,” JSNT 66 (1997): 15–26; Dale C. Allison, Jesus of Nazareth: Millenarian Prophet 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998), esp. 39-106; Bruce Chilton, “Friends and Enemies,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Jesus, ed. Markus Bockmuehl (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 72–86; Dale C. 
Allison, “The Continuity Between John and Jesus,” JSHJ 1 (2003): 6–27; Dunn, Jesus Remembered, 348–55; 
Daniel S. Dapaah, The Relationship between John the Baptist and Jesus of Nazareth: A Critical Study (Lanham: 
University Press of America, 2005); Graham H. Twelftree, “Jesus the Baptist.,” JSHJ 7 (2009): 103–25; Dale C. 
Allison, Constructing Jesus: Memory, Imagination, and History (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010); 
Maurice Casey, Jesus of Nazareth: An Independent Historian’s Account of His Life and Teaching (London: 
T&T Clark, 2010), 171–97, 282–83; Max Aplin, “Was Jesus Ever a Disciple of John the Baptist? A Historical 
Study” (PhD thesis., University of Edinburgh, 2011); Roberto Martínez, The Question of John the Baptist and 
Jesus’ Indictment of the Religious Leaders: A Critical Analysis of Luke 7:18–35 (Cambridge: James Clarke, 
2011); Joan E. Taylor and Federico Adinolfi, “John the Baptist and Jesus the Baptist: A Narrative Critical 
Approach,” JSHJ 10 (2012): 247–84; Federico Adinolfi, “Gesù continuatore di Giovanni. Studio storico-
esegetico sulla relazione tra Gesù di Nazaret e Giovanni il Battista” (PhD thesis., University of Bologna, 2014). 
 40 On Antipas’ appointment as tetrarch of Galilee and Perea, see Josephus, Ant. 17.188; J.W. 2.93–95. 
On Emperor Gaius stripping him of his tetrarchy and his ensuing exile in Gaul (or Spain), see, Ant. 18.252–255; 
J.W. 2.183. 
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different aspects of scholarly research intersect with the interests of this study. Thus, I reserve 
in-depth qualification of scholarly discourse for subsequent chapters.  
 
1. The Question of Function 
A major research question on John’s death is understanding what it means and how it 
functions in the primary evidence of the first century, particularly with respect to the Markan 
and Matthean traditions (Mark 6:14–29//Matt 14:1–12; cf. Luke 3:19–20; 9:7–9).41 
Accordingly, this section presents three lines of interpretation that appear frequently in 
scholarly debate regarding the social and literary function of John’s beheading in the 
Synoptic Gospels.42 The first line of interpretation views John’s death through an “anti-
Herodian lens.” The second line of interpretation observes that John’s beheading 
 
 41 Although some attention on this matter is dedicated to Josephus’ episode as well (Ant. 18.116–119), 
the bulk of critical inquiry is angled by the Synoptic Gospels. On the function of John’s death in Josephus’ 
account, see, e.g., Webb, Baptizer and Prophet, 34, who identifies two contributions that John’s death makes to 
Josephus’ Antiquities of the Jews: (1) it provides another example of unrest among the Jewish people in 
Palestine and (2) it offers a “popular Jewish explanation” for Aretas’ defeat of Antipas. See further, John P. 
Meier, “John the Baptist in Josephus: Philology and Exegesis,” JBL 111 (1992): 233.  
 42 This question seems to attract attention, at least in part, because of the seemingly odd structural 
placement of John’s death in both Mark and Matthew. In the former, it appears as the interior of an intercalation 
between Jesus sending out the twelve disciples to preach repentance and heal the sick and demon-possessed 
(6:7–13) and their subsequent return (6:30–32). In both the former (Mark 6:17) and the latter (Matt 14:3), it 
appears to interrupt the linear progression of the narrative by offering a glimpse into a past event. Interestingly, 
John’s death occurs as a “flashback” in Josephus’ narration as well (Ant. 18.116–119). Christos Karakolis, 
“Narrative Funktion und christologische Bedeutung der markinischen Erzählung vom Tod Johannes des Täufers 
(Mk 6:14–29),” NovT 52 (2010): 135, suggests that John’s death is the only episode presented in Mark as a 
glimpse into the past. Similarly, Goguel, Au seuil de l’Évangile, 51, refers to John’s death as a “récit 
rétrospectif.” Moreover, by the time he finishes narrating John’s death, Matthew appears to forget that he has 
flashbacked in his sequence, since he notes in 14:13a that Jesus withdrew to a secluded place “having heard” 
(about John’s death, presumably). See, John Nolland, The Gospel of Matthew, NIGTC (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2005), 588. On the implications and inherent difficulties of this observation for establishing Markan 
or Matthean priority, see further, Lamar Cope, “The Death of John the Baptist in the Gospel of Matthew; Or, the 
Case of the Confusing Conjunction,” CBQ 38 (1976): 515–19. In Luke’s Gospel, on the other hand, the banquet 
scene is notably absent and Luke records only the speculation concerning Jesus’ identity and Antipas’ claim that 
he beheaded John (9:7–9; cf. Mark 6:14–16; Matt 14:1–2; Luke 3:19–20). 
 Accordingly, these structural observations are met with stylistic explanations. Rudolf Bultmann, 
History of the Synoptic Tradition, trans. John Marsh (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), 301–02, suggests that 
Mark introduced the story in order to “fill the gap” between the sending and return of the Twelve. Vincent 
Taylor, The Gospel According to St Mark (London: Macmillan, 1952), 307, treats the story as an “interlude.” 
R.T. France, The Gospel of Mark, NIGTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 18, 255, classifies it as a 
“digression.” A. E. J. Rawlinson, St Mark (London: Methuen & Co, 1925), 79, vibrantly expresses it as Mark’s 
“artistic ‘dove-tailing’” designed to “occupy the reader’s attention” while the twelve disciples perform their 
mission. Likewise, Goguel, Au seuil de L’Évangile, 52, views John’s death as “en marge de la narration” that is 
so positioned in order to occupy the lapse of time between the twelve’s departure and return. The interpretations 
that follow, however, identify connections beyond these cursory explanations. 
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foreshadows or anticipates Jesus’ crucifixion. And the third line of interpretation asserts that 
John’s beheading functions to disentangle Jesus from the speculation that he was the risen 
John the Baptist.43 Relevant to present purposes, these lines of discourse underscore two 
phenomena in particular that early recipients of the tradition employ in their present social 
frameworks, as chapter five will show: (1) the critique of one or more members of the 
Herodian court and (2) the relation of John’s beheading to Jesus’ crucifixion. 
 
 
 43 See, Mark 6:14–16; Matt 14:1–2; Luke 9:7–9. At this juncture, it is worth noting that the question of 
function poses itself differently to scholars who approach the Synoptic Gospels with different critical 
methodologies. Scholars differentiate between the function of John’s death at the narrative level of the 
Synoptics and its function in its pre-Synoptic form(s). See, e.g., Joachim Gnilka, Das Evangelium nach Markus, 
EKK (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1998), 1:246. The early form critics tended to conceptualize the 
role of the Synoptic Evangelists in the composition of the Gospels primarily as mere collectors or editors of 
isolated (anonymous) units of tradition. Only secondarily—if at all—were they creative authors. See, e.g., 
Martin Dibelius, From Tradition to Gospel, trans. Bertram Lee Woolf, LibTT (Cambridge: James Clarke & Co 
Ltd, 1971), 3: “The composers are only to the smallest extent authors. They are principally collectors, vehicles 
of tradition, editors. Before all else their labour consists in handing down, grouping, and working over the 
material which has come to them.” Cf. Vincent Taylor, The Formation of the Gospel Tradition (London: 
Macmillan, 1933), 1–43. Consequently, the orientation of their method was principally focused on tradition-
historical matters (e.g. tracing the origin and development of units of tradition). See, e.g., Bultmann, History of 
the Synoptic Tradition, 6: “The aim of form criticism is to determine the original form of a piece of narrative, a 
dominical saying or a parable. In the process we learn to distinguish secondary additions and forms, and these in 
turn lead to important results for the history of the tradition.” Dibelius, From Tradition to Gospel, 1, however, 
maintained that, in addition to penetrating into a period previous to the written Gospels, a further objective of 
Formgeschichte was “to make clear the intention and real interest of the earliest tradition.” In other words, his 
interest as a form critic in understanding the function of tradition was not a narrative-level concern, but a 
concern oriented toward the interpretation of units of tradition in and of themselves in their pre-Synoptic 
form(s). See further, Dibelius, From Tradition to Gospel, v–vi: “The present-day reader should learn to read the 
individual passages of the early tradition in the way they were meant, before the time when, more or less edited, 
they were included in the Gospels.” Cf. Bultmann, History of the Synoptic Tradition, 245, who remarks that 
“legends” are not themselves unified but “gain their entry point only when set in their context.” Unfortunately, 
Bultmann does not seem to offer what this specifically entails with respect to John’s death which he later 
discusses in the same chapter and classifies as one of these “legends” (History of the Synoptic Tradition, 301–2). 
 The rise of redaction criticism in the 1950s—with the works of Willi Marxsen on Mark, Günther 
Bornkamm (et al.) on Matthew, and Hanz Conzelmann on Luke—re-conceptualized the role of the Evangelists 
in the composition of the Gospels. The redaction critics no longer viewed the Evangelists merely as collectors of 
traditions, but creative individuals who shaped the theology of their respective Gospels. Willi Marxsen, Mark 
the Evangelist: Studies on the Redaction History of the Gospel, trans. Roy A. Harrisville (Nashville: Abingdon, 
1969), 18-19, contends: “While the scope and limit of our evangelists’ sources and their share in the revision of 
the material can scarcely be determined with final certainty (unfortunately, we cannot get a glimpse of their 
writing desk); while ultimately we cannot know even the names of our authors, their backgrounds, or their 
careers, we must still emphasize that we are dealing with authors.” Likewise, Günther Bornkamm, Gerhard 
Barth, and Heinz Joachim Held, Tradition and Interpretation in Matthew (London: SCM, 1963), 11: “[The 
Synoptic Evangelists] are by no means mere collectors and handers-on of the tradition, but are also interpreters 
of it.” See Hans Conzelmann, The Theology of St. Luke (London: Faber & Faber, 1961), 9–17, for similar 
comments. The rise of narrative criticism in the early 1980s, moreover, only increased the conceptualization of 
the Gospels as intimately woven narrative webs. As a result, for redaction and narrative critics, the answer to the 
question as to what John’s death means and how it functions in the primary data is intimately related to 
ascertaining its various connections to its narrative context. 
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1.1. Anti-Herodian Interpretations of John’s Death 
 Many scholars postulate that the Synoptic tradition of John’s beheading is designed to 
criticize the political figure(s) responsible for his execution. Dibelius claims that the point of 
the pericope in Mark and Matthew is to stress that Antipas gets entangled in his oath; 
Dibelius thus classifies the account as an “Anekdote über Herodes.”44 Gnilka postulates that 
the purpose of the Markan account could have been “zu brandmarken” Antipas and his 
court.45 While acknowledging that the historian can only speculate as to the historical 
development of Mark 6:17–29, Davies and Allison think that its intention was possibly “to 
criticize the Herodian court.”46 Likewise, Meier posits that the tradition exhibits “folklore 
tinged with strong anti-Herodian feeling” that early Christians or John-the-Baptist followers 
“reformulated” into a martyrdom.47 In his study on the pre-history of Synoptic tradition, 
Theissen classifies the death of John the Baptist as a “court legend” that portrays the abuse of 
power with John as the victim.48 A few pages later, he categorizes the account as a “popular 
folk tradition” and claims: “there is nothing here to point to the Baptizer as a precursor of 
Jesus.”49  
 In an important study, Smith argues that Mark 6:14–29 exposes tyrannical behavior.50 
En route to this contention, Smith forwards what he calls “stock-features” that exemplify 
ancient tyrant-types: “1) the tyrant’s paranoia; 2) the tyrant’s possession of a bodyguard; 3) 
the tyrant’s display of excess; and 4) the tyrant’s encounter with a philosopher.”51 Then, he 
 
 44 Martin Dibelius, Die urchristliche Überlieferung von Johannes dem Täufer (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1911), 79–80 (quotation, p. 80). 
 45 Gnilka, Markus, 1:246. 
 46 William D. Davies and Dale C. Allison, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel 
according to Saint Matthew, ICC (London: T&T Clark, 1988), 2:465. 
 47 Meier, Marginal Jew, 2:173. 
 48 Gerd Theissen, The Gospels in Context: Social and Political History in the Synoptic Tradition 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 81–96 (quotation, p. 81). 
 49 Theissen, The Gospels in Context, 85. 
 50 Abraham Smith, “Tyranny Exposed: Mark’s Typological Characterization of Herod Antipas (Mark 
6:14–29),” BibInt 14 (2006): 259–93. 
 51 Smith, “Tyranny Exposed,” 271. 
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demonstrates that these stock-features are at work in Mark’s portrayal of Antipas.52 Mark 
thus characterizes Antipas as an ancient tyrant-type. Culpepper builds on Smith’s schematic 
of ancient tyrant-types and similarly contends that Mark constructs Antipas as a type of 
“King.”53 Significantly, Culpepper observes that the term βασιλεύς occurs twelve times in 
Mark’s narrative, with five occurrences in the present passage with reference to Antipas 
(6:14, 22, 25, 26, 27) and six times in Mark 15 with reference to Jesus as “King” of the Jews 
(15:2, 9, 12, 18, 26, 32). For Culpepper, this distribution establishes the “antithesis” between 
Antipas and his kingdom with Jesus’ Kingdom.54 Chapter four will return to this distribution 
and highlight it as a component of Mark’s interpretive keying of John’s beheading to Jesus’ 
crucifixion. Chapter five, moreover, will demonstrate that Justin Martyr and Origen 
superimpose a Jewish identity into Antipas, making him “king” of the Jews. With this and 
other maneuvers, they rework the tradition to take on anti-Jewish overtones.  
 Whereas some scholars stress that John’s death criticizes the Herodian court in 
general and Herod Antipas in particular, other scholars argue that the Markan tradition 
primarily derides the female antagonists: Herodias and her daughter. Collins postulates that 
“the probable intent (or effect) of the pre-Markan story [was] to disparage the Herodian 
women.”55 Similarly to Collins, Crossley views the tradition as placing the blame for John’s 
death on the shoulders of Herodias and Salome.56 He maintains that the pre-Markan version 
serves as a “plea for survival in the face of a very real and deadly political threat from 
political rulers of Palestine.”57 I will revisit Crossley’s argument in chapter four.  
 
 52 For example, Mark 6:20 identifies Antipas as paranoid (Smith, “Tyranny Exposed,” 277–79). 
 53 R. Alan Culpepper, “Mark 6:17–29 in Its Narrative Context: Kingdoms in Conflict,” in Mark as 
Story: Retrospect and Prospect, ed. Kelly R. Iverson and Christopher W. Skinner, SBLSBS 65 (Atlanta: Society 
of Biblical Literature, 2011), 145–63. 
 54 Culpepper, “Mark 6:17–29 in Its Narrative Context,” 154. For similar observations, see, M. Eugene 
Boring, Mark: A Commentary, NTL (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006), 177. 
 55 Adela Yarbro Collins, Mark: A Commentary, Hermeneia (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007), 313. 
 56 James G. Crossley, “History from the Margins: The Death of John the Baptist,” in Writing History, 
Constructing Religion, ed. J. G. Crossley and C. Karner (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 147–61. 
 57 Crossley, “History from the Margins,” 149. 
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 These “anti-Herodian” interpretations have much precedent in the history of 
interpretation. In the mid-fourth century, Hilary of Poitiers, in his Commentary on Matthew 
viewed Antipas as an analogue to Israel whose unbelief led to lustfulness.58 Later in the same 
century in his own Commentary on Matthew, Jerome suggests that Antipas’ fidelity to his 
oath reveals his impiety “under the pretext of piety.”59 Jerome does not take at face value 
Antipas’ supposed grief at the daughter’s request in Matt 14:9. He argues that Antipas “was 
hiding his true thoughts” and thus “feigning sadness in his countenance, while he had joy in 
his heart.”60 In the early fifth century, Augustine regards Herodias as more wicked than 
Antipas, referring to her as “[t]hat detestable woman.”61 In contradistinction to Jerome, he 
views Antipas as having a more positive inclination toward John (“Herod loved John”62). 
Antipas, according to Augustine, was torn between his lust for Herodias and his reverence for 
the Baptist until he positioned himself—via his oath—in a situation where he had to make a 
decision between two evil choices.63 Calvin observes the dissonance between the Markan and 
Matthean portrayals of Antipas’ disposition toward John (Mark 6:20, 26; Matt 14:5, 9). He 
attempts to harmonize the depictions by positing an elaborate sequence. Antipas progresses 
from someone unwilling to put John to death, to someone willing but unable to do so, and 
finally to someone with an insufficient disposition to commit murder, whom Herodias took 
advantage of in her scheme to strike down the Baptist.64 
 
 58 Hilary of Poitiers, Comm. Matt. 14.7–8. 
 59 Jerome, Comm. Matt. 14.9 (Scheck, FC). 
 60 Jerome, Comm. Matt. 14.9 (Scheck, FC). See also Jerome’s previous comments regarding Matt 14:7: 
“I do not excuse Herod by saying that he committed murder reluctantly and against his will on account of the 
oath. For he perhaps took the oath in order to create the conditions for this future occasion” (Comm. Matt. 14.7 
[Scheck, FC; italics added]). 
 61 Augustine, Serm. 307.1 (Hill).  
 62 Augustine, Serm. 308.1 (Hill). 
 63 Augustine, Serm. 307.1; 308.1. Augustine views it as the lesser of two evils for Antipas to break his 
oath than to keep it by having the Baptist murdered (see, Serm. 308.2). 
 64 John Calvin, Commentary on a Harmony of the Evangelists, Matthew, Mark, and Luke, trans. Rev. 
William Pringle (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2005), 222–23. 
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 The negative characterization of the Herodian court, moreover, often takes on 
normative significance in these precedents. For example, in his letter to Amphilochius, Basil 
draws attention to Antipas’ “wickedness under a pretext of piety” as substantiation for his 
prohibitions against (1) making oaths and (2) keeping wicked oaths already sworn.65 
Appealing to Herodias’ and Antipas’ involvement in John’s death, Ambrose pleads (1) to 
women to teach their daughters modesty and (2) to men to avoid banquets.66 In one of his 
homilies on the Gospel of Matthew, Chrysostom too employs both Antipas and Herodias as 
examples of the dangers of oaths, dancing, and banquets. Like Augustine, he especially views 
Herodias as the most wicked character: “But albeit [Antipas] was so wicked, that base 
woman was more wicked than all of them, both the damsel and the tyrant.”67 Finally, in the 
nineteenth century, Harriet Beecher Stowe, Euphemia Johnson Richmond, Mrs. Donaldson, 
and Margaret Black all appeal to Herodias and/or Salome as negative examples to dissuade 
the misuse of power among women.68 
 Interpreters, therefore, have long differed in their estimations of the guilt of the 
members of Herod’s court (relative to one another) with respect to John’s execution. Some 
have emphasized the negative portrayal of Antipas in the primary data. Others (e.g. Crossley) 
have argued that the Markan tradition is apologetic to Antipas. In chapter four, I will critique 
Crossley’s argument by showing that Mark’s seemingly apologetic stance toward Antipas is 
designed to heighten his lack of masculinity. This critique, moreover, will reinforce a feature 
of John’s death that is particularly important for its early reception history: the distancing 
between the characterizations of the Herodian court and John the Baptist.  
 
 
 65 Basil, Letters, 199.29 (Way, FC). 
 66 Ambrose, Concerning Virgins, 3.5.25–3.6.31. 
 67 John Chrysostom, Hom. Matt. 48 (quotation, 48.5; NPNF1 10:299). See further, Chrysostom, Hom. 
Matt. 48.8 (NPNF1 10:301): “Let us weep for Herodias, and for them that imitate her.” 
 68 Marion Ann Taylor and Heather E. Weir, eds., Women in the Story of Jesus: The Gospels through 
the Eyes of Nineteenth-Century Female Biblical Interpreters (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2016), 163–76. 
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1.2. John’s Death Anticipates Jesus’ Death 
 Historically, in addition to the anti-Herodian readings noted above, the most 
frequently offered interpretation of John’s death is that it foreshadows or anticipates Jesus’ 
own demise. As early as the second century CE, Justin Martyr relates John’s beheading to 
Jesus’ crucifixion.69 Steinmann describes John’s death as a “martyrdom” designed to 
“prefigure the passion of the servant of Yahweh.”70 A decade later, E. Schweitzer, in his 
commentary on Mark, entitled his discussion of Mark 6:14–29, “The Destiny of the Baptist 
as Prophetic of the Destiny of Jesus.”71 The language of Steinmann and Schweitzer is typical 
in scholarship. These sorts of comments are normally anchored in two types of references: (1) 
appeals to the parallels (verbal, thematic, etc.) between John’s and Jesus’ deaths and (2) 
appeals to John as the forerunner to Jesus. 
 
1.2.1. References to Parallels between John’s and Jesus’ Deaths 
 Scholars have long detected the parallels between the so-called two “passions” of 
John and Jesus.72 In 1925, for example, Rawlinson entertains this possibility by observing 
that the same Greek word for the corpse of John in Mark 6:29 (πτῶμα) is the same word used 
 
 69 Justin Martyr, Dial. 49.1–7. See further, chapter five of this present study. 
 70 Steinmann, Saint John the Baptist and the Desert Tradition, 99. 
 71 Eduard Schweizer, The Good News According to Mark (Atlanta: Knox, 1970), 131. 
 72 Some scholars have helpfully set forth general points of convergence between the two so-called 
passions. With respect to the Gospel of Matthew, Davies and Allison (Saint Matthew, 2:476), for example, 
succinctly compare these links between John and Jesus: both were apprehended (14:3; cf. 21:46), both were 
bound (14:3; cf. 27:2), both Antipas and the chief priests and Pharisees feared the crowds (14:5; cf. 21:46), 
Antipas grieved John’s death and Pilate displayed reticence to kill Jesus (14:6–11; cf. 27:11–26), and both John 
and Jesus were buried by (a) disciple(s) (14:12; cf. 27:57–61). They conclude that Matt 14:1–12 “portends in 
some detail exactly what is to happen in the passion narrative” and that the redactional activity of the Evangelist 
makes it likely that he was consciously aware of these equivalences (Saint Matthew, 2:476). With respect to the 
Gospel of Mark, Karakolis (“Narrative Funktion,” esp. 146–52) enumerates at length the similarities and 
differences between John’s and Jesus’ respective passion narratives. For others who appeal to the parallels to 
assert a connection between the deaths of John and Jesus, see, e.g., C. E. B. Cranfield, The Gospel According to 
Saint Mark, CGTC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), 208–9; Ernst, Johannes der Täufer, 28–29; 
Joel Marcus, Mark 1-8: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 27 (New York: Doubleday, 
2000), 397–404. 
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for Jesus’ corpse in Mark 15:45.73 In her narrative and reader-response analysis of the Gospel 
of Matthew, Anderson devotes a portion of a chapter to Matthew’s characterization of John 
the Baptist.74 She observes a paralleling vacillation between Antipas, who sought to kill John 
but feared the crowds (Matt 14:5), and the chief priests and Pharisees, who sought to seize 
Jesus but feared the crowds (Matt 21:46).75 Moreover, she observes that the “verbal 
repetitions” sharpen the links between the fates of John and Jesus.76 Comparably, France 
reasons that the Markan portrayal of Antipas’ “wavering” and being “tricked into 
pronouncing sentence against his better judgment” corresponds to Pilate’s inability to re-
direct the chief priests hostility away from Jesus (Mark 15:1–15). Thus, this reveals “Mark’s 
desire to link together the fates of John and of Jesus.”77 
 Like France, McVann argues that Mark’s account of John’s death foreshadows Jesus’ 
fate by aligning Mark’s characterization of certain authority figures, namely: Antipas and 
Pilate.78 Both Antipas and Pilate positively estimate John and Jesus (Mark 6:20; cf. 15:5, 9, 
13) and attempt to save them (Mark 6:20; cf. 15:4–14) but fail to do so because they fall 
victim to the manipulation of external influences (Mark 6:19; cf. 14:1, 15:9–14).79 In both 
cases, McVann suggests, Mark characterizes the authority figures as “morally reprehensible” 
concerned with preserving “false honor.”80 McVann’s comments are significant because they 
reveal that Mark’s alignment of John’s death to Jesus’ death coexists with a moral indictment 
 
 73 Rawlinson, St Mark, 83. Not only do the burials of the corpses of John and Jesus encourage 
comparison, but Morna Hooker (The Gospel According to Saint Mark [London: Black and Peabody, 1991], 
161–62) maintains that Mark thereby intends to draw a contrast between the two figures: the former figure is 
buried and only rumors surface about his resurrection while the latter figure is buried but is indeed raised from 
the dead. 
 74 Janice C. Anderson, Matthew’s Narrative Web: Over, and Over, and Over Again, JSNTSup 91 
(Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1994), 83–90. 
 75 Anderson, Matthew’s Narrative Web, 89. 
 76 Anderson, Matthew’s Narrative Web, 89–90 (quotation, p. 90). 
 77 France, The Gospel of Mark, 257. 
 78 Mark McVann, “The ‘Passion’ of John the Baptist and Jesus before Pilate: Mark’s Warnings about 
Kings and Governors,” BTB 38 (2008): 152–57. 
 79 McVann, “The ‘Passion’ of John the Baptist and Jesus before Pilate,” 153. 
 80 McVann, “The ‘Passion’ of John the Baptist and Jesus before Pilate,” 156. 
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of the political figures involved in their executions. I will make a similar observation in 
chapter four. However, in chapter five, we will also see that Origen contrasts John’s 
beheading and Jesus’ crucifixion to elevate Christians at the expense of Jews. 
  
1.2.2. References to John as the Forerunner of Jesus  
 Scholars also establish John’s death as a foreshadowing by appealing to John’s role as 
a precursor or Elijah-type figure who foreruns Jesus.81 Marxsen, in his seminal redaction-
critical work, devotes an entire chapter of his analysis to Mark’s shaping of John-the-Baptist 
traditions.82 Marxsen claims that Jesus’ passion narrative was the first written unit of Jesus 
tradition. In turn, tradition “developed backward,” so that Mark “prefixes” Jesus’ passion 
with life-of-Jesus and life-of-John traditions.83 By applying early Christian terminology 
(παραδίδωμι, 1 Cor 11:23) to John the Baptist (παραδίδωμι, Mark 1:14), the precursor’s end 
is tied to Jesus’ fate.84 Wink argues in his 1968 classic redaction-critical analysis of John-the-
Baptist traditions that the suffering of the Baptist in Mark 6:17–29 is not explained until the 
descent from the transfiguration in Mark 9:9–13.85 Jesus’ connection therein between John 
and Elijah (9:13) necessitates that “the suffering of John is as necessary and inevitable as the 
suffering of Christ.”86 As such, “John’s suffering as Elijah-incognito prepares the way for the 
 
 81 In the early third century CE, Hippolytus intimates that Jesus would preach in Hades since Jesus’ 
forerunner, John, also preached in Hades when Antipas executed him (Antichr. 45). In the same century, Origen 
also indicates that John the Baptist died and descended into the underworld as Jesus’ precursor in order to 
proclaim the coming of Jesus (Hom. Luc. 4.5). On the intertextual connections between the beheading of John in 
Mark 6:14–29 and the stories of Elijah, Ahab, and Jezebel in the HB, see, e.g., David M. Hoffeditz and Gary E. 
Yates, “Femme Fatale Redux: Intertextual Connection to the Elijah/Jezebel Narratives in Mark 6:14–29,” BBR 
15 (2005): 199–221. Cf. Gnilka, Markus, 1:247–52, who thinks that Mark understands John as the returned 
Elijah (9:13), but is not certain that this connection necessitates that Mark aligns Elijah and Jezebel with John 
and Herodias in Mark 6:14–29. 
 82 See, Marxsen, Mark the Evangelist, 30–53. 
 83 Marxsen, Mark the Evangelist, 31. 
 84 Marxsen, Mark the Evangelist, 40. While Marxsen revolves his discussion of John’s fate mostly 
around Mark 1:14 he does suggest that the “aim of Mark 6:17ff. is to give expression to christological elements” 
(p. 40, n. 35). The idea is that by the time John’s death is narrated in 6:17–29, Mark has already established 
John as Jesus’ forerunner and that 6:17–29, as a consequence, enhances the link between their fates. 
 85 Walter Wink, John the Baptist in the Gospel Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1968), 13.  
 86 Wink, John the Baptist in the Gospel Tradition, 16. 
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fate of Jesus.”87 Further, Webb remarks in his 1991 monograph John the Baptizer and 
Prophet that Mark’s implicit identification of John the Baptist as Elijah-redivivus in 9:13 
underscores John as a forerunner, paving the way for Jesus’ fate with his own fate.88 
 Scholars, therefore, make different appeals to assert that John’s death anticipates 
Jesus’ death. While some accentuate the parallels between their respective “passions,” others 
underscore John’s role as a type of Elijah-figure. John’s identity as the returned Elijah 
becomes particularly important in Justin Martyr’s Dialogue with Trypho. As we will see in 
chapter five, the identity of Elijah stands at the heart of the competitive Christology that 
marks Justin’s social context.  
 
1.3. John’s Death as a Demarcating Event 
 In addition to establishing the interconnection between the deaths of Jesus and John, 
scholars have also argued that John’s end clearly distinguishes him from Jesus. Before his 
pioneering work on form criticism, Die Formgeschichte des Evangeliums, Dibelius subjected 
the death of John the Baptist to form-critical analysis in his 1911 work Die urchristliche 
Überlieferung von Johannes dem Täufer.89 Dibelius concludes that the people’s inability to 
verify John’s death led to their belief that John had not in fact died (“Das Volk glaubt nicht 
an den Tod seines Helden”).90 Rather, they believed “daß der Heros in Wahrheit noch lebe” 
 
 87 Wink, John the Baptist in the Gospel Tradition, 17. So also, Hooker, Mark, 158–59; William L. 
Lane, The Gospel According to Mark, NICNT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974), 215, 223; Karakolis, 
“Narrative Funktion,” 135–55. 
 88 Webb, Baptizer and Prophet, 53–54. The alignment of John and Elijah across the Synoptics, 
however, is not monolithic. Wink, John the Baptist in the Gospel Tradition, 43: “Luke divests John of the role 
of Elijah redividus which Mark had suggested and Matthew had developed.” So also, Catherine M. Murphy, 
John the Baptist: Prophet of Purity for a New Age (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2003), 41–83. Similarly, 
Mark Goodacre, “Mark, Elijah, the Baptist and Matthew: The Success of the First Intertextual Reading of 
Mark,” in Biblical Interpretation in Early Christian Gospels, Volume 2: Matthew, ed. Tom Hatina, LNTS 310 
(London: T&T Clark, 2008), 73–84, contends that Matthew strengthens Mark’s John/Elijah identification but 
Luke downplays it. Cf. Webb, Baptizer and Prophet, esp. 62–65, who argues that Luke (like Mark and 
Matthew) does portray John as Elijah-redivivus.  
 89 Dibelius, Die urchristliche Überlieferung, 77–87. 
 90 Dibelius, Die urchristliche Überlieferung, 86. 
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and hence can recognize the Baptist in Jesus (Mark 6:14–16; 8:28).91 Wink claims that 
Dibelius argued that the account of John’s death (Mark 6:17–29) served to “counteract” the 
people’s belief in John’s resuscitation.92 He argues against Dibelius’ apparent proposal by 
contending that, had Mark been concerned with subverting the belief in John’s revitalization, 
then he would have “suppressed 6:14–16 and 8:28” since they “lend credence to the belief in 
John’s resuscitation.”93  
 The idea that Mark 6:17–29 combats the speculation surrounding Jesus’ identity as 
John in 6:14–16 has not, however, completely disappeared from consideration. Delorme, for 
instance, argues that the story of John’s death works on two levels.94 On one level, it serves 
as a corrective to the identities prescribed to Jesus in Mark 6:14–16.95 Attaching Jesus to 
these great figures of the past potentially undermines what makes Jesus unique. John’s death, 
therefore, “dispel[s] these images” but, at the same time and, on a second level, underscores 
the relationship between John and Jesus.96 Dibelius’ supposed argument has also re-surfaced 
in Kraemer’s 2006 article.97 She maintains that the Gospel narratives’ accounts of John’s 
death are fabrications designed to refute early “concerns about the vexing relationship 
between John and Jesus, most particularly the unnerving possibility that Jesus might have 
 
 91 Dibelius, Die urchristliche Überlieferung, 86. 
 92 Wink, John the Baptist, 11. Wink’s conceptualization of Dibelius is misleading because Dibelius 
never explicitly states that Mark 6:17–29 subverts the belief in John’s revitalization (strictly speaking, Dibelius 
does not use resurrection/resuscitation language with respect to Mark 6:14–16). At best, Dibelius implies the 
embryo of this notion when he (1) suspects that Mark 6:17–29 supplants an original lost conclusion to 6:14–16, 
and (2) states that the “synoptischen Berichte(n)” are shaped by the two poles of venerating the Baptist on the 
one hand and combatting his standing alongside Jesus, on the other hand. See, Dibelius, Die urchristliche 
Überlieferung, 83, 86–87 (quotation, pp. 86–87).  
 93 Wink, John the Baptist, 11. 
 94 Jean Delorme, “John the Baptist’s Head—The Word Perverted: A Reading of a Narrative (Mark 
6:14–29),” Semeia 81 (1998): 126–27. 
 95 Cf. Lane, Mark, 215, who passingly comments that 6:17–29 clarifies the reports in 6:14 and 6:16. 
Lane, however, does not specify what he means. Does 6:17–29 clarify 6:14 and 6:16 in that it relates to the 
reader a past event that had not been mentioned up to this point (Mark 1:14 only mentions that John had been 
handed over, not that he had been executed)? Or does 6:17–29 clarify the apparent confusion surrounding the 
precise relationship between John and Jesus? 
 96 Delorme, “John the Baptist’s Head—The Word Perverted,” 127. 
 97 Kraemer, “Implicating Herodias,” 341, n. 57, likens her argument to Dibelius’ but cites Wink’s 
conceptualization of Dibelius’ argument. 
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been John raised from the dead.”98 Specifically, the narration of beheading John and then 
burying his corpse, as his head remains with Herodias, rebuts the notion that Jesus is the 
resurrected John.99  
 The modern manifestations of Dibelius’ supposed argument view John’s beheading as 
unambiguously distinguishing John from Jesus. Thus, whereas some interpreters have 
emphasized how the Synoptic Gospels compare John’s beheading to Jesus’ crucifixion, these 
other proposals have emphasized how the Gospels contrast John from Jesus. In chapter four, I 
will qualify this latter emphasis in light of the ideology of beheading, which I will set forth in 
chapter three.  
 
2. The Question of “Historical Accuracy” 
The second broad question that drives discussions of John’s arrest and execution is the 
question of “historical accuracy.”100 Scholars variously estimate the accuracy of the first-
century primary data. Scholarly discourse in this regard tends to revolve around two kinds of 
arguments: (1) appeals to cultural traditions that parallel John’s death and (2) appeals to 
“contentious details.”  
 
 98 Kraemer, “Implicating Herodias,” 322. If Kraemer is correct, this could provide one possible (or an 
additional) explanation for why Luke does not detail the banquet scene that led to John’s execution: Luke 9:7–9 
accomplishes in three verses what Mark sought to accomplish in sixteen verses (and Matthew in twelve). 
However, the progression of her argument is too awkward to convince since it still relies on reasserting the 
beheading to dispel the notion that John overcame beheading and rose from the dead. For further critique of 
Kraemer’s argument, see chapter four.  
 99 Kraemer, “Implicating Herodias,” 341. 
 100 Scholars tend to evince a certain stance along a spectrum between arguing for or against the 
accuracy of the Markan and Josephan accounts of John’s execution. The notion of “historical accuracy” is 
multi-dimensional and perhaps in that sense it is inherently ambiguous and unhelpful. In discussions of John’s 
death, it is certainly the case that the expression, and other related terminology (e.g. historicity, plausibility, 
etc.), varies in scholars’ usage so much so that it is often difficult (1) to infer what aspect(s) of historical 
accuracy scholars affirm or deny and (2) to ascertain if they mischaracterize the nature of one another’s 
arguments. But, since the terminology is so prevalent, it is inescapable to utilize the term in discussing previous 
research. Three interconnected dimensions of meaning tend to operate in scholarly approaches to the question of 
“accuracy,” though these are by no means hard and fast categories: historicity, primitivity, and plausibility. In 
this survey, therefore, (1) the term historicity refers to the idea that the accounts of John’s death closely 
approximate “what actually happened.” (2) The term primitivity refers to the notion that the Markan and/or 
Matthean tradition of John’s execution is pre-Synoptic and emerged relatively early. (3) The term plausibility 
refers to the idea that John’s death as presented in the primary data is believable as a hypothetical possibility 
given what historians know of the social and cultural milieu of first-century Galilee and Judea. 
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2.1. Appeals to Cultural Traditions 
 Some scholars argue against the accuracy of the Markan account of John’s beheading 
by appealing to cultural traditions that resemble the narrative.101 For example, Murphy argues 
that since the story appears to be crafted out of the HB, especially the conflict between Elijah, 
Ahab, and Jezebel (1 Kgs 19:1–2; 21:17–26), it does not pass the criterion of discontinuity.102 
In his monograph Water into Wine and the Beheading of John the Baptist, Aus makes the 
case that John’s execution in Mark 6 is directly influenced by Jewish haggadic traditions on 
Esther.103 He suggests that the “historically false” appellation of Antipas as a “King” in 
Mark’s account “can very well be due to dependence on the original narrator’s prototype, 
Esther 1” in which “King” Ahasuerus, like Antipas, gave a banquet for his leading 
officials.104 Likewise, Aus argues that Antipas’ offer of up to half of his kingdom to Salome 
“has nothing to do with historical reality” but it rather “derives from the Esther narrative” and 
most ostensibly from the first targum of Esther 5:3 where Ahasuerus offers Esther half of his 
kingdom.105 These and other parallels lead Aus firmly to doubt the historicity of Mark 6:17–
29: “There was no birthday banquet of a ‘King’ Herod Antipas, no dancing of a ‘little girl’ 
Salome before drunken men, no head dripping of blood brought in on a platter.”106  
 
 101 The parallels between John’s death and other stories from the HB and Greco-Roman literature are 
frequently documented and so I will not enumerate a comprehensive list of the parallels here. For the parallels to 
the Elijah-Ahab-Jezebel conflict, see, e.g., Hoffeditz and Yates, “Femme Fatale Redux”; Boring, Mark, 178. For 
the parallels to the story of Esther see, e.g., R. Aus, Water into Wine and the Beheading of John the Baptist: 
Early Jewish-Christian Interpretation of Esther 1 in John 2.1–11 and Mark 6.17–29, BJS 150 (Atlanta: 
Scholars, 1988). For Greco-Roman parallels see, e.g. Bultmann, History of the Synoptic Tradition, 301, n. 5; 
Marcus, Mark 1–8, 402. Cf. Charles H. Talbert, Matthew, PCNT (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010), 183. 
 102 Murphy, John the Baptist, 72–73. 
 103 For his full discussion of the ten affinities that he identifies in this capacity, see Aus, Beheading of 
John the Baptist, 41–66.  
 104 Aus, Beheading of John the Baptist, 42. 
 105 Aus, Beheading of John the Baptist, 55–56 (quotations, p. 55). Similarly, Marcus, John the Baptist 
in History and Theology, 99. 
 106 Aus, Beheading of John the Baptist, 73. 
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 Aus, however, probably does not intend to convey the idea that the mere presence of 
cultural parallels renders the tradition ahistorical, but rather that the amount of or the 
precision of the parallels has a bearing on judging historicity.107 This logic underlies other 
works as well. For Crossley, the parallels between Mark 6:17–29 and the haggadic traditions 
associated with Esther (as set forth by Aus) suggest that Mark’s version of John’s death “did 
not happen.”108 Theissen connects the “motif of the free request” with his contention that 
Mark 6:17–29 is a “legendary retelling of events.”109 In her monumental 1997 monograph on 
John the Baptist, J. Taylor makes the following assertion: “The long story in Mark’s Gospel 
should probably not be considered historical in many of its details. It has marked literary 
characteristics that seem rooted in biblical precedents.”110 Similarly, Dibelius forwards the 
dance of the girl and the king’s promise as based on “Sagenmotive” rather than on 
“geschichtlich richtigen Voraussetzungen” or “geschichtlichen Traditionen.”111 The two 
elements thus fit “in den Palast eines Märchenkönigs als an den Hof des Antipas.”112 Finally, 
Bultmann classifies the story of John’s death as “a legend” that had its pre-history in 
“Hellenistic Jewish tradition.”113 He bolsters this contention by appealing to its “heathen 
parallels.”114  
 
 107 See, Aus, Beheading of John the Baptist., 67, where he claims that the parallels “provide too many 
exact word and motif similarities for [Mark 6.17–29] to be dismissed as mere ‘reminiscences’ of [Jewish 
traditions about Esther].”  
 108 Crossley, “History from the Margins,” 148. 
 109 Theissen, Gospels in Context, 86. Theissen does not necessarily deny the historicity of the substance 
of Mark’s account (whatever that substance may be), only that its form is legendary. Similarly, Joachin Gnilka, 
“Das Martyrium Johannes’ des Täufers (Mk 6, 17–29),” in Orientierung an Jesu: Zur Theologie der Synoptiker, 
ed. P. Hoffmann, Norbert Brox, and Wilhelm Pesch (Freiburg: Herder, 1973), 78–92.  
 110 Taylor, The Immerser, 246. In 2010, Taylor, “John the Baptist,” 821, likewise remarks: “The story 
of Antipas’ reluctance to kill John as given in Mark (Luke [sic] 6:17–29; Matt. 14:3–12) is highly indebted to 
motifs in the book of Esther and may reflect popular speculation.”  
 111 Dibelius, Die urchristliche Überlieferung, 79. 
 112 Dibelius, Die urchristliche Überlieferung, 79. 
 113 Bultmann, History of the Synoptic Tradition, 301. Bultmann (History of the Synoptic Tradition,, 
244–45, n. 1) acknowledges that although the strict definition of the term “legend” does not imply a negative 
judgment on the question of historicity, in his work the operative definition of the term does involve this 
implication. Cf. Dibelius, From Tradition to Gospel, xv: “The term ‘legend’ does not in itself raise the question 
of historicity.” 
 114 Bultmann, History of the Synoptic Tradition, 301. Here, therefore, one can observe Bultmann 
exemplifying his contention that form criticism both presumes and results in judgments of historicity: “I am 
indeed convinced that form-criticism, just because literary forms are related to the life and history of the 
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 Alternatively, Scobie contends that the similarities between the story of John’s death 
and the stories of Elijah and Esther “are not close enough to warrant the conclusion that the 
New Testament story is a pure fiction.”115 Although Scobie’s remark reveals that he 
questions the precision or the amount of the parallels, it nevertheless suggests that he would 
conclude John’s execution story as some sort of literary creation had the parallels aligned 
more considerably. V. Taylor concedes a certain amount of literary freedom in light of the 
parallels, but contends: “creation on the basis of these stories is exposed to formidable 
difficulties.”116 Lane regards the resemblances with Esther as typical “in the depiction of an 
oriental court scene.”117 Nolland, finally, takes an intermediary position. He asserts that the 
story of John’s death in the Gospels has “clearly not been spun out of” the Esther allusions.118 
He concedes, however, that the “court intrigue” that these allusions establish nevertheless 
means “that confidence in this account cannot be put on the same level as for the main body 
of Gospel tradition.”119 
 To summarize, the presence of cultural archetypes in the tradition affects scholarly 
evaluations of the “historical accuracy” of John’s execution. This study, with its focus on 
reception, is not concerned with reconstructing “what actually happened.” Nevertheless, my 
approach’s conceptualization of the early reception of John’s death as instances of social 
memory (see chapter two) shares the concern to identify how early handlers of the tradition 
relate John’s death to their significant cultural traditions of the past. In chapter five, for 
instance, I will show that Origen contrasts the outpouring of the spirit in Acts 2:1–41 with the 
 
primitive Church not only presupposes judgments of facts alongside judgements of literary criticism, but must 
also lead to judgements about facts” (History of the Synoptic Tradition, 5). 
 115 Scobie, John the Baptist, 180, n. 1 (italics added). 
 116 Taylor, St Mark, 311. Similarly, Cranfield, Saint Mark, 208. 
 117 Lane, Mark, 217. 
 118 Nolland, The Gospel of Matthew, 581.  
 119 Nolland, The Gospel of Matthew, 581. 
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removal of John’s head in a bid to highlight the preeminence of Christians at the expense of 
Jews. 
 
2.2. Appeals to “Contentious Details” 
 Scholars also question the historical accuracy of first-century portrayals of John’s 
death on the basis of what I will collectively refer to as “contentious details.” Many of these 
difficulties surface when juxtaposing Josephus’ version of John’s death (Ant. 18.116–119) 
with the Synoptic Gospels’ portrayals. The contentious details include: (1) Antipas’ 
identification as βασιλεύς in Mark but as merely τετραάρχης in Josephus, Matthew, and 
Luke;120 (2) Mark’s claim that Philip (the tetrarch?) was Herodias’ first husband on the one 
hand and Josephus’ claim, on the other hand, that Salome, Herodias’ daughter, married Philip 
the tetrarch;121 (3) the name and parentage of the dancing daughter;122 (4) the (im)-
 
 120 See Mark 6:14, 22, 25, 26, 27. Cf. Matt 14:1; Luke 3:19; 9:7; Acts 13:1; Josephus, Ant. 17.188; 
18.241–56; J.W. 2.178–83. Interestingly, Matt 14:9 refers to Herod Antipas as ὁ βασιλεύς whereas he had 
previously referred to Antipas in Matt 14:1 as ὁ τετραάρχης. Mark Goodacre, The Synoptic Problem: A Way 
Through the Maze (London: T&T Clark International, 2001), 73, categorizes this feature of Matt 14:9 as an 
example of “editorial fatigue.” Moreover, Collins, Mark, 303, observes that the title “tetrarch” is applied to 
Antipas by two inscriptions (Cos and Delos). Similarly, Casey, Jesus of Nazareth, 338–44, observes that 
Antipas minted coins with his title “tetrarch” on the reverse side and with a reed plant on the front side. In 
addition to the Cos and Delos inscriptions, Morton Jensen, Herod Antipas in Galilee: The Literary and 
Archaeological Sources on the Reign of Herod Antipas and its Socio-Economic Impact on Galilee (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 203–14, notes a recently identified coin of Antipas (dated to 4 CE) that reads “Tetrarch, 
Herod” on the front. Some scholars suggest that Mark’s utilization of the term “king” derives from “local 
custom.” See, e.g., Cranfield, Saint Mark, 206. Marcus, Mark 1–8, 398–99 (quotation, p. 398), recognizes that 
the “title ‘king’ is technically inaccurate” but attributes its usage to Markan irony. 
 121 See Mark 6:17. Matthew 14:3 likewise mentions that Herodias was the wife of Philip. Josephus 
(Ant. 18.109, 136) indicates that Herodias was married to “Herod” (Antipas’ half-brother) before she married 
Antipas. (In the same passage, moreover, Josephus claims that Herodias and Herod had a daughter named 
Salome who married Philip the tetrarch before his death in 33/34 CE; Salome subsequently married and had 
three sons with Aristobolus [Ant. 18.136–137]). The difficulty lies in the observation that no ancient source 
indicates that this “Herod” was also named “Philip.” Moreover, if Mark and Matthew both have Philip the 
tetrarch in view (both do not explicitly identify him as “tetrarch” in this passage), then this is incompatible with 
Josephus who clearly identifies Philip the tetrarch as the husband of Salome, not Herodias. Furthermore, Codex 
Bezae (D) at Matt 14:3 omits the name Φιλίππου to read that Herodias was married to Antipas’ brother. The 
codex thus portrays the familial relationship similarly to Josephus’ portrayal. Likewise, Luke 3:19 refers to 
Herodias’ former husband as merely Antipas’ brother. See further, Cranfield, Saint Mark, 209. 
 122 Matthew 14:6 does not explicitly name the dancing daughter but refers to her as “the daughter of 
Herodias” (ἡ θυγάτηρ τῆς Ἡρῳδιάδος). The evidence in Mark 6:22, however, is more convoluted. Some 
manuscripts (e.g. א, B, D, L) indicate that this dancing figure was Antipas’ daughter and named Herodias (like 
her mother). If Mark understands this daughter to be born of Antipas and Herodias (cf. 6:24), then this comes 
into tension with Josephus. Josephus does not indicate that Antipas and Herodias had any children together. 
Other manuscripts at Mark 6:22 (e.g. A, C) indicate that the girl is Herodias’ daughter (presumably from her 
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plausibility of a Herodian princess (sensuously) dancing at an elitist banquet;123 (5) the age of 
Salome at the time of the dance;124 (6) the different explanations that Mark, Matthew, and 
Josephus provide for why John died, including the liable individuals;125 (7) the plausibility of 
Antipas, a client-ruler of Rome, having authority in himself to offer half his kingdom to the 
dancing daughter;126 and (8) Tiberias or some other Galilean locale as the tacit location of 
 
previous marriage) and also named Herodias (θυγατρὸς αὐτῆς τῆς Ἡρῳδιάδος). This also presents problems in 
relation to Josephus. He indicates that Salome was the name of Herodias’ daughter from her previous marriage 
(Ant. 18.136–137). Still other manuscripts at Mark 6:22 (e.g. 205) are grammatically ambiguous in their 
reading: θυγατρὸς τῆς Ἡρῳδιάδος. The genitive τῆς Ἡρῳδιάδος could be rendered appositionally (“the 
daughter, that is, Herodias”) or as a genitive of relationship (“the daughter of Herodias”). This same 
grammatical ambiguity with respect to the genitive case is also at work in the manuscripts (again, e.g. א B D L) 
that read θυγατρὸς αὐτοῦ Ἡρῳδιάδος (“his daughter, that is, Herodias” or “his daughter of [i.e. whom he had 
with] Herodias”). See further, Marcus, Mark 1–8, 396. 
 123 Enslin, “John and Jesus,” 13: “That a royal princess should dance in such a gathering is hardly 
likely.” Cf. Scobie, John the Baptist, 180: “But when we remember the moral standards of the Herodian family, 
we can believe anything.” Marcus, Mark 1–8, 396, sees several inaccuracies in the Markan pericope, but argues 
that the feature of the dancing girl “is not one of them.” Like Scobie, he appeals to the moral depravity of the 
Herodian lineage to substantiate his claim. See further, Ezra P. Gould, The Gospel According to St. Mark, ICC 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1896), 113. 
 124 Kraemer, “Implicating Herodias,” 330, captures the heart and potential reach of this issue: “This 
problem is important because it speaks to the historical plausibility of the Gospels’ claim that Herodias and her 
daughter (presumed to be Salome) played some role in the death of John, prompted by John’s critique of 
Herodias’ marriage to Herod. If the Gospels’ claim is meritorious, it must be consistent with what we know 
about the chronology of all these events: at the time of John’s death, Herodias must be married to Herod 
Antipas; her daughter, Salome, must be of an age to dance before Antipas; Salome must also be of an age that 
allows her to be married to Philip before he dies in 33 C.E., and subsequently married to Aristobulus in the early 
50s C.E., and to have borne him three sons. And this is without even considering the potential implications of all 
this for dating the deaths of John and Jesus.” See further, Theissen, The Gospels in Context, 90–91.  
 125 Mark’s Antipas arrests John to protect him from Herodias (6:17, 19–20). But Herodias takes 
advantage of an “opportune day” (6:21) and urges the daughter to have Antipas fulfill his oath by beheading 
John (6:21–28). Matthew indicates that Antipas wants to execute John but refrains from doing so because “he 
feared the crowd” (14:5). Thereafter, however, Herodias urges the daughter to have Antipas fulfill his oath by 
beheading John (14:6–11). Luke suggests that (1) Antipas arrests John because of the latter’s repudiation of the 
former’s marriage to Herodias (3:19–20) and that (2) Antipas had John beheaded (9:7–9). Josephus portrays 
Antipas as preemptively executing the Baptist before the Baptist’s activity led to a revolt (Ant. 18.118). Three 
scholars in particular, whose works attempt to situate Jesus and John within the social and political context of 
Second Temple Judaism, exemplify the concern to converge these dissonant explanations regarding why John 
died: E.P. Sanders, Robert Webb, and Joan Taylor. For their full discussions, see, Webb, Baptizer and Prophet, 
373–77; E. P. Sanders, The Historical Figure of Jesus (London: Penguin, 1993), 92–94; Taylor, The Immerser, 
213–41. Recently, Marcus, John the Baptist in History and Theology, 98–112 has also argued along these lines. 
On this matter, all three argue that Mark and Josephus do not directly contradict one another, but represent two 
sides of a multi-faceted complex that led to John’s arrest and execution (Webb, Baptizer and Prophet, 375; 
Sanders, Historical Figure, 93; Taylor, The Immerser, 213). Their approach is enlightening as it underscores the 
socio-political dimensions of John’s seemingly mere moral rebuke of Antipas. Cf. Taylor, St Mark, 311; Lane, 
Mark, 216–17; Robert A. Guelich, Mark 1–8:26, WBC 34A (Dallas: Word, 1989), 331; Davies and Allison, 
Saint Matthew, 2:465. 
 126 Scobie, John the Baptist, 179–80: “To object to the promise of Antipas that he would give to the 
dancing girl ‘up to half my kingdom’ (Mark 6:23) is to misunderstand the nature of the story in which 
exaggeration plays a part.” Cranfield, Saint Mark, 212: “To object that Herod was not in a position to give half 
his kingdom away, as he was dependent on Rome, is to take his words prosaically.” Cf. Enslin, “John and 
Jesus,” 13: “That the politically astute Antipas, tipsy though he may have been, would have made such an 
impossible offer of repayment as ‘half my kingdom’ is simply absurd.” 
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Antipas’ banquet but the explicitly identified fortress of Machaerus in Perea as the location 
where John was executed in Josephus’ account.127  
 Murphy observes that the element of the sensuous dance does not pass the criterion of 
multiple-attestation since only one independent witness attests to it.128 Surprisingly, Meier 
includes a brief section on John’s death without explicitly discussing the criteria of 
authenticity in the second volume of his behemoth project, A Marginal Jew.129 His discussion 
is brief in part because the “legendary tone” and the differences with Josephus’ account lead 
him to conclude that Mark 6:17–29 “contains little historical worth, even with reference to 
the historical John.”130 He poses the rhetorical question: “If Mark can be so wrong about the 
basic familial relationships that are the driving engine of the plot of his story about John’s 
execution, why should we credit the rest of the story as historical?”131 Furthermore, Meier 
favors Josephus’ claim that John was executed at Machaerus. Since Josephus is so well 
informed in his information on Machaerus, he is not therefore likely to be wrong in his 
presentation.132 Meier does not altogether dismiss Mark’s account, however, but confirms 
that it “has a historical core.”133 His overall assessment, though, is to regard the Synoptic 
 
 127 Mark 6:21 indicates that Antipas held the banquet “for the leading [ones] of Galilee” (τοῖς πρώτοις 
τῆς Γαλιλαίας). This may imply that the banquet was held in Galilee, and perhaps at Tiberias—Antipas’ base of 
operations. Josephus claims that the Baptist was incarcerated and executed at Machaerus in Perea (Ant. 18.119). 
If John was incarcerated at Machaerus, then it would be impossible for Antipas to have had the Baptist’s head 
delivered to the banquet in Tiberias (a multi-day trip) within a single day’s journey.  
 128 Murphy, John the Baptist, 72. 
 129 Meier, Marginal Jew, 2:171–76. 
 130 Meier, Marginal Jew, 2:171. 
 131 Meier, Marginal Jew, 2:172. Meier poses this question specifically in relation to two Markan 
familial claims that Josephus contradicts: (1) that Herodias’ first husband was named Philip (Mark 6:17), and 
(2) that Antipas and Herodias had a daughter named Herodias (Mark 6:22). 
 132 Meier, Marginal Jew, 2:173. See also, W. Barnes Tatum, “John the Baptist and Jesus: A Report of 
the Jesus Seminar” (Sonoma: Polebridge, 1994), 160, who reports that the Fellows of the Jesus Seminar voted 
100 percent “red” on Machaerus as the site of John’s execution.  
 133 Meier, Marginal Jew, 2:172. Meier identifies the “historical core” as (1) the fact that John was 
arrested and executed by Antipas and (2) that Antipas’ marriage to Herodias functioned as “background or 
motivation” for John’s death. Cf. Murphy, John the Baptist, 72–73, who identifies the multiply-attested core as 
the fact that Antipas had John executed. 
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Gospels as more reliable in their presentations of the aspects of John’s ministry but Josephus 
as more reliable in his portrayal of John’s death.134 
 Likewise, Enslin argues that Mark’s details abound in difficulties if viewed “as the 
accurate report of an actual historical incident.”135 Enslin concludes that Mark does not 
portray an actual historical occurrence on account of contentious details two, four, and seven 
mentioned above.136 Josephus, on the other hand, offers a less “flashy” but more probable 
contrast.137 Like Enslin and Meier, Cope argues that Josephus’ account presents a 
“historically more plausible account of the death of John.”138 Cope adds that John’s death in 
Josephus lacks “any special bias and is probably wholly correct or may be supplemented by 
the more lurid, and perhaps apocryphal, account of John’s death told in the gospels.”139  
 Crossley posits two pieces of evidence that render the historicity of the episode as 
unlikely. First, neither in Josephus’ account of John’s death (Ant. 18.116–119) nor in the rest 
of the Gospels—except in Mark 6:17–29—is there any hint that (1) John the Baptist and 
Herod Antipas had any sort of reconciliation, (2) Herod Antipas felt remorse for John’s 
death, or (3) someone other than Antipas was responsible for John’s death.140 Second, since 
Antipas’ authority was reliant upon Rome, his oath to the dancing daughter (Mark 6:22–23) 
“would have been impossible.”141 While doubting the plausibility and historicity of Mark’s 
account, Crossley proceeds to argue for the tradition’s primitivity: he dates the emergence of 
the pre-Markan tradition to the late 30s or early 40s CE.142 Thus, Crossley dates the tradition 
to a period when portraying Herodias and Salome as dangerous and manipulative women 
 
 134 Meier, Marginal Jew, 2:173. This conclusion is strengthened, according to Meier, by a literary 
analysis of Mark 6:17–29 whereby Marks’ story is embedded with resonances from the HB, particularly the 
stories of Elijah and Esther. 
 135 Enslin, “John and Jesus,” 12. 
 136 Enslin, “John and Jesus,” 12–13. 
 137 Enslin, “John and Jesus,” 13. 
 138 Cope, “Death of John the Baptist,” 515. So also, Boring, Mark, 178. 
 139 Cope, “Death of John the Baptist,” 516. 
 140 Crossley, “History from the Margins,” 148. 
 141 Crossley, “History from the Margins,” 148. 
 142 Crossley, “History from the Margins,” 156–57. 
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would not have amounted to “suicide.”143 Similarly to Crossley, Theissen identifies five 
“displacements” in Mark’s account that probably reflect a later socio-political climate than 
the actual circumstances at the time of John’s death.144  
 Crossley and Theissen, therefore, both seek to identify the factors that distorted 
Mark’s tradition. This study’s approach similarly shares the conviction that the memory of 
the past is always localized in the social frameworks of the present (see chapter two). I thus 
agree with Crossley’s and Theissen’s assumption that present social factors impact the shape 
of tradition. My study augments theirs, however, by inverting the orientation of inquiry: 
theirs is a pre-Synoptic tradition history, whereas mine is a post-Synoptic tradition history.  
 Whereas some scholars seem to doubt the plausibility or historicity of Mark’s 
presentation on account of the contentious details, others argue for the plausibility or 
historicity of the episode or display varying postures of ambivalence. V. Taylor recognizes 
that the contentious details represent “a formidable case” but attempts to demonstrate that 
“much of it falls away when it is submitted to cool appraisal.”145 In his 1989 commentary on 
the Gospel of Mark, Guelich attempts to alleviate the tensions between Mark and Josephus 
that lead many to conclude that Mark’s version derives more from “folklore” than from “how 
it actually happened.”146 Sollertinsky argues for the historical credibility of the Markan 
version rather than Josephus’ version.147 He substantiates his case by asserting that Josephus 
did not wish to cast an unfavorable light on Herodias since she, Agrippa, and Josephus shared 
 
 143 Crossley, “History from the Margins,” 156: “Such a story would be downright suicidal when Herod 
Antipas and Herodias were pulling the strings of power.” 
 144 Theissen, Gospels in Context, 86–89. 
 145 Taylor, St Mark, 310–17 (quotation, p. 310). Taylor’s defense of the credibility of many of Mark’s 
contentious details does not amount to claiming historicity. Instead, he argues that the account reveals Mark’s 
“fidelity” to early perceptions of Antipas and John (St Mark, 311). Similarly, Lane argues that the arguments 
against the “historical integrity” of Mark’s narration “are not substantial and should be set aside” (Mark, 217). 
He reasons that since John’s disciples did not have access to perceive John’s actual execution, it was only 
“inevitable” that the report of John’s death “would first be whispered about, and then take shape in a popular 
report.” Thus, although Lane argues for the “integrity” of Mark’s account, he does not necessarily argue for its 
historicity. 
 146 Guelich, Mark, 326. 
 147 S. Sollertinsky, “The Death of St. John the Baptist,” JTS 1 (1900): 507–28. 
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the same Hasmonean lineage.148 Thus, Sollertinsky makes his case by arguing quite the 
opposite of Cope (see above). The latter assigns bias to the Gospels whereas the former 
assigns bias to Josephus.  
 Finally, in a remark frequently quoted, Rawlinson upholds the general plausibility of 
both Mark and Josephus and further surmises that Mark’s presentation reflects early rumors 
surrounding Johns’ death: 
 Both are no doubt bona fide and independent; it is a mistake to try to harmonize the 
 two. Josephus’ version will give the facts as they presented themselves to an historian 
 who wrote sixty years later, and who was concerned to trace the political causes of a 
 war. The story in Mk will be an account, written with a certain amount of literary 
 freedom, of what was being darkly whispered in the bazaars or market-places of 
 Palestine at the time: it has at least the value of reflecting faithfully the opinion 
 entertained of Herod by his subjects, the shock to public opinion caused by his 
 adulterous marriage, and the thrill of horror aroused by his execution of the great 
 ascetic prophet of repentance.149 
 
Regardless of the accuracy of Rawlinson’s assessment, his implicit claim that the portrayals 
of John’s death are impacted by their socio-political matrix is a recognition shared by the 
present study. In chapter four, for instance, I will suggest that many first-century readers of 
Mark likely understood the account as framed according to ancient discourses on beheading. 
 
2.3. Summary 
 To summarize, some scholars appeal to the striking parallels between John’s death 
and cultural traditions from antiquity (e.g. Esther) to estimate the “historical accuracy” of 
Mark’s account of John’s beheading. Others make this same appeal but argue that the Markan 
story has a historical core that has been diachronically embedded with legendary layers of 
material. Some critics refer to one or more “contentious details” to evaluate the question of 
“historical accuracy.” Many scholars, therefore, at least implicitly recognize that the past is 
 
 148 Sollertinsky, “The Death of St. John the Baptist,” 509–12. 
 149 Rawlinson, St Mark, 82. 
 43 
not recalled as such. The past emerges in textual artifacts bearing the shape of the archetypal 
past as well as the marks of the various present social horizons in which the tradition is 
recalled. Chapter five in particular will take this recognition further by arguing that Justin 
Martyr and Origen localize John’s beheading in “Jewish-Christian” relations (of the second 
and third centuries, respectively) in anti-Jewish ways.  
 
3. The Question of Chronology 
What year did John die? This is the third question that drives discussions of John’s death. The 
complexity of this problem is readily apparent to anyone who dives into the depths of 
configuring a precise date for seemingly any event from antiquity. John’s death is no 
exception to this rule.150 Scholars have demonstrated how pinpointing the date of his death 
ebbs and flows as different pieces of evidence are interpreted and prioritized.151 As the 
present work focuses on reception, we will not return to this question in subsequent chapters, 
and so, the following survey is brief. The question of chronology is nevertheless discussed 
here in order to highlight a feature of this discourse that intersects with my study: John’s 
death occurred before Jesus’ death. As primary sources position John’s beheading as a 
foreshadowing of Jesus’ crucifixion, they implicitly make the sequential claim that John died 
ahead of Jesus.152 As aforementioned, the interconnection between John’s beheading and 
 
 150 Marcus, John the Baptist in History and Theology, 121, remarks that identifying the year of John’s 
death is “more complicated” than determining when John was born and when John began his public ministry.  
 151 Cf., e.g. Harold W. Hoehner, Herod Antipas (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1980), 125–31, 169–71; 
Kraemer, “Implicating Herodias,” 327–30. 
 152 Relatedly, when Historical Jesus scholars claim that Jesus initially adhered to but later rejected—
after the Baptist’s death—John’s apocalyptic message, they tacitly affirm the chronological sequence of the 
Synoptic Gospels that John died before Jesus. In turn, they must adopt a date of John’s death before the date 
Jesus’ death. See, e.g., John Dominic Crossan, The Historical Jesus: The Life of a Mediterranean Jewish 
Peasant (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 230, 236–38, 259, who appeals to the historical Jesus uttering both 
Luke 7:24–27 (//Matt 11:7–10) and Luke 7:28 (//Matt 11:11) to assert that, after John died, Jesus no longer 
accepted John’s apocalyptic vision. Crossan further dates John’s death to the early 30s CE, that is, to a date 
amicable to his supposition that Jesus outlived John. Some Historical Jesus scholars, to be sure, are quick to 
affirm that John died before Jesus without addressing the chronological complexity inherent to this claim. See, 
e.g., Paula Fredriksen, From Jesus to Christ: The Origins of the New Testament Images of Jesus (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1988), 110, 127–28. 
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Jesus’ crucifixion is a feature of the Synoptic tradition that early recipients implement in their 
present social contexts.  
  Also, the question of chronology reinforces the important structural observation that 
in every first-century source in which John’s death is narrated it appears as a “flashback,” 
interrupting the linear progression of the narration. How “far back” this flashback seems to 
look, therefore, ultimately affects when scholars date his death. For my own purposes, that 
John’s death occurs as a “flashback” in Mark raises the question of its narrative function, a 
question I will return to in chapter four. 
 
3.1. Standard Proposals of the Date of John’s Death 
 Scholars often date John’s death to c. 30 CE. J. Taylor, for example, follows this 
commonplace assertion.153 Her argument consists of multiple moves. First, she observes that 
John’s death, as a “flashback” in Josephus, should be dated prior to 34 CE (the date often 
assigned to Antipas’ war with Aretas).154 Second, she affirms the chronological parameters 
set forth in Luke 3:1–3 where Luke portrays John’s emergence on the public scene occurring 
in the fifteenth year of Tiberius’ reign (c. 27–29 CE).155 Moreover, since Philip the tetrarch 
died c. 34 CE (i.e. the twentieth year of Tiberius’ reign), and if Mark is correct in dating 
John’s death to a time before Salome was married to Philip, then John’s death must have 
occurred prior to 34 CE.156 Therefore, Taylor concludes that John died between 28/29 CE and 
34 CE and further observes: “Jesus continued with his own mission and was executed 
sometime between the death of John and the recalling of Pilate in early 37.”157  
 
 153 See Taylor, The Immerser, 255–59. 
 154 Taylor, The Immerser, 255, n. 77. 
 155 Taylor, The Immerser, 255. 
 156 Taylor, The Immerser, 257. 
 157 Taylor, The Immerser, 257–58 (quotation, p. 258). 
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 Similarly to Taylor, Hoehner argues that Luke 3:1 requires the death of John to “have 
occurred between A.D. 28 and 32.”158 Hoehner, however, observes that Josephus’ narration 
makes “it [seem] that John’s death occurred not much before the defeat of Antipas’ army by 
Aretas in A.D. 36.”159 Rather than proposing a late date for John’s death, however, he argues 
that a late date proposal is “an inference from Josephus that the Baptist’s death must have 
occurred very shortly before the time of Antipas’ defeat by Aretas.”160 For Hoehner, 
Josephus’ account does not set a strict parameter on the date of John’s death: it only indicates 
that John’s death occurred at an indefinite time before Antipas’ defeat by Aretas.161 Like 
Taylor and Hoehner, Theissen and Merz date John’s death to “an indefinite time before the 
defeat of Herod Antipas by the Nabataean king Aretas in 36 CE.”162 Since the Baptist 
emerged during the fifteenth year of Tiberius’ reign (28 CE), then John probably died early in 
30 CE.163 John died, therefore, “even before Jesus.”164  
 Many scholars, therefore, date John’s death between 28/29 CE and 34 CE. This range 
is based on appealing to (1) the parameter provided by Luke 3:1–3, (2) the Gospels’ 
impression that John’s death occurred soon after his emergence on the public scene, and (3) 
 
 158 Hoehner, Antipas, 125. 
 159 Hoehner, Antipas, 125. 
 160 Hoehner, Antipas, 126. 
 161 Josephus (Ant. 18.116) indicates that some Jews interpreted Antipas’ defeat as divine retribution for 
Antipas’ arrest and execution of John the Baptist. Rather than seeing this as implying that John’s death occurred 
closer to the Antipas-Aretas conflict (c. 35/36 CE), Hoehner (Antipas, 126, n. 1) argues that “Jews felt God’s 
revenge did not always occur immediately at the time of the misdeed.” As an example, Hoehner cites the Jews’ 
connection of Antiochus Epiphanes’ desecration of the Temple with Antiochus’ death three years later (see Ant. 
12.248–253, 357; 1 Macc. 1.29, 54; 6.8–13). Marcus, John the Baptist in History and Theology, 124, argues 
similarly to Hoehner: “And we certainly cannot conclude that Antipas’s murder of the Baptist must have 
occurred shortly before the disastrous war that was popularly believed to be a punishment for that murder. After 
all, if Christians could think that the desecration of the Temple in 70 CE was a punishment for the execution of 
Jesus in the thirties, it does not seem implausible that Palestinian Jews known to Josephus could think that 
Antipas’s defeat around 36 CE was a punishment for his execution of John several years earlier.” Similarly, 
Theissen, The Gospels in Context, 89–90; Ulrich B. Müller, Johannes der Täufer: Jüdischer Prophet und 
Wegbereiter Jesu, BG 6 (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2002), 79–82. Cf. Kraemer, “Implicating 
Herodias,” 327, n. 9, who characterizes Hoehner’s argument as an effort to “mitigate any conflicts.” 
 162 Gerd Theissen and Annette Merz, The Historical Jesus: A Comprehensive Guide, trans. John 
Bowden (London: SCM, 1998), 197. 
 163 Theissen and Merz, The Historical Jesus, 197. 
 164 Theissen and Merz, The Historical Jesus, 198. 
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Josephus’ clear but indefinite indication that John’s death occurred before Antipas’ defeat by 
Aretas.  
 
3.2. Alternative Proposals of the Date of John’s Death 
 Other scholars, however, date John’s death differently. Some scholars argue that it 
occurred in the early 20s CE.165 Others suggest that John’s death did indeed occur closer to 
Antipas’ defeat by Aretas around 34–36 CE.166 Still others suggest that it is impossible to 
know for certain precisely when John died.167 Despite this divergence, many scholars still 
recognize that John’s death is presented as a “flashback” in Josephus and that John preceded 
Jesus in death.168 
 Chilton, for example, dates John’s death to 21 CE.169 He pinpoints Antipas’ visit to 
Rome (Ant. 18.110–111) and ensuing marriage to Herodias to 19 CE.170 Moreover, he 
observes that Josephus’ account of John the Baptist (Ant. 18.116–119) is a “flashback.”171 
Further, a lapse of fifteen years or so between Herodias’ divorce from Philip around 19 CE 
and Philip’s death in 34 CE, followed by the war with Aretas around 36 CE, explains Philip’s 
soldiers joining Antipas’ forces in the latter’s struggle against Aretas.172 Chilton’s early date 
provides room for his claim that Jesus “apprenticed himself to [John] as a youth.”173 After 
 
 165 See, e.g., Chilton, “Friends and Enemies”; Bruce Chilton, “John the Baptist: His Immersion and His 
Death,” in Dimensions of Baptism: Biblical and Theological Studies, ed. Stanley E. Porter and Anthony R. 
Cross (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002), 25–44; Bruce Chilton, “John the Baptist,” REHJ. Cf. Bruce 
Chilton, “John the Purifier,” in Jesus in Context: Temple, Purity, and Restoration, ed. Bruce Chilton and Craig 
A. Evans (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 203–20. 
 166 See, e.g., Wolfgang Schenk, “Gefangenschaft und Tod des Täufers Erwägungen zur Chronologie 
und ihren Konsequenzen,” NTS 29 (1983): 453–83. 
 167 See, e.g., Sanders, Historical Figure, 290. 
 168 Clare K. Rothschild. Baptist Traditions and Q (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 46–52, concludes 
that John died probably before Jesus sometime between 28–36 CE.  
 169 Chilton, “John the Baptist,” 340–41. 
 170 Chilton, “Immersion and Death,” 43.  
 171 Chilton, “John the Baptist,” 341. 
 172 Chilton, “John the Baptist,” 341. 
 173 Chilton, “Friends and Enemies,” 72. 
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John’s death, Jesus ceased from immersing others and moved out of the geographical 
location of John’s ministerial activity.174  
 Kraemer, however, displays more reticence in dating John’s death. In her excellent 
analysis of the complexity of reconciling the chronologies that Josephus and the Gospels 
provide, she ultimately concludes that their differences “cannot and should not be 
amalgamated.”175 Moreover, Kraemer accentuates the internal chronological tension within 
Josephus’ narration of events. On the one hand, the report of John’s death implies that John’s 
death occurred within a few years before Antipas’ defeat by Aretas in 36 CE and Tiberius’ 
death in 37 CE.176 On the other hand, Ant. 18.145–160 indicates that Antipas had already 
joined Herodias in marriage by the time that Agrippa I returned from Rome (24/25 CE) upon 
the death of Tiberius’s son, Drusus (d. 23 CE).177 Consequently, John could have repudiated 
Antipas’ marriage to Herodias around the early 20s CE and died soon afterward. Strictly 
speaking, however, Kraemer is quick to note that John’s death in Josephus “need not 
postdate” their marriage. The only strict sequential parameter that Josephus provides for 
John’s death is that it occurred before Antipas’ military conflict with Aretas.178  
 In a similar vein, Sanders reaches a reticent conclusion: “We do not know when 
Antipas met Herodias, when his former wife fled to her father, and when John was 
executed.”179 Sanders acknowledges that Ant.18.116–119 is a “flashback” since Josephus 
recounts it “after the event that it is said to have caused.”180 As such, Sanders claims that 
Josephus does not narrate events sequentially but rather topically.181 Sanders observes that 
Josephus narrates Jesus’ life (Ant. 18.63–64) in between events that occurred around 19 
 
 174 Chilton, “Friends and Enemies,” 74–76. 
 175 Kraemer, “Implicating Herodias,” 340. 
 176 Kraemer, “Implicating Herodias,” 327. 
 177 Kraemer, “Implicating Herodias,” 327–28. 
 178 Kraemer, “Implicating Herodias,” 328. 
 179 Sanders, Historical Figure, 290. 
 180 Sanders, Historical Figure, 289. 
 181 Sanders, Historical Figure, 287–88. 
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CE.182 Therefore, to propose that Jesus died around 36 CE requires the historian “to accept 
that Josephus sequenced the Baptist’s death correctly, but Jesus’ life incorrectly.”183 Equally, 
to assert that Jesus died around 21 CE requires the historian “to accept that Josephus 
sequenced Jesus’ life correctly, but John the Baptist’s death incorrectly.”184 Sanders’ 
maneuver reveals that he maintains the Gospels’ sequence of John’s and Jesus’ deaths 
regardless of whether Jesus died early in the 20s or later in the mid-30s. He adjusts the date 
of John’s death on the basis of when he dates Jesus’ death. The assumption that John died 
before Jesus thus runs through his reasoning. 
 In contrast to Sanders, Schenk unravels the assumption that John died before Jesus. 
Rather than prioritizing the Synoptic Gospels’ narrative frameworks (e.g. Mark 1:14; 6:14; 
Matt 11:12//Luke 7:16), Schenk prioritizes evidence from Josephus in estimating the date of 
John’s death and its sequence in relation to Jesus’ death.185 He dates Antipas’ defeat by 
Aretas to 36 CE and thusly reasons with respect to Ant. 18.116–119: 
 Die Deutung der Antipas-Niederlage als göttliche Rehabilitierung des hingerichteten 
 Täufers weist auf enge sachliche wie chronologische Zusammenhänge. Diese 
 Beseitigung eines Störenfrieds läßt kaum damit rechnen, daß Antipas ihn mehrere 
 Jahre vorher verhaftet und dann eingekerkert gelassen hätte.186 
 
Whereas Hoehner (see above) views the temporal proximity of John’s death to Antipas’ 
defeat as indefinite, Schenk suggests that the populace’s interpretation of Antipas’ defeat as 
divine rehabilitation necessitates that John died in close proximity to 36 CE. In turn, this 
allows him to remain open to the idea that John may have outlived Jesus by 4–5 years.187  
 
 182 Sanders, Historical Figure, 287. 
 183 Sanders, Historical Figure, 287. 
 184 Sanders, Historical Figure, 288. 
 185 Schenk, “Gefangenschaft und Tod des Täufers.” 
 186 Schenk, “Gefangenschaft und Tod des Täufers,” 463. “The interpretation of the defeat of Antipas as 
divine rehabilitation/restoration for the executed Baptist points at narrow, factual, and chronological coherences. 
This elimination of a disturber hardly allows [us] to reckon/calculate that Antipas had arrested him several years 
prior and then left [him] incarcerated” (translation mine). 
 187 Schenk, “Gefangenschaft und Tod des Täufers,” 463–64. 
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 Scholars, therefore, do not necessarily hold fast to Luke 3:1–3 (or the Gospel 
narratives’ frameworks in general) as an incontrovertible way of identifying when John died. 
Some view Ant. 18.145–160 as indicating that Antipas had married Herodias in the early 20s 
CE and that, as a result, John may have likewise died in the early 20s. Others, however, view 
Ant. 18.109–119 as intimating that John died closer to the mid-30s. Schenk, moreover, claims 
a late date for John’s death and concludes that John may have actually died after Jesus.  
 
Conclusion: A Neglected Fourth Question 
The previous survey set forth three primary questions that drive scholarly research on the 
death of John the Baptist. First, we observed multiple ways that scholars have interpreted 
John’s death. Some view John’s death as anti-Herodian in its function while others have 
observed how it relates John to Jesus or differentiates the two figures. Second, scholars have 
argued for or against the accuracy of the Markan version on the basis of (1) its employment 
of cultural traditions and (2) the presence of “contentious details.” Third, much scholarship 
has attempted to pinpoint when John died. Some argue that John must have died between 
28/29 CE and 34/35 CE. Others propose that John died in the early 20s CE or even after Jesus 
died. Cumulatively, whereas past research has focused extensive attention on these three 
questions, a fourth question has received far less consideration: the question of reception.  
 I am not suggesting that scholars pay no attention to the post-history of John’s death. 
In his 2001 monograph, Hartmann includes a brief treatment of samples of the reception of 
Mark 6:14–21, including in the nineteenth-century paintings of Gustave Moreau.188 In 2013, 
Neginsky studies the reception of Salome in texts, iconography, paintings, sculptures, poetry, 
etc., especially from the fourth century through the Middle Ages, Renaissance, and 
 
 188 Michael Hartmann, Der Tod Johannes des Täufers: Eine exegetische und rezeptionsgeschichtliche 
Studie auf dem Hintergrund narrativer, intertextueller und kulturanthropologischer Zugänge, SBB 45 
(Stuttgart: Verlag Katholisches Bibelwerk, 2001), 356–64. 
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nineteenth century.189 Further, in her 2015 article, Stichele includes an analysis of the 
fifteenth-century artist Giovanni di Paolo’s six panels on the life and death of John the 
Baptist.190 And, in her 2017 essay, Joynes performs an analysis of the reception of Mark 
6:14–29 in Hinrik Funhof’s late fifteenth-century painting The Feast of Herod.191 Clearly, 
scholarship has focused on the post-history of John’s death to an extent. However, what these 
studies illustrate is that when scholars focus on the reception of John’s death, the selection of 
texts and artifacts under investigation often encompasses an expanse of one or two millennia.  
 Additionally, there is a notable lack of emphasis on the reception of John’s death in 
the second and third centuries in particular. The volume dedicated to the Gospel of Mark in 
the Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture series concentrates mostly on interpreters 
from the fourth century onwards in regards to Mark 6:14–29.192 A similar focus is apparent in 
Luz’ work with respect to the parallel account in Matt 14:1–12.193 In Neginsky’s analysis of 
the reception of Salome, she notably claims: “a religious and theological interest in [Salome] 
came only in the fourth century.”194 In a section entitled “Wirkungsgeschichte,” Gnilka 
discusses the critical tone against Herod that Calvin and Luther hold in their discussions of 
John’s death.195 The present study, therefore, steps into this lacuna by analyzing the reception 
history John’s of beheading in the first three centuries. How might one conceptualize and 
approach such an analysis? We thus now turn to chapter two to further explore this matter.  
 
 
 189 Rosina Neginsky, Salome: The Image of a Woman Who Never Was (Newcastle upon Tyne: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013). 
 190 Caroline Vander Stichele, “The Head of John and Its Reception or How to Conceptualize 
‘Reception History,’” in Reception History and Biblical Studies: Theory and Practice, ed. Emma England and 
William John Lyons, STr 6; LHBOTS 615 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2015), 79–93. 
 191 Christine E. Joynes, “The Reception of the Bible and Its Significance,” in Scripture and Its 
Interpretation: A Global, Ecumenical Introduction to the Bible, ed. Michael J. Gorman (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2017), esp. 160–63. 
 192 Thomas C. Oden and Christopher A. Hall, ed., Mark, ACCS 2 (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 
1998), 82–88. 
 193 Ulrich Luz, Matthew 8–20, Hermeneia (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2001), 308–09. 
 194 Neginsky, Salome, 23. 
 195 Gnilka, Markus, 1:252–53. Gnilka briefly notes the reception of the populace’s identification of 
Jesus as John (Mark 6:14) in Origen before proceeding to Erasmus and Calvin. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
A HEURISTIC FRAMEWORK FOR RECEPTION: MEMORY AND VIOLENCE 
 
Every encounter with tradition that takes place within 
 historical consciousness involves the experience of 
 a tension between the text and the present.196 
 
Collective memory continuously negotiates between available 
 historical records and current social and political agendas.197 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter one’s identification of the reception of John’s death as an underexplored area in 
scholarly discourse leads naturally to a consideration of how one might conceptualize such an 
examination. Drawing on social theories of memory and violence, this second chapter 
addresses this concern and, in turn, constructs a heuristic framework for analyzing the 
reception of John’s death according to the dynamics involved in the social remembering of 
violent events.  
 
1. Social Memory Theory 
Hübenthal has demonstrated that biblical scholarship “has a backlog to work off when it 
comes to understanding and using social memory theory.”198 She reaches two conclusions. 
First, social memory theory needs to be brought to bear on biblical studies more fully than it 
has in the past.199 Second, the need exists to explain what the theory has to offer at the 
exegetical level in particular.200 In consideration of her two conclusions, this section (1) 
 
 196 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall 
(London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 317. 
 197 Yael Zerubavel, Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 5. 
 198 Sandra Hübenthal, “Social and Cultural Memory in Biblical Exegesis: The Quest for an Adequate 
Application,” in Cultural Memory in Biblical Exegesis, ed. Pernille Carstens, Trine Bjornung Hasselbach, and 
Niels Peter Lemche, PHSC 17 (Piscataway: Gorgias Press, 2012), 196. 
 199 Hübenthal, “Social and Cultural Memory in Biblical Exegesis,” 196. 
 200 Hübenthal, “Social and Cultural Memory in Biblical Exegesis,” 196. 
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traces the emergence of social memory as a theory and its advent in NT scholarship, and (2) 
argues for its adoption as a category for understanding reception and for analyzing the 
reception of violence in particular. Although social memory theory should not be equated 
with an “exegetical method,” it does aid in conceptualizing and structuring analysis of 
narrations of violence.  
 
1.1. Maurice Halbwachs and His Legacy 
 Social memory theory is an interdisciplinary area of inquiry whose theorists study the 
social dimensions of individual and collective remembering.201 Despite the interdisciplinary 
makeup of its practitioners,202 social memory theory—in large measure—traces its roots back 
to the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, who in 1925 published his seminal work on the 
social frameworks of memory.203 For Halbwachs, all instances of remembrance, including 
individual recollections, are triggered by and localized in group identities (e.g. families, 
 
 201 Barry Schwartz, “Iconography and Collective Memory: Lincoln’s Image in the American Mind,” 
Sociological Quarterly 32 (1991): 302, defines “collective memory” as “a metaphor that formulates society’s 
retention and loss of information about its past in the familiar terms of individual remembering and forgetting.” 
On the similarities and differences between the terms “social memory,” “collective memory,” and “cultural 
memory” in critical discourse, see especially Hübenthal, “Social and Cultural Memory in Biblical Exegesis,” 
175–99. Since all three terms share a common interest in the social dimensions of memory, this study will 
utilize the term “social memory” to refer to individual or group memory localized in and formative for a social 
group. For helpful introductions to the theory, see Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989); Barbara Misztal, Theories of Social Remembering (Maidenhead: Open 
University Press, 1990); James Fentress and Chris Wickham, Social Memory, New Perspectives on the Past 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); Jeffrey Olick and Joyce Robins, “Social Memory Studies: From ‘Collective 
Memory’ to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices,” ARS 24 (1998): 105–40; Astrid Erll and Ansgar 
Nünning, eds., Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook, MCM 8 (Berlin: de 
Gruyter, 2008); Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Levy, “Introduction,” 3–62. See also, Susannah Radstone, ed., 
Memory and Methodology (Oxford: Berg, 2000); Geoffrey Cubitt, History and Memory (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2007). 
 202 Olick and Robins, “Social Memory Studies,” 106, describe social memory studies as “a 
nonparadigmatic, transdisciplinary, centerless enterprise.” 
 203 Maurice Halbwachs, Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire (Paris: Librarie Félix Alcan, 1925). Astrid 
Erll, “Cultural Memory Studies: An Introduction,” in Cultural Memory Studies: An International and 
Interdisciplinary Handbook, ed. Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning, MCM 8 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008), 8, 
considers it unquestionable that Halbwachs’ “studies of mémoire collective have emerged as the foundational 
texts of today’s memory studies.” Similarly, Jeffrey K. Olick, In the House of the Hangman: The Agonies of 
German Defeat, 1943–1949 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005), 336, refers to Halbwachs as the 
“founding father of the sociology of collective memory.” Fentress and Wickham, Social Memory, ix, too 
describe Halbwachs as “the first theorist” of collective memory. The study of memory, including its social 
aspects, however, predates the French sociologist. For examples, see Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Levy, 
“Introduction.” 
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religious groups, social classes) to which the rememberer(s) belongs in the present.204 
Because of these “social frameworks” that encompass recall, “the past is not preserved but is 
reconstructed on the basis of the present.”205 Thus, Halbwachs argues against a perspective of 
memory that views recollection as simply replicating the past as such. Instead he advocates 
for a view that understands recollection as embedded within the language and ideas one 
appropriates by virtue of existing within a social matrix. Coser, therefore, is correct when he 
claims that Halbwachs construed the relationship between the past and the present as one 
where “the past is a social construction mainly, if not wholly, shaped by the concerns of the 
present.”206  
 The recognition of memory as a social construct is axiomatic for memory theorists. In 
1932, seven years after Halbwachs’ publication of Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire, 
psychologist Bartlett argued that recollection is enabled by the construction of “schemata.”207 
For Bartlett, “schemata” are structures of memory that individuals inherit by virtue of their 
connection to the past:  
 [Remembering] is thus hardly ever really exact, even in the most rudimentary cases of 
 rote recapitulation…. [This imprecision is] an effect of the organism’s capacity to turn 
 round upon its own “schemata,” and is directly a function of consciousness.… So, 
 since many “schemata” are built of common materials, the images and words that 
 mark some of their salient features are in constant, but explicable, change. They, too, 
 are a device made possible by the appearance, or discovery, of consciousness, and 
 without them no genuine long-distance remembering would be possible.208 
 
 
 204 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, ed. and trans. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), 37–40. See, Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Levy, “Introduction,” 19. Anthony Le Donne, 
“Theological Memory Distortion in the Jesus Tradition,” in Memory and Remembrance in the Bible and 
Antiquity, ed. Stephen C. Barton, Loren T. Stuckenbruck, and Benjamin G. Wold, WUNT 212 (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2007), 164, reminds us: “This is why amnesia patients are often advised to return to a familiar 
environment for recovery. External environments prompt the memories required to operate within them.” 
 205 Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, 40. 
 206 Lewis A. Coser, “Introduction: Maurice Halbwachs 1877–1945,” in On Collective Memory, by 
Maurice Halbwachs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 25. 
 207 Frederic C. Bartlett, Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1932). 
 208 Bartlett, Remembering, 213–14. 
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Bartlett was skeptical of the notion that collectivities possessed a literal mental capacity to 
recall, but was receptive to Halbwachs’ idea that an individual’s membership in a social 
group stimulated and conditioned an individual’s recollection.209 Recently, Schwartz has 
argued that individuals do not remember the past in isolation but “they do so with and against 
others situated in different groups and through the knowledge and symbols that predecessors 
and contemporaries transmit to them.”210  
 This recognition, however, captures only “half the truth” of memory, as Schudson 
(and Schwartz following him) puts it.211 Schudson argues that the past is under certain 
circumstances resistant to present manipulation.212 He maintains, for instance, that traumatic 
pasts often force themselves upon the present as events that must be remembered.213 I would 
add that certain individual and cultural traumas can force themselves upon the present as 
events that must, for whatever reason, be repressed.214  
 Like Schudson, Schwartz contends that the past constrains the degree of present 
manipulation of the past. In reference to the Gospels, he writes: “No successful historical 
writer, however, is free to create any conversation he or she likes; the writer must construct 
talk that readers find plausibly motivated, consistent with the subject’s actions, and hence 
objectively possible.”215 In this light, it is quite possible for an individual or collective entity 
to recall erroneously the words of a historical figure’s speech and yet still capture an 
“accurate” initial impression of that figure’s message. Conversely, as different aspects of a 
 
 209 Bartlett, Remembering, 294–96.  
 210 Barry Schwartz, “Where There’s Smoke, There’s Fire: Memory and History,” in Memory and 
Identity in Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity: A Conversation with Barry Schwartz, ed. Tom Thatcher, 
SemeiaSt 78 (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2014), 9. 
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(1989): 113; Schwartz, Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory, 25. 
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 213 Schudson, “The Present in the Past versus the Past in the Present,” esp. 109–10. 
 214 See, e.g., Janet Jacobs, “The Memorial at Srebrenica: Gender and the Social Meanings of Collective 
Memory in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” Mem Stud 14 (2017): 423–39. 
 215 Schwartz, “Where There’s Smoke, There’s Fire,” 9. See also, Le Donne, “Theological Memory 
Distortion in the Jesus Tradition,” 166: “In order for images associated with the past to make sense in the 
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record are selectively emphasized, suppressed, or varyingly contextualized, it is quite 
possible for an accurate transcription of a figure’s actual words to obscure considerably the 
essence of the speaker’s originating message.216  
 Importantly, therefore, Schwartz does not regress to what Casey categorizes as a 
“photographic paradigm” or “passivist” view of memory where the “remembering subject” 
replicates the past with minimal manipulation.217 Schwartz does not deny that social 
institutions, differing economic statuses, or competing power structures distort our narrations 
of the past.218 He affirms that “[r]ecollection of the past is an active, constructive process, not 
a simple matter of retrieving information. To remember is to place a part of the past in the 
service of conceptions and needs of the present.”219 Nor does he emphasize exclusively the 
instrumentality of memory for advancing present ideologies. Rather, as Zerubavel observes, 
Schwartz critiques an “overemphasis” on the adaptive capability of the present—an 
overemphasis that “undermines the notion of historical continuity.”220 In short, Schwartz’ 
paradigm of memory construes the relationship between the past and the present in instances 
of remembrance as reciprocal.221  
 
 216 Cf. Chris Keith, Jesus’ Literacy: Scribal Culture and the Teacher from Galilee, LNTS 413 
(London: T&T Clark, 2011), 64, who argues that the historical Jesus was likely someone capable of producing 
both accurate and inaccurate memories of himself. 
 217 Edward S. Casey, Remembering: A Phenomenological Study (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1987), 269. 
 218 Cf. Le Donne, “Theological Memory Distortion in the Jesus Tradition,” 166: “Social Memory 
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 219 Barry Schwartz, “The Social Context of Commemoration: A Study in Collective Memory,” Social 
Forces 61 (1982): 374. 
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precede the other; they are mutually affecting and dialectic. Our present is determinative for our image of the 
past (i.e., the past is made to reflect the present) even as our past is determinative for our image of the present 
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 221 Thus, in his work on the reception of Abraham Lincoln in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
(Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory), Schwartz demonstrates that continuity accompanies 
vicissitudes with respect to Lincoln’s image across generations. 
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 In this respect, the mobilization of memory in various media (oral testimonies, textual 
artifacts, monuments and tombs, rituals and festivals, music, iconography, etc.) represents the 
culmination of a complex, continuous negotiation between the past (including the actual past 
and subsequent representations of that past) as a constraint and the present (itself a product of 
the past) as a manipulator of the past.222 But, this mobilization of memories into durable 
forms does not mean that memories consequently “assume immobile form” (to borrow Kirk’s 
language), even if they are physically a “frozen moment of the collective processes of 
establishing memory and identity.”223 This is not to deny, for example, that the textualization 
of the Gospel of Mark constituted an attempt to stabilize a particular understanding of Jesus 
or to minimize competing understandings.224 Undeniably, the coalescing of memory into 
vehicular modes may imply the presence of a social group hoping to maintain an enduring 
sense of identity in light of a shared, agreed-upon past.225 Nevertheless, even relatively 
stabilized pasts undergo evolution precisely because they are the location of constant 
visitation, evaluation, analysis, and thus, reconfiguration of a group’s identity and ethos in the 
shadow of ever-shifting present demands.  
 
 222 Jeffrey K. Olick and Daniel Levy, “Collective Memory and Cultural Constraint: Holocaust Myth 
and Rationality in German Politics,” ASR 62 (1997): 934; Zerubavel, Recovered Roots, 5; Fentress and 
Wickham, Social Memory, ix–40. 
 223 Alan Kirk, “Memory Theory and Jesus Research,” in Porter and Holmén, Handbook for the Study of 
the Historical Jesus, 1:816; Hübenthal, “Social and Cultural Memory in Biblical Exegesis,” 195 (italics 
original), respectively. 
 224 On the textualization (and its significance) of the Gospels, see, e.g. Werner Kelber, The Oral and 
Written Gospel: The Hermeneutics of Speaking and Writing in the Synoptic Tradition, Mark, Paul and Q 
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983); Chris Keith, “Prolegomena on the Textualization of Mark’s Gospel: Manuscript 
Culture, the Extended Situation, and the Emergence of the Written Gospel,” in Thatcher, Memory and Identity 
in Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity, 161–86; Chris Keith, “Early Christian Book Culture and the 
Emergence of the First Written Gospel,” in Mark, Manuscripts, and Monotheism: Essays in Honor of Larry W. 
Hurtado, ed. Chris Keith and Dieter T. Roth, LNTS 528 (London: T&T Clark, 2015), 22–39; Chris Keith, “The 
Competitive Textualization of the Jesus Tradition in John 20:30–31 and 21:24–25,” CBQ 78 (2016): 321–37. 
See also, Larry Hurtado, “Greco-Roman Textuality and the Gospel of Mark: A Critical Assessment of Werner 
Kelber’s The Oral and the Written Gospel,” BBR 7 (1997): 91–106. 
 225 Consider Schwartz’ description of commemorative ritual: “As a standardized, repetitive, and 
symbolic activity that allows participants to define their relation to the past, commemorative ritual fixes in mind 
the events of the past, a process facilitated by the emotional assembling of the community itself” (“Where 
There’s Smoke, There’s Fire,” 10). 
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 Furthermore, the emergence of memory in media perpetuates and further enables a 
fluid reception history of memory across generations regardless of a social group’s hope of 
maintenance. Egyptologist J. Assmann argues that the materialization of tradition in the 
medium of writing—the transition of memory from living communication (communicative 
memory; kommunikatives Gedächtnis) to tradition (cultural memory; kulturelles 
Gedächtnis)—permits “the horizon of symbolically stored memory to grow far beyond the 
framework of knowledge functionalized as bonding memory.… In certain circumstances 
cultural memory liberates people from the constraints of bonding memory.”226 This 
recognition of a complex interchange between past and present in commemorative activity is 
highly significant for this study’s understanding of reception, and I will return to it. 
 
1.2. The Emergence of Social Memory Theory in New Testament Studies 
 Kirk and Thatcher formally introduced social memory theory to NT scholarship in 
their 2005 co-edited volume, although applications of the theory had appeared in German 
scholarship several years previously.227 Since the volume’s publication, several studies have 
surfaced applying the theory’s concepts. To provide one example, in 2006 Bockmuehl 
privileged “living memory” to understand the relationship between early Petrine and Pauline 
Christianity. He expanded to up to one hundred fifty years the threshold of living memory 
that J. Assmann had previously estimated at 40–100 years.228 Several other applications to 
 
 226 Assmann, Religion and Cultural Memory, 21. On kommunikatives Gedächtnis and kulturelles 
Gedächtnis see, Jan Assmann, Das kulturelle Gedächtnis. Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen 
Hochkulturen (München: Beck, 1992), 48–56. 
 227 Alan Kirk and Tom Thatcher, eds., Memory, Tradition, and Text: Uses of the Past in Early 
Christianity, SemeiaSt 52 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2005); Jens Schröter, Erinnerung an Jesu 
Worte: Studien zur Rezeption der Logienüberlieferung in Markus, Q und Thomas, WMANT 76 (Neukirchen-
Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1997). Keith has written an overview of the emergence of social memory theory in 
NT studies. The sixth volume of Early Christianity divides this overview into two parts. See, Chris Keith, 
“Social Memory Theory and Gospels Research: The First Decade (Part One),” EC 6 (2015): 354–76; Chris 
Keith, “Social Memory Theory and Gospels Research: The First Decade (Part Two),” EC 6 (2015): 517–42. 
 228 Bockmuehl, Seeing the Word, 169–70. Assmann, Das kulturelle Gedächtnis, 50–56, suggests a forty 
year threshold for kommunikatives Gedächtnis. In other works, Assmann has suggested a three to four 
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various subjects could be cited.229 More pertinent to present purposes is the fact that the 
theory so far has found the most traction in Gospels research, principally historical Jesus 
studies, as is frequently observed.230  
 Some historical Jesus scholars argue for conceptualizing the Gospels as textual 
artifacts that have emerged from commemorative activity. Kirk, for example, has written: 
 [M]emory analysis puts the proper complexion on the core datum of research, the 
 gospel traditions. They are artifacts of memory; they have circulated along 
 memorializing pathways; and by finding their way into the written medium they have 
 navigated the major crisis of memory. The gospels, we might say, are the deep pools 
 of early Christian memory.231 
 
In a similar fashion, Keith considers “the written Gospels” to be instances of “Jesus 
memory.”232 In my estimation, this categorization of the Gospels as memory by Kirk and 
Keith should be uncontroversial. They are not advocating for treating the Gospels as 
instances of historically accurate replications of the past or eye-witness testimonies (as if 
autobiographical memory was not susceptible to subjectivity). Nor are they denying that the 
Jesus of history contributed to the formation of variegated perceptions of him, including 
“accurate” and “inaccurate” ones. Keith is emphatic when he explains that viewing the 
written narratives about Jesus as artifacts of processes of memory is not a priori to establish 
their accuracy or inaccuracy.233 Other leading voices in the discourse likewise operate with a 
 
generation threshold. See, Assmann, Religion and Cultural Memory, 30; Jan Assmann, “Communicative and 
Cultural Memory,” in Erll and Nünning, Cultural Memory Studies, 111, 117. 
 229 For references, see, Keith, “Social Memory Theory (Part Two),” 518. 
 230 Hübenthal, “Social and Cultural Memory in Biblical Exegesis,” 176: “The only area in biblical 
research where social memory theory has gained reasonable currency is in historical Jesus research and even 
there it is treated highly critically and discussed extremely controversially.” Keith, “Social Memory Theory 
(Part Two),” 518: “It is undeniable that social memory theory’s most demonstrable inroads into New Testament 
scholarship reside in Jesus studies.” For more recent similar comments, see e.g., Sandra Hübenthal, “Reading 
the Gospel of Mark as Collective Memory,” in Social Memory and Social Identity in the Study of Early Judaism 
and Early Christianity, ed. Samuel Byrskog, Raimo Hakola, and Jutta Jokiranta, NTOA/SUNT 116 (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2016), 69; Alan Kirk, Memory and the Jesus Tradition, RJF3C (London: T&T Clark, 
2018), 1.  
 231 Kirk, “Memory Theory and Jesus Research,” 1:842. 
 232 Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, 61. 
 233 Keith, “Social Memory Theory (Part Two),” esp. 537–38. 
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similar understanding of the theory.234 What these advocates are encouraging is for scholars 
to work out the historiographical implications of viewing the transmission of Jesus traditions 
as a dynamic, active, and ebbing and flowing interplay between the actual past, subsequent 
appropriations of the past, and the ever-shifting horizons of the present.  
 With this clarification in view, we can observe that this new paradigm in historical 
Jesus research has bred two chief historiographical consequences. The first consequence has 
been a methodological critique of the so-called criteria of authenticity with their indebtedness 
to form-critical conceptions of memory and tradition. Kirk summarizes the form-critical 
paradigm thusly:  
 The form critics equated memory with individual eye-witness recollection. While 
 memory traces of this sort lay at the origins of the tradition, they were a residuum, 
 largely inert with respect to developments in the tradition itself. The salient image 
 was of so-called authentic memories of Jesus coming to be buried under multiple 
 layers of ‘tradition.’235 
 
Put otherwise, genuine glances at the Jesus of history, according to the form-critical 
paradigm, resided—if anywhere—behind several strata of interpreted material, material that 
reflected the Sitz im Leben of early Christian communities. Hence the rise of criteria that 
historical Jesus scholars employed to sift and separate authentic from inauthentic Jesus 
material. Although the criteria have not been immune from attacks outside of memory 
discourse,236 historical Jesus scholars who advocate for a “Jesus memory” approach have led 
the charge in the early twenty-first century in effecting what Bernier calls “the criteria 
approach’s obituary.”237 Keith and Le Donne’s co-edited volume published in 2012, which 
dealt the final blow to the criteria, included contributing essays of Schröter, Rodríguez, and 
 
 234 See, e.g., Jeffrey K. Olick, “Products, Processes, and Practices: A Non-Reificatory Approach to 
Collective Memory,” BTB 36 (2006): 13; Rodríguez, Structuring Early Christian Memory, 41–80; Kirk, 
“Memory Theory and Jesus Research,” 1:839; Hübenthal, “Social and Cultural Memory in Biblical Exegesis,” 
192. 
 235 Kirk, “Memory Theory and Jesus Research,” 1:809. 
 236 See, e.g., Morna Hooker, “Christology and Methodology,” NTS 17 (1971): 480–87; Morna Hooker, 
“On Using the Wrong Tool,” Theology 75 (1972): 570–81. 
 237 Jonathan Bernier, The Quest for the Historical Jesus after the Demise of Authenticity, LNTS 540 
(London: T&T Clark, 2016), 1, n. 3. 
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Allison, in addition to their own.238 All five of these scholars have written monographs 
importing memory theory into the study of Christian Origins (and Keith has actually written 
two).239 In essence, many of those who advance a memory paradigm reject the criteriological 
approach’s notion of uncovering a pristine, unfiltered memory of the historical Jesus. 
Memory, as we have seen, is always localized in and shaped by subjectivity. Therefore, to 
search for a memory of Jesus external to localization or social shape, and thus purely 
formative of the present is puzzling, to put it euphemistically.240 
 If the first consequence of the Jesus-memory approach was a methodological 
dismantling of the tool scholars utilized to uncover Jesus, then the second consequence was 
to rethink how the historian could appropriately construct the historical Jesus moving 
forward. Importantly, the memory approach’s rejection of the criteria on the basis of viewing 
Jesus material as thoroughly subjective has not led these theorists to campaign for a new “No 
Quest” period. Similar to Gadamer who viewed subjectivity as the phenomenon that rendered 
both objectivity impossible and understanding possible,241 some memory theorists have 
considered (at least implicitly) subjectivity both the problem of constructing the historical 
Jesus and (part of) its solution.242 For Keith, the interpretive portrayals of Jesus—both 
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accurate and inaccurate ones—are historical phenomena that, precisely because they do exist, 
must be explained in terms of this dynamic interaction between present and past. In this vein, 
Keith argues that any construction of Jesus must elucidate the various memories of him in 
light of the ever-shifting socio-historical contexts which these memories continually shaped 
and in which they took shape.243 Relatedly, Le Donne proposes identifying multiple 
commemorative trajectories in a bid to triangulate a mnemonic origin in the life of Jesus.244 
 Social memory theory has not received an altogether warm welcome by scholars, 
however. In his 2012 article, Foster refers to memory theory as one of three “dead-ends” in 
historical Jesus research.245 In his two-part overview of the first decade of social memory 
research in Gospels studies, Keith has issued a lengthy correction to many of Foster’s claims 
that lead Foster to his conclusion.246 However, despite the shortcomings in Foster’s argument, 
his article raises the question of what social memory theory offers not only historical Jesus 
research, but also other related fields within the discipline of NT studies. In this vein, I 
contend that social memory theory can be applied to reception-historical analysis as a useful 
conceptual and analytical category. Similar to social memory’s import in Jesus studies, 
treating the Gospels as artifacts of memory not only results in a methodological complication 
 
“Distortion is, most commonly, a natural and benign function of memory selection … memory distorts the past 
to render it intelligible to the present.… Our memories demand a high degree of continuity in order to tie all of 
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of previous conceptualizations of the reception of the Gospels. It also provides a heuristic 
tool for performing reception analysis, and in particular, the reception of violence. 
 
1.3. The Significance of Social Memory Theory for Reception History 
 For many scholars, reception is construed as an account of the impact, or aftereffects, 
of an originating text in various media (commentaries, homilies, art, etc.). For instance, Luz 
defines reception history as follows: “Reception history of the Bible is the history of the 
reception of biblical texts in periods subsequent to New Testament times.”247 As a further 
example, Räisänen went so far as to reconceptualize Wirkungsgeschichte in terms of isolating 
the empirical effectiveness of a text in history.248 J. Assmann is correct when he argues that 
reception history should not be simplistically conceptualized as the present receiving the 
past.249  
 Indeed, in light of our understanding of the written Gospels as commemorative 
artifacts, the text-receiver paradigm of reception runs into two interrelated complications. 
First, the division between the Gospels (as originating texts) and reception (as receivers of 
such texts) is problematic. It is not merely the case that the written Gospels became catalysts 
that enabled subsequent receptions in periods after their textualization. The written Gospels 
themselves, as commemorative texts, constitute, in social memory terminology, the results of 
complex processes between the influences of multiple pasts and ever-shifting present 
horizons. Put succinctly, the Gospel narratives form part of the reception history of 
precipitating stimuli and stimulate further reception.250  
 
 247 Ulrich Luz, “The Contribution of Reception History to a Theology of the New Testament,” in The 
Nature of New Testament Theology: Essays in Honour of Robert Morgan, ed. Christopher Rowland and 
Christopher Tuckett (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 123. 
 248 Räisänen, “The Effective ‘History’ of the Bible, 303–24. 
 249 Jan Assmann, Moses the Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1997), 9. 
 250 To his credit, Luz (Matthew in History: Interpretation, Influence, and Effects [Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1994], 23) recognizes that “biblical texts themselves are the result of a history of effects because they are 
not the ultimate point of departure … but products of human reception, human experiences, and human history.” 
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 Here is precisely where Gadamer’s principle of Wirkungsgeschichte intersects with 
social memory theory. His principle recognizes that the subject is always already impacted by 
the course of history by virtue of her own historicity. For Gadamer, “the central problem of 
hermeneutics” is the task of “historically effected consciousness” (wirkungsgeschichtliches 
Bewußtsein), that is, coming to an awareness of our own situation as beings already impacted 
by the course of history.251 Our situation as “already affected by history” “determines in 
advance both what seems to us worth inquiring about and what will appear as an object of 
investigation.”252 To deny this inherent subjectivity in the process of understanding in order 
to feign objectivity is tantamount to denying one’s own historical existence.253 Or, to 
articulate the previous statement in Halbwachsian terms: denying that “the individual 
borrows from society everything that enables conceptualization of the past”254 is tantamount 
to rejecting that one is—or has ever been—located within or in opposition to a social 
framework.255 In this sense, instances of remembrance embody Wirkungsgeschichte because 
they are always localized in and impacted by the course of history. 
 Second, because “historical representations are negotiated, selective, present-oriented, 
and relative … [and simultaneously] cannot be manipulated at will,”256 viewing reception 
history through the theoretical framework of social memory theory allows historians to 
observe how social groups form and reinforce their identities. It permits us “to shift our focus 
from time to temporalities and thus to understand what categories people, groups, and 
cultures employ to make sense of their lives, their social, cultural, and political attachments, 
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and the concomitant ideals that are validated.”257 In this sense, social memory theory 
conceives of reception not only as the receiving and interpretation of a precipitating text, but 
as a fluid and dynamic process of identity formation. 
 Social memory theory also provides a heuristic framework for analyzing this vibrant 
process of identity formation. Since (1) identity formation is perhaps none more acute than in 
reference to violence and (2) John’s beheading represents an obviously violent event, we turn 
presently to constructing the contours involved in the social remembering of violence.  
 
2. A Heuristic Framework: The Social Remembering of Violence 
 
This section details four features involved in the social remembering of violence: identity 
formation, interpretive keying, selectivity (the violence of memory), and contestation. I close 
the chapter by explaining the significance of these features for the reception of John’s death. 
A necessary word on the key term “violence,” however, is first in order.  
 
2.1. Visible and Invisible Violence  
 
  “Violence is a slippery concept—nonlinear, productive, destructive, and 
reproductive.”258 So opens the 2004 anthology of influential voices on the study of violence 
co-edited by Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois. Their description is at once incredibly vague and 
acutely sensible. Any study on violence immediately runs into the problem of defining 
“violence” amidst all of its possible valences.259 This study adopts a bipartite metaphor in its 
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 258 Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois, “Introduction: Making Sense of Violence,” in 
Violence in War and Peace: An Anthology, ed. Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2004), 1 (italics removed). 
 259 What one social context considers a legitimate application of violence is subject to contestation in 
another, as John Kloppenborg, “The Representation of Violence in the Synoptic Parables,” in Mark and 
Matthew I: Comparative Readings: Understanding the Earliest Gospels in Their First Century Settings, ed. 
Eve-Marie Becker and Anders Runesson, WUNT 271 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 323, observes. In 
contrast to the German Gewalt (“force”), the English term “violence” largely functions as a category of criminal 
designation—to ethically label something as evil, terrible, or horrific. According to Ari Z. Bryen, Violence in 
Roman Egypt: A Study in Legal Interpretation (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 54–55, 
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discourse: visible and invisible violence. Visible violence refers to those types of violent 
outbursts that, in general, are obvious, explicit, and often involve a transference of bodily 
harm by one or more co-present human agents. Visible violence thus largely corresponds to 
what Žižek designates “subjective violence.”260 Physical acts of injury, homicide, 
assassinations, rape, abuse, war, assault, execution, genocide, torture, and bodily mutilation 
all would fall under this term. For analytical purposes, I thus treat John’s beheading as an 
instance of visible, bodily violence.  
 Several anthropologists, philosophers, and sociologists, however, have observed that 
violence is not merely an instance of physical harm or injury to the body. Violence also exists 
in the social structures that frame everyday existence. It is the banal violence of poverty, 
rhetoric and ideology, racial oppression, disease, hunger, exclusion, boundary demarcations, 
and social hierarchies. Hence, theorists draw on a multiplicity of metaphors to conceptualize 
these different facets of violence, including, for example, Farmer’s “structural violence,”261 
Bourdieu’s “symbolic violence,”262 Lawrence and Karim’s “rhetorical violence,”263 Scheper-
Hughes’ “everyday violence,”264 Žižek’s notions of “objective and systemic violence,”265 and 
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others.266 For this study, invisible violence (so named because it is not always readily 
perceptible as “violence”), refers to those social structures and cultural ingredients that can 
nurture and enable visible forms of violence. 
 Thus, visible and invisible violence are not strictly dichotomous: they are deeply 
intertwined. As Farmer elucidates in reference to extreme suffering in Haiti: “Life choices are 
structured by racism, sexism, political violence, and grinding poverty.”267 Social matrixes 
crystallize into visible cases of violence. These paradigms and group structures create the 
social, economic, and cultural conditions necessary for conflict to manifest in forms of visible 
harm and injury. Violence, in this light, “is not opposed to structure as something that exists 
external to structure; it is another form of structure, of processes, of practices.”268  
 This interrelation of visible and invisible violence is important for this study’s focus 
on the memory of John’s visibly violent death. As chapters four and five will argue, while 
early recipients press John’s beheading into the service of identity formation, they also begin 
to redeploy his beheading in anti-Jewish directions. In this regard, the memory itself of John’s 
beheading becomes “violent.” The dissemination and inscribing of anti-Jewish ideology is 
appropriately understood as a specific example of invisible violence. Anti-Jewish attitudes 
can legitimize, lend approval to, and crystallize into acts of physical harm and injury against 
Jews. In other words, anti-Jewishness—as a nurturer of violence—is a social structure 
impregnated with dangerous potential (see chapter five). Unless otherwise made explicit, 
visible types of violence will be in view throughout this study when I employ the unqualified 
term “violence.” 
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2.2. Violence and Identity 
 
 Some occurrences of violence present us with a paradox: they defy “integration or 
dissolution” in terms of memory.269 On the one hand, violence threatens our sense of 
continuity with our past and thus calls into question conceptions of personhood, membership, 
and affiliation.270 It renders identity dubious, under siege, in danger of dissolution. When 
violence bursts onto the scene we experience it precisely as such—a bursting, an eruption, a 
rupture of normalcy, an anomaly of everyday existence.271 Kirk refers to such events as a 
“social disruption,”272 a fracture between the past and the present that unsettles our sense of 
“equilibrium.”273 To be sure, the appearance of violence as anomalous is fundamentally 
illusory. For, as indicated above with our notion of invisibility, violence “lives in the shapes 
that it appears to subvert.”274  
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 Nevertheless, the perception of violent events as glitches in the normal mechanisms of 
society renders violence an ostensibly unique phenomenon, one capable of preventing 
individuals and groups to return to a state of normalcy. When U.S. President Kennedy was 
assassinated on November 22, 1963, this shocking incident ruptured any sense of normalcy in 
communities across the country: 
 The central preoccupation of the nation was with the details of what had happened 
 and whether or not the president would live. University classes were interrupted and 
 canceled, factory workers left their jobs and went home, stores closed their doors, and 
 the everyday activities of the nation ground to a halt. Continuation of business as 
 usual seemed to make little sense in view of the extraordinary events that were 
 happening. Regular television programming was suspended and news coverage 
 continuously reported on the events surrounding the assassination.275  
 
The massacre at Wounded Knee in late December 1890 (when U.S. soldiers opened fire on 
nearly 400 unarmed Lakota refugees) quelled (at least temporarily) the eschatological hopes 
of the Lakota who “had embraced the spirit dance in 1889 because it provided hope and 
renewal in the form of cleansing the earth of the whites and returning the spirits of deceased 
relatives and the buffalo.”276 Moreover, the division between the past and the present also 
elicits uncertainty concerning the future. Neal observes, for instance, that the 1941 attack on 
Pearl Harbor occasioned “intense levels of fear that the attack was simply a forerunner of a 
planned invasion of California.”277 In essence, certain violent events thrust individuals and 
collectives to the extremities of existence because they appear to destabilize continuity 
between the past, present, and future. Žižek, therefore, is on point when he contends that 
prose, not poetry, is impossible after Auschwitz. He reasons: “Poetry is always by definition, 
‘about’ something that cannot be addressed directly, only alluded to.”278 
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 On the other hand, however, personhood, membership, and affiliation are forged 
through violent encounters and crystallized in narrations about the past. Thus, the memory of 
violence frequently becomes the locus of expressing identity. Buckley-Zistel notes that the 
1994 Rwandan genocide remains a crucial matter to remember for all Rwandans, Hutu and 
Tutsi alike, and this is in part due to the fact that many Hutu and Tutsi are still coping with its 
aftereffects.279 She observes: “The individual and the collective raison d’être of the nation 
and its people is built around the genocide.”280 Similarly, Pesantubbee explains that the 
Lakota “needed to incorporate the gravesite [at Wounded Knee] into their ceremonial cycle” 
in order to overcome the generations of despair and depression that the Wounded Knee 
massacre triggered.281 Writing in 2004, Nytagodien and Neal allude to the role of memory in 
overcoming violence. They observe that many Japanese soldiers, who had committed heinous 
acts against civilians in occupied countries during WWII, continue to struggle with 
“unwanted memories” that “can only be alleviated through achieving some degree of 
closure.”282 Malkki, as a further example, in her ethnographic research on Hutu refugees in 
Tanzania who had fled from Burundi as a result of the 1972 genocide, observes that the 
massacre “represented an end or a culmination in [their] mythico-history insofar as ‘the past’ 
that lived in Burundi stopped at the moment of flight.”283 Their “mythico-history” was thus 
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divided into pre-massacre years and post-massacre years and this not merely in a strict 
chronological sense, but also in “spatial, social, and symbolic” senses.284 
 Furthermore, violent events often become didactic frames for directing behavior. In 
the formation of commemorative narratives, we witness “the indelible infusion of constituent 
events and personae with categorical moral meanings.”285 This is especially discernable in 
commemorations of violent deaths of significant figures as mnemonic communities highlight 
the virtues of the victims and/or vices of the perpetrators to exemplify good and bad behavior 
respectively. For example, in the fourth century CE, Basil recalled Antipas’ role in John the 
Baptist’s death for the sake of forbidding his readers to swear oaths.286 Winter describes the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights as “a normative statement of a standard against 
which to measure the behavior of the states in which we live.”287 As a further example, 
Buckley-Zistel provides the statement below by a survivor of the Rwandan genocide: 
 We have to remember people who died in 1994. It is important to remember someone 
 that you love, a relative, a friend. We have to commemorate it in order to put a 
 mechanism of prevention in place, and to ask God to help us. For me, we cannot 
 forget what happened.288 
 
Further still, in the decades following WWII, Japan has repeatedly looked back to their 
actions in WWII “as a major referent for what to avoid in the future.”289 Similarly, the Lakota 
look to the gravesite at Wounded Knee as a source of motivation “to continue to struggle 
against cultural loss.”290 
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  In light of these examples, the threat of violence to divest individuals and groups of 
their identities often creates the impulse to combat such rupture. Violent events force 
themselves upon the present as phenomena that must be overcome in terms of memory. Thus, 
social groups tend to commemorate violent catastrophes, solidifying them “into durable 
forms” with a view toward combatting “the danger of rupture.”291 Of course, traces of this 
rupture will never disappear fully: 
 When traumatic injury is profound, as in the case of genocide or physical threat and 
 torture, survivors are not able to put the pieces back together without retaining signs 
 of breakage. There will always be scars.… [What] seems like “past” trauma shapes 
 the present by its outstanding demands to be attended to and to have its losses and 
 pain acknowledged. It manifests itself in current lives not simply as reminder and 
 remainder but as present reality. The memories and presence of such trauma may 
 exact a fierce loyalty around which identity may constitute itself. In other words, the 
 trauma, even though it is not fully articulated or even recognized as trauma, may 
 become the guiding force of identity and meaning formation.292  
 
From this perspective, certain violent events possess gravitational power. Identity formation 
readily orbits around such events. Wagner-Pacifici, therefore, is surely correct when she 
suggests that events embedded in “conflict and contradiction” have an “intrinsic draw on 
us.”293  
 
2.3. Interpretive Keying 
 
 An important aspect of remembering violence involves what Schwartz designates 
interpretive “keying.”294 For Schwartz, crisis in the present represents the strongest incentive 
for social groups to invoke the past in a bid to understand the crisis.295 Schwartz’ model of 
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Sociology 19 (1996): 306. 
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keying rests on the rudimentary, but solid, premise that perception is an act of identification, 
where one recognizes an object, event, or emotion by pairing it alongside a known symbol.296 
Thus, understanding keying involves considering how “participants in one primary event … 
interpret their experience by aligning it to another primary event.”297 He defines keying in 
this way: 
 Keying transforms the meaning of activities understood in terms of one event by 
 comparing them with activities understood in terms of another. Reactions to 
 Woodrow Wilson’s death in 1924, for example, assume new meaning when keyed to 
 reactions to Lincoln’s death in 1865. “Keying” is more than a new word for 
 analogical thinking, more than a way individuals mentally organize their social 
 experience; keying transforms memory into a cultural system because it matches 
 publicly accessible (i.e., symbolic) models of the past (written narratives, pictorial 
 images, statues, motion pictures, music, and songs) to the experiences of the 
 present.… Keying is communicative movement—talk, writing, image- and music-
 making—that connects otherwise separate realms of history.298 
 
To articulate it more succinctly, keying transforms the semantic and moral coloration of an 
event by filtering it through the lens of culturally significant scripts, narrative templates, 
tropes, or images from the archetypal past.299 For his part, Schwartz shows that Americans 
during the Great War summoned the image of Abraham Lincoln to articulate America’s “role 
in the conflict as being on God’s side against Satan.”300 The image of Lincoln paired to the 
war thus served to mobilize and moralize the war-time efforts.301  
 Outside of Schwartz’ work, further examples that correspond to his notion of 
interpretive keying abound. In his 2012 essay, Winter draws attention to the presentation of 
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the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to the United Nations in Paris during early 
December 1948, a few years removed from the end of WWII: 
Here they were, in the Palais de Chaillot, a few metres from the spot where Hitler had 
stared out across the Seine at the Eiffel Tower, and surveyed his new dominions a brief 
eight years before. The Place de la Concorde, the geographical heart of the Revolution, 
was only a few kilometres away. Nearby the deputies of 1789 and 1793 framed their 
call to arms in not one but two earlier Universal Declarations of the rights of man and 
the citizen. To announce a new Universal Declaration in Paris 150 years later was an 
act of memory, but also of transition from the humiliations of Nazi occupation to the 
reassertion of the universal principles on which the French revolutionary tradition 
rested.302 
 
To use Schwartzian language, one can observe that the commemorative document was keyed 
to the foundational principles of the French Revolution (including the locales associated with 
those principles in the French collective imagination). The French summoned the tradition of 
the Revolution in order to articulate their overcoming of the yoke of Nazi rule that had 
interrupted their sense of continuity with their past. Winter thus further describes the 
declaration as “a set of principles framed because of a historical catastrophe which preceded 
it.”303 According to Jacobs, at Auschwitz commemorative images of women are keyed 
according to the tropes of maternal and sexual suffering, creating a semantic context that 
understands the genocide as one that targeted even women and children.304 Finally, consider 
also the testimony that Aretxaga records of a prisoner attempting to express the humiliating 
prison conditions in Northern Ireland that eventually led to the so-called Dirty Protest (1978–
1981): “It just reminded me of the Jews in the concentration camps because every man in the 
[visiting] room was bald and we were all very thin and frightened.”305 This idea of 
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interpretive keying transforming the meaning of violent events will play a significant role in 
our analysis of the reception of John’s death and I will return to it in chapters four and five.   
 
2.4. Selective Remembering and the Violence of Memory 
 
 As should be clear by now, selectivity characterizes individual and collective forms of 
remembering. Inherent to this idea of selectivity is the concept of forgetting. As A. Assmann 
and Shortt put it: “Every act of remembrance, whether individual or collective, necessarily 
involves selective, partial, or otherwise biased forms of forgetting.”306 It is here that we must 
abandon the perceived strict dichotomy between remembering and forgetting. The latter does 
not necessarily imply failure and the former does not always imply success. Rather, the 
former presupposes the latter because, as Le Donne contends, “it is impossible to see an 
object from every vantage-point.”307 Emphasizing one vantage point necessarily entails 
forgetting other possible perspectives.  
 Undoubtedly, not all instances of remembering/forgetting are made from the same 
cloth. Connerton, for example, distinguishes between seven types of forgetting.308 A. 
Assmann details four models of remembering/forgetting for navigating a violent past.309 And 
Ricoeur speaks of active and passive forgetting as representing two extremes along a 
continuum of forgetting.310 For present purposes, however, I leave aside the issue of 
classifying different episodes of memory according to sub-categories of remembering and/or 
forgetting. Instead, I wish to highlight what is at stake in how a violent past is selectively 
 
Landres, Religion, Violence, Memory, and Place, 214, argued that memorializing those events was no simple 
matter, since their meaning was still continuing to unfold, as they were when they first occurred. 
 306 Aleida Assmann and Linda Shortt, “Memory and Political Change: Introduction,” in Assmann and 
Shortt, Memory and Political Change, 5. 
 307 Le Donne, “Theological Memory Distortion in the Jesus Tradition,” 168. 
 308 Paul Connerton, “Seven Types of Forgetting,” Mem Stud 1 (2008): 59–71. 
 309 Aleida Assmann, “From Collective Violence to a Common Future: Four Models for Dealing with a 
Traumatic Past,” in Modlinger and Sonntag, Cultural History and Literary Imagination, 43–62. 
 310 Paul Ricoeur, “Memory—Forgetting—History,” in Meaning and Representation in History, ed. Jörn 
Rüsen (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2006), 9–19. 
 75 
remembered: remembering/forgetting violence is dangerous. This danger is apparent in two 
respects. 
 In one respect, remembering or forgetting violence risks (re)creating invisible and 
visible forms of violence. B. Lincoln once stated: “If war is the continuation of politics by 
other means … violence is the continuation of conflict by means of physical force.”311 
Building on his apodosis, we may formulate another thesis: while violence is the continuation 
of conflict by means of physical force, the memory of violence perpetuates the social 
conditions necessary for conflict to spark instances of physical harm. To quote Pennebaker 
again: “Powerful collective memories—whether real or concocted—can be at the root of 
wars, prejudice, nationalism, and cultural identities.”312 Indeed, B. Lincoln continues: 
 When social groups constitute their identity in religious terms and experience 
 themselves as a sacred collectivity (the faithful, the righteous, or God’s chosen 
 people, for instance), as a corollary they tend to construe their rivals in negative 
 fashion (heretics, infidels, apostates, evil, bestial, demonic, satanic, etc.). Under such 
 circumstances, the pursuit of self-interest—including vengeance for slights to one’s 
 pride (a.k.a. “honour”)—can be experienced as a holy cause, in support of which any 
 violence is justified.313 
 
 In her research on the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, Buckley-Zistel argues that 
Rwandans engage in what she terms “chosen amnesia.”314 Chosen amnesia is a deliberate 
refusal to remember certain aspects of the genocide, including the racial antagonisms 
between Hutu and Tutsi that fueled the massacres. To remember the causes of the genocide 
would have inevitably constructed the perpetrators and victims into antagonistic group 
identities. Consequently, chosen amnesia was viewed as (1) enabling peaceful co-existence 
between Hutu and Tutsi, and thus (2) a necessary deterrent of aggravating peaceful co-
existence and of repeating the atrocity.315 From this perspective, to remember certain aspects 
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of the difficult past between Hutu and Tutsi was tantamount to recreating the antagonistic and 
invisible social structure that had sowed the seeds of visible violence.316 Buckley-Zistel 
reveals a dark irony, however, when she contends that “chosen amnesia” fails to resolve 
social antagonisms. The strategy of deliberately forgetting the causes of the genocide may 
inadvertently “lead to the very thing it is designed to prevent” if another dictatorship arises 
and aggravates these unresolved social antagonisms.317 From this perspective, not to 
remember certain aspects of the genocide runs the risk of recreating violence.  
 Germany has faced similar difficulties in how to approach remembering WWII. After 
the Nuremberg Trials, Winston Churchill advocated forgetting, that is, not confronting 
Germany with the horrific memories of their past as a means of overcoming the war.318 In 
German eyes during the 1950s, forgetting the past represented “openness towards the 
future.”319 In later decades, however, the policy of forgetting from the 1950s “became 
negatively associated with denial and cover-up.”320 Thus, remembering in the 1980s and 
1990s became viewed “as a therapeutic tool to cleanse, to purge, to heal, to reconcile.”321 In 
this light, A. Assmann’s claim that memories are “double edged” in that they have the 
capacity both to overcome and perpetuate violence is especially poignant.322 
 In a second respect, remembering or forgetting a violent event—or rather certain 
aspects of that past—risks divesting a social group of their identity. Jacob’s research of 
gender representations at the memorial to genocide at Srebrenica regarding the 1990s conflict 
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in Bosnia-Herzegovina will help clarify this idea.323 According to Jacobs, the Serbian intent 
to destroy Bosnian culture, and thereby assert Serbian supremacy, motivated the sexual 
violence against Bosnian Muslim women: 
 Within the Serbian project of cultural and biological annihilation, gender informed the 
 goals of genocide in a number of specific ways. While Bosnian Muslim men were 
 enslaved, tortured, mutilated, and killed, women were enslaved, raped, tortured, 
 mutilated, impregnated, and, in some cases, murdered. Rape and forced pregnancy 
 were carried out as a means to expand the Serbian nation through the birth of Serbian 
 soldiers whose paternity, under the patriarchal norms of Serbian society, would define 
 their ethnic superiority and strength.324 
 
However, Jacobs observes that the commemorative narratives and texts at Srebrenica omit 
the trope of genocidal rape against Bosnian Muslim women. Instead, “the tropes of virtue and 
goodness” underscore gendered representation of women as “that of the grieving mother and 
wife.”325 Accordingly, she argues: 
 Because the memory of the raped body is marked by personal, familial, and national 
 degradation, memorializing this suffering and honoring those who survived the 
 violence are antithetical to the project of nation building and ethnic pride. 
 Remembering rape brings to public consciousness the specter of thousands of 
 “spoiled bodies” and the loss of virtue among Bosnian Muslim women, threatening 
 the viability of an ethnonationalist movement upon which notions of women’s 
 goodness and men’s protective manhood rely. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
 absence of sexual crimes as a trope of national remembrance thus illuminates a 
 politics of memory that is entwined with the restoring of patriarchal order and the 
 revitalization of traditional Muslim society.326 
 
By “forgetting” about the genocidal rape, the commemorative site circumvented a detail of 
the past that would have presumably impeded the reconfiguration of traditional Muslim 
identity, had it been remembered. From this perspective, to “remember” the genocidal rape 
would have comprised a threat to the reconstitution of the collective self.  
 Even if Jacobs’ interpretation of this particular site is wrong (it is after all an 
argument from silence), her argument highlights an important axiom regarding memory and 
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identity: identity in the present is largely sustained by memory of the past that evaluates that 
past as (ultimately) positive. A positive self-image of the past is necessary for the self’s 
continued existence, at least under some circumstances. Thus, when confronted with a violent 
past that is humiliating, degrading, or positions the self (whether perpetrators or victims) in a 
negative light, two impulses are possible in terms of memory selectivity. First, the event or 
the degrading aspects of it are repressed (whether actively or passively).327 Second, the 
degradation is acknowledged but contested so as not to be debilitating. 
 
2.5. Memory Contestation and Bodily Mutilation 
 
 Remembering a violent past is hardly ever apolitical.328 Lawrence and Karim argue: 
“Violence always has a context. Context shapes not just the actors or victims but also those 
who represent them. What is celebrated in one place may be mourned in another. Memory is 
never an equal balance, or a neutral lens, of human experience and history.”329 To paraphrase 
Wertsch, a social group’s embrace of a narrative about their past implies the dispelling of 
alternative or competing narrations.330 Indeed, A. Assmann demarcates “national memories” 
in general as “not dialogic but monologic” since they enhance identity and acclaim the 
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collective self.331 Insofar as narrations of violence are embedded in (re)configuring 
subjectivities, memories of violence are thus subject to contestation.332  
 The narration of violence as a site of contestation takes on particular significance 
when specific techniques of bodily violence are in view. Henry explains: “Bodies do not 
simply express trauma; they are a place where identity and meaning can be actively 
reconfigured into socially and personally acceptable ways for understanding, coping, and 
creatively managing trauma.”333 Human bodies signify. As Douglas notes: “The human body 
is the most readily available image” of a social structure.334 Undeniably, the body (including 
its constituent parts) is a ready-to-use conduit of socially constructed meaning(s). Since 
human bodies can function as channels of explicit and implicit discourse, they are 
“expressions of the social world they inhabit,” vehicles of symbolic communication.335 
 To touch,336 adorn,337 modify,338 or imprison339 the body, therefore, conveys or elicits 
information specific to a socio-historical context. Likewise, to mutilate or subject the body to 
 
 331 Assmann, “From Collective Violence,” 54. See also, Malkki, Purity and Exile, 55; Neal, National 
Trauma, 205–06.  
 332 Consider, for example, the varying conceptualizations of Timothy McVeigh’s intentions in the 
Oklahoma City bombing. Whereas McVeigh viewed himself as a patriot fulfilling his duty, American society 
has largely externalized his actions as one of an extremist, not a patriot. See, Kenneth Foote, “On the Edge of 
Memory: Uneasy Legacies of Dissent, Terror, and Violence in the American Landscape.,” Soc Sci Q 97 (2016): 
115–22; Hamm, “Apocalyptic Violence.” 
 333 Doug Henry, “Violence and the Body: Somatic Expressions of Trauma and Vulnerability during 
War,” MAQ 20 (2006): 391. On the human body as a “site” of memory, see Misztal, Theories of Social 
Remembering, 141–45. 
 334 Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology (London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1973), 
17. 
 335 Erica Reischer and Kathryn S. Koo, “The Body Beautiful: Symbolism and Agency in the Social 
World,” Annu. Rev. Anthropol. 33 (2004): 299. 
 336 João De Pina-Cabral, “Tamed Violence: Genital Symbolism in Portuguese Popular Culture,” Man 
28 (1993): 101–20, shows that, during festivals in Amarante, Portugal, teenage boys prod teenage girls (on the 
head or backside) with phallic-shaped cakes to publicly demarcate their personal gender identity. 
 337 Although most Americans would recognize the (un)-adorned third finger on the left hand as an 
indicator of marital status, Reischer and Koo, “The Body Beautiful,” 300, argue that they likely would not 
possess the requisite cultural knowledge to recognize that white robes in India designate a woman’s widowhood. 
 338 As Asian facial features are frequently the object of pejorative stereotyping in American culture, 
Reischer and Koo, “The Body Beautiful,” 305, notes that many Asian Americans actually surgically modify 
their eyes to reflect more clearly those qualities associated with a capitalistic work-ethic (e.g. attentiveness). 
 339 Miranda Aldhouse-Green, “Chaining and Shaming: Images of Defeat, From Llyn Cerrig Bach to 
Sarmitzegetusa,” OJA 23 (2004): 319–40, argues that the utilization of the gang-chain publicly signifies the 
change in status and shame of the captive. 
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physical forms of violence is to freight such violence with symbolic potential.340 For 
example, in Anglo-Norman England, Norman rulers utilized castration as a penalty for 
treason.341 According to Van Eickels, masculinity constituted a prerequisite of political 
efficacy. Thus, to castrate a political enemy comprised “an appropriate form of royal 
revenge.”342 Further, Connerton argues that the French revolutionaries who executed Louis 
XVI of France chose beheading as the mode of execution because of its fitting symbolism.343 
For a millennium, France’s kings received the anointing of oil and the crown on their heads 
as the bodily enactment of their coronation. To decapitate the anointed head, therefore, 
amounted to a “ritual revocation” of that coronation.344 It both expressed the people’s 
detestation of the old dynastic regime and their intent to constitute a new social order moving 
forward. Connerton thus notes: “Not simply the natural body of the king but also and above 
all his political body was killed.”345 
 Thus, perpetrators often harness physical forms of violence, such as torture or 
disfigurement, to humiliate and divest individuals of their identities. Torture often infantilizes 
its victims.346 In the words of Scarry: 
 Whatever pain achieves, it achieves in part through its unsharability, and it ensures 
 this unsharability through its resistance to language.… Physical pain does not simply 
 resist language but actively destroys it, bringing about an immediate reversion to a 
 
 340 See, Kirk, “The Memory of Violence,” 192; Malkki, Purity and Exile, 94. The symbolism of 
somatic violence is observable in pop-cultural phenomena as well. Viv Burr (“‘Oh Spike You’re Covered in 
Sexy Wounds!’ The Erotic Significance of Wounding and Torture in Buffy the Vampire Slayer,” in Sex, 
Violence, and the Body: The Erotics of Wounding, ed. Viv Burr and Jeff Hearn [Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008], 137–56) has shown, for instance, that the cult-classic television show Buffy the Vampire 
Slayer (starring Sarah Michelle Gellar) has several scenes of bodily torture throughout the series that are 
erotically charged. 
 341 Klaus Van Eickels, “Gendered Violence: Castration and Blinding as Punishment for Treason in 
Normandy and Anglo-Norman England,” Gend Hist 16 (2004): 588–602. 
 342 Van Eickels, “Gendered Violence,” 591. 
 343 Connerton, How Societies Remember, 9–13. 
 344 Connerton, How Societies Remember, 13. By contrast, Ilongot men of northern Luzon in the 
Philippines decapitate human heads in order to cast away the rage that is born of personal loss. See, Rosaldo, 
“Grief and a Headhunter’s Rage.” 
 345 Connerton, How Societies Remember, 9. 
 346 See e.g., Begoña Aretxaga, “Dirty Protest: Symbolic Overdetermination and Gender in Northern 
Ireland Ethnic Violence,” Ethos 23 (1995): esp. 129; Aretxaga, “Dirty Protest,” (2004): esp. 246. 
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 state anterior to language, to the sounds and cries a human being makes before 
 language is learned.347  
 
Furthermore, Malkki provides numerous graphic accounts of violent techniques used by Tutsi 
against Hutu in the 1972 Burundi genocide: 
 The manners that the Tutsi employed—if, for example—yes, we are adults, well … 
 for example: a pregnant woman (Hutu). There was a manner of cutting the stomach. 
 Everything that was found in the interior was lifted out without cutting the cord. The 
 cadaver of the mama, the cadaver of the baby, of the future, they rotted on the road. 
 Not even burial. The mother was obliged to eat the finger of the baby. One cut the 
 finger, and then one said to the mother: Eat! […].348 
 
She provides similarly disturbing accounts on the same page: 
 
 The girls in secondary schools, they killed each other. The Tutsi girls were given 
 bamboos. They were made to kill by pushing the bamboo from below [from the 
 vagina] to the mouth … For the pregnant women, the stomach was cut, and then the 
 child who had been inside—one said to the mama: “Eat your child”—this embryo. 
 One had to do it. And then, other women and children, they were put inside a house—
 like two hundred—and then the house was burned.349 
 
As Malkki persuasively indicates throughout her discussion, these methods of killing are not 
random acts of violence.350 How people suffer is of utmost importance—violent atrocities of 
bodily mutilation are not void of meaning. The focus on specific body parts (e.g. vagina) and 
social relationships (e.g. mother-embryo) symbolically corresponds the procedures of killing 
to the socio-political intent “to destroy the procreative capability, the ‘new life,’ of the Hutu 
people.”351 Indeed, forcing women to consume their own children signified “a complete 
reversal of the ‘progress of nature’ in which the mother’s body nurtures, forms, and brings 
into the world ‘new life.’”352 Similarly, Hutu viewed other methods of disfigurement—
demolishing skulls, connecting the vagina/anus to the skull via bamboo, forcing fathers and 
 
 347 Elaine Scarry, “The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World,” in Scheper-Hughes 
and Bourgois, Violence in War and Peace, 366. 
 348 Malkki, Purity and Exile, 91 (see 86–102 for her wider discussion). 
 349 Malkki, Purity and Exile, 91 (italics original). 
 350 Malkki, Purity and Exile, 95–96, mentions that the Tutsi did not kill Hutu with bullets because that 
would have represented an honorable death. 
 351 Malkki, Purity and Exile, 92. 
 352 Malkki, Purity and Exile, 93. 
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daughters to drown together in incestuous positions—as stressing their powerlessness and 
dehumanization.353 Especially with these accounts’ emphasis on reproductive methods of 
torture, it is not surprising that the Hutu viewed the minority Tutsi as seeking “‘to equalize 
the population, up until 50 percent.’”354 
 In commemorative activity, however, the symbolic meanings associated with bodily 
violence are subject to affirmation or contestation, “as those with competing claims over 
meaning try to inscribe their own version of reality onto individuals.”355 The embedded 
meaning of violence in some cases becomes inverted or significantly altered in how it is 
narrated.356 Bringing a violent past to bear on the present often compels social groups to 
vilify or cast as heroes the perpetrators or victims of past violence. As Malkki observes, the 
Hutu refugees framed their descriptions of bodily harm by underscoring the guilt of the 
perpetrators thereby shifting “the dehumanizing gaze” to the Tutsi.357 Thus, perpetrators and 
victims are marked into separate group identities. In such instances, the mutilated body 
becomes a key rhetorical instrument of asserting social autonomy, of transforming (or 
confirming) symbolic potentials, and setting apart antagonistic social groups from one 
another.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 With this theoretical framework in place, we can now identify its significance for 
analyzing the reception of the beheading of John the Baptist. Representations of bodily 
violence in the ancient world “do not simply reflect past realities.”358 They are fundamentally 
memory distortions, shaped by moral judgments that cast socio-political figures in negative 
 
 353 Malkki, Purity and Exile, 91–93. 
 354 Malkki, Purity and Exile, 91. 
 355 Henry, “Violence and the Body,” 385. 
 356 Cf. Neal, National Trauma, 17, notes that remembering groups assign to a violent past “strong 
moralistic judgments in terms of right or wrong, good or bad, true or false.” 
 357 Malkki, Purity and Exile, 93. 
 358 Walter Pohl, “Perceptions of Barbarian Violence,” in Drake, Violence in Late Antiquity, 22. 
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or positive terms. Zimmermann’s analysis of literary descriptions of “Formen extremer 
körperlicher Gewalt” (“extreme forms of physical violence”) highlights the excessive 
violence attributed to Roman emperors by ancient Roman historians.359 He argues that these 
literary narratives are designed as “Horrorszenarien” (“horror scenarios”) that instill disgust 
in the reader because of the “Absurdität” (“absurdity”) of the forms of violence described.360 
He comments that these narrations reflect Roman historians’ “politische 
Auseinandersetzungen oder die zeitgenössische Einschätzung einer politischen 
Konstellation” (“political disputes or the contemporary assessment of a political 
constellation”).361  
 This political slanting is not unlike the memory distortion that characterizes the 
memory of John’s beheading in the first three centuries. Underlying these traditions are the 
mechanisms of the social remembering of violence that this chapter has theorized. As 
chapters four and five will show, at work in the reception history is the contest over the 
memory of John’s beheading. The separation of the head from its body constituted a form of 
somatic violence in the ancient world that was freighted with degrading symbolic potential. 
Just as the crucifixion of Jesus forced early Christians to contest the negative symbolism of 
the script of crucifixion when they remembered Jesus’ death (e.g. Phil 2:5–11), so also those 
who remembered John’s beheading show signs of the commemorative impulse to reshape its 
social script in their configurations of self-definition.362 The Gospel of Mark, Justin Martyr, 
and Origen all acknowledge the degrading symbolism of John’s beading. However, they also 
 
 359 Martin Zimmermann, “Extreme Formen physischer Gewalt in der antiken Überlieferung,” in 
Extreme Formen von Gewalt in Bild und Text des Altertums, ed. Martin Zimmermann, MSAW (München: 
Herbert Utz Verlag, 2009), 155–92 (quotation, p. 155). Zimmermann distinguishes these “Formen extremer 
körperlicher Gewalt” (“extreme forms of physical violence”) from “einfachen Gewaltszenen” (“scenes of simple 
violence”) (p. 155). 
 360 Zimmermann, “Extreme Formen physischer Gewalt,” 155. 
 361 Zimmermann, “Extreme Formen physischer Gewalt,” 192. 
 362 See, Kirk, “The Memory of Violence,” 198–200. 
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key John’s beheading to the crucifixion of Jesus. In so doing, they shift the degrading 
potential of the decapitation away from John and onto his attackers.  
 Chapter five in particular will argue that, as the boundary lines between “Jews” and 
“Christians” become more readily recognizable in the second and third centuries, the 
contestation of John’s beheading takes on “anti-Jewish” reconfigurations. Whereas the 
Gospel of Mark, for instance, passes a negative moral judgment on “king” Antipas—and the 
Gospel of Matthew on Antipas the “tetrarch”—Justin Martyr and Origen superimpose a 
Jewish identity onto Herod Antipas. In effect, they redeploy the negative characterization of 
Antipas to implicate Jews in the beheading of God’s prophet, John. In this regard, the 
memory of John’s beheading becomes “violent.” It perpetuates invisible violence as it 
inscribes an ideological conceptualization of the Jews as manifest killers of the prophets. 
Before proceeding to chapters four and five, however, it is necessary in chapter three to 
substantiate the claim that beheading in the ancient world constituted a humiliating technique 
of bodily mutilation. As we will see, some historians misleadingly categorize beheading as an 
“honorable” method of death in the ancient Greco-Roman world. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
CULTURES OF BEHEADING IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 
 
Human beings have often cut off one another’s heads.  
They do not always cut off another’s head.  
They often strenuously disapprove cutting off heads,  
yet someone somewhere is always cutting off someone else’s head for some reason.  
Why?363 
 
The deliberate separation of a head from 
 its body is exclusively cultural.364 
 
Arya Stark: Could you bring back a man without a head? 
Not six times. Just once. 
Thoros of Myr: I don’t think it works that way, child.365  
 
Introduction 
Prior to chapter four’s presentation of the contestation of John’s decapitation, it is necessary 
in this third chapter to offer a cultural analysis of the ideology of beheading in the ancient 
world. Two observations prompt this analysis. First, interpreters have considerably neglected 
bringing the social discourse of beheading to bear on interpreting John’s decapitation. Major 
monographs on the Baptist sparingly (if at all) appeal to ancient beheadings in their 
discussions of his death.366 Likewise, a review of several commentaries on Mark 6:14–
29//Matt 14:1–12 shows that many scholars have devoted little or no attention to this 
consideration.367 Even Malina and Rohrbaugh’s social-scientific analysis of Mark 6:14–29 
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76; Schweizer, Mark, 131–35; Lane, Mark, 210–23; C. S. Mann, Mark, AB (New York: Doubleday, 1986), 
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does not once mention either John’s beheading, the postmortem manipulation of John’s head, 
or the burial of John’s headless body.368  
 This lacuna is especially palpable when compared to the abundance of scholarship 
that interprets the death of Jesus in light of the sociology of ancient crucifixion. Hengel’s 
comment from 1977—“There is still an urgent need for a comprehensive study of crucifixion 
and capital law in antiquity, including the Jewish world”—no longer rings true, at least not as 
an urgent need.369 German and English works on crucifixion in antiquity, for example, by 
Kuhn, Chapman, Samuelsson, and Cook in 1982, 2008, 2011, and 2014, respectively, and the 
collaborative effort by Chapman and Schnabel in 2015 have largely answered Hengel’s 
call.370 Accompanying these labors is a host of articles and essays dedicated to (Jesus’) 
crucifixion in reference works371 and peer-reviewed journals.372 Despite the chorus of voices 
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that has joined the discussion, widespread agreement persists that the shame of Jesus’ 
crucifixion represented an obstacle to overcome in early Christianity’s proclamation(s) of 
Jesus as ὁ Χριστός.373 In a field dominated by studies that emphasize the severity of Roman 
crucifixion, understanding the severity of ancient beheading is largely uncharted territory for 
NT scholars. 
 Second, historians frequently categorize beheading in the Greco-Roman world as 
simple, unaggravated, or an honorable form of violence. Berkowitz’ characterization of 
Roman decapitation as “its most honorable method [of execution]” is typical in this regard.374 
Relatedly, some NT scholars have been quick to contrast the extremeness of crucifixion with 
the simplicity of other forms of punishment.375 However, as the following discussion 
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demonstrates, these assertions need to be met with significant nuance. I argue that the severed 
head, in the general context of John the Baptist, not only represented a degrading form of 
bodily violence, but also one that could interrupt proper burial and impact the victim in life in 
the hereafter. 
 With these two preliminary observations in place, the following discussion 
accordingly breaks into two parts. The first section sets forth a grouping of primary data of 
beheadings in the ancient world. This data suggests that inhabitants of the ancient Greco-
Roman world were familiar with the social script of beheading. The second section then 
details the nature of this script by offering several points of modification to the assertion that 
beheading comprised an honorable death in ancient Rome. The chapter closes by previewing 
how the contours of this script affect this study’s interpretation of early memories of John’s 
beheading. 
 
1. The Severed Head: A Familiar Social Script 
That the ideology of beheading has been largely underexplored is unfortunate. A sampling of 
the primary sources relevant to John’s context reveals that the severing of the head (or in 
many cases the already severed head) was a familiar social script for those who lived in the 
ancient Greco-Roman world.  
 
1.1. Beheadings in Jewish Literature 
 Many Jewish occupants of the Roman Empire who read the HB or LXX for 
themselves (or listened as others read for them), were likely familiar with the traditions of 
beheading that formed part of their cultural heritage. Joseph interprets the baker’s dream as 
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signifying that Pharaoh would cut off the baker’s head.376 Judges recounts that the 
Ephraimites brought the heads of Oreb and Zeeb to Gideon.377 When the Philistines captured 
the ark of YHWH and placed it in the temple of Dagon, they woke up on the second morning 
to behold Dagon’s head and hands cut off before the ark.378 First Samuel also narrates that 
David cut off Goliath’s head with Goliath’s own sword and brought the head to Jerusalem.379 
After King Saul died on Mount Gilboa he was beheaded by the Philistines.380 Two 
Benjamites attack, behead, and then present the head of Ishbosheth (Saul’s son) to David at 
Hebron.381 An unnamed woman had Sheba’s head cut off and thrown to Joab when Joab 
pursued Sheba to Abel.382 During a severe famine in Samaria, the King of Israel sought 
Elisha’s head: “So may God do to me, and more, if the head of Elisha son of Shaphat stays on 
his shoulders today” (2 Kgs 6:31 NRSV; similarly, 4 Kgdms 6:31 LXX). Jehu had Ahab’s 
seventy sons decapitated and their heads stacked in two heaps before the gate of Jezreel.383 
Finally, Isaiah conveys that YHWH cut off from Israel both head and tail (Isa 9:13; Isa 9:13 
LXX; see also 4Q163). 
 Many Jewish texts retell these traditions. Josephus depicts David cutting off Goliath’s 
head “with the sword [of Goliath]” (τῇ ῥομφαίᾳ τῇ ἐκείνου) (Ant. 6.191). Thereafter, David 
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antecedent of either the possessive particle ו in Hebrew or the personal pronoun αὐτοῦ in Greek. Both versions, 
however, clarify in other ways that these pronouns refer to Goliath (not David). Specifically, they (1) indicate 
earlier in the narrative that David removed his own sword and armor before entering the battle (1 Sam 17:39; 1 
Kgdms 17:39 LXX) and (2) stress throughout the account that YHWH does not save by means of the sword (1 
Sam 17:45–47; 1 Kgdms 17:45–47 LXX). The Hebrew text, moreover, stresses in 17:50 that David did not have 
a sword in his hand (דוד דיב ןיא ברחו) when he struck down the Philistine. Psalm 151:7 LXX commemorates 
David’s defeat of Goliath by claiming that David used the Philistine’s sword to behead him: ἐγὼ δὲ σπασάμενος 
τὴν παρ᾽αὐτοῦ μάχαιραν ἀπεκεφάλισα αὐτόν (“But I, having withdrawn the short-sword from him, beheaded 
him”). 
 380 1 Sam 31:9; 1 Chr 10:9–10; 1 Chr 10:9–10 LXX; cf. 1 Kgdms 31:9 LXX. 
 381 2 Sam 4:1–12; 2 Kgdms 4:1–12 LXX. 
 382 2 Sam 20:10–22; 2 Kgdms 20:10–22 LXX. 
 383 2 Kgs 10:1–11; 4 Kgdms 10:1–11 LXX. 
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takes Goliath’s head to his tent.384 Like 1 Sam 31:8–9, Ant. 6.368–378 conveys that the 
Philistines “cut off” (ἀποτέμνουσιν) Saul’s head the morning after his death. Then there is 
Philo who recounts Joseph’s interpretation of the baker’s dream from Gen 40:19: “And after 
three days the king will command you to be crucified (ἀνασκολοπισθῆναι), and your head to 
be cut off (τὴν κεφαλὴν ἀποτμηθῆναι), and the birds will fly down and feast upon your flesh, 
until you are wholly devoured.”385 Josephus also recasts two stories as beheadings that were 
not portrayed as beheadings in the HB.386 According to Ant. 6.193–204, Saul pledges his 
daughter to David if David would bring Saul the heads (κεφαλάς) of six hundred Philistines. 
By contrast, 1 Sam 18:25 (1 Kgdms 18:25 LXX) claims that Saul asked David to bring him 
one hundred “foreskins” (תולרע) (ἀκροβυστίαις). In Ant. 2.310 Pharaoh “threatened to behead 
(τὴν κεφαλὴν ἀποτεμεῖν) [Moses], should he ever again come and pester him” concerning 
letting the Hebrews go.387 By contrast, Exod 10:28 does not specify the type of death with 
which Pharaoh threatened Moses, only that Pharaoh threatened Moses with death: 
  תומת ינפ ךתאר םויב יכ  
 “For, on the day you see my face you will die.”388  
Conversely, Josephus in one instance recasts a beheading from the HB as a mere crucifixion. 
In Ant. 2.73, he portrays Joseph predicting Pharaoh’s baker would be crucified: τῇ τρίτῃ 
δ᾽αὐτὸν ἀνασταυρωθέντα βορὰν ἔσεσθαι πετεινοῖς (“and on the third day, having been 
crucified, he would be food for the birds”). By contrast, Gen 40:19 has Joseph predict that the 
baker would be beheaded and then impaled. 
 
 384 Josephus, Ant. 6.192; cf. 1 Sam 17:54. 
 385 Philo, Ios. 96 (Yonge). 
 386 Similarly, Esth. Rab. 7:10 indicates that Haman would be beheaded and crucified (cf. Esth. 7:10). 
For the midrashic text and its translation, see Cook, Crucifixion in the Mediterranean World, 345. 
 387 Josephus, Ant. 2.310 (Thackeray, LCL). 
 388 The Septuagint does not specify the type of death either: ᾗ δ᾽ἄν ἡμέρα ὀφθῇς μοι, ἀποθανῇ (“Now, 
on whatever day you are seen by me, you will die”) (Exod 10:28 LXX). 
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 Further examples of decapitation from Jewish literature abound. According to Jdt. 13–
16, Judith cut off the head of the Assyrian general Holofernes. Judah Maccabee had the 
defeated Seleucid commander Nicanor beheaded and his head publicly displayed.389 “Zabdiel 
the Arab cut off (ἀφεῖλεν) the head (τὴν κεφαλήν) of Alexander and sent it to Ptolemy” (1 
Macc 11:17). Josephus mentions several other first-century (B)CE beheaded persons, 
including Herod the Great’s brother Joseph, Antigonus’ general Pappus, Antigonus himself, 
the tribune Celer, Herod’s slave Simon, the self-designated prophet Theudas, and an 
unnamed soldier who had destroyed certain laws of Moses.390 Josephus also recounts that a 
captured Roman trooper escaped beheading during the siege of Jerusalem.391  
 
1.2. Beheadings in Greco-Roman Literature 
 Others in the Greco-Roman world not familiar with Jewish traditions also likely 
understood the social script of beheading. The severed head was a prevalent cultural trope 
and a common site in war, public displays of violence, and city sieges. Iliad 18.176–180 
portrays the struggle for the corpse of Patroclus and mentions Hector’s eagerness to sever 
Patroclus’ head from his cadaver. Xerxes had Leonidas’ corpse beheaded.392 Euphorion 
makes reference to the Romans using an axe (πέλεκυς) in beheadings.393 Polybius mentions a 
certain prince whose body was impaled after his head was cut off and sewn up in ass’s 
skin.394 At Hist. 1.7.11–12, Polybius also describes the mass beheading of three hundred 
soldiers after the city Rhegium fell.395 Perseus cut off Medusa’s head, careful only to glance 
at her face through the reflection of his shield.396 Dionysius of Halicarnassus recounts 
 
 389 1 Macc 7:39–50; 2 Macc 15:28–36. 
 390 See, respectively, J.W. 1.323–326 (Ant. 14.448–450); J.W. 1.342–343 (Ant. 14.464); Ant. 15.8–9; 
J.W. 2.246; Ant. 17.273–277; Ant. 20.97–99 (cf. Acts 5:36); Ant. 20.117. 
 391 J.W. 6.360–362. 
 392 Herodotus, Pers. Wrs. 7.238. 
 393 Pr. Frgmts. 194. 
 394 Hist. 8.21.3. 
 395 Livy, Ab. urbe cond 3.9.3, numbers this mass beheading at three thousand. 
 396 Ovid, Metam. 4.765–785. 
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beheadings in the public sphere (ἐν τῷ φανερῷ) and in the forum (ἀγορά) at Rome.397 
Velleius Paterculus (Comp. Rom. Hist. 2.27.3), Lucan (Civ. W. 2.160–173), and Appian 
(Rom. Hist. Civ. 1.10.93) hold varying reports of beheading in the aftermath of the Battle at 
the Colline Gate in Rome (82 BCE). Cassius prematurely offered his neck to the sword after 
he had sent an orderly to identify whether an approaching military force was a friend (Brutus) 
or foe (Caesar and Antony).398 
 Hannibal beheaded Vesulus “by a swift (rapido) sword cut.”399 Germanic tribes cut 
off Varus’ head from his dead body after the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest in 9 CE.400 In his 
account of the execution of Dareius, Plutarch refers to the Persian custom of using a knife 
(ξυρόν) to behead the condemned.401 Some reports, according to Plutarch, claim that Galba 
had his head cut off.402 Plutarch indicates that Antony had Antigonus the Jew beheaded.403 
Describing events in the latter half of the first century CE, Tacitus mentions a certain Sabinus 
whose body was dragged to the Gemonian stairs in Rome after having his head cut off.404 
Tacitus also recounts that Claudia Octavia’s head was transported to Rome after her 
 
 397 Ant. rom. 2.29; 3.58.4; 6.30.1–2. 
 398 Velleius Paterculus, Comp. Rom. Hist. 2.70.2–3.  
 399 Silius Italicus, Pun. 10.145–146 (Duff, LCL). 
 400 Velleius Paterculus, Comp. Rom. Hist. 2.119.1–5. Dio Cassius, Rom. hist. 56.21.5, indicates that 
Varus took his own life, but does not comment on the postmortem treatment of his body by the Germanic tribes. 
 401 “He turned back, and with one hand clutching Dareius by the hair, dragged him to the ground, and 
cut off (ἀπέτεμε) his head (τὸν τράχηλον) with the knife (τῷ ξυρῷ)” (Plutarch, Art. 29 [Perrin, LCL]). Perrin’s 
rendering of τράχηλον as “head” in English is appropriate in that it conveys that this passage refers to a 
beheading. At first glance, “he cut his throat” may seem like the natural translation of τράχηλον (lit. “neck” or 
“throat”) as the direct object of ἀποτέμνω (lit. “cut from” or “cut off”). However, three reasons make this option 
unlikely in this particular instance. First, the executioner clearly enters the chamber with the intent of beheading 
Dareius, as the context makes clear beforehand: ὁ δὲ δήμιος κληθεὶς ἧκε μὲν ξυρὸν ἔχων, ᾧ τὰς κεφαλὰς 
ἀποτέμνουσι τῶν κολαζομένων (Art. 29). Second, although Plutarch portrays the executioner initially refusing 
to behead Dareius, at the pressure of those outside the chamber the executioner concedes and fulfills his duty. 
The text and context do not convey that he slit Dareius’ throat instead of beheading him. Third, the notion of 
slitting a throat is more frequently conveyed by other means, particularly in the usage of σφάζω and its cognates 
(see, e.g., Euripides, Andr. 410; Cycl. 399; El. 813). I am not aware of a single clear reference in Plutarch where 
τράχηλον is used to communicate a slit throat. Plutarch uses σφάζω and its cognates to communicate this idea. 
See Plutarch, Dion. 57.2; Oth. 2.3; Vit. pud. 4; Amat. narr. 3 (twice). 
 402 Galb. 27.2–4. 
 403 Ant. 36. Dio Cassius (Hist. rom. 49.22.6) does not explicitly mention that Antigonus was 
decapitated: “But Antigonus he bound to a cross and flogged,—a punishment no other king had suffered at the 
hands of the Romans—and afterwards slew him” (Cary and Foster, LCL). 
 404 Hist. 3.74. 
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gruesome execution involving steam from a hot bath and her veins being cut.405 For his role 
in the assassination of Julius Caesar, Trebonius was decapitated and soldiers rolled his head 
on the pavement until it was crushed entirely.406 Dio Cassius writes that the head of Brutus 
was sent to Rome but lost at sea during a storm.407 And Herodian even reports that 
Commodus beheaded ostriches by shooting arrows at them in the Roman amphitheater. The 
birds continued to run swiftly after their heads had been cut off.408 
 
1.3. Clarification  
 A deluge of other examples could be cited. Two points of clarification, however, are 
necessary. First, I am not suggesting that ancient people were more inclined toward violence 
than modern societies. This impression “dominates the popular and non-scholarly perception 
of antiquity.”409 To an extent, this assumption surfaces from the observation that violence in 
the ancient world was a public phenomenon, invading public spaces such as amphitheaters, 
arenas, roads, forums, city walls, and citadels.410 The public performance of a phenomenon 
can certainly enable the perception of its pervasiveness. However, a shift in the spatial 
performance of violence—from public to private—in the modern period does not necessarily 
imply a decline in its scope.411 Rather, the shift just as easily implies ideological changes 
about the legitimate use of, goals of, and culturally appropriate locations for such 
performances.412 In this respect, the dubious contemporary assumption that antiquity was 
 
 405 Ann. 14.64. 
 406 Appian, Bell. civ. 3.26. 
 407 Hist. rom. 49.2–3. 
 408 Hist. Emp. 1.15.5. 
 409 Martin Zimmermann, “Violence in Late Antiquity Reconsidered,” in Drake, Violence in Late 
Antiquity, 350.  
 410 One is reminded of Quintilian’s remark about crucifixion: “When we crucify criminals the most 
frequented roads are chosen, where the greatest number of people can look and be seized by this fear. For every 
punishment has less to do with the offence than with the example” (Decl. min. 274.13 [Bailey, LCL]). 
 411 Zimmermann, “Violence Reconsidered,” 350–51. 
 412 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: 
Vintage, 1977), 11–12, argues that the modern period’s practice of execution (characterized by the 
“disappearance of the spectacle and the elimination of pain”) indicates “a whole new morality concerning the 
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especially prone toward violence reflects more the modern West’s insulation from 
enactments of violence than it presents a cogent differentiation between ancient and modern 
predispositions.413 
 Second, I am not proceeding under the assumption that all accounts of beheading 
from the HB and Greco-Roman literature “actually occurred” (as portrayed). In constructing 
an ideology of beheading in the ancient world, it is not necessary to ascertain and rely on 
“real” accounts, on the one hand, and to discard “idealistic” ones, on the other hand. It is best 
to abandon such a strict dichotomy altogether. The theoretical approach advocated by 
Hölscher for investigating Greek and Roman culture in images of war is illuminating on a 
comparative basis: 
 Firstly, all artistic images are of course mental constructs. As far as they represent the 
 world of reality, they select specific subjects and motifs relevant for their purpose, 
 focus on particular aspects of them, and enhance the expressive power of those 
 chosen aspects. Images are thus reflections of cultural imagination. Secondly, reality 
 too is a construct. The reality of war is determined and formed by particular technical 
 conditions—arms and armour, logistical equipment, tactical and strategic concepts, 
 patterns of behavior and social ideals. Such conditions affect fundamentally the 
 concrete and visual conduct of fighting. Reality in this sense is an image. Thirdly, the 
 perception of reality is also a construct. A war or a battle can be perceived, for 
 example, as a collective enterprise or as a series of individual achievements, as a 
 glorious event or as a theatre of suffering and death. Perception in this sense creates 
 images. And finally, such mental constructs are determined by cultural circumstances, 
 specific to individual societies in different historical periods.414 
 
 
act of punishing.” For instance, the move to strict capital punishment means that execution no longer specifies 
the crime committed; nor does it identify the social status of the culprit. 
 413 Furthermore, it is not possible to arrive at such a differentiation. In his work on interpersonal 
violence in the Roman Empire, Garrett G. Fagan, “Violence in Roman Social Relations,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Social Relations in the Roman World, ed. Michael Peachin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 469, observes that the requisite documentation to quantify “rates of domestic violence, or muggings, or 
bandit/pirate raids, or even violent conflicts between supposedly ‘law-abiding’ inhabitants of the empire” does 
not exist. He claims: “The best we can hope for is to arrive at a kind of Roman ‘etiquette of violence,’ insofar as 
we can glimpse the sort of violence that was done, by whom and to whom, and under what circumstances.” 
Fagan reasserts these comments in his more recent study, “Urban Violence: Street, Forum, Bath, Circus, and 
Theater,” in Riess and Fagan, The Topography of Violence, 231–47. Relatedly, the fluctuation in the amount of 
violence reported between various ancient authors does not decisively indicate a corresponding fluctuation in 
rates of violence across different temporal matrices. As Zimmermann, “Violence Reconsidered,” 353, puts it: “If 
there are more reports of violence for a particular time span, then this may simply mean that—for whatever 
reason or political aim—there was more reporting on violence in this time, not necessarily more violence.” 
 414 Tonio Hölscher, “Images of War in Greece and Rome: Between Military Practice, Public Memory, 
and Cultural Symbolism,” JRS 93 (2003): 2. 
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Hölscher’s approach rightly complicates the dichotomy between realism and idealism.415 It 
thus shares an affinity with social memory theory’s complication of the relationship between 
the past and the present. On the one hand, those who create images or narrate instances of 
“real” violence from the past inevitably distort these events. Their portrayals are distorted by 
culturally specific motifs and conditioned by present social contexts. In this sense, “real” 
portrayals of violence reflect and advance the ideology of a social group—their attitudes, 
emotions, convictions, judgments, and core values presumed essential for existence.416  
 On the other hand, those who create “idealistic” accounts of violence nevertheless 
rely on existing social structures and purvey real historical attitudes and judgments. As Fagan 
explains: “Ancient anecdotes and fiction can act as mirrors that reflect social attitudes, 
assumptions, and realities, even if the immediate context is highly dubious or even 
fantastical. This is because in order to be effective, satires or novels have to present their 
audience with recognizable social paradigms.”417 Narrations of violence obscure and 
communicate reality by distorting it. 
 
 415 Hölscher, “Images of War in Greece and Rome,” 7–8, exemplifies his approach in his discussion of 
the “powerful male body, trained by naked exercise in the palaestra” as a core factor in ancient Spartan 
conceptualizations of “successful warriorship” (quotations, p. 7). His discussion begins by observing the 
numerous ancient Greek vase paintings and reliefs of naked warriors. These images contrast with the reality of 
archaic battles that were fought in full hoplite armor. He then proceeds to juxtapose two texts about fourth-
century Sparta. The first text, from Xenophon (Hellenica 1.28), details a decisive Spartan victory over a larger 
Persian force. The Spartan leader Agesilaos had eradicated his troopers’ initial despair by stripping Persian 
captives of their clothes. He thus revealed their “pale bodies that had never trained in a Greek palaestra” (p. 7). 
The second text, from Plutarch (Agesilaos 34.6–8), details a Theban invasion of Sparta. According to Hölscher’s 
summary, “a certain Isidas ran out from his house, totally naked, his body rubbed with oil like an athlete, and 
put the enemy to flight” (p. 7). Such a maneuver was not a military custom. However, as Hölscher contends, the 
trained male body was a real factor in military conflict. This reality of warfare was thus “made visible” in 
ancient Greek paintings and reliefs of naked warriors even though it was perhaps not actually “visible in battle” 
(pp. 7–8). Conversely, if these paintings had depicted armored warriors (as opposed to naked warriors), then 
they would have communicated a real military custom. But, they would not have communicated “the full reality 
of warfare” (p. 7). Hölscher thus arrives at two conclusions. (1) “The nude body of Greek warriors in art is 
therefore not a phenomenon of idealization: the body was a real factor in the conception of war” (p. 7). (2) The 
scarcity of nude bodies of warriors in Hellenistic Greek art does not reflect a shift from idealism to realism in 
the Hellenistic age as much as it reflects a shift away from seeing the body as the central factor in successful 
military action. 
 416 For similar comments, see Zimmermann, “Violence Reconsidered,” 357. 
 417 Fagan, “Violence,” 469–70. 
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 It is with these clarifications in place that I make the assertion that inhabitants of the 
Greco-Roman world were familiar with the social script of beheading. They could “read” this 
script not because everyday rates of violence were necessarily high. Rather, many likely 
understood the sight of the severed head because of their access to traditions about 
decapitation(s). This familiarity underlines the importance of engaging this script to 
understand the tradition of John’s beheading. As chapters four and five will show, some of 
the early tradition history of John’s death acutely dwells on the contours of his decapitation. 
Those who remembered his beheading in the early centuries CE engage this script and 
redeploy it in their commemorative operations of self-definition. What, then, were the 
ideological contours of beheading?  
 
2. The Social Script of Beheading 
The act of severing and separating a head from its body was performed with the intention of 
degrading and dishonoring the beheaded. Repeated assertions in critical scholarship, 
however, run the risk of painting a misleading picture about the degrading potential of 
beheading in the ancient world. According to Kyle in his Spectacles of Death in Ancient 
Rome: “Quick and unaggravated, decapitation at the edge of town was the most discreet form 
of execution, a privilege for citizens of status. For a host of crimes Rome punished criminals 
of low status with aggravated or ultimate punishments (summa supplicia), which included 
exposure to wild beasts, crucifixion, and burning alive.”418 Garnsey refers to “death by 
decapitation” as “the least painful and degrading form of execution.”419 Like Kyle and 
Garnsey, Coleman differentiates between the “‘aggravated’ forms of capital punishment” 
 
 418 Kyle, Spectacles of Death, 53. 
 419 Garnsey, “Why Penalties Become Harsher,” 147. 
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(crucifixion, crematio, and damnatio ad bestias) and “simple execution by decapitation.”420 
According to Wiedemann: 
 Beheading by the sword came to be a privilege reserved only for the so-called 
 honestiores (senators, soldiers and others in the emperor’s service, and members of 
 municipal councils, with their families).… But the rest of the population (the 
 humiliores) found themselves subject in late antiquity to the forms of the death 
 penalty to which only non-citizens had been liable in earlier centuries. These were: 
 crucifixion, being torn to death by animals (ad bestias), and being burnt to death (ad 
 flammas or crematio).421 
  
Also, some NT scholars have been quick to establish the extremeness of crucifixion by 
contrasting it with the simplicity of other forms of punishment. In reference to Mark 15:12–
14, Lane comments: “Both the leaders of the people and the inflamed crowd demanded not 
simply capital punishment, but the most ignominous [sic] form of death, crucifixion.”422 
 Collectively, these assertions rightly underscore that Rome often distributed 
punishment unequally between those of varying social statuses in order to maintain these 
distinctions even in death.423 Executions in the Roman arena in the early Empire, for 
example, upheld such stratifications by allocating types of punishment according to the 
statuses of the performers.424 Kyle is convincing when he contends that the Epicurean 
concept of death as the great equalizer of individuals is not altogether true of ancient Roman 
 
 420 Coleman, “Fatal Charades,” 55. 
 421 Wiedemann, Emperors and Gladiators, 69. 
 422 Lane, Mark, 556. Cf. Evans, Mark, 484. 
 423 Berkowitz, Execution and Invention, 153: “A criminal condemned to death in the Roman Empire 
might, among other penalties, end up either decapitated, exposed to wild beasts, crucified, burned alive, or 
condemned to be a gladiator, depending on his or her social status and on the nature of the crime.” Coleman, 
“Fatal Charades,” 55: “A crucial factor in the Roman penal system was the evolution of differentiated penalties 
for offenders of different status: humiliores and honestiores.… Increasingly under the Empire the pool of 
persons treated as humiliores grew, so that penalties previously reserved for slaves became applicable to free 
aliens and perhaps even to citizens of low status.” 
 424 J. C. Edmondson, “Dynamic Arenas: Gladiatorial Presentations in the City of Rome and the 
Construction of Roman Society during the Early Empire,” in Roman Theatre and Society, ed. W. J. Slater (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 96–97: “To be condemned ad gladium (i.e. to decapitation by the 
sword) was less demeaning socially than to be crucified or burnt alive, which in turn were less demeaning 
punishments than to be condemned ad bestias. The normal result was death in all cases, but the niceties of social 
stratification had to be preserved even in death.” 
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ideologies.425 Further, it is true that Romans could—and probably did—appeal to their status 
to gain what was sometimes considered a more favorable death in beheading.426  
 Such claims, however, need to be qualified by the surplus of primary evidence that 
situates beheading as a degrading form of bodily mutilation. In this vein, the remainder of 
this chapter offers seven points of nuance that accentuate this feature of ancient beheading 
discourses. The last three points are particularly important for the present study as they 
underscore elements of beheading vital for understanding the early reception of John’s death.  
 
2.1. Degradation of the Victim 
 First, severing a head from its body was not necessarily a “quick” undertaking. The 
employment of swords, axes, or knives in the moment of severing a head from the body did 
not by default imply a clean, “painless” cut with one swift stroke of the instrument. Epictetus 
mentions a certain Lateranus (whom Nero ordered to be beheaded) who had to offer his neck 
a second time because the first blow did not achieve its purpose: “For he stretched out his 
neck and received the blow, but, as it was a feeble one, he shrank back for an instant, and 
then stretched out his neck again.”427 Further, in some circumstances beheading formed part 
of a complex enactment of violence, such as when it was combined with other forms of 
 
 425 Kyle, Spectacles of Death, 128. 
 426 Cf. Acts 16:37–38; 22:25–28; 25:1–27. It is common to explain the variegated executions of Peter 
(crucifixion) and Paul (decapitation) by detailing the different forms of punishment imposed on Roman citizens 
versus non-citizens. See, Valerio Marotta, “St. Paul’s Death: Roman Citizenship and summa supplicia,” in The 
Last Years of Paul: Essays from the Tarragona Conference, June 2013, ed. Armand Puig i Tàrrech and John M. 
G. Barclay, WUNT 352 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015), 247–69. 
 427 Epictetus, Disc. 1.1.19–20 (Oldfather, LCL). Judith’s decapitation of Holofernes took more than one 
cut: “And she struck into his neck twice in her strength and took off his head from him” (Jdt 13:8 LXX). 
Archaeological evidence of decapitated inhumations in early and late Roman Britain correspond to the literary 
descriptions of beheadings varying between one or more strokes. For details, see, Dorothy Watts, Religion in 
Late Roman Britain: Forces of Change (London: Routledge, 1998), 74–95; Katie Tucker, “‘Whence This 
Severance of the Head?’: The Osteology and Archaeology of Human Decapitation in Britain” (PhD thesis., 
University of Winchester, 2012), 109–133. Modern case studies likewise observe that severing a head from its 
body was not necessarily easy. See, e.g., Kamil Hakan Dogan, “Decapitation and Dismemberment of the 
Corpse: A Matricide Case,” JFS 55 (2010): 542–45, who reports seventy-one wounds to the head and back of a 
decapitated victim. 
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degrading harm: flogging,428 crucifixion and/or impalement,429 dragging,430 and the 
dismemberment and mutilation of other parts of the body.431 In these respects, beheading 
could conform to the ancient correspondence between a slow death and a shameful death.432
 Second, decapitation was not universally recognized as an “unaggravated” form of 
execution in Rome. Following crucifixion and burning someone alive, Callistratus describes 
beheading as an extreme punishment (Dig. 48.19.28). Similarly, the Pauli Sententiae 
indicates crucifixion, burning, and beheading as the summa supplicia (PS. 5.17.2). Thus, 
O’Collins’ description of decollatio as one of the “aggravated methods of execution” in 
Roman society is not without ancient precedent.433  
 Third, Rome could behead citizens or those who held a high social status in a bid to 
dishonor them. Emperor Claudius once sentenced a Roman tribune named Celer to 
beheading: “Celer he sent back to Hierosolyma in chains, and directed that he be handed over 
to the Judeans for torture and that, after he had been dragged around the city, in this way 
(οὕτω) his head be hacked off.”434 Mason observes the implication that the adverb οὕτω (“in 
this way”) makes explicit: “This beheading, after torture and humiliation by foreigners, 
following the months-long journey back to Judea in anticipation, would be an extreme form 
 
 428 See, e.g., Appian, Samn. Hist. 3.9.3; Diodorus of Sicily, Lib. Hist. 36.4; 38.8; Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus, Ant. Rom. 3.58.4; 5.61.3; Livy, Ab urbe cond. 2.5; Plutarch, Publ. 6.99; Polybius, Hist. 1.7.12. In 
the Greek examples, the “scourging” appears as an aorist circumstantial participle and the “beheading” appears 
as an aorist (in)finite verb. Both actions are thus linked together as a coterminous event. I refrain from including 
P.Oxy. 22.2339 among these examples. It mentions that a judge was “about to behead” (μέλλοντες κεφαλίσαι) a 
certain Apollodotus (1.6). The judge then orders him to be scourged: καὶ ἐκέλευσεν αὐτὸν φλαγέλλας 
μαστιγωθῆναι (1.10–11). The two punishments are thus not combined. For a helpful transcription of the papyrus 
and for links to high resolution images, see http://www.papyri.info/hgv/25937. 
 429 See, e.g., Gen 40:19; Philo, Ios. 96, 98; Somn. 2.213; Josephus, Ant. 6.374; 15.8–9; Herodotus, Hist. 
8.21.3; Polybius, Hist. 8.21.3; cf. Dio Cassius, Hist. rom. 49.22.6; Plutarch, Ant. 36. 
 430 See, e.g., Josephus, J.W. 2.246. 
 431 See, e.g., 2 Macc 15:30–33; Tacitus, Hist. 3.74. 
 432 Zimmermann, “Violence Reconsidered,” 356, quoting Seneca, Ira. 1.6.4, claims: “[Seneca] took it 
for granted that the criminal should not die quickly but should suffer for a period commensurate to the gravity of 
his deed. The good lawmaker and statesmen should provide for a ‘shameful and slow end’ of those sentenced to 
death.” Cf. Rhiannon Graybill, Are We Not Men? Unstable Masculinity in the Hebrew Prophets (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2016), 3, who observes concerning Isa 20:1–5: “The complement to pain in Isaiah 20 
is shame.… The abstract sign of shame depends upon the specific shaming of the prophet’s body, through its 
exposure, its vulnerability, and its suffering.” 
 433 O’Collins, “Crucifixion,” 1207. Cf. Tertullian, Mart. 4.9. 
 434 Josephus, J.W. 2.246 (Mason). 
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of degradation for the tribune.”435 Another example is Lucan’s account of the aftermath of the 
Battle at the Colline Gate (82 BCE): “The heads of the chief men were borne on pikes 
through the terrified city and piled in the centre of the forum.”436 
 Further still, Antony’s decision to behead Antigonus the Jew emanated directly from 
the need to disgrace his memory: 
 He [Antony] was the first Roman who decided to behead a king, since he believed 
 that in no other way could he change the attitude of the Jews so that they would 
 accept Herod, who had been appointed in his [Antigonus’] place. For not even under 
 torture would they submit to proclaiming him king, so highly did they regard their 
 former king. And so he thought that the disgrace (τὴν ἀτιμίαν) would somewhat dim 
 their memory of him and would also lessen their hatred of Herod.437 
 
According to Josephus, Antony beheaded Antigonus with the specific intent of shaming 
Antigonus, even though the latter held a socially prominent status.438 Appian makes the 
following remark in his portrayal of the beheading of two Roman generals: “Sulla did not 
spare them because they were Romans, but killed them both and sent their heads (τὰς 
κεφαλάς) to Lucretius at Praeneste to be displayed round the walls.”439 This text presupposes 
that their identity as Romans elicited the expectation that they could have been spared from 
this type of public humiliation.  
 Fourth, even if some ancients carried out certain beheadings with the intent of 
minimizing the shame that the victim faced, this did not preclude that others would perceive 
it through the filter of shame. Berkowitz appeals to m. Sanh. 7 to bolster her argument that 
the Jewish experience of Roman execution influenced rabbinic laws of execution.440 
According to m. Sanh. 7:3, decapitation was carried out thusly by the Jewish court: 
 
 435 Steve Mason, Flavius Josephus: Translation and Commentary. Volume 1B. Judean War 2., trans. 
Steve Mason (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 199, n. 1545.  
 436 Lucan, Civ. W. 2.160–162 (Duff, LCL). 
 437 Josephus, Ant. 15.9–10 (Marcus and Wikgren, LCL). 
 438 Cf. Dio Cassius, Hist. rom. 49.22.6; Plutarch, Ant. 36. Cicero criticizes Verres (governor of Sicily) 
because “he [Verres] had men of high rank and stainless character actually beheaded” (Ag. Verr. 4.64.144 
[Greenwood, LCL]). 
 439 Appian, Rom. Hist. Civ. 1.10.93 (White, LCL). See also, Velleius Paterculus, Comp. Rom. Hist. 
2.27.3. 
 440 Berkowitz, Execution and Invention, 153–79. 
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 B. They would cut off his head with a sword, 
 C. just as the government does. 
 D. R. Judah says, “This is disgusting.” 
 E. “But they put his head on a block and chop it off with an ax.” 
 F. They said to him, “There is no form of death more disgusting than this  
  one.”441 
 
Berkowitz contends that the respective disputants—the Sages on the one hand and Rabbi 
Judah on the other—“each wish to protect the criminal’s body from indignity as best as 
possible.”442 However, what is important to underline for present purposes is that the Sages’ 
proposal for the proper method of carrying out beheading is perceived by another (Rabbi 
Judah) as most disgraceful, and vice versa.  
 
2.1.1. Degradation of the Victim into the Afterlife 
 Fifth, beheading held the potential to humiliate the victim not only at the moment of 
death, but also into the afterlife. The importance of properly disposing of the dead in the 
ancient world is a well-known truism.443 “All societies use culturally appropriate rituals of 
separation or rites of passage to come to terms with the emotional intensity of killing and 
death, to lay the dead to rest, and—more importantly, since societies privilege the living 
above the dead—to restore the social fabric and let the living move on.”444 It is not necessary 
 
 441 M. Sanh. 7:3 (Neusner). 
 442 Berkowitz, Execution and Invention, 160. 
 443 Homer, Il. 22.337–343, indicates that Hector begged Achilles to return his body home for proper 
disposal instead of letting the dogs devour it. The Levitical code allowed Israelite priests—who were otherwise 
instructed not to have contact with a corpse—to bury their close family (Lev 21:1–9; cf. 21:10–15). The Twelve 
Tables’ injunction on burning or burying bodies within the city limits, the tombs and monuments on the 
peripheries that visitors first saw when visiting Rome, the elaborate funeral procession for the death of 
noblemen, and the popularity of burial clubs for those with modest means—all of these features attest to the 
weight ancient Romans placed on properly caring for the dead. See, Keith Hopkins, Death and Renewal, SSRH 
2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 201–55; Kyle, Spectacles of Death, 13. See also, Matt 8:21–
22//Luke 9:59–60. In addition to ancient Greece, Rome, and Israel, the importance of coming to terms with 
death is similarly palpable in ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt, Anatolia, and Syria. See, Robert Garland, The Greek 
Way of Death (London: Duckworth, 1985), 1–37; Hiroshi Obayashi, ed., Death and Afterlife: Perspectives of 
World Religions, CSR 33 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992); Byron R. McCane, Roll Back the Stone: Death 
and Burial in the World of Jesus (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 2003); John J. Collins et al, “Death, 
the Afterlife, and Other Last Things,” in Religions of the Ancient World: A Guide, ed. Sarah Iles Johnston 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 470–95. 
 444 Kyle, Spectacles of Death, 1–2. 
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here to set forth a comprehensive analysis of the variegated ancient beliefs about death, 
burial, and life after death.445 Important for present purposes is that some beliefs about the 
nature of life after death motivated the anxiety to properly dispose of the dead.446  
 As Metcalf and Huntington explain: “Life becomes transparent against the 
background of death, and fundamental social and cultural issues are revealed.”447 One such 
social and cultural issue that mortuary rituals reveal specifically in the Greek and Roman 
worlds is that many people believed they could influence their circumstances of life in the 
hereafter.448 With respect to Petronius, Sat. 71, Kyle observes: “The pre-need [sic] 
arrangements of the gauche and pompous Trimalchio for his funeral and the care of his grave 
reveal a common Roman perception that people could influence their status and care after 
death.”449 Similarly, Hopkins comments: “In Rome, as in many other societies, tombs were 
often equipped with goods which would make the dead person’s life after death more 
pleasant: toys for children, mirrors and cosmetics for women, dice and drinking cups for 
men.”450 
 
 445 In addition to the studies cited in this discussion, see, e.g., Alan F. Segal, Life after Death: A History 
of the Afterlife in Western Religion (New York: Doubleday, 2004); Jan Assmann, Death and Salvation in 
Ancient Egypt, trans. David Lorton (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); Alexander Achilles Fischer, Tod 
und Jenseits im Alten Orient und Alten Testament (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 2005); Nicola 
Laneri, ed., Performing Death: Social Analyses of Funerary Traditions in the Ancient Near East and 
Mediterranean (Chicago: Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, 2007). 
 446 To be sure, ideologies of the afterlife varied in the Greco-Roman world. Hopkins, Death and 
Renewal, 227: “Pagan beliefs ranged from the completely nihilistic denial of after-life, through a vague sense of 
souls’ ghostly existence, to a concept of the individual soul’s survival and of personal survival in a recognisable 
form.” Cf. Kyle, Spectacles of Death, 129: “Most Greeks and Romans accepted some idea of the soul and some 
at least a shadowy sort of afterlife. The finality of death, the belief that the dead just die and decompose, was 
known but not widely accepted.” For primary data on the range of Roman beliefs concerning the afterlife, see 
especially, Valerie M. Hope, Death in Ancient Rome: A Sourcebook (London: Routledge, 2007), 211–47. 
 447 Peter Metcalf and Richard Huntington, Celebrations of Death: The Anthropology of Mortuary 
Ritual, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 2. Similarly, Hopkins, Death and Renewal, 
217: “Death is a protracted social process.” Douglas J. Davies, A Brief History of Death (Oxford; Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 2005), 1: “The history of death is a history of self-reflection. Who are we?” 
 448 Cf. William J. Murnane, “Taking It with You: The Problem of Death and Afterlife in Ancient 
Egypt,” in Death and Afterlife: Perspectives of World Religions, ed. Hiroshi Obayashi, CSR 33 (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1992), 35, observes that the ancient Egyptian Pharaohs had endowments established “to pay 
the mortuary priests who provided for the eternal well-being of the deceased’s spirit.” 
 449 Kyle, Spectacles of Death, 141. On p. 128 of the same study, Kyle writes: “Ancient cemeteries 
show that the kingdom of the dead was not an egalitarian realm.” 
 450 Hopkins, Death and Renewal, 229. 
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 Significantly, therefore, when the living did not bury the dead they prevented the dead 
from possessing a favorable transition into the afterlife.451 Vernant contends that the goal of 
funerary practices is elucidated in instances of burial denial and corpse abuse: “Cette finalité 
des pratiques funéraires se révèle avec le plus de netteté là où, précisément, elles font défaut 
et surtout là où elles sont rituellement déniées, dans les procédures d’outrage au cadavre 
ennemi.”452 After his death, the spirit of Patroclus visited Achilles as the latter slept 
beseeching Achilles to bury him in speed so that he may “pass within the gates of Hades.”453 
Patroclus was thus unable to join the other dead on the other side of the river until he had 
been buried. In his Satires (3.254–67), Juvenal describes a man whose body was crushed by a 
wagon-full of rocks. No trace of remaining limbs or bones were found. Accordingly, Juvenal 
writes that the man “is already a newcomer sitting on the bank, shuddering at the hideous 
ferryman. The wretched man has no hopes of a bark across the muddy torrent, because he 
doesn’t have a coin in his mouth to offer.”454 Similarly, Virgil recounts that the ferryman 
Charon is not able to transport the unburied dead across the banks of the waters “until their 
bones have found a resting place.”455  
 In such contexts where properly burying the dead was a vital social requirement and a 
factor in the social status of the deceased in the afterlife, beheading could be perceived as: (1) 
tarnishing the social well-being of the victim past the point of death and (2) interrupting 
normal mortuary practices surrounding the deceased. “Treatment of corpses remained one of 
 
 451 J. M. C. Toynbee, Death and Burial in the Roman World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1971), 43: “All Roman funerary practice was influenced by two basic notions—first, that death brought 
pollution and demanded from the survivors acts of purification and expiation; secondly, that to leave a corpse 
unburied had unpleasant repercussions on the fate of the departed soul.”  
 452 Jean-Pierre Vernant, “La belle mort et le cadavre outragé,” in La mort, les morts dans les sociétés 
anciennes, ed. Gherardo Gnoli and Jean-Pierre Vernant (Paris: Éditions de la Maison des sciences de l’homme, 
1990), 67. “The purpose of funerary practices is revealed with the most clearness precisely where they are 
failing, and chiefly where they are ritually denied, in the procedures of insulting the enemy’s cadaver” 
(translation mine). 
 453 Homer, Il. 23.65–74 (Murray, LCL). 
 454 Juvenal, Sat. 3.264–267 (Braund, LCL). 
 455 Virgil, Aen. 6.327–328 (Fairclough, LCL). 
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the means by which men could hurt, humiliate, or honour one another, express contempt or 
respect.”456 Homer portrays at length the repercussions of Hector’s defeat of Patroclus, the 
beloved comrade of Achilles. In the midst of his portrayal, the two sides struggle for 
Patroclus’ corpse. As the struggle continues, Iris arrives from Olympus imploring Achilles to 
protect Patroclus’ dead body. Iris stresses Hector’s eagerness “to cut the head from the tender 
neck and fix it on the stakes of the wall” and Achilles’ consequent “reproach, if [Patroclus] 
comes to us a corpse mutilated in any way.”457 Kyle relates that executions in the Roman 
forum (which frequently included beheadings) “often led to denials of burial and the dumping 
of corpses into the Tiber” and that “the denial of even minimal burial” amounted to “a form 
of damnation beyond death.”458 
 In this vein, it is important to emphasize that beheading was not always a method “of 
execution” in the ancient world. The ancients frequently beheaded those who had already 
 
 456 Robert Parker, Miasma: Pollution and Purification in Early Greek Religion (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1983), 46. Herodotus, Pers. Wrs. 7.238, writes about Xerxes’ treatment of the dead body of Leonidas: 
“Having thus spoken, Xerxes passed over the place where the dead lay; and hearing that Leonidas had been king 
and general of the Lacedaemonians, he bade cut off his head and impale it. It is plain to me by this especial 
proof among many others, that while Leonidas lived king Xerxes was more incensed against him than against all 
others; else had he never dealt so outrageously with his dead body; for the Persians are of all men known to me 
the most wont to honour valiant warriors” (Godley, LCL). 
 457 Homer, Il. 18.176–180 (Murray, LCL). 
 458 Kyle, Spectacles of Death, 218, 131. 
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died,459 and cast away their heads and/or bodies unburied, often as food for birds.460 Such 
corpse abuse violated the integrity of the body and prevented or interfered with the proper 
disposal of the corpse. Consider the description of Sulla’s proscriptions in the aftermath of 
the Battle at the Colline Gate in Rome (82 BCE) in Lucan’s De Bello Civili: 
 When the heads, dissolving in corruption and effaced by lapse of time, had lost all 
 distinctive features, their wretched parents gathered the relics they recognized and 
 stealthily removed them. I remember how I myself, seeking to place on the funeral 
 fire denied them the shapeless features of my murdered brother, scrutinised all the 
 corpses slain by Sulla’s peace: round all the headless bodies I went, seeking for a 
 neck to fit the severed head.461 
 
Significantly, this text connects the quest to reunite the severed head and headless body with 
the intent to properly dispose of the dead. The separation of the head from its body represents 
 
 459 See, e.g., Herodotus, Pers. Wrs. 7.238; Velleius Paterculus, Comp. Rom. Hist. 2.119.1–5; Tacitus, 
Ann. 14.64; Josephus, Ant. 9.125–131; 14.448–450, 464; J.W. 1.323–326, 342–343. An example from the HB is 
the explicit beheading of Saul’s corpse in 1 Sam 31:1–13 (cf. Josephus, Ant. 6.368–378). The corresponding 
passage in 1 Chr 10:1–14 (1 Chr 10:1–14 LXX) implicitly makes this suggestion. First Chronicles 10:10 does 
make it clear that Saul did indeed lose his head (the Philistines display it in their temple). But, the verbal 
expression ואשיו (“and they took”) in relationship to the direct object ושאר (“his head”) in 1 Chr 10:9 does not 
readily translate into “they took off his head.” Admittedly, אשנ appears in a <verb + direct object> relationship 
with שאר in Gen 40:19 to describe the beheading of Pharaoh’s chief baker: 
ךילעמ ךשאר תא הערפ אשי םימי תשלש דועב (“In three days Pharaoh will take up your head from upon you”). In the 
context of Gen 40:19, however, the notion of separation—that is, taking the head up-and-off the chief baker—is 
supplied by the prepositional phrase ךילעמ (“from upon you”). Compare Gen 40:13 where the chief cupbearer’s 
head is “lifted up” in the sense that he is restored to office. Thus, the imagery of a beheading disappears from 
Gen 40:19 without the presence of ךילעמ. Comparably, 4Q163, Frags. 4–6 1.6 (4Qpap pIsac), has the preposition 
ןמ prefixed to לארשי to convey the idea of separation, that is, cutting off a head from Israel: 
 בנזו שאור לארשימ הוהי תרכיו (“And YHWH has cut off from Israel head and tail” [Martínez and Tigchelaar]). In 
this respect, since the clause in 1 Chr 10:9 lacks the idea of separation, it is best to conclude that 1 Chr 10:9 does 
not portray the moment of Saul’s beheading.  
  In attempting to infer when Saul lost his head in this account, therefore, one option is to suppose the 
Chronicler expects the reader to “fill in the gaps” of the narrative by assuming the Philistines first beheaded Saul 
before “they took his head” to the temple. A second option is also to “fill in the gaps” and suppose that Saul 
managed to behead himself when he “fell on his own sword.” In this light, it is interesting to notice that the 
Babylonian Talmud contains a tradition claiming that when Saul “fell on his own sword” he fell with his “neck” 
on the sword (see, b. Sotah 10a). No Jewish interpretive tradition to my knowledge, however, explicitly claims 
that Saul lost his head the moment he hit his neck on the sword. It seems best, therefore, to treat 1 Chr 10:1–14 
as implying that the Philistines beheaded Saul’s corpse. See further, Ralph W. Klein, 1 Chronicles, Hermeneia 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2006), 287: “The Chronicler has reworded his Vorlage in 1 Sam 31:9.… The rest 
of the Chronicler’s account, in any case, presupposes that Saul’s head had been cut off and no further attention 
is given to the stripping of the king.” By contrast, 1 Kgdms 31:1–13 LXX does not portray Saul losing his head 
at all. In this text, the Philistines take and fasten Saul’s body (σῶμα) to the wall of Beth Shan (31:10). 
 460 See, e.g., Gen 40:19; 2 Macc 15:30–33; Appian, Samn. Hist. 3.9.3; Tacitus, Hist. 3.74. On birds 
preventing burial by consuming the human body, see, Suetonius, Aug. 13.2: “For instance, to one man who 
begged humbly for burial, [Octavian] is said to have replied: ‘The birds will soon settle that question’” (Rolfe, 
LCL).  
 461 Lucan, Civ. W. 2.166–173 (Duff, LCL). See, Elaine Fantham, ed., Lucan. De Bello Civili. Book II. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 111: “An individual survivor, not the poet, is reporting.” 
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an obstacle to such intentions.462 Likewise, the anxiety for the integrity of the body in burial 
is apparent in Tacitus’ description of the burials of Piso and Titus Vinius (69 CE):  
 He [Otho] was then carried through the heaps of dead bodies, while the forum still 
 reeked with blood, first to the Capitol and then to the Palatine; after that he allowed 
 the bodies to be given up for burial and burning. Piso was laid to rest by his wife 
 Verania and his brother Scribonianus, Titus Vinius by his daughter Crispina, after 
 they had discovered and redeemed their heads, which the assassins had kept for 
 profit.463 
 
 According to Asconius’ first-century CE commentary on Cicero’s Oratio in senatu in 
toga candida, Catiline cut off the head of Marcus Marius Gratidianus and carried it 
throughout the city of Rome.464 Hinard sees the following intention in the bodily mutilation 
of Gratidianus: “pour priver l’adversaire de tout statut dans le monde des morts” (“to deprive 
the enemy of all status in the world of the dead”).465 In the same way Hinard interprets the 
other decapitations during the proscriptions of Sulla in 82 BCE. These beheadings involved 
the public exhibition of the severed heads to the point where they lost their facial features, 
their recognition, and therefore, their status in the afterlife.466 As Aldhouse-Green explains: 
“Decapitation is symbolically important: heads are essentially linked with identity; despoiling 
a corpse (and particularly robbing it of its head) may be perceived to prevent ‘proper’ burial 
and reincorporation in the next world.”467 
 
 462 As Mark Thorne, “Memoria Redux: Memory in Lucan,” in Brill’s Companion to Lucan, ed. Paolo 
Asso (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 372, puts it, the severed head undercuts “attempts to memorialize the dead.” 
 463 Tacitus, Hist. 1.47 (Moore, LCL). For further evidence that demonstrates the importance of 
reuniting a head with its body for burial, see, Tacitus, Hist. 1.41, 49; Suetonius, Galb. 20; Plutarch, Galb. 28. 
 464 Q. Asconius, Cic. Comment. 84C. For the Latin text and translation of Asconius’ commentary, see, 
R. G. Lewis, ed., Asconius: Commentaries on Speeches of Cicero, trans. R. G. Lewis, revised by Jill Harries et 
al. CAHS (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 164–89. See also, Plutarch, Sull. 32.2. 
 465 François Hinard, “La male mort. Exécutions et statut du corps au moment de la première 
proscription,” in Du châtiment dans la cité. Supplices corporels et peine de mort dans le monde antique, Table 
ronde de Rome (9–11 novembre 1982) (Rome: École Française de Rome, 1984), 309. 
 466 See, Hinard, “La male mort,” 308–09. 
 467 Miranda Aldhouse-Green, “Chaining and Shaming: Images of Defeat, From Llyn Cerrig Bach to 
Sarmitzegetusa,” OJA 23 (2004): 330. Cf. A. J. L. Van Hooff, From Autothanasia to Suicide: Self-Killing in 
Classical Antiquity (London: Routledge, 1990), 77: “In modern times self-killers wish to save finder and 
relatives from a shocking scene. In antiquity the appearance of the mortal remains has everything to do with the 
way and degree in which one is supposed to live in the hereafter. The art of dying should be a worthy fulfilment 
of life.” On the connection between the head and identity, see Virgil’s account of Priam’s death: “He lies, a 
huge trunk upon the shore, a head severed from the neck, a corpse without a name (sine nomine corpus)!” (Aen. 
2.557–8 [Fairclough, LCL]). Thus, the separation of the head from the body anonymized Priam. 
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 Some images of life in the hereafter involved the idea that the dead carried with them 
into the afterlife their physical wounds and shame from their moment of death. In his 
discussion of the Greeks’ views of life in Hades, Garland vividly describes fallen warriors as 
“eternally blood-bespattered.”468 The dead who converse with Odysseus in Hades are 
preoccupied with “the memory of their life or the shame they experienced in the manner of 
their death.”469 Kyle argues that the many Romans and Greeks thought that the soul retained 
“the marks and mood of the moment of death.”470  
 This idea that mutilating the body could affect the victim in the afterlife finds 
expression in a late second- or early third-century CE anonymous text from Egypt. Garland 
claims the papyrus offers “the grisliest description of the underworld to come down to us 
from antiquity.”471 The text mentions the visitor in the underworld at the Shores of Ugliness 
beholding the corpses of those beheaded: 
 So swiftly he came to that toilsome land, the Shores of Ugliness. There, sitting on a 
 rock, when he had bound a reed with corpse’s hair, he took bait and feeding the hook 
 sent it down to the deepest depths. Yet when he drew forth the swimming hair, since 
 he could then catch nothing at all, … For stretched around there lay a vast plain, full 
 of corpses of dreadful doom, beheaded (πελεκιζομένων) or crucified. Above the 
 ground stood pitiable bodies, their throats but lately cut. Others, again, impaled, hung 
 like the trophies of a cruel destiny. The Furies, crowned with wreaths, were laughing 
 at the miserable manner of the corpses’ death. There was an abominable stench of 
 gore.472 
 
Two observations about this narration are in order. First, the dead bear a recognizable form of 
existence: the marks of mutilation they received in the moments of their deaths are 
perceptible. Something about the dead’s appearance made the manner of their death not only 
 
 468 Garland, The Greek Way of Death, 74. Similarly, Alan E. Bernstein, The Formation of Hell: Death 
and Retribution in the Ancient and Early Christian Worlds (London: UCL Press, 1993), 30, observes that, while 
in Hades Odysseus saw those slain in battle who were still clothed in their blood-stained armor (Homer, Od. 
11.41). 
 469 Bernstein, The Formation of Hell, 23–33 (quotation, p. 26). 
 470 Kyle, Spectacles of Death, 129. 
 471 Garland, The Greek Way of Death, 76. 
 472 Denys L. Page, trans., Select Papyri, Volume III: Poetry, LCL 360 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1941), 421. 
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perceptible to the visitor but also distinguishable from other types of mutilated corpses.473 
Those that were beheaded in death retained such a mutilated existence beyond death. Second, 
the text notes that the corpses were the subject of continued mockery because of the manner 
of their death. Those that were beheaded in death retained the shame associated with 
beheading beyond death.474  
 That beheading—with its violation to the integrity of the body—could be viewed as a 
form of burial denial and humiliation beyond death is not without further significance. In a 
chapter entitled “Porous Death,” Bernstein demonstrates that many Greeks and Romans 
believed the barriers between the living and the realm(s) of the dead to be “porous.”475 The 
unburied dead can visit the living in order to (1) haunt or punish the living for neglect of 
burial, (2) implore the living to bury them, (3) request the living to correct an imperfect 
burial, and (4) demand vengeance on those who murdered them.476 Accordingly, Bernstein 
comments: “The dead were neither as fully dead nor as fully alive as the living might wish.… 
Death itself was no absolute boundary.… The spirit knows what happens to the corpse.”477 In 
this respect, denying full or partial burial ran the risk of not securing safe separation from the 
dead.478  
 Related to the idea that beheading could disrupt reincorporation in life in the hereafter 
is the notion that decapitation prevents the possibility of “resurrection.” Kyle claims that 
Christian conceptualizations of resurrection fueled Romans in their abuse of Christian 
 
 473 Cf. Bernstein, The Formation of Hell, 27, who notes that, in Odysseus’ journey to the underworld, 
the dead do not have flesh or bone because the funeral pyre consumed them. Nevertheless, they do have a soul 
and an image that makes them recognizable. 
 474 As another example of the dead maintaining the wounds from their death, consider Virgil’s 
portrayal of Aeneas in the region of the underworld known as the Fields of Mourning (Aen. 6.440–476). The 
Trojan sees (1) Eriphyle “pointing to the wounds her cruel son had dealt” (Aen. 6.445–446) and (2) Dido “with 
wound still fresh” (Aen. 6.450) (Fairclough, LCL). 
 475 Bernstein, The Formation of Hell, 84–106. 
 476 Bernstein, The Formation of Hell, 93–100. 
 477 Bernstein, The Formation of Hell, 98. 
 478 Bernstein, The Formation of Hell, 93: “Burial worked in two ways. It provided access to the 
underworld for the dead, but also, in principle at least, it safely isolated them from human habitation.”  
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corpses.479 The second-century Acts of Justin and His Companions contains the following 
exchange between Rusticus and Justin: 
 The prefect turned to Justin: “If you are scourged and beheaded (ἀποκεφαλισθῇς), do 
 you believe that you will ascend to heaven (μέλλεις ἀναβαίνειν εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν)?” “I 
 have confidence from my perseverance,” said Justin, “if I endure. Indeed, I know that 
 for those who lead a just life there awaits the divine gift even to the consummation.” 
 The prefect Rusticus said: “You think, then, that you will ascend (ἀναβήσῃ)?” “I do 
 not think,” said Justin, “but I am fully convinced of it.” The prefect Rusticus said: “If 
 you do not obey, you will be punished.” Justin said: “We are confident that if we 
 suffer the penalty we shall be saved (σωθῆναι).” The prefect Rusticus passed 
 judgement: “Those who have refused to sacrifice to the gods are to be scourged and 
 executed in accordance with the laws.”480 
 
The question posed by Rusticus presumes that beheading quelled the possibility of Justin’s 
resurrection. Significantly, however, Justin’s response attests to the notion that beheading did 
not necessarily work in this regard.481 Thus, in a single text, we have two characters 
reflecting antithetical ideologies as to the efficacy of beheading.  
 One is also reminded of the late second-century Martyrdom of Paul, where we read 
Paul telling Nero that he will appear to Nero even after Paul’s head is severed:  
 When Paul was brought to him in accordance with the edict, he stood by his sentence, 
 saying, “Decapitate (τραχηλοκοπήσατε) this man, lest he should take on strange ideas 
 as his own.” And Paul said, “Caesar, it is not for a short time that I live for my king. 
 Know that even if you cut off my head (τραχηλοκοπήσῃς), I will do this: I will appear 
 to you after I have been raised (ἐγερθείς) again, so that you may know that I did not 
 die but am alive in my king Jesus Christ, who judges the entire world.”482  
 
Thus, Paul’s address to Caesar acknowledges but combats the presumption that the severed 
head would prevent his resurrection and ensure separation from Caesar. Converged in both 
the Acts of Justin and His Companions and the Martyrdom of Paul, therefore, are antithetical 
ideologies regarding the efficacy of beheading. The co-presence of these antitheses is not 
 
 479 Kyle, Spectacles of Death, 243. On the conundrum of the bodily resurrection of the mutilated dead 
in early Christian theology, see, e.g., Dale C. Allison, Night Comes: Death, Imagination, and the Last Things 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2016), 19–44; Candida R. Moss, Divine Bodies: Resurrecting Perfection in the New 
Testament and Early Christianity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019). 
 480 Acts Justin Recension A.5 (Musurillo, 46–47). 
 481 The author of Revelation similarly sees “the souls of those beheaded” (τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν 
πεπελεκισμένων) alive and with Christ: “They lived (ἔζησαν) and reigned with the Christ for a thousand years” 
(Rev 20:4). 
 482 Mart. Paul 4 (Eastman, 132–33). 
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dissimilar to the contours of these ideas in the Synoptic portrayals of John’s death. As the 
next chapter will show, Mark 6:14–16 and Luke 9:7–9 contradictorily depict Herod Antipas’ 
estimation of the success of John’s decapitation with respect to the possibility of John’s 
resurrection.  
 
2.1.2. The Public Nature of Beheading 
 Sixth, the public nature of beheading also accentuates the degradation of the 
beheaded. The severed head as a sight in public spaces is a pervasive theme in ancient 
literature. Many texts highlight the public display and visibility of the beheading-proper.483 
Other texts stress the public manipulation or presentation of a previously severed head.484 
Decapitated heads can communicate, and effectively so, even though they can no longer 
control their faculties.485 Zimmermann classifies Rome’s public displays of violence as a 
“category of rhetoric” that “could generate the strongest emotional response” and “have the 
 
 483 See, e.g., Livy, Ab urbe cond. 2.5; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 2.29; 6.30.1–2; Polybius, 
Hist. 1.7.11–12; Josephus, Ant. 6.191–192; J.W. 2.246; 6.360–362. See also Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. 
rom. 3.58.4. The prepositional phrase ἐν τῷ φανερῷ in this text either modifies the adverbial participle 
αἰκισθέντες (“having been scourged”) or the finite verb ἀπεκόπησαν (“they beheaded”). This ambiguity does 
not suggest that a private beheading took place after a public scourging. Rather, even though the aorist participle 
conveys that the scourging occurred before the beheading, the two actions are presented as a single complex by 
virtue of their grammatical linkage. As a result, ἐν τῷ φανερῷ is best seen here as modifying both actions. 
Therefore, Cary’s LCL translation (“scourged and beheaded in public”) is apropos. 
 484 Hector was eager to behead Patroclus’ corpse “and fix it on the stakes of the wall” (Homer, Il. 
18.177 [Murray, LCL]). Telesinus’ head was placed on a spear and paraded around the walls of Praeneste 
(Velleius Paterculus, Comp. Rom. Hist. 2.27.3). According to Josephus, David presented six hundred heads to 
King Saul (Ant. 6.203–204). The Philistines “fastened [Saul’s] head in the temple of Dagon” (1 Chr 10:10). So 
also, 1 Chr 10:10 LXX; cf. 1 Kgdms 31:9 LXX. Jehu had the heads of Ahab’s seventy sons displayed “before 
the gate” (πρὸ τῆς πύλης) in two heaps (Josephus, Ant. 9.127). Nicanor’s head was transported to Jerusalem and 
there displayed: “they stretched out [the head and hand] among Jerusalem” (ἐξέτειναν παρὰ τῇ Ιερουσαλημ) (1 
Macc 11:47). According to 2 Macc 15:28–36, Nicanor’s head was sent to Jerusalem (15:30–31), its tongue cut 
out (15:33), and exhibited on the citadel: “He fastened (ἐξέδησεν) Nicanor’s head from the citadel, manifest for 
all (ἐπίδηλον πᾶσιν) and an apparent (φανερόν) sign (σημεῖον) of the Lord’s help” (15:35). The NRSV 
translation of 2 Macc 15:35b (“a clear and conspicuous sign to every one of the help of the Lord”) understands 
both ἐπίδηλον and φανερόν as modifying σημεῖον, whereas my translation suggests an adverbial understanding 
of the first adjective and an attributive understanding of the second adjective. Whichever option one prefers in 
unraveling the text’s grammatical ambivalence, neither translation hinders the clear emphasis on the visibility of 
Nicanor’s displayed head. 
 485 In Celtic tradition, however, the severed head could speak and sing. See, Watts, Religion in Late 
Roman Britain, 79–80. Ovid’s portrayal of the beheading of Emathion has Emathion’s severed head uttering 
curses on the altar: “Chromis struck off his head with his sword: the head fell straight on the altar, and there the 
still half-conscious tongue kept up its execrations and the life was breathed out in the midst of the altar-fires” 
(Metam. 5.103–106 [Miller, LCL]). 
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deepest impact.”486 “[Violence] was an important basis for [Rome’s] existence, pertaining as 
it did not only to victoriousness over external enemies but also to the internal order of the 
state.”487 In this context, the public nature of beheading was a preventative and deterrent 
mechanism aimed at ensuring socio-political stability.488 It conveyed a strong message to the 
beholder(s): the same fate awaits those who emulate the victim.489 By beheading or 
displaying the severed heads of criminals and revolutionaries, Rome not only prevented 
culprits from repeating offences, but also sought to quell current insurgencies, dissuade future 
revolutionaries, and thus to restore social order and control.490 
 For example, Polybius, Hist. 11.27–30 recounts Scipio summoning an assembly in the 
marketplace where he addresses a multitude of mutineers. Toward the end of his speech, 
Scipio metaphorically differentiates between the leaders and the rest of the mutineers by 
comparing the latter to the sea and the former to the violent winds that fall upon the sea 
(11.29.9–13). The sea appears to share the same harmful character as the winds when the 
wind stirs it (11.29.10). Accordingly, Scipio determines to punish the leaders of the revolt 
and grant amnesty to the rest: without the wind’s influence, the sea’s power is tamed. 
Polybius mentions the perceptible fear on the insurgents’ countenance as the leaders of the 
revolt were punished in their sight: 
 
 486 Zimmermann, “Violence Reconsidered,” 345. Cf. Martha Malamud, “Pompey’s Head and Cato’s 
Snakes,” CP 98 (2003): 33: “The point of decapitation as a weapon of terror is that it is at once terrifyingly 
concrete and powerfully metaphorical.” 
 487 Zimmermann, “Violence Reconsidered,” 347. 
 488 See, Coleman, “Fatal Charades,” 48, who distinguishes between prevention and deterrence in the 
Roman penal system. For Coleman, prevention concerns eliminating the culprit’s behavior and deterrence 
concerns inhibiting potential culprits. 
 489 Cf. Kyle, Spectacles of Death, 7: “Some [anthropologists and sociologists] suggest that all social 
order is ultimately based on violence. To reinforce the social order violence must be performed or proclaimed in 
public, and public violence tends to become ritualized into games, sports, and even spectacles of death.” On 
violence as a spatially charged phenomenon, see Josiah Osgood, “The Topography of Roman Assassination, 
133 BCE–222 CE,” in Riess and Fagan, The Topography of Violence, 209–27; Werner Riess, “Where to Kill in 
Classical Athens: Assassinations, Executions, and the Athenian Public Space,” in Riess and Fagan, The 
Topography of Violence, 77–112; Fagan, “Urban Violence: Street, Forum, Bath, Circus, and Theater.” 
 490 On beheading as an instrument of ensuring socio-political stability, see, e.g., Josephus, Ant. 20.117; 
Polybius, Hist. 1.7.12; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 2.29; Livy, Ab urbe cond. 2.5; 4.10. Cf. Josephus, 
Ant. 17.273–277; 20.97–99. 
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 The multitude of mutineers were so thoroughly cowed by fear of the surrounding 
 force and the terror that looked them in the face, that while some of their leaders were 
 being scourged and others beheaded, none of them changed his countenance or 
 uttered a word, but all remained dumbfounded, smitten with astonishment and 
 dread.”491  
 
After the leaders were punished, the remaining mutineers “took their oath to the tribunes that 
they would obey the orders of their officers and be guilty of no disloyalty to Rome. Scipio 
then by successfully nipping in the bud what might have proved a great danger restored his 
forces to their original discipline.”492 
 It is important to observe, however, that the demeaning nature of a public 
beheading—either in the beheading-proper or in the post-mortem manipulation of the severed 
head—does not imply that a private beheading was void of symbolism. As chapter five will 
show, Origen invests John’s beheading-proper in prison with symbolic potential. 
  
2.1.3. Emasculation of the Victim and Elevation of the Perpetrator 
 Seventh, while the removal of the head from its body constituted a loss of identity and 
self-control on the part of the victim, it simultaneously represented an assertion of victory, 
power, and domination on the part of the perpetrator. Insofar as “self-control” over one’s 
body and “control” over others was the hallmark characteristic of many ideals of masculinity 
in the Greco-Roman world, beheading was an inherently gendered phenomenon.493 It 
highlighted (1) the emasculation of the victim, who now lacked somatic autonomy, and (2) 
affirmed the manliness of the victor, who now possessed power over the victim’s head and 
 
 491 Polybius, Hist. 11.30.2–3 (Paton, LCL). 
 492 Polybius, Hist. 11.30.4–5 (Paton, LCL). Similarly, Livy, Ab urbe cond. 28.29: “Such was the end 
and outcome of the mutiny of the soldiers which began at Sucro.” 
 493 On “self-control” as the chief virtue of many Greco-Roman conceptualizations of masculinity, see, 
Colleen Conway, Behold the Man: Jesus and Greco-Roman Masculinity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), 15–34; Brittany E. Wilson, Unmanly Men: Refigurations of Masculinity in Luke-Acts (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 39–75; Susanna Asikainen, Jesus and Other Men: Ideal Masculinities in the Synoptic 
Gospels, BibInt 159 (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 19–45. See further, this study’s section in chapter four entitled “The 
Masculinity of Herod Antipas.” 
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body.494 As Riess explains: “Whoever dominates another person or exerts violence against 
him or her is often physically and maybe also socially and economically superior and, thus, 
constructs the victim as weaker and inferior.”495 In this vein, honor and shame go hand-in-
hand in the act of decapitation. To cast the shadow of shame on someone involves shining the 
light of honor on someone else.  
 This understanding of beheading is due in no small part to the symbolic importance of 
the head. As the locus of recognition, one’s head and one’s identity are indelibly linked.496 
Hartmann similarly states: “Es [Haupt] symbolisiert wie kein anderes Körperteil die Person 
als ganze” (“It [the head] symbolizes, like no other body-part, the person as a whole”).497 In 
this respect, to remove someone’s head anonymizes the dead and acclaims the identity of the 
self.498 It symbolizes the prestige of the victor at the expense of the loser. 
 This hierarchical positioning of the perpetrator over the beheaded victim is 
recognizable in several cases. Plutarch refers to a report that held a certain Fabius Fabulus as 
the one who beheaded Galba (Galb. 27). Due to his inability to carry Galba’s head by his hair 
(Galba was bald), he wraps it in his cloak. Fabius’ companions urge him to publicly display 
his “deed of valour” (ἀνδραγαθίαν), or as I would translate it, his “manly virtue.”499 Fabius 
then proceeds to impale the head on a spear.  
 Judith’s heroics in cutting off Holofernes’ head lead her to be blessed by the elders 
and every woman of Israel (Jdt 15:8–10, 12), afforded plunder (Jdt 15:11), celebrated in song 
(Jdt 16:1–17), and honored for the rest of her life (Jdt 16:21). “The all-controlling 
 
 494 See, Rita Dolce, “Losing One’s Head” in the Ancient Near East: Interpretation and Meaning of 
Decapitation (London: Routledge, 2018), 3, who rightly claims that “a ‘loss of self-control’” is “a meaning 
inherent from the outset in the condition of anyone who ‘loses their head,’ in either the metaphorical or the real 
sense.” 
 495 Riess, “Introduction,” 3. 
 496 Aldhouse-Green, “Chaining and Shaming,” 330. 
 497 Hartmann, Der Tod Johannes des Täufers, 191 (translation mine). 
 498 Virgil, Aen. 2.557–558 describes the separation of Priam’s head from his body as that which 
anonymizes him: “He lies, a huge trunk upon the shore, a head severed from the neck, a corpse without a name 
(sine nomine corpus)!” (Fairclough, LCL).  
 499 Plutarch, Galb. 27 (Perrin, LCL). LSJ, s.v. “ἀνδραγαθία” defines the noun as “manly virtue.” 
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(παντοκράτωρ) Lord has set them aside by the hand of a woman (ἐν χειρὶ θηλείας)” (Jdt 
16:5). Here, the “masculinity” of the Lord is enhanced by Judith’s beheading of Holofernes. 
By contrast, the Assyrians react in horror at the sight of the general’s headless body (Jdt 
14:14–19; 15:1–3). According to Jdt 14:18, the eunuch Bagoas exclaims: “One woman (μία 
γυνή) of the Hebrews has brought shame (αἰσχύνην) into the house of King Nebuchadnezzar, 
because (ὅτι) behold, Holofernes [is] on the ground and his head is not on him (ἡ κεφαλὴ οὐκ 
ἐστιν ἐπ᾽αὐτῷ).”  
 First Samuel 5:1–5 paints a picture of the superiority of YHWH to Dagon. After the 
Philistines capture the ark of God and place it in the house of Dagon, they awake on two 
occasions to witness Dagon fallen in a position of inferiority before the ark. On the second 
occasion, the text reads: “Dagon had fallen on his face to the ground before the ark of the 
Lord, and the head of Dagon and both his hands were lying cut off upon the threshold” (1 
Sam 5:4 NRSV).  
 Psalm 151 LXX juxtaposes David’s beheading of the foreigner (i.e. Goliath) with 
removing “the disgrace” (ὄνειδος) from Israel.500 Similarly, the Syriac text of the Psalm 
reads: “But after I unsheathed his sword, I cut off his head; and I removed the shame from the 
sons of Israel.”501 Josephus’ account of the death of Jebosthos (Ant. 7.46–52) mentions that 
the two Benjamites killed and beheaded Jebosthos in order to elevate their social status and 
security:  
 [They] reckoned that if they killed Jebosthos they would receive great gifts (δωρεῶν) 
 from David and that their deed would bring them a military command (στρατηγίας) or 
 some other mark of confidence (τινος ἄλλης πίστεως) from him.… They made their 
 way into the particular room where Saul’s son lay asleep, and killed him. Then they 
 cut off his head and, travelling a whole night and day with the thought of fleeing from 
 those whom they had wronged to one who would accept their deed as a kindness and 
 offer them security (ἀσφάλειαν), they came to Hebron. Here they showed the head of 
 
 500 BDAG, s.v. “ὄνειδος,” offers the following definition for the term ὄνειδος: “loss of standing 
connected with disparaging speech.” 
 501 Ps 151B (5ApocSyrPs 1b) (Charlesworth). 
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 Jebosthos to David and presented themselves as his well-wishers, who had removed 
 his enemy and rival for the kingdom.502 
 
 Further, Seneca refers to the boast of Volesus: “Only recently Volesus, governor of 
Asia under the deified Augustus, beheaded three hundred persons in one day, and as he 
strutted among the corpses with the proud air of one who had done some glorious deed worth 
beholding, he cried out in Greek, ‘What a kingly act!’”503 When Perseus utilizes Medusa’s 
severed head to defeat Andromeda (the sea-serpent), as Malamud says, Ovid makes it clear 
that “Perseus, new owner of the head, has assumed the Gorgon’s petrifying power.”504 The 
owner of the severed head has procured power by divesting the victim of control. Or as 
Voisin puts it in reference to Roman head-hunting, “trancher la tête de l’ennemi revient à 
s’approprier une énergie autre qui s’ajoute et renforce sa propre supériorité.”505 
 As a final example, the tombstone of Insus son of Vodullus similarly exhibits 
triumphalism at the expense of the defeated. The stone, unearthed in Lancaster, England in 
2005 by the University of Manchester Archeological Unit, measures between two and three 
meters in height, nearly one meter in width, and weighs nearly fifteen hundred pounds.506 It 
depicts a Roman horseman holding both a sword and a barbarian’s decapitated head in his 
right hand. Beneath the victor’s right foot kneels the barbarian’s headless corpse. The 
inscription written beneath the depiction commemorates Insus by using triumphant 
terminology: 
 DIS MANIBVS INSVS VODVLLI […] CIVE TREVER EQVES ALAE AUG [.] 
 VICTORIS CVRATOR DOMITIA […] 
 
 To the shades of the dead. Insus son of Vodullus, citizen of the Treveri, cavalryman 
 of the ala Augusta, troop of Victor, curator, his heir had this set up.507  
 
 502 Josephus, Ant. 7.47–49 (Marcus, LCL). 
 503 Seneca, Ira. 2.5.5 (Basore, LCL). 
 504 Malamud, “Pompey’s Head and Cato’s Snakes,” 31. 
 505 Jean-Louis Voisin, “Les Romains, chasseurs de têtes,” in Du châtiment dans la cité, 274. “To cut 
off the head of an enemy is to appropriate an other’s energy that adds to and reinforces one’s own superiority” 
(translation mine). 
 506 Stephen Bull, Triumphant Rider: The Lancaster Roman Cavalry Tombstone (Lancaster: Lancashire 
Museums, 2007). 
 507 Inscription and translation provided by Bull, Triumphant Rider, 10.  
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Bull summarizes how the postures of the two figures casts them in a superior-inferior 
relationship:  
 Apart from the decapitated condition, the fallen barbarian[’s] … position of 
 abasement, crumpled, small, and partially naked is deliberate. The beard and long hair 
 of his decapitated head … show his barbarism and uncivilized status. His abject 
 defeat is further emphasised by the foot of Insus which appears to rest on the small of 
 his back.508  
 
This commemorative artifact, therefore, can be categorized according to what Aldhouse-
Green (in reference to Trajan’s Column and the Bridgeness slab from the Antonine Wall) 
calls “the triumph of romanitas” and the “‘grammar’ of defeat.”509 
 
Conclusion: Flipping the Script 
With these seven considerations in mind, we should be careful not to jump to the conclusion 
that (1) beheading was void of dishonor, (2) beheading constituted an ideal manner of death, 
or (3) the “privilege” of decapitation was equivalent to an honorable death. Although 
beheading could represent one’s preferred manner of death on occasion—especially when 
confronted with what is perceived to be a more severe alternative—we are not dealing with a 
spectrum from dishonorable to honorable bodily injury, but with varying degrees of 
degradation.510 
 However, while the (public) sight of the severed head often implies the elevation of 
the perpetrator, whose victory the decapitated head signifies, this hierarchical positioning 
does not necessitate that those who witness, are a party to, or remember the beheading agree 
 
 508 Bull, Triumphant Rider, 18. 
 509 Aldhouse-Green, “Chaining and Shaming,” 328–30. 
 510 According to Plutarch, Art. 14, the mother of Artaxerxes objects to the king regarding his command 
to have a certain Carian beheaded: “O, King, do not let this accursed Carian off so easily, but leave him to me, 
and he shall receive the fitting reward for his daring words” (Perrin, LCL). Upon the mother’s appeal, the 
executioners instead rack the Carian on a wheel for a duration of ten days, gouge out his eyes, and then pour 
molten brass into his ears until he dies. The mother’s comment does not reveal that beheading lacked severity, 
only that beheading in this particular circumstance was not a severe enough penalty. 
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that the perpetrator truly stands in an honorable or superior position. For example, when the 
two Benjamites brought the head of Jebosthos to David in anticipation of receiving δωρεῶν, 
David reacted strongly against their expectations: 
 He did not, however, receive their deed in the manner which they had expected, but 
 cried, “Vile wretches, you shall suffer instant punishment! … Perhaps you suspected 
 that I have changed and am no longer the same man, so that I take pleasure in 
 evildoers and consider your regicidal deed a favour—when you slay in his own bed a 
 righteous man who has done no one a single wrong and even showed you great 
 friendliness and honour. You shall, therefore, make amends to him by being punished 
 and shall give satisfaction to me for having slain Jebosthos in the belief that I should 
 be glad of his death, for you could not have done my reputation a greater wrong than 
 by supposing such a thing.”511 
 
David specifically insists that the victim was “a righteous man” (ἄνδρα δίκαιον) and 
characterizes their deed as that of “evil-doing men” (κακούργοις ἀνδράσι). Not only did 
David view the beheading as casting an unfavorable shadow over the Benjamites, he also 
reckoned it tarnished his own “reputation” (δόξα). This text demonstrates, therefore, that 
when the victim is perceived as undeserving of the beheading, the possibility arises that the 
perceiver will not agree with the social script that casts perpetrator and victim in a respective 
superior-inferior relationship. In such instances, the perceiver can attempt to flip the script of 
degradation by shifting the shame away from the victim.512 
 This counterbalancing maneuver is significant because, as we will see in chapters four 
and five, early memories of John’s death similarly attempt to contest the stigma of John’s 
beheading by transferring the stigma elsewhere. Chapters four and five together will argue 
that early Christian memory of John’s beheading is characterized by a dangerous 
synchroneity. On the one hand, the memories of his decapitation operate as the loci for 
 
 511 Josephus, Ant. 7.50, 51–52 (Marcus, LCL). 
 512 Comparably, Kyle, Spectacles of Death, 13, suggests that Rome’s concept of violence required 
ancient Rome to justify the violence performed in the arena: “The condemnation of persons to the arena to face 
death in ways tantamount to torture and corpse abuse raised concerns about justification, purification, and 
avoidance of contamination or religious pollution. It was not difficult, but it was necessary that the Roman 
community somehow assured itself that the killing was acceptable and even positive and therapeutic—that the 
victims were justly executed criminals, traitors, prisoners of war, paid volunteers, or dangerous heretics.” 
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expressing and constituting identity. As chapter two demonstrated, group identity is often 
sustained by a positive self-assessment of a shared past. Hence, individuals and groups often 
transform, however subtly, the humiliation of a violent past so as not to be debilitating to 
their ideological needs in the present. Early handlers of the tradition of John’s beheading 
contest its humiliation so that it sheds a negative spotlight on the Herodian court, and 
especially Herod. On the other hand, the tradition’s judgment on political figures perpetuates 
a culture of invisible violence. In chapter five, we will see that the vilifying of John’s 
attackers allows Justin Martyr and Origen to associate contemporary Jews who reject Jesus 
with the Herodian dynasty who had rejected the prophet John. Thus, the main point in chapter 
five is that, when taken together, these memories flip the script of John’s decapitation in such 
a way that enabled some early Christians to maintain antagonistic social relations with those 
Jews who had rejected Jesus as the Christ. We thus now turn in chapters four and five to 
explore how the early reception history of John’s decapitation engages the social script of 
beheading. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DEGRADATION CONTESTED: MARK’S MEMORY OF JOHN’S BEHEADING 
If John’s beheading is a castration,  
it is Herod’s phallus on the platter, not John’s.513 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The Synoptic Gospels contain the earliest traditions related to the beheading of John the 
Baptist (Mark 6:14–29; Matt 14:1–12; cf. Luke 9:7–9; 3:19–20).514 This chapter focuses on 
the earliest written tradition of John’s death: Mark 6:14–29. I argue that Mark acknowledges 
but contests the degrading potential of John’s beheading. In this text, Mark keys John’s 
beheading to Jesus’ crucifixion and shifts the dehumanizing gaze of the violence of John’s 
death away from John and onto his attackers. In short, Mark’s memory of John’s death 
distances John from the Herodian court by aligning John with the protagonist of Mark’s 
story. The tradition positions Herod as a paranoid and emasculated figure while affirming the 
masculinity of John the Baptist. 
 
1. Contesting the Beheading of John the Baptist in Mark 6:14–29 
According to Mark 6:14–16, Jesus’ “name” instigates diverging speculation about the 
identity of Jesus and the source of his powers.515 The explanatory conjunction γάρ in 6:17 
connects this speculation to a narrative “flashback” about the beheading of John the Baptist 
(6:17–29). Herod arrests and binds John in prison “because of Herodias,” whom Herod had 
 
 513 Nicole Wilkinson Duran, “Return of the Disembodied or How John the Baptist Lost His Head,” in 
Reading Communities Reading Scripture: Essays in Honor of Daniel Patte, ed. Gary A. Phillips and Nicole 
Wilkinson Duran (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 2002), 287. 
 514 Josephus (Ant. 18.116–119) also narrates John’s death. Josephus’ account, however, makes no 
mention of decapitation as the method of John’s execution. 
 515 Some credit his powers to the idea that John the Baptist had been raised from the dead: “And they 
were saying: ‘John the Baptist has been raised from the dead (ἐγήγερται ἐκ νεκρῶν) and because of this the 
powers are at work in him’” (6:14). Others associate Jesus with Elijah or one of the prophets (6:15). At 6:16 
Mark reveals Herod’s perception to be parallel with the opinion expressed by the unarticulated subject of ἔλεγον 
from 6:14: “But when Herod heard, he was saying: ‘He whom I beheaded (Ὅν ἐγὼ ἀπεκεφάλισα), John, this 
one has been raised (ἠγέρθη).’” 
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married (6:17). Mark 6:19 indicates that Herodias “held a grudge” against John and sought 
“to kill” him, presumably because of his critique of her marriage to Herod (see 6:18). 
Herodias, however, could not actualize her desire “because”—as Mark details with a series of 
imperfect verbs—Herod “was fearing” John, “kept protecting” him, “was being greatly 
perplexed” by him, and “gladly kept hearing him” (6:20). Nevertheless, an “opportune day” 
(ἡμέρας εὐκαίρου) arrived on Herod’s birthday when he held an elitist banquet (6:21). At the 
banquet, Herod swears an oath and promises his daughter whatever she would ask (up to half 
his kingdom, 6:22–23), after she had danced and pleased him (6:22). Goaded by her mother, 
Herodias, the girl asks for “John the Baptist’s head on a platter” (ἐπὶ πίνακι τὴν κεφαλὴν 
Ἰωάννου τοῦ βαπτιστοῦ, 6:25). Not wishing to break his oath in front of his elite guests, 
Herod proceeds to actualize the girl’s request (6:26–28). The flashback sequence ends on the 
note that John’s disciples collected John’s “body” (πτῶμα) and laid it in a tomb (6:29). 
 Two features of the Markan narration of John’s death are significant for present 
purposes. The first significant feature is the structural relationship of the episode to its wider 
narrative context. This feature involves two elements. (1) John’s death is intercalated 
between Jesus’ sending of the twelve (6:6b/7–13) and their return (6:30). (2) Mark’s 
sequence involves a narrative retrospection, introduced by the explanatory conjunction γάρ in 
6:17. These structural elements invite the interpreter to understand (1) how 6:14–29 connects 
with its wider narrative context,516 and (2) the functional relationship of the flashbacked 
sequence in 6:17–29 to the reported speculation of Jesus’ identity/powers in 6:14–16. As we 
will see, this contextualization is vital for understanding how Mark characterizes the major 
figures in the story of John’s death, and thus how Mark contests the potential shame of John’s 
ignominious death.  
 
 516 Duran, “Return of the Disembodied or How John the Baptist Lost His Head,” 278.”  
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 The second significant feature of the Markan narration is that it acutely dwells on the 
violence of the beheading. According to 6:14, some attributed the powers at work in Jesus to 
the notion that John the Baptizer “has been raised from the dead” (ἐγήγερται ἐκ νεκρῶν). 
Herod’s opinion recounted in 6:16 (“This one has been raised” [οὗτος ἠγέρθη]) reflects this 
idea but is qualified with a fronted relative clause that emphasizes the fact of the beheading: 
ὅν ἐγὼ ἀπεκεφάλισα Ἰωάννην (“He whom I myself beheaded, John”). For Herod, it is the 
presumed raising of a beheaded man that allows, or at least does not prevent, him to align 
Jesus with John the Baptizer.517  
 Not only does the account begin with a focus on decapitation, it also ends with 
attention on corpse abuse. The girl to whom Herod swore an oath makes her request known: 
“I wish that at once you would give to me on a platter (ἐπὶ πίνακι) the head (τὴν κεφαλήν) of 
John the Baptist” (Mark 6:25). Thereafter, Mark carefully notes how John’s head is handled: 
• Herod orders an executioner “to bring” (ἐνέγκαι) John’s head (Mark 6:27).518 
• The executioner (or Herod) “brings” (ἤνεγκεν) John’s head (τὴν κεφαλὴν αὐτοῦ) on a 
platter (Mark 6:28).519 
• The executioner (or Herod) “gives” (ἔδωκεν) the head (αὐτήν) to the girl (Mark 
6:28).520 
• The girl then “gives” (ἔδωκεν) the head (αὐτὴν) to her mother (Mark 6:28).521  
The narrative proceeds by juxtaposing this fate of John’s head vis-à-vis his headless body—
his head (κεφαλή) and body (πτῶμα) are separated at burial: 
 
 517 Similarly, Gould, The Gospel According to St. Mark, 110: “Herod dwells upon the thought, that this 
prophet who has now risen from the dead was beheaded by himself. Hence the relative clause, which contains 
the statement of the beheading, is placed first and ἐγώ is expressed.”  
518 Cf. Matt 14:9—Herod orders for John’s head “to be given” (δοθῆναι).  
519 Cf. Matt 14:11—John’s head (ἡ κεφαλὴ αὐτοῦ) “was brought” (ἠνέχθη) on a platter. 
520 Cf. Matt 14:11—John’s head “was given” (ἐδόθη) to the girl. 
521 Cf. Matt 14:11—The girl then “brings” (ἤνεγκεν) the head to her mother. 
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• “His [presumably John’s] disciples came and took his body (τὸ πτῶμα αὐτοῦ) and 
placed it (αὐτό) in a tomb” (Mark 6:29).522 
 This differentiation between the respective fates of John’s head (κεφαλή) and body 
(πτῶμα) largely escapes the purview of biblical scholars.523 Despite their commentary’s 
social-scientific perspective, Malina and Rohrbaugh, for instance, overlook this element: their 
analysis on John’s death fails to comment in toto on 6:27–29.524 Similarly, Cranfield’s 
commentary on the passage ends after a brief linguistic note on σπεκουλάτορα in 6:27.525 
And Kertelge’s 1994 commentary does not examine 6:29 at all.526 Relatedly, many scholars 
who devote attention to the depiction of John’s burial in 6:29 focus on discursive matters.527 
Witherington utilizes 6:29 to speculate that the tradition of John’s death originates within the 
circle of John’s disciples, since John’s disciples apparently continued to exist even after the 
Baptist’s demise (referring to Acts 19:1–12).528 Klostermann merely makes a two-fold 
observation: (1) Mark does not specificy where the disciples bury John’s “Rumpf” (“hull”), 
but (2) Jerome thinks they buried it in Samaria-Sebaste.529  
 
 522 Cf. Matt 14:12: “His [presumably John’s] disciples came, took the body (τὸ πτῶμα) and buried it 
(αὐτό).” 
 523 An exception is Kraemer, “Implicating Herodias,” 321–49, whose argument I critique below. Cf. 
Craig A. Evans, Jesus and the Ossuaries: What Jewish Burial Practices Reveal about the Beginning of 
Christianity (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2003), 13–14; Edmondo Lupieri, “John the Baptist in New 
Testament Traditions and History,” ANRW 2.26.1:436, n. 17. For examples of medieval poets who wrote about 
the different fates of John’s head and body, see Greti Dinkova-Bruun, “The Beheading of John the Baptist in 
Medieval Poetic Discourse,” in Decapitation and Sacrifice. Saint John’s Head in Interdisciplinary Perspectives: 
Text, Object, Medium, ed. Barbara Baert and Sophia Rochmes (Leuven: Peeters, 2017), esp. 45–46. 
 524 See, Malina and Rohrbaugh, Social-Science Commentary, 216–17. 
 525 See, Cranfield, Saint Mark, 204–13. 
 526 Kertelge, Markusevangelium, 64–67. 
 527 To be fair, some scholars make the important observation that Mark 6:29 foreshadows Mark 15:43–
46. See, e.g., Nineham, Saint Mark, 176; Josef Ernst, Das Evangelium nach Markus (Regensburg: Verlag 
Friedrich Pustet, 1981), 185; Gnilka, Markus, 251; Maloney, The Gospel of Mark, 127; Stein, Mark, 307. 
 528 Witherington, The Gospel of Mark, 216. For an argument that Mark 6:14–29 originates in John the 
Baptist circles, see, Joseph Thomas, Le Mouvement Baptiste en Palestine et Syrie (Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1935), 
110–11. Backhaus, Die “Jüngerkreise” des Täufers Johannes, 169, argues, however, that Mark 6:14–29 shows 
no serious interest in John’s disciples. 
 529 Klostermann, Das Markusevangelium, 61. Cf. Mann, Mark, 298: “Whatever later tradition may 
suggest, it is to be presumed that the body was buried near Machaerus (assuming this to be the place of 
execution).”  
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 Other scholars, alternatively, tend to make the problematic assertion that John’s burial 
stresses that he was honored in death. Along this line, Donahue and Harrington’s claim is 
typical: “Since proper burial was a sign of honor and of divine favor John is honored in 
death.”530 Schnackenburg even refers to the burial of John at Mark 6:29 as “ein tröstlicher 
Abschluß” (“a comforting conclusion”).531 Collins refers to it as “an act of piety” on the part 
of John’s disciples.532  
 Such readings, however, fail to understand 6:29 in light of 6:27–28. In other words, 
they fail to notice or parse the significance of the separation of John’s head from its body. 
Hartmann rightly observes that “der Sieg über Johannes und seine Entehrung” are 
demonstrated by means of the display of John’s head on the platter.533 But when Hartmann 
immediately proceeds to say, “Wo das Haupt danach verbleibt, sagt der Text nicht,” he 
misses the sharp contrast the text draws between the fates of John’s head (κεφαλή, 6:27–28) 
and body (πτῶμα, 6:29).534 From this perspective, the text does indicate, albeit by subtraction, 
where the head remains: not with the body.535 To reiterate a main point from chapter three, in 
the ancient world beheading and the manipulation of the head could be perceived as (1) a 
form of corpse abuse that interrupted proper burial, thereby (2) preventing full 
reincorporation of the deceased in life in the hereafter. Since these notions were relatively 
common in antiquity, it is vital to note at the outset that some first-century readers would 
likely understand the Markan account of John’s death as framed along these lines of 
discourse.  
 
 530 Donahue and Harrington, The Gospel of Mark, 200 (italics added). Similarly, Ernst Lohmeyer, Das 
Evangelium des Markus (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967), 121; Ernst, Das Evangelium nach 
Markus, 185; Rudolf Pesch, Das Markusevangelium (Freiburg: Herder, 1984), 343. 
 531 Rudolf Schnackenburg, Das Evangelium nach Markus (Düsseldorf: Patmos-Verlag, 1966), 156. 
 532 Collins, Mark, 314. 
 533 Hartmann, Der Tod Johannes des Täufers, 198. 
 534 Hartmann, Der Tod Johannes des Täufers, 198. 
 535 The same observation can be made of Matt 14:11–12. See, Nolland, The Gospel of Matthew, 585, 
who merely asks the question: “Are we to think of John’s body as buried headless?” 
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 The plot to decapitate John, therefore, was not likely an attempt to show John a 
kindness on the part of the Herodian family. The public parade of John’s head on a platter 
and the separation of his head from his body at burial freighted John’s death with symbolic 
potential.536 This postmortem manipulation of John’s head can be understood as casting the 
Herodian family and John in a superior-inferior relationship, respectively, as John’s head and 
body are controlled and his identity divested by Antipas and the Herodian women. 
 Yet, while Mark includes narrative elements that invoke the degradation of the 
beheaded victim, he remembers John’s beheading in such a way that its symbolic potential 
does not reflect poorly on John the Baptist. Mark attempts to restrain this negative symbolism 
by contesting it. In this section, we will focus on interpretive keying (see chapter two) as a 
feature of this pericope’s contestation of John’s degradation. Mark pairs John’s beheading to 
Jesus’ crucifixion. In so doing, John is distanced from the Herodian court and the degrading 
symbolic capacity of his bodily mutilation is brought into tension with the negative portrayal 
of those responsible for putting him to death.  
 Following the ensuing discussion, two prominent plot-lines in scholarly discourse that 
we introduced in chapter one will be met with qualification. The first is the function of John’s 
beheading (6:17–29) in its relationship to the speculation surrounding Jesus’ identity (6:14–
16). Scholars have largely overlooked how an ideology of beheading provides a key lens 
through which to view the narrative function of John’s death. The second is the scholarly 
assessment of the guilty parties involved in John’s beheading. Both discussions, moreover, 
 
 536 Commenting on Mark 6:14–29, Hartmann, Der Tod Johannes des Täufers, 195, rightly observes 
that the public display of John’s head is highly symbolic: “Erst im öffentlichen Raum zeigt sich auch die 
eigentliche symbolische Tiefendimension der Enthauptung.… Die Demonstration bzw. Präsentation des 
Hauptes stellt dann den sichtbaren Sieg über den Gegner dar” (“The actual symbolic depth dimension of the 
beheading only becomes evident in the public space.… The demonstration or presentation of the head then 
presents the visible triumph over the opponent” [translation mine]). Importantly, however, the idea that the 
postmortem public display of a severed head is freighted with symbolism does not correspondingly mean that 
private beheadings are less emblematic. As we will see in the next chapter, Origen freights the secrecy (i.e. 
privacy) of the moment of John’s beheading in prison with symbolic potential. Thus, it is important to observe 
that, although John’s head is publicly displayed, his “beheading-proper” occurs in prison. 
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will reinforce the central idea of the present chapter that Mark drives a wedge between John 
and the Herodian court. 
 
1.1. Keying John’s Beheading to Jesus’ Crucifixion 
 Mark 6:14–29 reflects the chief characteristics of interpretive keying. The pericope 
analogically pairs John’s beheading with Jesus’ crucifixion. This alignment, however, does 
not merely serve to compare the two’s deaths. Rather, their convergence transforms the 
memory of John’s beheading into a “cultural system” (to use Schwartz’ language)537 as 
John’s beheading is integrated into an emerging cultural script. The effect of this integration 
is that the potential rupture that beheading can instigate is displaced; the ideological script of 
beheading is flipped. The group(s) associated with Mark’s narration overcomes the 
degradation of John’s violent end by weaving it into the tapestry of Jesus’ death. In this way, 
the maintenance of John’s honor and identity are contingent on Jesus’ honor and identity. 
Thus, John’s identity as the prophetic forerunner of Jesus (1:1–15) is exemplified in his 
death, not divested. Setting forth the various interconnections between 6:14–29 and Jesus’ 
death will help elucidate this mechanism of commemorative activity. 
 (1) Mark’s recurrent designation of Herod Antipas as a “king” (βασιλεύς) in the 
present passage (6:14, 22, 25, 26, 27) corresponds to his designation of Jesus as “king” 
(βασιλεύς) in the passion narrative (15:2, 9, 12, 18, 26, 32). Of the twelve occurences of the 
substantive βασιλεύς in Mark, eleven refer either to Antipas or Jesus.538 Antipas and Jesus are 
 
 537 Schwartz, Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory, 226. 
 538 See, Culpepper, “Mark 6:17–29 in Its Narrative Context, 145–63. 
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the only specific characters described as such in Mark’s narrative.539 Linguistically, then, 
Mark enables a juxtaposition of the two kings:540 
• Antipas orders the violent death of John the Baptist having been manipulated into an 
oath by the dancing girl (6:22–27), whereas Jesus voluntarily lays down his life for 
the benefit of many (10:45).541 
• Antipas’ “sending” (ἀποστείλας) (6:17) of persons to arrest John and his “sending” 
(ἀποστείλας) (6:27) of an executioner to behead John contrasts sharply with Jesus 
who sends (ἀποστέλλειν) (6:7) the twelve disciples to proclaim repentance, to 
exorcise demons, and to heal the sick (6:12–13).542  
With just these two points of contrast between Jesus and Antipas,543 we can already see that 
in aligning John to Jesus, Mark distances them from Antipas. (2) The speculation as to Jesus’ 
identity in 6:14–16 (John the Baptist, Elijah, or one of the prophets) parallels the speculation 
regarding Jesus’ identity in 8:28. The speculation of 8:28, moreover, prompts Peter to declare 
Jesus as the Messiah (8:29) and leads to Jesus’ first passion prediction of Mark’s Gospel: 
“And he began to teach them that it is necessary for the Son of Man to suffer greatly, to be 
rejected by the elders, the chief priests, and the scribes, to be killed, and—after three days—
to be raised” (8:31). (3) Similarly, the observation in 9:9–13 that Elijah has already suffered 
and that the Son of Man would suffer recalls that Mark has already closely associated John 
the Baptist with Elijah.544 John’s prophetic denouncement of king Herod’s marriage 
 
 539 The occurrence of βασιλεύς in Mark 13:9 is generic and does not specify the identities of those who 
receive this title. 
 540 Geoffrey D. Miller, “An Intercalation Revisited: Christology, Discipleship, and Dramatic Irony in 
Mark 6.6b–30,” JSNT 35 (2012): 182: “Mark’s reference to Herod as a king should immediately grab the 
reader’s attention; the title is inaccurate, for Herod was merely a ‘tetrarch’ (τετράρχης) [sic].” 
 541 Culpepper, “Mark 6:17–29 in Its Narrative Context,” 163. 
 542 Similarly, Stein, Mark, 302. 
 543 For a contrast between Herod’s and Jesus’ masculinity in their roles as dinner hosts (6:14–29; 6:32–
44), see, Peter-Ben Smit, Masculinity and the Bible: Surveys, Models, and Perspectives (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 
62, who argues that Herod’s “loss of self-control is precisely what initiates his downfall as a credible and 
masculine ruler.” On Herod’s lack of self-control, see further below. 
 544 Likewise, in reference to Mark 9:11–13, Brian C. Dennert, John the Baptist and the Jewish Setting 
of Matthew, WUNT 403 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015), 40–41: “The disciples do not seem to have 
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resembles Elijah’s prophetic repudiation of king Ahab (1 Kgs 17–19, esp. 18:17–19).545 And, 
Herodias’ plot against John is similar to Jezebel’s plot against Elijah (1 Kgs 19, esp. 19:2 
where Herodias swears to kill Elijah).546 Thus, John’s connection with Elijah simultaneously 
aligns Herodias and Herod to Jezebel and Ahab, respectively, both of whom are characterized 
negatively in the HB.547 
 (4) Herodias “kept wishing” (ἤθελεν) “to kill” (αποκτεῖναι) John (6:19) after he 
criticizes Antipas’ marriage to her (6:18), but was prevented from doing so because Antipas 
“was fearing” (ἐφοβεῖτο) John (6:20). In a similar manner, Jesus’ opponents seek to arrest 
and/or kill Jesus (after he criticizes them), but their strategies are foiled or regulated by fear: 
A. 11:18: “And the chief priests and scribes heard it and they kept seeking how they 
might destroy him; for they were fearing (ἐφοβοῦντο) him, because the crowd was 
amazed at his teaching.” 
B. 12:12: “And they [the chief priests, scribes, and elders—see 11:27] kept seeking to 
arrest him, but they feared (ἐφοβήθησαν) the crowd, for they knew that he spoke this 
parable against them. And they left him and departed.”  
 
recognized John as Elijah, as their question points to a belief that Elijah has not yet come. While Jesus does not 
explicitly name John as Elijah, the description that ‘they did to him whatever they wanted’ (9:13) combined 
with the allusions in the death of John and use of Mal 3:1 to introduce John identifies him as the ‘Elijah to 
come.’ The passage thus defends the Elijanic identity of John, using the suffering of the Son of Man to 
substantiate a suffering Elijah.” Strictly speaking, Mal 3:1 does not specify that the “messenger” is Elijah (cf. 
Mal 4:5–6). However, Mark’s (1) insinuation that John the Baptist is the messenger of Mal 3:1 (1:2–4), (2) 
alignment of Jesus with the one who “is coming after” John (1:7, 9; cf. Mal 4:5–6; see also 4 Kgdms 19:20 
LXX—ἀκολουθήσω ὀπίσω σου), (3) close approximation of the clothing worn by John and Elijah (1:6; cf. 2 
Kgs 1:8), and (4) idea that Elijah has already come “first” (9:9–13; cf. Mal 4:5–6) makes it clear, albeit 
indirectly, that the Markan John the Baptist embodies the messenger of Mal 3:1 and Elijah of Mal 4:5–6. See, 
Ernst, Johannes der Täufer, 34, who attributes “das Fehlen einer offenen Identifizierung des Täufers mit Elija” 
in 9:9–13 to Mark’s narrative technique of indirectness. On John the Baptist’s identification with Elijah in 
Matthew, Luke, and the Gospel of John, see chapter five. 
 545 In his Commentary on Matthew, Jerome claims that John the Baptist rebuked Herod and Herodias 
“with the same authority with which Elijah had rebuked Ahab and Jezebel” (Comm. Matt. 14.3–4 [Scheck, FC]). 
 546 For the parallels between 1 Kgs 17–19 and Mark 6:14–29 see, Silvia Pellegrini, Elija—Wegbereiter 
des Gottessohnes: Eine textsemiotische Untersuchung im Markusevangelium, HerdBS 26 (Freiburg: Herder, 
2000), 280–81. 
 547 See 1 Kgs 16:30–31, 33; 18:4, 13; 19:1–2; 21:23, 25 (“Indeed, there was no one like Ahab, who 
sold himself to do what was evil in the sight of the Lord, urged on by his wife Jezebel” [NRSV]); 2 Kgs 9:7, 10, 
22, 36–37; cf. also Rev 2:20. 
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C. 14:1: “And the chief priests and the scribes kept seeking how in cunning they might 
arrest and kill (ἀποκτείνωσιν) him; for they were saying, ‘Not during the festival, or 
else there may be a riot among the people.’” 
Thus, Herodias’ ongoing plot to kill John analogically maps her onto the opponents of Jesus 
who ongoingly stirred similar schemes.548 (5) A fifth, and related, analogical mapping is the 
connection between Herodias and Judas Iscariot. Just as Herodias managed to initiate John’s 
death on an “opportune” (εὐκαίρου, 6:21) day,549 Judas “was seeking” an “opportune time” 
(εὐκαίρως) to hand Jesus over (14:11). (6) Sixthly, John the Baptist is “handed over” 
(παραδοθῆναι, 1:14), “grasped” (ἐκράτησεν, 6:17), and “bound” (ἔδησεν, 6:17). Jesus also is 
“handed over” (παραδίδωμι, 3:19; 9:31; 10:33 [twice]; 14:10–11, 18, 21, 41–42, 44; 15:1, 10, 
15; cf. 13:9, 11–12), “grasped” (κρατέω, 14:44, 46; cf. 12:12; 14:1, 49), and “bound” (δέω, 
15:1). (7) Antipas initially listens to John the Baptist “gladly” (ἡδέως, 6:20) but later 
demands John’s beheading in the midst of social pressure (6:26–27). In a similar reversal, a 
crowd initially listens to Jesus “gladly” (ἡδέως, 12:37) in Jerusalem but later demands Jesus’ 
crucifixion after the chief priests stir them up (15:11, 13–14). (8) Following the respective 
deaths of John and Jesus, their bodies (πτῶμα, 6:29; 15:45) are “placed” (τίθημι, 6:29; 15:46, 
47; 16:6) “in a tomb” (ἐν μνημείῳ, 6:29; 15:46). (9) The opinion that John the Baptist has 
been raised (6:16; from the dead—6:14) “foreshadows belief in the resurrection of Jesus” 
(8:31; 9:9–10, 31; 10:34).550 
 (10) Both John and Jesus are portrayed as innocent but nevertheless put to death as a 
political leader navigates social pressure. According to 6:20: “For Herod feared John because 
he knew (εἰδώς) that he was a righteous and holy man (ἄνδρα δίκαιον καὶ ἅγιον) and he was 
 
 548 See also Mark 14:55 where the chief priests and Sanhedrin “kept seeking” (ἐζήτουν) testimony in 
order to put Jesus to death. 
 549 Mark draws attention to this element of the story in 6:21 by means of a genitive absolute 
construction: γενομένης ἡμέρας εὐκαίρου. 
 550 Donahue and Harrington, The Gospel of Mark, 201. 
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protecting him.” This recognition in 6:20 is connected to Herodias’ inability to kill John in 
6:19. Despite this recognition, and “although he was deeply grieved,” Antipas “did not wish” 
(οὐκ ἠθέλησεν) to reject the girl’s wish for John’s head because of his oaths and dinner 
guests; and so he has John beheaded (6:26–27). Similar to Antipas, Pilate, according to 
15:10, “knew (ἐγίνωσκεν) that the chief priests had handed him [Jesus] over because of 
envy.” This recognition is connected to Pilate’s opportunity he presents to the crowd for him 
to release “the King of the Jews” (15:9). After the crowd’s insistence for him to crucify Jesus 
(15:12–13), Pilate asks them: “Why? What evil (κακόν) has he done?” (15:14). Thus, in 
response to Bond’s argument that “nothing in Pilate’s previous behaviour has given any hint 
that the governor does regard Jesus as innocent,” it must be emphasized that the Markan 
Pilate does not explicitly indicate that Jesus was truly guilty of the charges brought against 
him.551 Pilate “wishes” (βουλόμενος) to satisfy the crowd; and so he has Jesus flogged and 
handed over to be crucified (15:15) in accordance with the crowd’s “wish” (θέλετε, 15:9, 12). 
With Mark’s alignment of John’s innocence to Jesus’ innocence, a moral judgment is passed 
on the death of John the Baptist: by keying John’s death to Jesus’ death, Mark infuses John’s 
beheading with the moral coloration of Jesus’ crucifixion. John is viewed as unjustly 
executed insofar as Jesus is unjustly executed.552 Thus, again, as John is aligned to Jesus he is 
distanced from Antipas. 
 (11) The repetition of the verb θέλω (“I want/wish”) in this pericope in reference to 
Herod, Herodias, and the girl integrates the “wishes” of the Herodian court into the Markan 
theme of the (in)appropriate orientation of one’s “wish” (or “will”), a theme particularly 
 
 551 Helen Bond, Pontius Pilate in History and Interpretation, SNTSMS 100 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 112. 
 552 Cf. Stein, Mark, 304, who writes in reference to 6:20: “The turmoil in Herod’s mind makes his 
action all the more damnable.” On Mark’s presentation of Pilate as a weak ruler see, Susan Miller, Women in 
Mark’s Gospel, JSNTSup 259 (London: T&T Clark International, 2004), 83. Cf. Bond, Pontius Pilate, 105–19, 
who argues that, although Mark does not portray Pilate as a weak ruler, he is still implicated in the death of 
Jesus. So also, Asikainen, Jesus and Other Men, 70–71. 
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prominent in the three passion predictions (Mark 8–10) and in the passion narrative itself 
(Mark 14–15).553 According to Mark 6:19, Herodias has a grudge against John the Baptist 
and “was/kept wanting” (ἤθελεν) to kill him. After swearing to give to the girl whatever she 
“wishes” (θέλῃς, 6:22), Herod did “not wish” (οὐκ ἠθέλησεν, 6:26) to refuse the girl’s 
“wishing” (θέλω, 6:25) for John’s head on a platter. Herod’s desire is grounded in part on 
account of “those reclining” (6:26) at the “banquet” (6:21), whom Mark had previously 
portrayed as “his great persons,” “the rulers of a thousand,” and “the first ones” of Galilee 
(6:21).  
 The various “wishes” of the Herodian court diverge from other characters who 
appropriately wish in Mark’s Gospel. 
A. 1:40–41: “A leper comes to him [Jesus] imploring him, and kneeling says to him, ‘If 
you wish (θέλῃς), you are able to cleanse me.’ And, moved with compassion, he 
[Jesus] stretched out his hand, touched him, and said to him, ‘I do wish (θέλω). Be 
cleansed.’” 
B. 3:35: “For whoever does the will of God (τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ), this one is my brother, 
sister, and mother.” 
C. 8:34: “He [Jesus] summoned the crowd with his disciples and said to them, ‘If 
someone wishes (θέλει) to follow after me, let them deny themselves, take up their 
cross, and follow me.’” 
D. 10:51: “And Jesus answered and said to him, ‘What do you want (θέλεις) me to do for 
you?’ The blind man said to him, ‘My rabbi, let me see again.’” 
E. 14:36: “He [Jesus] was saying, ‘Abba, Father, all things are possible for you; remove 
this cup from me; yet, not what I want (θέλω), but what you [want/θέλεις].” 
 
 553 See, Abraham Smith, “Tyranny Exposed: Mark’s Typological Characterization of Herod Antipas 
(Mark 6:14–29),” BibInt 14 (2006): esp. 281–86. 
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Miller’s contrast is helpful: “Unlike the Herodians, those who suffer diseases and live as 
social outcasts express desires which are compatible with the will of God.… The desires of 
Herodias, her daughter and Herod bring torment and death to others.”554 Further, the last 
example above (14:36) plainly identifies Jesus as one whose focus is on effecting the will of 
God. The second example (3:35) designates those who do the will of God as Jesus’ (true) 
family.  
 Switching vantage points will help further illuminate the contrast between Jesus and 
Antipas in this respect. The “wishes” of the Herodian court in 6:14–29 accord with others 
who inappropriately “wish” in Mark’s Gospel. Consider the following examples: 
A. 9:13: “But I tell you that even Elijah has come, and they did to him as many things as 
they wished (ἤθελον), as it is written about him.” 
B. 12:38–40: “And in his teaching he was saying, ‘Beware of the scribes, who want (τῶν 
θελόντων) to walk in long robes, [who want] greetings in the marketplaces, [who 
want] the first-seats (πρωτοκαθεδρίας) in the synagogues, and [who want] the first-
seats (πρωτοκλισίας) at banquets (τοῖς δείπνοις).… They will receive the greater 
condemnation.’”555 
C. 15:9, 11: “And Pilate answered them, ‘Do you want (θέλετε) me to release for you the 
King of the Jews?’… But the chief priests stirred up the crowd to have him release for 
them Barabbas instead.” 
D. 15:12–13: “Pilate again was saying to them, ‘What, then, do you wish (θέλετε) me to 
do with the one whom you call ‘the King of the Jews’?’ And again, they cried out, 
‘Crucify him!’” 
 
 554 Miller, Women in Mark’s Gospel, 84. 
 555 Cf. Mark 9:35: “If someone wishes (θέλει) to be first (πρῶτος), they will be last of all and servant of 
all.” 
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In this regard, we might also observe Pilate’s “wishes” that are described in 15:15 using a 
near synonymn of θέλω: “Pilate, wishing (βουλόμενος) to satisfy the crowd, released for 
them Barabbas and handed over Jesus, after flogging him, to be crucified.”556 Further still, as 
a response to the disciples’ discussion on the road about who is “greatest” (μείζων, 9:34), 
Jesus indicates that whoever “wishes” (θέλει) to be “first” (πρῶτος) will/must be last (9:35). 
Similarly, in 10:35–37, James and John make known their “wish” (θέλομεν, 10:35; θέλετε, 
10:36), namely, to “sit” (καθίσωμεν, 10:37) in places of honor at Jesus’ glory. Soon 
thereafter, Jesus constructs two indefinite relative sentences. He says in 10:43: “But, whoever 
wishes (θέλῃ) to become great (μέγας) among you will/must be your servant.” In like 
manner, he says in 10:44: “Whoever wishes (θέλῃ) to be first (πρῶτος) will/must be 
everyone’s slave.” Jesus makes these two statements as a contrast (notice the adversative 
conjunction ἀλλ’ in 10:43) to the “rulers” (ἄρχειν) and the “great ones” (μεγάλοι) (10:42).557 
Thus, the appearance of key terms—θέλω, μέγας, ἄρχω, πρῶτος—in Mark 9–10, 12:38–40, 
and 15:9–13 parallels the “wishing” Herodian court and Antipas who dined with “his great 
persons” (τοῖς μεγιστᾶσιν αὐτοῦ), “the rulers of a thousand” (τοῖς χιλιάρχοις), and “the first 
ones” (τοῖς πρώτοις) of Galilee (6:21). In connecting John’s death to the passion prediction 
units and the passion narrative, the Herodian court is paired with those whose “wishes” are 
improperly focused.  
 With these examples in place, we can clearly notice that John’s death is thoroughly 
integrated into the narrative web of Jesus’ death. Concurrently, this keying aligns the 
Herodian court with those whose “wishes” are not of a proper focus, including Jesus’ 
antagonists who want Jesus crucified and the scribes who want social prestige. As we will see 
in the next chapter, subsequent handlers of the tradition of John’s death weaponize the 
 
 556 See, BDAG, s.v. “βούλομαι.” 
 557 Jesus’ statement in Mark 10:40 presupposes that the expectation of being granted places of honor at 
Jesus’ right and left is not unrealistic for James and John to wish for. But, as 10:38–39, 43–44 clarify, such 
expectation needs refocused. 
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negative characterization of the Herodian court by making their moral coloration emblematic 
of contemporary Jews.  
 
2. Qualifications of Scholarly Discourse 
The previous discussion places us in a better position to qualify two particular streams of 
scholarly discourse surrounding the death of John the Baptist. The first stream is the 
relationship between the narrative of John’s beheading in 6:17–29 and the report of the 
speculation about Jesus’ identity in 6:14–16. The second stream is the scholarly assessment 
of the relative blame Herod and Herodias deserve in putting the Baptist to death. Both 
discussions, moreover, will sharpen the negative characterization of Antipas at work in 
Mark’s account. 
 
2.1. The Function of Mark 6:17–29 
 As Culpepper says: “The story [of John’s beheading] is recalled almost as an 
afterthought to explain Herod’s response to the reports of Jesus’ activities.”558 Indeed, 
Goguel once remarked that the story has a “caractère épisodique” and that it sits “en marge 
de la narration.”559 In her classic commentary on the Gospel of Mark, Hooker writes: 
 Between the account of the sending out of the Twelve and that of their return, Mark 
 inserts an account of Herod’s reaction to the rumours about Jesus, together with the 
 story of his beheading of John the Baptist. There seems no logical connection 
 between the two themes, but the somewhat artificial insertion provides an interlude 
 for the disciples to complete their mission.560  
 
The marginal character of the episode has sparked considerable attention, as scholars have 
sought to identify what further connections the pericope has to 6:14–16 (and to the Gospel as 
a whole) beyond merely occupying the lapse of time between the sending out of the disciples 
 
 558 Culpepper, “Mark 6:17–29 in Its Narrative Context,” 146. 
 559 Maurice Goguel, Au seuil de l’Évangile, 52. 
 560 Hooker, Saint Mark, 158. 
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and their return. A frequent connection that scholars make is the numerous parallels John’s 
death has with Jesus’ death, as we have already seen.  
 A steady current of scholarship, however, has argued that 6:17–29 also functions to 
clarify that Jesus was not John the Baptist. Janes, for example, writes: “Is Jesus John raised 
from the dead? Is Jesus the returned John? That question—which no one thinks any longer to 
ask—Mark is intent on making sure we never ask again.”561 Witherington advocates for this 
understanding as well: “What prompts this story is that, as we are told in v. 14, some thought 
Jesus was John the Baptizer redivivus.… This story then clarifies matters for the Markan 
audience by distinguishing between the two men, while at the same time foreshadowing the 
sort of violent end that Jesus would also come to.”562 Later in his analysis, Witherington is 
more emphatic: “The point is that people with their own speculations were not coming up 
with the notion that Jesus was Messiah or Lord, and in a biography this story about the 
Baptist is crucial, for it clears up once and for all that Jesus is not John.”563 According to 
Pellegrini, since John is “enthauptet und begraben” (“beheaded and entombed”), the story of 
6:17–29 dispels the hypotheses entertained in 6:14 and 6:16.564 Following Pellegrini, Dennert 
likewise asserts that John’s death “shows that Jesus cannot be the resurrected John.”565 
 In my estimation, the best advocate of this position is Kraemer. She summarizes her 
position as follows: 
 In my view, these narratives respond to early Christian anxieties and contestations 
 about the relationship between Jesus and John: they are fashioned to refute not simply 
 the suggestion that John the Baptist has been resurrected but more precisely the 
 possibility that Jesus is John raised from the dead by telling a narrative in which the 
 body of John is desecrated in a manner that makes it impossible to resurrect it, at least 
 
 561 Regina Janes, “Why the Daughter of Herodias Must Dance (Mark 6.14–29),” JSNT 28 (2006): 446–
47. 
 562 Witherington, The Gospel of Mark, 212 (italics added).  
 563 Witherington, The Gospel of Mark, 214 (italics added). 
 564 Pellegrini, Elija, 284, 287 (quotation, p. 287). 
 565 Dennert, John the Baptist, 37. 
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 physically, by severing the head from the body, and by leaving the head with 
 Herodias while burying the corpse.566 
 
Kraemer defends this claim with an important observation. Antipas’ evaluation of the 
Baptist’s identity in 6:16 can be read as a question (“Has John, whom I beheaded, been 
raised?”) and not necessarily an indicative statement (“John, whom I beheaded, has been 
raised.”). In fact, Kraemer insists, this is “exactly” how Luke 9:9 (“I beheaded John: who is 
this one about whom I hear such things?”) understands Antipas’ response to the rumors: “The 
author of Luke thus implies that Antipas thinks that Jesus cannot be John, because Antipas 
had previously beheaded him.”567 Hence, she reasons: “Further implicit in Antipas’s 
objection is precisely the notion that something about beheading John makes it impossible for 
him to be resurrected in the body of Jesus.”568 For Kraemer, therefore, 6:17–29 “is 
constructed to provide a compelling answer to the question not of why John was executed but 
of why John was executed by decapitation, or why, following his execution by some other 
means, his head was then severed from his body.”569 
 Perhaps the greatest strength in Kraemer’s thesis is her recognition that the rumors 
regarding Jesus’ identity recounted in 6:14–16 are central for understanding the function of 
the narrative.570 It is no overstatement to claim that the central theme around which Mark’s 
entire Gospel narrative pivots is Jesus’ identity.571 Related to this recognition is her 
acknowledgement that something about beheading John—and particularly, the separation of 
the head from the body—is crucial for understanding the function of the narrative. 
 
 566 Kraemer, “Implicating Herodias,” 341. Similarly, Lupieri, “John the Baptist in New Testament 
Traditions and History,” ANRW 2.26.1:436, n. 17. 
 567 Kraemer, “Implicating Herodias,” 342. 
 568 Kraemer, “Implicating Herodias,” 342. 
 569 Kraemer, “Implicating Herodias,” 342. 
 570 Miller, “An Intercalation Revisited,” 177: “These three verses serve as the interpretive crux of the 
passage, highlighting Christology as the overarching theme.” 
  571 See, e.g., 1:1, 11, 24–25, 34; 3:11, 21–22; 4:41; 5:6–7; 6:2–3, 14–16; 8:27–29; 9:7; 10:46–52; 
11:27–33; 14:61–62; 15:2, 39. 
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 Despite these strengths, the position Kraemer advocates is complicated by two 
insights. First, readers of Mark’s Gospel are already aware of the fact that Jesus is not John 
the Baptist. The Markan prologue begins by delineating Jesus’ messianic identity: “The 
beginning of the good news of Jesus Christ [the Son of God]” ( Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ [υἱοῦ θεοῦ]) 
(1:1). After a scant five-verse indication of John’s baptizing activity and preaching in 1:4–8, 
readers encounter simultaneously Jesus and John at the River Jordan (1:9–11). The former is 
baptized by the latter (1:9). Moreover, as Jesus ascends from the water, the voice from 
heaven makes Jesus’ identity plain for the reader: “You are my beloved son (ὁ υἱός μου ὁ 
ἀγαπητός), in you I am well pleased” (1:11).  
 Informed by the prologue, readers who arrive at 6:14–16 hardly take seriously the 
possibility entertained by Herod (6:16) and the populace (6:14) that Jesus was John raised 
from the dead.572 Scholars, like Witherington, who adamantly claim that John’s beheading 
conclusively clarifies for readers that Jesus is not John miss that this conclusion was 
definitively reached at the very opening of Mark’s narrative. 
 One can entertain the counterargument that Mark is reinforcing what should already 
be clear for the audience. This counter, however, is not necessarily true when we consider the 
other complication: Kraemer’s conflation of Mark 6:16 and Luke 9:9 obscures that these two 
verses have incongruent semantic forces. Across these two verses, Herod’s speech is not, as 
Kraemer claims, precisely the same: 
 Mark 6:16 (as a declarative statement): “Having heard, Herod was saying: ‘The one 
 whom I beheaded, John, this one has been raised!’” 
 
 Mark 6:16 (as a question): “Having heard, Herod was saying: ‘The one whom I 
 beheaded, John, has this one been raised?’” 
 
 Luke 9:9: “Herod said: ‘John I myself beheaded. But who is this about whom I hear 
 such things?’” 
 
 
 572 Similarly, Maloney, Gospel of Mark, 126: “The reader … knows that all suggestions miss the point, 
but the question ‘Who is Jesus?’ continues to be raised by the characters in the story.” So also, Miller, “An 
Intercalation Revisited,” 181–82. 
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Kraemer is correct to state that, for Luke’s Herod, the beheading of John renders the Baptist’s 
association with Jesus as an impossibility. According to Luke 9:7, Herod heard that some 
thought that Jesus was John the Baptist raised from the dead. Herod’s response here in Luke 
9:9 clearly differentiates Jesus from John on the basis of John’s mutilated body.573 The same, 
however, cannot be said of Mark 6:16. Rather, as medieval scholar Masciandaro puts it: 
“John’s decapitation is introduced through Herod’s confusion as not having worked.”574 
 There are two plausible ways of understanding Herod’s comment in Mark 6:16. Each 
way is distinguishable from the sense of Luke 9:9. In one respect, Herod’s remark may reveal 
his doubts as to the efficacy of John’s beheading. This understanding presupposes that 
severing a head from its body could, under normal circumstances at least, inhibit the 
“resurrection” of the body. For Herod to envision that John somehow overcame his 
mutilation to embody and empower Jesus (in whatever sense) accentuates the dramatic 
characterization of Herod. It is no surprise to observe that interpreters often portray Antipas’ 
statement as revealing his superstitious fear, despite the fact that neither the substantive 
“fear” nor its cognates are mentioned in 6:16. Consider C. Evans’ comments in this regard: 
“Herod’s declaration that Jesus must be John, whom he beheaded, attests to the despot’s 
fearful respect of the power he sensed was at work in Jesus, a power that not only must be 
from beyond the confines of the mortal realm, but a power not limited by the conventions of 
death, burial, and resurrection.”575 At the same time as accentuating Jesus’ power, this option 
 
 573 I thus disagree with Nathanael Vette and Will Robinson’s criticism of Kraemer: “The comment of 
Antipas in Luke 9:7 [sic], ‘John I beheaded etc.’ (Ἰωάννην ἐγὼ ἀπεκεφάλισα) is best seen as expressing 
skepticism towards resurrection, not the resurrection of a beheaded person per se” (“Was John the Baptist 
Raised from the Dead? The Origins of Mark 6:14–29” BibAn 9 [2019], 337, n. 5). Their critique falters on their 
ignorance of the ideology of beheading, which they acknowledge two sentences previously in the same footnote: 
“We are not aware of tradition stipulating that beheaded persons could not be resurrected.” See chapter three 
where we identified traditions that are evidence of this stipulation. 
 574 Nicola Masciandaro, “Non potest hoc corpus decollari: Beheading and the Impossible,” in Heads 
Will Roll: Decapitation in the Medieval and Early Modern Imagination, ed. Lariss Tracy and Jeff Massey, 
MRAT 7 (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 20 (italics original). 
 575 Evans, Jesus and the Ossuaries, 14. See, Collins, Mark, 304. See also, Miller, Women in Mark’s 
Gospel, 81, who appeals to Mark 6:26 (where Herod is “deeply troubled” [περίλυπος]) to claim that “the 
residual conflict within Herod is illustrated by Herod’s fear that Jesus is John risen from the dead.” In reference 
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reveals a hint of mockery behind Mark’s portrayal of Herod in that Herod incredulously 
believes John overcomes a type of death designed not to be overcome. As the previous 
chapter demonstrated, some ancients believed bodily mutilation such as beheading thwarted 
hopes of “resurrection.” In this respect, Kraemer’s core argument that 6:17–29 refutes the 
idea that Jesus is John is entirely plausible, but not for the reasons she puts forward. That 
John is not merely beheaded (6:27) but his head and body separated in burial (6:28) only 
reinforces the ludicrousness of Herod’s belief first implicitly criticized in 6:16.  
 The other plausible explanation is not categorically different from the first, but it 
nevertheless alters the sense of the passage. Its divergence is a matter of estimating the doubt 
of Herod to a different degree. Rather than supposing that Antipas held a measure of doubt 
regarding the efficacy of beheading, this option reads his comment in 6:16 as confidently 
affirming—without a doubt we might say—that Jesus was indeed the beheaded John risen 
from the dead. In other words, it is on the basis of John’s mutilated body that leads Herod to 
associate John with Jesus (or at least it does not prevent Herod from aligning John with 
Jesus), and not, as in Luke 9:9, untangle their being equated.  
 This understanding of Herod’s remark also accords well with what we learned in the 
previous chapter about the ideology of beheading in the ancient world. Some ancients applied 
violence to the body to subvert hopes of “resurrection.”576 For some ancients, however, the 
separation of a head from its body prevented proper burial. The mutilated dead could return 
to the land of the living.577 From this perspective, far from proving that Jesus was not John 
 
to the parallel saying in Matt 14:2, John Chrysostom suggests that Herod is so fraught with horror that he is 
attempting to remind himself that he had John beheaded (Hom. Matt. 24.4). 
 576 This idea is not limited to antiquity. In the medieval period, for example, Jacobus de Voragine 
compiled a tradition in the Legenda aurea that portrays Herodias as burying John’s head separate from his body 
as a safeguard “because she feared that the prophet would return to life if his head was buried with his body” 
(see, Jacobus de Voragine, The Golden Legend: Readings on the Saints, trans. William Granger Ryan 
[Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012], 523). 
 577 Scholarship on decapitated inhumation in Roman Britain has fluctuated between interpreting 
decapitated burials as hindering or aiding the dead’s entry into the underworld. For discussion and citations, see 
Watts, Religion in Late Roman Britain, 74–95. 
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the Baptist raised from the dead, 6:17–29 explains why Herod held that belief in the first 
place: the separation of John’s head (6:27–28) from its body’s burial (6:29) enabled Herod’s 
speculation.578 From this vantage point, the logic of Kraemer’s position does not hold weight. 
We can rightly ask: how does narrating John’s beheading (6:17–29) clarify that Jesus is not 
John when it is precisely the fact of John’s beheading that enables the two figures being 
aligned in the first place (6:16)? The answer in this case is obvious—it does not. According 
to this interpretation, moreover, one can also rightly detect a hint of fear in Herod’s 
declaration.  
 Regardless of which explanation one deems more likely, however, two conclusions 
remain defensible. (1) The Markan and Lukan narrations about John’s death are undergirded 
by differing ideologies of beheading—one that upholds resurrection as an impossibility for 
the decapitated (Luke) and one that has room for the possibility of the decapitated partaking 
in resurrection, despite their mutilation (Mark). (2) Both explanations reinforce Mark’s 
negative characterization of Antipas. The former explanation portrays Antipas entertaining 
ludicrous notions and the latter option presents Antipas as paranoid that John had overcome 
his beheading. Not all scholars, however, are convinced that Mark 6:17–29 characterizes 
Antipas negatively. 
 
2.2. Gender and Blame in Mark 6:17–29 
 In his 2015 monograph, Jesus and the Chaos of History: Redirecting the Life of the 
Historical Jesus, Crossley sets forth a careful reading of the dynamics of gender at work in 
the account of John’s death in Mark 6:17–29, which he treats as a pre-Markan tradition.579 In 
Crossley’s view, the tradition all but exonerates Herod Antipas of blame in John’s 
 
  
 579 Crossley, Jesus and the Chaos of History, 147–62. 
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decapitation while placing the guilt squarely on the shoulders of Herodias and Salome.580 In 
so doing, the tradition reinscribes “stereotypical gender constructions.”581 Crossley is not 
alone, moreover, in understanding one or more of the Herodian women as primarily at fault 
in the Markan tradition. In her 2006 article, Janes argues: “the episode lays the blame 
principally on Herodias, who sought John’s death and told her daughter what to ask.”582 Prior 
to Janes, Anderson asserted that “more extended comments and inside views of Herod seem 
designed to win sympathy for Herod … [but Herodias is presented] unsympathetically as a 
woman with a grudge.”583  
 This line of argumentation departs from other interpreters who claim that Mark casts a 
negative shadow primarily over Herod Antipas. Murphy, for example, writes that “the story 
leaves one angry with Herod, who has elevated pleasure, indiscretion, and his own honor 
above the righteousness of [John].”584 Donahue and Huntington claim that “the ultimate 
blame falls on Herod.”585 Similar to Crossley, but taking this different stance, is Glancy, who 
all but exonerates the Herodian women from blame while highlighting how scholars have 
underappreciated Antipas’ responsibility.586  
 The strategy of locating the blame for John’s death primarily on one party of Herod’s 
court at the expense of—or even relative to—the other, however, is dubious. The tradition 
paints both Antipas and the Herodian women with a dark brush. “The truth is that the threads 
 
 580 Crossley, Jesus and the Chaos of History, esp. 148, 153–54, 158. For an earlier version of his 
argument, see, Crossley, “History from the Margins,” 147–61. 
 581 Crossley, Jesus and the Chaos of History, 147. 
 582 Janes, “Why the Daughter of Herodias Must Dance,” 449. 
 583 Janice Capel Anderson, “Feminist Criticism: The Dancing Daughter,” in Mark and Method: New 
Approaches in Biblical Studies (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), 120. 
 584 Murphy, John the Baptist, 127. 
 585 Donahue and Harrington, The Gospel of Mark, 199. 
 586 Jennifer A. Glancy, “Unveiling Masculinity. The Construction of Gender in Mark 6:17–29,” BibInt 
2 (1994): 34–50. To be clear, Glancy does not suggest that Mark approves of the Herodian women’s actions in 
the story, only that “Herodias herself is not represented as a monster, nor is there any hint that the desire of 
mother and daughter grows out of their sexuality” (Glancy, “Unveiling Masculinity,” 42). The only “hint of a 
grotesque edge to female subjectivity and desire” that Glancy detects is Mark 6:24–25 where the daughter 
makes the additional requirement of John’s head on a platter (Glancy, “Unveiling Masculinity,” 50). Thus, 
Miller, Women in Mark’s Gospel, 78–79, who argues that Glancy “ignores the cruelty of the women” is not 
altogether accurate. One may argue that Glancy downplays the women’s cruelty, but she does not ignore it. 
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of guilt here are tangled.”587 There is good reason to suppose that, for first-century readers, 
determining which character’s shade is darker would be very much in the eye of the beholder. 
A critical review of Crossley’s argument is instructive in this regard. 
 
2.2.1. The Dangerousness of Female Seduction  
 As an initial remark, it must be emphasized that Crossley cogently demonstrates that 
Mark blames the Herodian women for their role in John’s death in 6:17–29. After all, Mark 
depicts Herodias as the one who held the grudge against John and “was wishing” (ἤθελεν) to 
kill him (6:19).588 Despite her mother expressing only the desire for John’s head (6:24), the 
daughter supplies what Asikainen calls a “macabre addition,”589 namely the requirement of 
John’s head “on a platter.”590 And, as Miller observes: “The account of Herodias and her 
daughter offers an evil counterpart to the faithful women we see elsewhere in the Gospel 
(5.21–43; 7.24–30; 14.3–9).”591  
 Crossley points to Josephus (Ant. 18.240–255), who identifies Herodias as “the main 
reason for Antipas’ eventual downfall,” as an example of a potential first-century reader who 
would have been positively inclined toward Mark’s portrayal of Herodias.592 Crossley may 
well be right. Josephus is not kind in his Antiquities of the Jews to Herodias. Yet, according 
to Josephus, God also punishes Antipas for listening to Herodias in her bid to promote 
 
 587 Duran, “Return of the Disembodied or How John the Baptist Lost His Head,” 290. 
 588 This depiction contrasts sharply, of course, with Matt 14:5 where it is Antipas who “wishes” 
(θέλων) to kill John. Also, in Mark’s portrayal, it is not beyond reason to suppose that Antipas imprisons John 
in order to protect John from Herodias (notice the series of explanatory indicators in Mark 6:17–18: διά, ὅτι, and 
γάρ). 
 589 Asikainen, Jesus and Other Men, 63. 
 590 Indeed, notice that Mark draws attention to this additional element by fronting the prepositional 
phrase ἐπὶ πίνακι before the accusative construction in 6:25: θέλω ἵνα ἐξαυτῆς δῷς μοι ἐπὶ πίνακι τὴν κεφαλὴν 
Ἰωάννου τοῦ βαπτιστοῦ (“I wish that, immediately, you would give me, on a platter, the head of John the 
Baptist”). See also, Miller, Women in Mark’s Gospel, 79: “The girl, therefore, is responsible for the associations 
of John’s death with a cannibalistic meal.” 
 591 Miller, Women in Mark’s Gospel, 81. 
 592 Crossley, Jesus and the Chaos of History, 148–49 (quotation, p. 149). Page 149: “Josephus, for one, 
would have accepted the idea that Herodias was deceptive and manipulative and more than capable of fooling 
Antipas.” 
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Antipas’ status in the eyes of Rome: “And thus did God punish Herodias for her envy at her 
brother, and Herod also for giving ear to the vain discourses of a woman.”593 Thus, in 
response to Crossley we might say that Josephus, for one, would have been congenial to the 
idea that Antipas lacked self-control in being manipulated by a woman. 
 In fact, we can level a similar argument in regard to Crossley’s comments about the 
perceived dangerousness of female sexual seduction. According to Crossley: “In first-century 
Palestine there was an established association between evil and seductive female 
sexuality.”594 He appeals to a number of relevant texts to illustrate this claim, including Prov 
7:25–26 where wrongdoing takes on the persona of a seductive woman: “Do not let your 
hearts turn aside to her ways; do not stray into her paths; for many are those she has laid low, 
and numerous are her victims” (NRSV).595 Moreover, wisdom was also associated with the 
luring sexuality of a woman, as in 11Q5 XXI, 11–18.596 These synonomously gendered 
personifications of evil and wisdom form what Crossley terms a “dangerous ambiguity.”597 
Accordingly, he reasons: 
 And Antipas was indeed lured and in the context of the construction of dangerous 
 ambiguity Mark 6.17–29 is relieving Antipas of some of the blame in that it was 
 hardly his fault he was attracted to the ‘young girl’.… With these cultural 
 constructions understood, it should be no surpise that Salome has Antipas under her 
 control.598 
 
Again, Crossley may well be right, at least to a limited extent. In light of the ideology of 
female sexuality in the first century, some first-century readers would hardly blame Antipas 
on account of his attraction to the “young girl” (κοράσιον, 6:22). Yet, this reasoning is not 
entirely convincing for at least two reasons. First, in some early manuscripts, including 
 
 593 Josephus, Ant. 18.255 (Whiston).  
 594 Crossley, Jesus and the Chaos of History, 151. 
 595 Crossley, Jesus and the Chaos of History, 151–52. 
 596 Crossley, Jesus and the Chaos of History, 152. 
 597 Crossley, Jesus and the Chaos of History, 152–53. Page 152: “Wisdom may be construed as 
sexually appealing but this is also, of course, how the female personification of evil is constructed and, in 
Proverbs, the language to describe both is clearly overlapping and it is potentially difficult to distinguish 
between the two (Prov. 7.11–12; 8.1–3).” 
 598 Crossley, Jesus and the Chaos of History, 152–53. 
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Codices Sinaiticus (א) and Vaticanus (B), the daughter whose dance apparently arouses599 
Antipas and his dinner guests is described as “his” (αὐτοῦ) daughter, i.e., Antipas’ daughter 
(6:22).600 Thus, Antipas’ pleasure and ensuing promise to his daughter potentially takes on 
incestuous overtones. But caution is in order here. As Stiebert explains: 
 Anthropological literature acknowledges incest taboos as universal, or near-universal 
 among human societies (with any exceptions having dubious legitimacy).… What 
 precisely constitutes incest is, however, variously understood. Incest, therefore, is a 
 cultural concept and what is incestuous (and illegal) in one society may be a close-kin 
 marriage (and legal) in another.601 
 
The specific prohibition of a father from having sexual relations with his daughter is 
conspicuously absent in the rather detailed incest prohibitions lists of Lev 18 and 20.602 This 
absence contrasts sharply, for instance, from Hittite law that expressly forbids men from 
incestuous relations with their daughters.603 One possible explanation for this omission in the 
Levitical Code is, of course, that in a patriarchal society the father’s lordship over his 
daughter extended to the sexual arena as well. Another explanation is that such a prohibition 
is so self-evident that there is no need to commit it to writing. In this vein, one is reminded of 
 
 599 Joel Marcus, Mark 1–8, 396, observes that the verb ἤρεσεν (“pleased”) (Mark 6:22) often has sexual 
connotations in the Septuagint (e.g. LXX: Gen 19:8; Job 31:10). See also, Crossley, Jesus and the Chaos of 
History, 153. Cf. Hartmann, Der Tod Johannes des Täufers, 162–68, 177–78, who argues that the daughter’s 
dance and the verb ἤρεσεν do not have erotic overtones. For Hartmann, the banquet scene reflects the 
benevolent response of a superior (Herod) to his inferior (the girl) who paid him homage. Hence, he describes 
the motif of Herod’s wish as the “freundliche Zuwendung” (“friendly devotion”) of the powerful (p. 177). See 
also, Nolland, The Gospel of Matthew, 582, who notes that “dancing need not be erotic to give delight and to stir 
gratitude.” Crossley does not interact with Hartmann whose argument could potentially bolster Crossley’s 
overarching assessment of Herod’ guilt in that it eliminates the idea of sexual passion motivating Herod’s 
promise. Even if Hartmann is correct, the elimination of this feature of the story does not detract from the other 
ways argued in this chapter that Mark negatively characterizes Antipas. 
 600 Uncials that also reflect this reading include D, L, and Δ. The ninth-century minuscule 565 also 
follows this reading. 
 601 Johanna Stiebert, Fathers and Daughters in the Hebrew Bible (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), 102–03. 
 602 Genesis makes no explicit condemnation, moreover, against Lot or his daughters for their sexual 
intercourse with their father while Lot was drunk (Gen 19:30–38). Interestingly, the reception of this tradition in 
rabbinic literature tends to treat Lot unsympathetically for this episode, with the incest viewed as Lot’s 
punishment for sexual promiscuity (m. Tan. 12; m. ’Ag. Ber. 25:1). Indeed, Gen. Rab. 51:8–9 may imply that 
Lot secretly enjoyed having sex with his daughters—he was cognizant of the one daughter arising (cf. Gen 
19:33) and did not thwart his daughters’ attempt to intoxicate him again on the following day. 
 603 Stiebert, Fathers and Daughters, 106. 
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Plato Leg. 8.838b where such incest is prevented by means of an “unwritten law” (νόμος 
ἄγραφος; on this text, see further below).604  
 Regardless, the injunction in Lev 18:6 against sexual relations with “any flesh of his 
relative” ( רשב ראש לכו ) may constitute an umbrella prohibition that, by implication, extends to 
the father-daughter relationship (Lev 18:6).605 Similarly, Lev 18:17 prohibits a man from 
sexual intimacy with “a woman and her daughter” (התבו השא), which may be understood as 
referring to daughters and stepdaughters.606 Some early manuscripts at Mark 6:22, including 
Codices Alexandrinus (A) and Ephraemi Rescriptus (C), alternatively read that the dancing 
girl was “her” (αὐτῆς) daughter, i.e., Herodias’ daughter.607 So, whether a first-century 
reading of 6:22 constituted αὐτοῦ or αὐτῆς, the possibility remains that this tradition could 
generate suspicions of incestuous lust motivating Antipas’ actions.  
 Furthermore, for those readers in the Greco-Roman world whose ideology of incest 
was not necessarily informed by Torah, Mark’s specification of a kinship between Antipas 
and the daughter (whether by blood or through marriage) would likely at least raise the 
question of permissable sexual encounters between men and women. Classical Greek authors 
frequently spew invectives against intercourse with daughters. Euripides characterizes such 
sex as barbaric: 
 That is the way all barbarians are: father (πατήρ) lies with daughter (θυγατρί), son 
 with mother, and sister with brother, nearest kin murder each other, and no law 
 prevents any of this. Do not introduce such customs into our city. For it is also not 
 right for one man to hold the reigns of two women. Rather, everyone who wants to 
 live decently is content to look to a single mate for his bed.608 
 
Consider also Xenophon’s Cyropaedia: “Neither does a father (πατήρ) fall in love with (ἐρᾷ) 
his daughter (θυγατρός), but somebody else does; for fear of God and the law of the land are 
 
 604 Similarly, Xenophon, Mem. 4.4.19–23. 
 605 HALOT, s.v. “   ב  שר ” renders וֹר  שְב רֵאְש as “his close relative.” 
 606 See, Stiebert, Fathers and Daughters, 107. 
 607 Uncials that also reflect this reading include W and Θ. The “family thirteen” manuscripts, several 
minuscules, and the eleventh-century lectionary 253 also follow this reading. 
 608 Euripides, Andr. 173–180 (Kovacs, LCL). 
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sufficient to prevent such love (ἔρωτα).”609 In Plato, sexual union between a man and his 
daughter receives a series of vitriolic vituperations: 
 Whenever any man has a brother or sister who is beautiful. So too in the case of a son 
 or daughter, the same unwritten law is most effective in guarding men from sleeping 
 with them, either openly or secretly, or wishing to have any connexion with them,—
 nay, most men never so much as feel any desire (ἐπιθυμία) for such connexion.… 
 [T]hese acts are by no means holy (μηδαμῶς ὅσια), but hated of God (θεομισῆ) and 
 most shamefully shameful (αἰσχρῶν αἴσχιστα).610  
 
Plato, moreover, excludes sexual intercourse with a daughter for men even after the men are 
no longer of the age to procreate: 
 When the women and men cease to be of the age to have children, we shall leave the 
 men free, I think, to have intercourse with whoever they wish, except with a daughter, 
 a mother or the daughter’s children or the mother’s mothers; and the women likewise 
 except with a son, a father and their sons and fathers.611 
 
The first-century CE Stoic philosopher, Musonius Rufus, in some of his lectures, discusses 
how men should treat their wives and daughters. Lecture 12 (entitled “On Sexual 
Indulgence”), argues that those men who indulge in sex outside of marriage do so out of a 
lack of self-control.612 This idea of self-control leads to the next reason to question Crossley’s 
claim: Mark 6:14–29 emasculates Antipas by casting him as a man without self-control. 
Insights from the burgeoning field of masculinity studies will help articulate the significance 
of this point. 
 
2.2.2. The Masculinity of Herod Antipas 
 As this chapter has shown, the Markan narration of John’s death attempts to control 
the potential degradation of John’s beheading by keying John to the sympathetic protagonist 
 
 609 Xenophon, Cyr. 5.1.10 (Miller, LCL). BDAG, s.v. “ἐράω” lists Cyr. 5.1.10 as conveying “sexual 
attraction.” LSJ, s.v. “ἔραμαι” describes the verb as “of the sexual passion.” The cognate noun ἔρως is likewise 
defined as “love, mostly of the sexual passion” (LSJ, s.v. “ἔρως”). 
 610 Plato, Leg. 8.838b–c (Bury, LCL). 
 611 Plato, Resp. 5.461b–c (Emlyn-Jones and Preddy, LCL). 
 612 See, Beryl Rawson, Children and Childhood in Roman Italy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), 208. Other examples of primary data that criticize sexual relations with daughters abound (e.g. Virgil, 
Aen. 6.623; Sextus Empiricus, Pyr. 3.246). 
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Jesus and molding a shadow over Antipas. In this respect, Mark flips the script of John’s 
decapitation. Τhe beheading does not portray outright Antipas and John in a superior-inferior 
relationship respectively. The picture of Antipas in “control” of John’s head (6:27–28) and 
body (ἐκράτησεν, 6:17; cf. 6:29) is brought into tension with key elements that demonstrate 
Antipas’ inferiority as a “king.”613 This degradation of Antipas takes on gendered nuances.  
 Conway has shown that the “specter of lost manliness, of a slide into effeminacy, was 
frequently raised before the eyes of the literate male audience.”614 In this sense, to be truly a 
“man” (vir; ἀνήρ) in the Greco-Roman world was proven not so much by one’s innate 
biological sex, but on one’s lived-out “virtue” (virtus; ἀνδρεία), and thus “manliness.”615 In 
short, “masculinity” was a performance indelibly linked to virtue.616 Accordingly, Conway 
asserts: “Acting like a man required one to assume the active role in private sexual practice as 
well as one’s public life. At the same time, such a role also required the careful display of 
control and restraint, both with respect to one’s passions—sexual and otherwise—and in 
terms of treatment of the other.”617 Wilson elucidates the connection between self-control and 
power, and thus reaches a similar conclusion: 
 In the Greco-Roman world, masculinity and power go hand in hand, with a manly 
 man exercising power over others in terms of sexual, paternal, political, and military 
 power, and exercising power—or self-control—over himself in terms of controlling 
 his own body and emotions. In brief, to be a man in the ancient world meant to wield 
 power over others and power over oneself.618 
 
 
 613 Simultaneously, of course, John the Baptist is acknowledged as a “righteous and holy man (ἄνδρα)” 
(Mark 6:20). 
 614 Conway, Behold the Man, 15–34 (quotation, p. 17). 
 615 See, Conway, Behold the Man, 22–23. 
 616 Asikainen, Jesus and Other Men, 30: “The quintessential masculine virtue was ἀνδρεία or virtus. 
Both the Greek word ἀνδρεία and the Latin word virtus derive from the gender-specific terms for ‘man’ (ἀνήρ 
and vir, respectively), and they can thus be translated as ‘manliness’ or ‘manly behavior.’ Both words 
characterize the ideal behavior of a man.” On gender performativity in modern critical discourse, see, Judith 
Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990). 
 617 Conway, Behold the Man, 22. 
 618 Wilson, Unmanly Men, 59. 
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Thus, mastery of the self (i.e. “self control” [αὐτοκράτωρ])—pertaining as it did to 
moderation in one’s sexual behavior, emotions, luxury, and control over others—comprised a 
or the chief virtue of ideal masculinity in this cultural context.619  
 From this perspective, then, it is striking to observe briefly six features of 6:14–29 
that underscore Antipas’ deficiency of this essential component.620 (1) To use Marcus’ words: 
 Throughout the passage, moreover, we see that this supposed “king” is not even in 
 control of himself, much less of his subjects; he is rather overmastered by his 
 emotions which swing wildly from superstitious dread (6:14, 16) to awe, fascination, 
 and confusion (6:20), to a sexual arousal that seems to border on insanity (6:22–23) to 
 extreme depression (6:26).… Herod is merely one who appears to rule (cf. 10:42), 
 whereas actually his strings are pulled by others.621 
 
(2) Antipas neither prevents his (step)-daughter from performing a dance that is received 
erotically nor ultimately protects John from Herodias’ desire to kill John.622 (3) He shows no 
restraint in offering the dancing girl a wish, namely, the immoderate “half of [his] kingdom” 
(ἡμίσους τῆς βασιλείας μου) (6:23; emphasis mine).623 Further, as previously mentioned, 
Antipas’ promise to the daughter stems from his sexual arousal (6:22), regardless of whether 
the dance itself was intentionally erotic.624 Mark thus portrays Antipas as one whose behavior 
 
 619 See, Conway, Behold the Man, 15–34; Wilson, Unmanly Men, 39–75 (esp. 64–75); Asikainen, Jesus 
and Other Men, 19–45 (esp. 29–35). Undoubtedly, competing versions of what constituted the truly masculine 
man existed in this cultural climate, as Asikainen, Jesus and Other Men, 19–45, has shown. The present 
contention that Antipas does not exemplify the ideal man does not stand or fall on envisioning one construction 
of “hegemonic” masculinity in the ancient world (with “self-control” as its hallmark characteristic). Rather, the 
point is that “self-control” is demonstrably present as a or the chief ingredient in many constructions of the ideal 
man. In turn, this enables us to interpret how some first-century readers would have gauged Antipas’ credibility 
as a masculine ruler. On “hegemonic masculinity” in modern critical discourse, see, Tim Carrigan, Bob (R. W.) 
Connell, and John Lee, “Toward a New Sociology of Masculinity,” Theory and Society 14 (1985): 551–604; 
R. W. Connell, Masculinities, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 76–81; R. W. Connell 
and James W. Messerschmidt, “Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept,” Gender and Society 19 
(2005): 829–59. 
 620 See also, Smith, “Tyranny Exposed,” whose identification of stock features of an ancient tyrant-type 
largely intersects with ancient conceptualizations of emasculating behavior outlined in this section.  
 621 Marcus, Mark 1–8, 398 (italics added and removed). Similarly, Miller, Women in Mark’s Gospel, 
83: “Herod is presented as a man who is torn apart by conflicting desires, and is depicted as the antithesis of a 
true ruler because others manipulate his emotions.” 
 622 Cf. Malina and Rohrbaugh, Social-Science Commentary, 216: “In non-elite eyes, honorable males 
would not allow a female family member to perform such a display; their failure to prevent her from doing so 
pegs them as shameless.” Similarly, Asikainen, Jesus and Other Men, 66: “Instead of controlling the women of 
his family, Herod is manipulated by them.” 
 623 This immoderate offer is all the more poignant for first-century readers who are aware that Antipas 
was a tetrarch (not a king), and thus did not have the authority (i.e. control) of fulfilling such an offer. 
 624 Ambrose, Concerning Virgins, 3.6.27, thinks that the girl exposed her nakedness. 
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was dictated by sexual passion. (4) His excessiveness could also be perceived from the 
observation that he held a luxurious banquet, inviting his “great ones,” “rulers of a thousand,” 
and “the first ones of Galilee” (6:21).625 (5) The swiftness (εὐθύς, 6:27) with which he 
commands is dictated by the urgency of the daughter (εὐθὺς μετὰ σπουδῆς, 6:25). (6) His 
corpse abuse of John in not allowing John’s head and body to be reunited in burial speaks to 
his excessive treatment of the other (6:27–29).626  
 Asikainen is correct: “Herod [Antipas] does not exemplify the ideal of masculine self-
control.”627 Consequently, Crossley’s contention that some first-century readers would hardly 
blame Antipas on account of his attraction to the κορασίον must be met with an important 
qualification: many first-century readers likely would blame him on account of not exercising 
proper control, including over his sexual passion. In this light, Antipas’ apologetic stance 
toward John in Mark 6:20 sharpens Antipas’ lack of control as he is ultimately incapable of 
protecting John effectively. 
 
2.2.3. Oath Ideology 
 Finally, Crossley’s appeal to the ideology of oaths and vows in the ancient world also 
comes up against problems. For Crossley: “The background of binding oaths and vows would 
have provided Mark 6.17–29 with further reasons to maintain Antipas’ innocence and blame 
Salome-Herodias because Antipas, obviously, must do the honourable thing and keep his 
word.”628 At first appearance, Crossley’s reasoning makes a great deal of sense. According to 
Num 30:3 LXX (MT: Num 30:2): “Whoever vows a vow to the Lord or swears an oath 
 
 625 Smith, “Tyranny Exposed,” 278: “Mark’s depiction of Antipas’ dinner party (to which Herod 
Antipas invites Romans among his guests) in juxtaposition to the languishing imprisonment of a prophet 
elsewhere described as a wilderness ascetic thus marks Antipas’ sumptuary excess.” 
 626 Cf. Hartmann, Der Tod Johannes des Täufers, 187–89, who (citing Seneca, Controversiae 9.2.4; 
Ep. 83.25; Valerius Maximus, Memorable Doings and Sayings, 9.2.2; Plutarch, Crass. 33.4) argues that the 
ancient literary motif of bringing a head to a feast functions to demonstrate the excessive cruelty of the one 
responsible (directly or indirectly) for the executed person’s death. 
 627 Asikainen, Jesus and Other Men, 65. 
 628 Crossley, Jesus and the Chaos of History, 154. 
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(ὀμνύω) or determines with determination about his soul shall not profane his word; all 
things that come out of his mouth, he shall do” (Num 30:3 LXX).629 And, as Crossley 
observes, even the Roman emperor Gaius Caligula is not exempt from the cultural requisite 
of keeping his word to Agrippa (referring to Josephus, Ant. 18.289–304).630 Thus, when 
Antipas “swears an oath” (ὀμνύω) to the daughter (6:23) and fulfills it (6:27–28), there is no 
indication that Antipas’ oath-keeping was foolish or his prioritization of his own honor 
dishonorable.631 Or so it seems. Three qualifying comments are in order.  
 First, despite the binding quality of oaths and vows, at least some ancients could 
understand certain cirumstances that render (1) breaking an oath permissible, or (2) breaking 
or keeping an oath a choice between two evils, particularly when fulfilling an oath or vow 
conflicts with another moral imperative. Cicero indicates “clear understanding in one’s own 
mind that [the oath] should be performed” as a criterion in discerning perjury.632 Cicero also 
once said regarding Agammenon: “He ought to have broken his vow rather than commit so 
horrible a crime.”633 Josephus specifies that Jephthah’s sacrifice of his daughter as a burnt 
offering (see Judg 11:29–40) was “neither sanctioned by the law (νόμιμον) nor well-pleasing 
to God (θεῷ κεχαρισμένην); for he had not by reflection probed what might befall or in what 
aspect the deed would appear to them that heard of it.”634 Thus, for Josephus, Jephthah’s 
 
 629 I have italicized “all” to reflect the grammatical emphasis on the all-encompassing nature of the 
construction πάντα ὅσα ἐάν (lit. “all things, as many things as”). 
 630 Crossley, Jesus and the Chaos of History, 154–55. See also, Deut 23:21–23; Eccl 5:5; Sir 23:11; cf. 
Mark 14:71. 
 631 Cf. Miller, Women in Mark’s Gospel, 83: “There is an implication that Herod’s company of guests 
are more likely to think badly of Herod for breaking his oath than for his murder of John.” 
 632 Cicero, Off. 3.29: “Furthermore, we have laws regulating warfare, and fidelity to an oath must often 
be observed in dealings with an enemy: for an oath sworn with the clear understanding in one’s own mind that it 
should be performed must be kept; but if there is no such understanding it does not count as perjury if one does 
not perform the vow” (Miller, LCL). 
 633 Cicero, Off. 3.25 (Miller, LCL). 
 634 Josephus, Ant. 5.266 (Thackeray and Marcus, LCL). In his account of Jephthah’s daughter, 
moreover, Josephus (Ant. 5.263–266) omits Judg 11:29 (“Then the spirit of the LORD came upon Jephthah” 
[NRSV]). Accordingly, Tal Ilan, “Flavius Josephus and Biblical Women,” in Early Jewish Writings, ed. Eileen 
Schuller and Marie-Theres Wacker (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2017), 176, writes: “Because being equipped with 
divine power should have made Jephthah’s vow superfluous, this could be the reason why Josephus skips over 
the verse. In so doing Jephthah loses in the eyes of Josephus the favor or grace of God.” 
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fulfillment of his vow conflicts with Torah.635 Josephus’ note about Jephthah’s lack of 
forethought implies that others would have objected to him carrying out the vow.  
 In this light, even though Mark does not explicitly denounce Antipas for keeping his 
oath, specific elements in Mark’s story would likely enable some early recipients of the 
tradition to condemn Antipas for not breaking it. The Markan tradition clearly stresses the 
Baptist’s innocence. John, for example, is characterized as one concerned with fidelity to 
Torah (6:22).636 And Antipas recognizes that John is a “righteous and holy man” (ἄνδρα 
δίκαιον καὶ ἅγιον) (6:20). Moreover, the concessive participial construction in 6:26 
(περίλυπος γενόμενος; “although [the King] became deeply distressed) indicates a measure of 
reluctance to fulfill the girl’s desire for John’s head. Although commenting on the Matthean 
account, Origen’s remarks are heuristically illustrative in this respect: “And the prophet was 
beheaded because of oaths, in relation to which the right thing to do was to break the oaths 
rather than keep them. For the accusation of rashness when making an oath and of breaking 
an oath because of rashness, and the accusation of putting a prophet to death to keep an oath 
are not the same.”637 Augustine, as a further example, views it as the lesser of two evils for 
Antipas to break his oath than shed the Baptist’s blood (Serm. 308.1–2).638  
 Second, even if Crossley is right that Antipas’ fulfillment of his oath does not paint 
him negatively, (1) the content of the oath—up to half of his kingdom—and (2) the 
motivation behind the oath—sexual arousal—do, as we have already shown. To this second 
qualification we can add the third, and final, one. Even if we concede to Crossley regarding 
 
 635 Josephus fails to state how the sacrifice is not sanctioned by Torah, but it is possible that the Torah’s 
moral imperatives against child sacrifice (Lev 18:21; 20:2; Deut 12:31; 18:10) inform his comments. 
 636 See Lev 18:16; 20:21; cf. Deut 25:5–10. See, Marcus, John the Baptist in History and Theology, 
58–59.  
 637 Origen, Comm. Matt. 10.22 (Heine, OECT). 
 638 Bede (Oden and Hall, Mark, 85–86) insinuates, by appealing to 1 Sam 25:2–39, that Herod should 
have broken his oath: “There is an urgent necessity for us to break our oath, rather than turn to another more 
serious crime in order to avoid breaking our oath. David swore by the Lord to kill Nabal, a stupid and wicked 
man, and to destroy all his possessions. But at the first entreaty of the prudent woman Abigail, he quickly took 
back his threats, put back his sword into its scabbard, and did not feel that he had contracted any guilt by thus 
breaking his oath in this way.” 
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the honor of oath-keeping, many first-century readers would likely view Antipas through a 
negative lens on account of him swearing an oath at all. The Matthean Jesus is an obvious 
example that comes to mind: 
 Again, you have heard that it was said to those of ancient times, “You shall not swear 
 falsely, but carry out the vows you have made to the Lord.” But I say to you, Do not 
 swear at all.… [5:37] Let your word be “Yes, Yes” or “No, No”; anything more than 
 this comes from the evil one.639 
 
 According to Josephus, the Essenes view swearing at all worse than perjury: “Any 
word of theirs has more force than an oath; swearing (τὸ ὀμνύειν) they avoid, regarding it as 
worse than perjury (τῆς ἐπιορκίας), for they say that one who is not believed without an 
appeal to God stands condemned already (ἤδη).”640 While the Essenes view swearing worse 
than swearing falsely, Philo considers swearing worse than even “to swear truly” (εὐορκεῖν): 
 To swear not at all is the best course and most profitable to life, well suited to a 
 rational nature which has been taught to speak the truth so well on each occasion that 
 its words are regarded as oaths; to swear truly (εὐορκεῖν) is only, as people say, a 
 “second-best voyage,” for the mere fact of his swearing (ἤδη γὰρ ὅ γε ὀμνύς) casts 
 suspicion on the trustworthiness of a man.641  
 
Thus, for Philo and the Essenes (if Josephus is to be believed), swearing an oath itself 
“already” (ἤδη) casts a suspicious gaze on the one who swears.  
 We might also point to Sir 23:11 where a “much-swearing man” (ἀνὴρ πολύορκος) is 
viewed as filled with “lawlessness” (ἀνομίας).642 And again Philo says that “[the habit of] 
much-swearing” (ἡ πολυορκία) casts suspicion on one’s credibility (Spec. 2.8). According to 
the Mishnah, one should not be “profuse in [making] vows.”643 In this vein, it is perhaps not 
insignificant that Mark portrays Antipas as making multiple oaths to the daughter: 
 
 639 Matthew 5:33–34, 37 (NRSV). 
 640 Josephus, J.W. 2.135 (Thackeray, LCL). 
 641 Philo, Decal. 17.84 (Colson, LCL). 
 642 Sirach 23:11 continues: “If he disregards [the oath], he sins doubly.” In contradistinction to the 
Essenes and Philo, then, Sir 23:11 seems to indicate disregarding one’s oath worse than swearing an oath in the 
first place. Nevertheless, swearing itself is still characterized negatively. Cf. Eccl 5:5 (MT: Eccl 5:4): “It is 
better that you should not vow (רֹדִת־ֹאל) than that you should vow and not fulfill it” (NRSV). 
 643 Mishnah, Demai 2.3 (Neusner). 
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• 6:22: “The king said to the girl, ‘Ask me for whatever you wish, and I will give it to 
you.’”  
• 6:23: “And he swore to her, ‘Whatever you ask me, I will give you, up to half my 
kingdom.’” 
Mark 6:26 indicates that Antipas did not wish to reject the daughter’s wishes out of regard for 
his “oaths” (τοὺς ὅρκους). As Duran succinctly puts it, Herod “talks too much.”644 
 In light of this discussion, it is best to conclude that the pre-Markan tradition’s 
recognition of John’s masculinity—“a righteous and holy man (ἄνδρα)” (6:20)—is designed 
to underscore Antipas’ lack thereof. The arguments levelled here against Crossley pertain 
precisely to his emphasis on the tradition blaming primarily Herodias and the daughter for 
John’s death. His principal contention that the tradition reflects early gendered reactions that 
attempt to reinscribe “stereotypical gender constructions” is not wrong, in my estimation, 
insofar as it is understood that this reinscribing does not preclude a construct of an 
emasculated Antipas.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown the interrelation of two features in the earliest written memory of 
John’s beheading. One feature is Mark’s intricate interconnection between the deaths of John 
and Jesus. The second feature is a wedge, or distance, between the respective 
characterizations of John and the Herodian court that this interconnection creates. With these 
maneuvers, the Gospel of Mark acknowledges but also contests the negative potential that 
remembering bodily violence risks evoking. This commemorative text thus functions as the 
locus of identity construction, where shame is mastered and ideology is expressed and 
reinforced.  
 
 644 Duran, “Return of the Disembodied or How John the Baptist Lost His Head,” 284. 
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 Paradoxically, however, the constructive process of overcoming the violence of 
John’s beheading risks creating invisible violence (see chapter two). The dangerousness of 
narrating acts of bodily violence is noticeable when the reception history of such violence is 
brought into view. Subsequent handlers of the tradition of John’s beheading perpetuate such a 
culture of invisible violence as they localize the wedge created between John/Jesus and the 
Herodian court in their present social frameworks. The dangerous impact of this distancing is 
most clearly observable in Justin Martyr’s Dialogue with Trypho and Origen’s Commentary 
on Matthew. As we will see in chapter five, both recipients weaponize the distance Mark first 
created between John and the Herodians by activating this feature in the context of early 
“Jewish-Christian relations.”  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE VIOLENCE OF MEMORY: JOHN’S BEHEADING AND THE JEWS 
 
Introduction 
This fifth chapter provides the final pieces to this work’s argument that the memory of John’s 
beheading becomes invisibly violent in its early reception. As chapter four demonstrated, the 
Gospel of Mark contests the degradation of John’s beheading by keying John’s death to 
Jesus’ death and vilifying the Herodian court, thereby creating a distance between the 
characterizations of victim and perpetrators. Many other handlers of the tradition in the first 
three centuries similarly create such a wedge, albeit in their own ways. In this regard, the first 
part of this chapter focuses on the reception of John’s beheading in the Gospels of Matthew 
and Luke. The bulk of this chapter, however, concentrates on the reception of John’s 
decapitation in Justin Martyr’s Dialogue with Trypho (second century) and in Origen’s 
Commentary on Matthew (third century).  
 I center the majority of attention on these latter two texts for three reasons. First, as 
indicated in the introduction and first chapter, a key contribution of this study is filling NT 
scholarship’s noticeable lack of attention on second- and third-century sources concerning 
John’s beheading. To focus primarily on first-century texts would represent more of the same 
work that has already been done. Second, limiting this study to two prominent texts enables a 
more in-depth study than a cursory survey of all second- and third-century texts that mention 
John’s beheading would otherwise allow. Third, Justin’s and Origen’s works are most salient 
in demonstrating the dangerous potential of John’s beheading in early “Jewish-Christian 
relations.”645  
 
 645 John T. Pawlikowski, “Anti-Judaism,” DJCR, 19–20: “The most important and comprehensive anti-
Judaic document was Justin Martyr’s Dialogue with Trypho. It became a model for discussions about Judaism in 
the ancient Church and sowed the seeds for an anti-Judaic attitude that would come to dominate the thinking of 
the churches from the fourth to the twentieth century.” Ronald E. Heine, Origen: Scholarship in the Service of 
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 Accordingly, the present chapter separates into three main parts. The first part briefly 
analyzes Matt 14:1–12 and Luke 9:7–9 to highlight two features of these texts that intersect 
with the interests that are evident in Justin’s and/or Origen’s works: (1) the differing 
characterizations of Herod and John the Baptist and (2) the matter of Elijah. The second part 
concerns Justin Martyr’s contestation of John’s beheading and argues that Justin redeploys 
John’s beheading in two anti-Jewish directions. First, Justin carefully assigns Herod a Jewish 
identity by making him a royal symbol of contemporary Jews. Justin activates the 
characterization of Herod as a prophet-killer and makes him another example of the Jews 
who kill God’s prophets. Second, Justin harnesses the image of John’s severed head on a 
platter to assert John’s Elijanic identity. But, in order to cast his version of Elijanic ideology 
as superior to competing Christian ideas, Justin aligns his Christian rivals’ arguments to 
Jews’ Elijanic ideology: he makes countering Jewish ideology an integral component of 
elevating his own version of Christology. The third part concerns Origen’s contestation of the 
Baptist’s decapitation and contends that Origen massages the negative portrayal of the 
Herodian court into an analogue of contemporary Jewish rejection of Jesus and of prophecy. 
However, Origen also treats John as a symbol of prophecy among the Jews. Accordingly, he 
will also retain the degradation of John’s beheading to assert the superiority of Christians at 
the expense of Jews. Thus, both Origen and Justin localize John’s beheading in their present 
social frameworks, weaponizing John’s beheading to advance anti-Jewish polemics. Both 
authors infuse contemporary Jews with the moral character of Herod, inscribing the Jews as 
killers of God’s prophet(s). In so doing, Justin and Origen perpetuate a culture of invisible 
 
the Church (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 227: “It is in the Commentary on Matthew especially that 
Origen reflects on the relationship between the Church and the Synagogue.” Already in the late fourth century 
we can observe the influence that Origen’s anti-Jewish interpretation of John’s beheading had on Jerome in the 
latter’s own Commentary on Matthew, which relied heavily on Origen’s commentary on the same work. See 
Jerome, Comm. Matt. 14.11.  
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violence. Before proceeding, however, it is necessary first to clarify some terminological 
matters. 
 
1. Terminological Remarks 
By the time of Justin Martyr in the second century, it is appropriate to conceptualize 
“Christian” and “Jew” as distinguishable social identities, at least in a restricted sense. Both 
Justin and Origen participate in self-definition by distancing themselves from Jews in the past 
who did not (and Jews in their own lifetimes who do not) follow Jesus. This work of self-
differentiation in their writings takes on anti-Jewish characteristics. Although our discussions 
of Justin and Origen will particularize these statements, explanation regarding this position’s 
relationship to the so-called “parting of the ways” and “anti-Jewishness” is necessary here at 
the outset.  
 
1.1. The “Parting of the Ways” 
 By adopting the perspective that by the mid-second century “Christian” and “Jew” 
were more or less distinguishable social identities to at least some contemporary 
commentators, I am not suggesting a clean break at a specific place and time between 
Christianity and Judaism that the metaphor of a singular “parting” seemingly implies.646 
Previous generations of scholars tended to view the destruction of the Jerusalem temple in 70 
CE as the decisive moment in the apparent partition.647 Others do not prefer to speak of 
Christianity and Judaism as individually bounded institutions, distinct from one another, until 
 
 646 Judith Lieu, “‘The Parting of the Ways’: Theological Construct or Historical Reality,” JSNT 56 
(1994): 101, describes the metaphor of “the parting of the ways” as a “short-hand for speaking of the separation 
between Judaism and Christianity understood not as a T junction but as a Y junction—two channels separating 
from a common source.” 
 647 For examples, see those cited in Marcel Simon, Verus Israel: A Study of the Relations between 
Christians and Jews in the Roman Empire AD 135–425, trans. H. McKeating (Oxford: The Littman Library of 
Jewish Civilization, 1986), x. 
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the fourth century.648 Some scholars continue to operate under the paradigm of a parting, 
albeit with varying levels of sophistication. Dunn, for example, voices the idea of multiple 
partings (hence the pluralized title of his monograph) and argues that the end of the Bar 
Kokhba Revolt (c. 135 CE) serves as the crucial point when “Christian and Jew were clearly 
distinct and separate.”649 Dunn, therefore, recognizes the separation as a lengthy and complex 
process, but he neverthless postulates a point of no return, when the partition became 
irreversible.  
 Others, however, question the utility of a parting paradigm.650 Fredriksen is critical of 
Dunn in this regard.651 Limiting the import of her conclusions to the first seven centuries, she 
responds to the question “When was the Parting of the Ways?” with her own rhetorical 
question: “What Parting of the Ways?”652 The force of Fredriksen’s rhetoric is driven by her 
awareness that alongside clear assertions of separation (by e.g. Justin Martyr) are perceptible 
indications of continuous social interactions between Jews and Christians.653 Indeed, even in 
the fourth century—a century for which Kraft makes the claim: “It is quite obvious that the 
‘ways’ … did indeed ‘part’”654—vehement expressions of distinction can be indelibly 
interwoven with hints of intimate proximity of Christians and Jews to one another. In 
Chrysostom’s efforts to dissuade Judaizing Christians from participating in Jewish festivals, 
his vilification of Jews presupposes the reality of close interactions between Jews and 
Christians. Consider this excerpt from his eighth homily: 
 
 648 For examples, see those cited in Daniel Boyarin, “Semantic Differences; or, 
‘Judaism’/‘Christianity,’” in The Ways That Never Parted: Jews and Christians in Late Antiquity and the Early 
Middle Ages, ed. Adam H. Becker and Annette Yoshiko Reed (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007), 66, n. 4. See 
also, Robert A. Kraft, “The Weighing of the Parts: Pivots and Pitfalls in the Study of Early Judaisms and Their 
Early Christian Offspring,” in Becker and Reed, The Ways That Never Parted, 87–94. 
 649 James D. G. Dunn, The Partings of the Ways Between Christianity and Judaism and Their 
Significance for the Character of Christianity, 2nd ed. (London: SCM, 2006), 318 (italics removed). 
 650 Most notably, Lieu, “‘The Parting of the Ways,’” 101–19. 
 651 Paula Fredriksen, “What ‘Parting of the Ways’?: Jews, Gentiles, and the Ancient Mediterranean 
City,” in Becker and Reed, The Ways That Never Parted, 35–36, n. 1. 
 652 Fredriksen, “What ‘Parting of the Ways’?,” 63 (italics added). 
 653 Fredriksen, “What ‘Parting of the Ways’?,” 61. 
 654 Kraft, “The Weighing of the Parts,” 87. 
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 Sit down and speak with him, but begin with another topic so that he does not suspect 
 you came to set him straight. Then say, “Tell me, do you agree with the Jews who 
 crucified Christ and who blaspheme him to this day and call him a transgressor of the 
 law?” Surely he will not dare say—if he is a Christian, and even if he has been 
 judaizing countless times—“I agree with the Jews.” But he will cover his ears and say 
 to you, “Of course not; hush up, man.” When you have gotten him to agree to this, 
 continue with the topic and say, “Tell me, how can you participate in their activities? 
 How can you join in their feasts, or fast with them?” Next, accuse the Jews of 
 ingratitude. Tell him of every transgression, which I have narrated to your charity in 
 recent days, and which has been proven from the place, from the time, from the 
 temple, and from the predictions of the prophets. Show him how the Jews do 
 everything without purpose and in vain, that they will never return to their former way 
 of life and that it is illegitimate to keep their former way of life outside of 
 Jerusalem.… Tell him that Jewish fasting, just like circumcision, casts the one who 
 fasts out of heaven even though he might have a thousand other good deeds. Tell him 
 that we are Christians and are called Christians for this reason, that we obey only 
 Christ, not that we run to his enemies. If some healing remedies are shown to you, and 
 someone says that they are able to heal, and for this reason he goes to the Jews, 
 expose their magical tricks, their spells, their amulets, their potions. The Jews appear 
 incapable of healing in any other way; for they do not truly heal. Far from it! I’ll go 
 even further and say this: if they truly heal, it is better to die than run to the enemies 
 of God and be healed in this way.655 
 
Similar to Chrysostom in the fourth century is Cyril of Jerusalem’s polemics in the fifth 
century: “Now the Greeks plunder you with their smooth tongues, ‘for honey distils from the 
lips of a strange woman,’ while the circumcision lead you astray by means of the Holy 
Scriptures, which they wrest vilely, if you go to them. They study Scripture from childhood to 
old age, only to end their days in gross ignorance.”656 Both Chrysostom and Cyril attest that, 
well into the fourth and fifth centuries, some Christians visited Jews (for varying reasons). 
Are we to presume that at least some of these Christians also understood themselves, in 
whatever sense, as Jews? Secure answers are difficult to ascertain. As Lieu notes: “In most 
cases we cannot know whether those involved would have adopted the label ‘Jew’ and/or 
 
 655 John Chrysostom, Adv. Jud. 8.5. Col. 934–935 (Meeks and Wilken, pp. 115–16; italics added). On 
Chrysostom’s rhetoric, see, F. J. Elizabeth Boddens Hosang, “Attraction and Hatred. Relations between Jews 
and Christians in the Early Church,” in Violence in Ancient Christianity, ed. Albert C. Geljon and Riemer 
Roukema, SVC 125 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 102–03. 
 656 Cyril, Catechetical Lectures, 4.2 (Telfer, LCC; italics added). 
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‘Christian’, or would have felt constrained to choose between them, while the labels that they 
may have been ascribed by others might be different again.”657  
 Moreover, the problem of answering such a question lies precisely on the theoretical 
acknowledgment that these (and other) texts are mediated and do not necessarily indicate a 
one-to-one correspondence to reality.658 If archaeologists were to unearth the writings of 
those whom Chrysostom hoped to dissuade, scholars would rightly be eager to observe 
whether they share the conceptual distance between Christians and Jews that Chrysostom 
invigorates. But the perspectives of these people are lost between the pages of history, 
evading the historian’s grip. However, the fact that Chrysostom’s perspective subsisted must 
surely indicate that at least some continued to have their own identity expressed and 
reinforced by his words.659 
 This discussion raises, therefore, the complexity of determining what characterizes a 
separation between Judaism and Christianity. Is such a break characterized by social 
antagonism, social isolationism (and thus the absence of mixed congregations), or distinct 
theological categories of thought? If one were to postulate a parting, for example, in the mid-
second century, (s)he would necessarily need to account for the apparent fact that some in the 
fifth century, who were construed as Christians, evidently participated in Jewish festivals and 
maybe even sought out Jewish input for interpreting Scripture. 
 Not only does this discussion raise the difficulty of what characterizes difference, it 
also raises the issue of power: Who determines the separation? Is it appropriate to postulate a 
 
 657 Judith M. Lieu, Christian Identity in the Jewish and Graeco-Roman World (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 305. 
 658 On the difficulty of negotiating the relationship between mediated texts and social realities, see, 
Lieu, Christian Identity, 300–02. 
 659 Cf. John Gager, The Origins of Anti-Semitism: Attitudes Toward Judaism in Pagan and Christian 
Antiquity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 7: “The voice of the Judaizing Christians—those who 
saw no need to tie their acceptance of Christianity to a repudiation of Judaism—is scarcely heard at all. The 
conception of early Christian history as governed by a progressive de-Judaization is true only for the victorious 
minority whose position is reflected in the surviving literature. The New Testament and other extant Christian 
writings represent and reinforce the views of the ultimate winners.” 
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parting only once pagans who wielded a measure of political authority could identify 
someone as ostensibly Christian? Or is it appropriate to speak of Christianity (in the sense of 
an entity extrinsic to Judaism) only when social exclusivity of Christians from Jews became 
the statistically dominant position? And when can we be sure that this supremacy occurred, 
given the prescriptive nature of much of the textual evidence? In this respect, if one were to 
postulate a post-Constantine parting in the fourth century, (s)he would need to account for 
certain earlier pagan perceptions, such as Suetonius who can speak of “Christians” 
(Christiani) as following “a new (novae) and wicked superstition.”660 In light of this 
complexity, Lieu’s comments are quite reasonable: 
 Both “Judaism” and “Christianity” have come to elude our conceptual grasp; we feel 
 sure that they are there, and can quote those “others,” outsiders, who were no less 
 sure. How else are we to understand the fiscus judaicus, how else to make sense of the 
 death, if not of the myriads of whom Eusebius speaks, at least of some who would not 
 let go of their conviction about Jesus, as they understood it? Yet when we try to 
 describe, when we seek to draw boundaries which will define our subject for us, we 
 lack the tools, both conceptual and material. It seems to me equally justifiable to 
 “construct” “Christianity” in opposition to “Judaism” at the moment when Jesus 
 “cleansed the Temple,” at least in the literary representation of that event, and to think 
 of that separation only in the fourth century, stimulated by dramatic changes in access 
 to power—and I could call to my defence advocates of both positions, no doubt 
 determined by their own starting-points and definitional frameworks.661 
 
Adding to this convolution is Boyarin’s recognition that the term Ἰουδαϊσμός (“Judaism”) in 
non-Christian Jewish usage in antiquity—see, 2 Macc 2:21; 8:1; 14:38—conveys the ways of 
Judeans or Jews, and thus “Jewishness,” not “Judaism” the religion.662 The occurrence of 
Ἰουδαϊσμός in 2 Macc thereby contrasts with the appearance in 2 Macc 4:13 of Ἑλληνισμός 
(“Hellenism”), a term that marks the ways and manners of the Greeks, and thus, we might 
add, “Greekness.”663 In fact, Boyarin convincingly argues that “Judaism” as a bounded 
institution mainly came into existence as a needed Christian construct to erect Christian 
 
 660 Suetonius, Nero 16.2 (Rolfe, LCL). 
 661 Judith Lieu, Neither Jew Nor Greek?: Constructing Early Christianity, 2nd ed. (London: 
Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2016), 239. Likewise, Lieu, “‘The Parting of the Ways,’” 108. 
 662 Boyarin, “Semantic Differences,” 67–68. 
 663 See, Boyarin, “Semantic Differences,” 68. 
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orthodoxy over and against heresy.664 Hence the tendency of many early Christians to define 
heresy “with reference to Judaism.”665  
 The purpose of this chapter is not to issue an argument that satisfactorily solves these 
and related issues. Rather, raising these difficulties helps situate my analysis of two primary 
texts as ideologically focused, while respecting the inherent complexity of early Jewish-
Christian interactions. Thus, when I claim that “Christian” and “Jew” were more or less 
distinguishable social identities by the mid-second century, I am not making a statement 
underpinned by a paradigm of a meta-level parting between Judaism and Christianity. The 
descriptor—“more or less”—therefore, is essential insofar as it captures that the fault lines 
between Jews and Christians in antiquity shifted gradually, sporadically, and fluctuated 
according to place.  
 Further, this recognition of relativity does not undercut that particular individuals (and 
segments of society) could self-define themselves as Christians and not Jews. Hence my 
intimation that “Christian” and “Jew” are distinguishable by the second and third centuries. 
Boyarin is again apropos:  
 But a partial answer to the paradox that, as early as the first century, Christians were, 
 nevertheless, recognizable at least in some places as not-Jews (Tacitus, the fiscus 
 judaicus, other evidence) is to note that whether or not there were Christianity and 
 Judaism, there were, it seems, at least some Christians who were not Jews, and, of 
 course, many Jews who were not Christians.666 
 
In my analysis below, it will become clear that Justin and Origen create a vast structural gulf, 
at least at the discourse level, between Christians and Jews (and align themselves with the 
former). Again, that Justin or Origen ideologically distance “Christians” from “Jews” does 
not assume that their sentiments were representative of the lived reality and ideology of all 
segments of Christians and Jews in the Roman Empire at large. Thus, my claim that 
 
 664 Daniel Boyarin, Border Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 11–13. 
 665 Boyarin, Border Lines, 12 (italics original). 
 666 Boyarin, Border Lines, 6–7. 
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“Christian” and “Jew” were more or less distinguishable social identities speaks rather to the 
capacity of individuals to make even contested distinctions and is, therefore, anchored with 
respect to Justin’s and Origen’s self-differentiating activity in particular.  
  
1.2. Anti-Jewishness 
 Another complicated terminological matter is delineating this chapter’s employment 
of the adjective “anti-Jewish” (or the nouns “anti-Jewishness” and “anti-Judaism”) to 
describe the memory of John’s death in Justin Martyr and Origen. “The search for a pure and 
unbiased vocabulary is probably doomed from the start.”667 Nevertheless, efforts must be 
made to minimize the potential confusion surrounding the use of such language. As an initial 
remark, I utilize the term “anti-Jewish” instead of “anti-Semitic” to avoid, inasmuch as 
possible, anachronistic overtones that the latter expression tends to elicit in a post-Holocaust 
world. Reinhartz will remind historians that while “some degree of anachronism is inherent 
to the study of the past,” some anachronisms are more acceptable than others.668 Although 
“anti-Semitism” is employed in a variety of ways669 (including as a synonymn of “anti-
Judaism”670), in general its usage communicates “racist discrimination against Jews for the 
simple reason that they are Jews,” a racial polemic particularly associated with the rise of 
Nazi Germany.671 The term “anti-Jewish” is less anachronistic—in that it does not tend to 
carry these associations—and thus, the more viable option to label the texts under 
 
 667 Gager, The Origins of Anti-Semitism, 7. 
 668 Adele Reinhartz, review of Judaism: The Genealogy of a Modern Notion, by Daniel Boyarin, 
Reading Religion [http://www.readingreligion.org] (2018). 
 669 See, Ritchie Robertson, “Varieties of Anti-Semitism,” EJD, 103–07, who mentions numerous types, 
including theological, economic, racial, and nationalist anti-Semitisms. See also Mark H. Gelber, “Literary 
Anti-Semitism,” EJD, 107, defines “literary anti-Semitism” as “the potential or capacity of a text to encourage 
or positively evaluate anti-Semitic attitudes or behaviors in accordance, generally, with the delineation of such 
attitudes and behaviors by social scientists and historians.” 
 670 Pawlikowski, “Anti-Judaism,” 19. 
 671 Anders Gerdmar, Roots of Theological Anti-Semitism: German Biblical Interpretation and the Jews, 
from Herder and Semler to Kittel and Bultmann, SJHC 20 (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 5–8 (quotation, p. 7). Frederick 
Schweitzer, “Persecution of Diaspora Jews: History of Jewish Persecution and Expulsion,” EJD, 95: “Anti-
Semitism may be defined basically as fear and hatred of the Jews.” 
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consideration here. I do not detect any overt hatred of “Jews” as such in Justin Martyr’s and 
Origen’s treatments of John’s death; and so I abstain from using “anti-Semitic” to eschew 
this accusation. 
 However, the employment of “anti-Jewish” at the expense of “anti-Semitic” does not 
presuppose that these terms are strict, unrelated, binaries. Gerdmar observes in his 
monumental 2009 monograph, Roots of Theological Anti-Semitism, that “anti-Judaism” 
typically indicates criticism of Judaism without necessarily denoting hatred of Jews for the 
simple fact that they are Jews.672 In this respect, it is the more innocuous term. But its degree 
of severity in relation to “anti-Semitism” does not mitigate its inherent dangerousness. As 
Gerdmar convincingly argues: “Anti-Judaism may be ‘fertilised’ and develop into anti-
Semitism.”673 Gerdmar thus detects an indelible link between anti-Judaism and anti-
Semitism, with the former often acting as “a praeparatio antisemitica.”674 My usage of “anti-
Jewish,” therefore, is not intended to overlook that notions which Justin Martyr and Origen 
both voiced—e.g. that “Jews” killed prophets like Jesus and John the Baptist—have fueled 
anti-Semitic sentiments and acts of physical violence against Jews. In fact, that anti-Jewish 
attitudes have actualized into visible violence against Jews over the course of history adds 
credence to the idea of conceptualizing anti-Jewishness as invisible violence, and thus 
impregnated with dangerous potential.675 
 Moreover, distinguishing “anti-Jewishness” from racial hatred of Jews does not carry 
the implication that Justin Martyr and Origen refrain from strong polemics vis-à-vis Jews 
who had rejected Jesus as Messiah. To take Justin Martyr as an example, throughout his 
 
 672 Gerdmar, Roots of Theological Anti-Semitism, 6–7. 
 673 Gerdmar, Roots of Theological Anti-Semitism, 8. 
 674 Gerdmar, Roots of Theological Anti-Semitism, 8. Similarly, Hosang, “Attraction and Hatred,” 106–
07. 
 675 Cf. Gelber, “Literary Anti-Semitism,” 111: “The Shoah made perfectly clear, by way of 
actualization, that the distance between literary anti-Semitism and other varieties of anti-Semitism is not that 
great, given political power and a willingness to commit crimes against humanity or, in this case, against 
Jewry.”  
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Dialogue with Trypho he refers to Trypho and Jews (like Trypho) who did not follow Jesus 
as ignorant (Dial. 9.1), “full of deceit and all wickedness” (Dial. 14.2), “a hard-hearted, 
foolish, blind, and crippled people (λαός), and children in whom there is no faith” (Dial. 
27.4), among other invectives. At one juncture, Trypho even remarks to Justin: 
 “It would be better for us,” Trypho concluded, “to have obeyed our teachers who 
 warned us not to listen to you Christians (ὑμῶν),676 nor to converse with you on these 
 subjects, for you have blasphemed many times in your attempt to convince us that this 
 crucified man was with Moses and Aaron, and spoke with them in the pillar of the 
 cloud; that He became man, was crucified, and ascended into Heaven, and will return 
 again to this earth; and that He should be worshipped.”677 
 
Soon thereafter, Trypho similarly retorts: “Don’t you realize … that you are out of your mind 
to say such things?”678 In light of these representative examples, Barnard’s contention that 
Justin’s and Trypho’s discussion is “friendly and docile” and “amicable” is to state only half 
the truth.679 Rajak is entirely correct: “In the Trypho, the polemic is both sustained and 
intense, even if punctuated by moments of genuine interaction.”680 
 Although Justin hopes that some Jews will believe in Jesus as the Christ,681 this 
prospect does not diminish the fact that his polemics drive a sharp contrast between non-
Christian Jews and non-Jewish Christians.682 The issue in conceptualizing Justin Martyr or 
 
 676 Falls’ translation obscures that the Greek term Χριστιανός (“Christian”) is absent here. 
Nevertheless, his rendering of ὑμῶν as “you Christians” captures the rhetorical distance between Jews and 
Christians Justin creates in his recurring juxtaposition of the second-person plural and first-person plural 
throughout his dialogue, as we will see. 
 677 Justin Martyr, Dial. 38.1 (Falls, FC). 
 678 Justin Martyr, Dial. 39.3 (Falls, FC). 
 679 L. W. Barnard, Justin Martyr: His Life and Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1966), 21, 40 (respectively). Similarly, Theodore Stylianopoulos, Justin Martyr and the Mosaic Law, 
Dissertation Series 20 (Missoula: SBL and Scholars Press, 1975), 35–36, speaks of the “irenic disposition” and 
“conciliatory tone” of Justin’s dialogue. Cf. Gager, The Origins of Anti-Semitism, 165, who responds to 
Barnard’s and Stylianopoulos’ claims: “But Justin’s polite tone and gentle manner are only part of the story. 
The other part is a sustained theological anti-Judaism.” Scholars make similar remarks regarding Origen’s tone 
about the Jews. See, e.g., Nicholas de Lange, Origen and the Jews: Studies in Jewish-Christian Relations in 
Third-Century Palestine, UCOP 25 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 76: “His [Origen’s] 
remarks about them [the Jews] are on the whole surprisingly free from the ill-informed rancor which pervades 
much of the literature on the subject which survives from the early Church. But it would be misleading to 
overlook entirely such traces of acrimony as do appear.” 
 680 Tessa Rajak, The Jewish Dialogue with Greece and Rome: Studies in Cultural and Social 
Interaction, AGJU 48 (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 513. 
 681 See e.g., Dial. 8.1–2; 32.2; 142.2–3; cf. 39.1–2.  
 682 As Susan Wendel, Scriptural Interpretation and Community Self-Definition in Luke-Acts and the 
Writings of Justin Martyr, NovTSup 139 (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 184 (italics added) astutely observes: “Justin still 
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Origen as “anti-Jewish” is not a matter of their inner disposition toward Jews.683 For this 
study, “anti-Jewish” is employed to describe a distancing between Jews and Christians, a 
wedge that pits Jews in an (ideological) inferior position to Christians. Casting Jews in an 
inferior light can happen even by those, such as Justin Martyr, with presumed “positive” or 
“harmless” intentions of “evangelization.” As chapter two demonstrated, violence exists even 
in the banal and seemingly innocuous mechanisms of self-definition. For this reason, it is 
appropriate to categorize Justin’s and Origen’s anti-Jewishness as a type of invisible 
violence—both authors engage in identity formation at the expense of Jews.  
 
  2. John’s Beheading in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke 
Outside the Gospel of Mark, the Gospels of Matthew and Luke are the only extant texts from 
the first century that mention the beheading of John the Baptist.684 As is frequently observed, 
Matt 14:1–12 follows Mark 6:14–29 in its general outline but heavily abbreviates the story.685 
Luke 9:7–9 follows Matt 14:1–2 and Mark 6:14–16 in narrating that speculation surrounded 
the identities of John and Jesus, but departs from Matt 14:3–12 and Mark 6:17–29 by not 
narrating the account of John’s beheading at all. Earlier in Luke 3:19–20, however, Luke had 
 
identifies Jews who believe in Jesus as an exceptional few whom God spared so that the Jewish race would not 
be completely obliterated (1 Apol. 53.7–8; Dial. 55.3; 32.2).… [Justin] frequently contrasts non-Jewish Christ-
believers with Jews, as if these two designations served as fitting labels for insiders and outsiders to the Christ-
believing community, respectively.” Similarly, that Origen envisions an ultimate future in which “all Israel will 
be saved” (Rom 11:25) does not neutralize the dangerous potential of the bleak assessment of the Jews in the 
meantime that Origen propagates. See, Joseph S. O’Leary, “The Recuperation of Judaism,” in Origeniana Sexta, 
BETL 118 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1995), 378: “Anti-Judaism is a structural necessity of his 
[Origen’s] thought, which systematizes the previous efforts to judge and recuperate Judaism and which in turn 
was inherited by all subsequent Christian theology.” On the ultimate salvation of the Jews in Origen, see Heine, 
Origen, 2010, 227–31; Peter W. Martens, Origen and Scripture: The Contours of the Exegetical Life, OECS 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 136, n. 10. On Origen driving a sharp wedge between Jews and 
Christians, see, e.g., Origen, Cels. 2.8. 
 683 See, Gager, The Origins of Anti-Semitism, 167. 
 684 Josephus mentions John’s death, but not the beheading of John (see, Ant. 18.116–119). The Gospel 
of John does not mention John’s death, let alone his beheading. But, see Augustine, Tract. Ev. Jo. 14.5.3 where 
he claims that Jesus’ crucifixion and John’s beheading exemplified the saying in John 3:30 (“He must increase, 
but I must decrease”). So also, Augustine, Serm. 307.1.  
 685 See, e.g., John Nolland, The Gospel of Matthew, 581; Harrington, The Gospel of Matthew, 216–17; 
Evans, Matthew, 291; Dennert, John the Baptist, 244. 
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linked Herod’s arrest of John with the latter’s rebuke of Herod concerning Herodias (cf. Mark 
6:17–18; Matt 14:3–4).686 Two matters regarding John’s death in Matthew and in Luke are 
particularly important for the present study: (1) the gap between the characterizations of John 
and Herod and (2) the matter of Elijah. 
 
2.1. John and Herod 
 Like the Gospel of Mark, both Matthew and Luke distance John the Baptist from 
Herod Antipas. In this distancing, both Gospels follow Mark in connecting John’s death to 
Jesus’ death. In his Studies in Matthew: Interpretation Past and Present, Allison observes 
that “fewer” scholars “have spoken of Matthew” in the same way that many—following 
Kähler—have evaluated the Gospel of Mark: “as a passion narrative with an extended 
introduction.”687 Despite Matthew’s passion narrative occupying “a proportionately smaller 
amount of space,” Allison contends that Matthew’s “entire narrative leans forward, so to 
speak, to its end, so that the reader of Matt. 1–25 is never far from thinking of the ensuing 
chapters, 26–28.”688  
 As part of this overall narrative effect, John’s beheading “leans forward” to Jesus’ 
crucifixion in Matthew’s narration. Matthew 14:1–2 excludes the populace’s speculation as 
to Jesus’ identity (Mark 6:14–15) and instead focuses exclusively on Herod’s conjecture that 
Jesus is the resurrected John. The elimination of these other opinions “offers a stronger focus 
on the link between John and Jesus.”689 Just as John is “grasped” (κρατέω, Matt 14:3) and 
“bound” (δέω, Matt 14:3), so also Jesus is “grasped” (κρατέω, Matt 21:46; 26:4, 48, 50, 55, 
 
 686 Also, as Joseph A. Fitzmyer, The Gospel According to Luke (I–IX): Introduction, Translation, and 
Notes, AB 28 (Garden City: Doubleday, 1981), 476, observes, Luke does not mention John’s death in Luke 
3:19–20 “because of the tradition he will make use of in the episodes of 7:18–30.” 
 687 Dale C. Allison, Studies in Matthew: Interpretation Past and Present (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2005), 217. 
 688 Allison, Studies in Matthew, 217. 
 689 Dennert, John the Baptist, 239. 
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57) and “bound” (δέω, Matt 27:2). According to Matt 14:5, Herod “wished” (θέλω, cf. Matt 
17:12) to “kill” (ἀποκτείνω) John the Baptist, but “feared” (φοβέω) the “crowd” (ὄχλος) 
“because they held him as a prophet (προφήτης).” The chief priests and Pharisees sought to 
grasp Jesus, but “feared” (φοβέω) the “crowds” (ὄχλος) “because they held him as a prophet 
(προφήτης)” (Matt 21:46).690 Similarly, the “crowd(s)” (ὄχλος, Matt 27:15–23) “want” 
(θέλω, Matt 27:15, 17, 21) Barrabas released, but Jesus crucified.691 John’s “disciples” 
(μαθητής, Matt 14:12) bury John; Joseph of Arimathea was “discipled” (μαθητεύω, Matt 
27:57) by Jesus and placed Jesus’ corpse in a tomb (Matt 27:57–61).692 Finally, of course, 
“John prepares the way for Jesus even in the manner of his execution.”693 John suffers an 
ignomonious death in beheading as Jesus similarly suffers a shameful end in crucifixion. 
 Luke 9:7–8 follows Mark 6:14–15 in recounting the various speculation that Jesus 
might be (1) John raised from the dead (Luke 9:7), (2) Elijah (Luke 9:8), or (3) one of the 
ancient prophets (Luke 9:8). Like Mark, Luke inserts this speculation into his narrative as the 
interior of an intercalation between the sending out of the twelve (Luke 9:1–6) and their 
return (Luke 9:10). According to Luke 9:9, Herod responds to the populace’s speculation 
about the identity of Jesus first with an observation, followed second by a rhetorical question: 
“Herod said: ‘John I myself beheaded; but who is this about whom I am hearing such 
things?” As the previous chapter argued, in contrast to Mark’s Herod, Luke’s Herod 
disassociates Jesus from John on the basis of the method with which Herod had John 
executed. This fact, however, does not negate that this saying connects John’s death to Jesus’ 
death in two ways. First, Herod’s rhetorical question “foreshadows Jesus’ question and 
 
 690 Dennert, John the Baptist, 247: “Matthew has inserted the behavior of the Jewish leaders into the 
portrayal of Herod, linking these groups together.” 
 691 Cf. Matt 21:23–27. 
 692 For further possible thematic links between John’s death and Jesus’ death in Matthew, see, e.g., 
Allison, Studies in Matthew, 225–26; Dennert, John the Baptist, 238–54. David L. Turner, Matthew, BECNT 
(Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 365: “Antipas’s reluctance to behead John may anticipate Pilate’s 
reluctance to crucify Jesus (14:9; 27:18–24).” 
 693 Turner, Matthew, 365. 
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Peter’s confession, which Jesus interprets through the suffering of the Messiah (9:18–22).”694 
Second, the disassociation between the two figures allows the narrator to add a final remark 
to Luke 9:9: “And he [Herod] was seeking to see him.” Thus, Luke 9:9 prepares the narrative 
for Jesus’ future interaction with Herod.695 Herod “will reappear in connection with the plot 
against Jesus and in connection with Jesus’ death (13:31–33; 23:7–11; Acts 4:27).”696 
 Matthew develops the differing characterizations between John and Herod in further 
ways. Herod’s desire to kill John in Matt 14:5 connects him with his father, Herod the Great, 
who similarly sought to kill Jesus in Jesus’ infancy (Matt 2:1–18).697 The Matthean Jesus’ 
command not to swear oaths (Matt 5:33–37) positions Herod in a negative spotlight, as his 
oath to the dancing daughter results in John’s beheading (Matt 14:7–12). Matthew portrays 
John the Baptist, on the other hand, in a positive light. The Matthean Jesus indicates that John 
is the greatest human (Matt 11:11). Prior to Matt 11:11, Matthew’s Jesus “has already 
affirmed the prophetic identity of John in 11:9.”698 In conjunction with Matthew’s reminder 
that the crowd thought of John as a prophet (Matt 14:5), Matthew situates Herod as one who 
is hostile to God’s prophets. Indeed, Matthew heightens this theme. Rather than narrating 
John’s death as the interior of an intercalation between the sending and return of the twelve 
(as does Mark and Luke), he inserts the account directly after the episode of Jesus’ rejection 
by his hometown (Matt 13:53–58).699  
 Similar to Mark and Matthew, Luke views John the Baptist positively and Herod 
negatively. As Kinman puts it, Luke’s John “was a prophet without equal.”700 According to 
 
 694 François Bovon, Luke: A Commentary on the Gospel of Luke 1:1—9:50, Hermeneia (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 2002), 349. 
 695 I. Howard Marshall, The Gospel of Luke: A Commentary on the Greek Text, NIGTC (Exeter: 
Paternoster Press, 1978), 355; Joel B. Green, The Gospel of Luke, NICNT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 
362. 
 696 Green, The Gospel of Luke, 360–61. 
 697 Dennert, John the Baptist, 239. 
 698 Nolland, The Gospel of Matthew, 583. 
 699 On the rejection of the prophets in Matthew, see also Matt 5:12; 17:12–13; 23:29–37.  
 700 Brent Kinman, “Luke’s Exoneration of John the Baptist,” JTS 44 (1993): 595. See also, Richard J. 
Erickson, “The Jailing of John and the Baptism of Jesus: Luke 3:19–21,” JETS 36 (1993): 455–66. 
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Luke 1:76, John the Baptist “will be called a prophet of the Most High.” The characterization 
of John as a prophet continues as John receives his prophetic call in Luke 3:2: “During the 
highpriesthood of Annas and Caiaphas, the word of God came upon John the son of 
Zechariah in the wilderness.” Given Luke’s positive estimation of John, then, it is not 
surprising that Luke’s antipathies reside with Antipas in the episode of John’s imprisonment: 
“And Herod the tetrarch, having been rebuked by him [John] concerning Herodias, the wife 
of his brother, and concerning all the evil things which he did, Herod also added this to them 
all: he locked up John in prison” (Luke 3:19–20).701 Finally, Herod’s question in Luke 9:9 
(“John I myself beheaded; but who is this about whom I am hearing such things?”) “leads the 
reader to class Herod as yet another character who ‘hears but does not understand’ (8.10).”702  
 These elements of Matthew and Luke, therefore, despite their different emphases, 
nevertheless share the common thread of driving a sharp divide between John the Baptist and 
Herod. Although stressing that the Gospels portray John positively and Herod negatively 
largely states the obvious, this divide takes an interesting turn in its reception history in the 
second and third centuries. Thus, understanding how this thread is woven into the contentious 
fabric of early “Jewish-Christian relations” is the task of the two main sections of this 
chapter. As we will see, Justin Martyr and Origen redeploy the negative characterization of 
Antipas in order to place Christians in a superior position to Jews.  
 
2.2. John and Elijah   
 The second matter regarding John’s death in Matthew and Luke is that of John’s 
relationship to Elijah. In the previous chapter, I made the observation that the Gospel of Mark 
indirectly portrays John as the returned Elijah. The resemblance between Herodias’ desire to 
 
 701 See, Erickson, “The Jailing of John,” 455: “Luke’s sympathies clearly lie with John the Baptist in 
John’s encounter with Herod Antipas (Luke 3:19–20).” 
 702 John A. Darr, Herod the Fox: Audience Criticism and Lukan Characterization, JSNTSup 163 
(Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 164. 
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kill John (Mark 6:19) and Jezebel’s resolve to kill Elijah (1 Kgs 19:1–3)—both of which are 
connected to the prophets’ respective criticisms of their marriages (Mark 6:17–18; 1 Kgs 
16:31–33; 18:17–18; 21:25)—has led scholars to conclude that this portrayal is at work in the 
episode of John’s death in Mark 6:14–29.703 Matthew’s account of John’s death follows Mark 
in indicating that John denounced Herod’s marriage to Herodias (Matt 14:3–4). Matthew 
departs from Mark, however, by casting Herod as John’s chief antagonist.704 According to 
Matt 14:5, it is Herod who wants to kill John (cf. Mark 6:19). Absent in Matthew’s portayal 
is the Markan Herod’s rather positive appraisal of John (Mark 6:20). Thus, Matthew “reduces 
the John/Elijah and Herodias/Jezebel typology of Mark by making Herod, not Herodias, the 
one who wants to kill John.”705  
 Overall, however, the Gospel of Matthew is the most explicit of the Synoptic Gospels 
in identifying John the Baptist as Elijah.706 The Matthean parallel (Matt 17:9–13) to Mark 
9:9–13 explicitly equates John the Baptist with Elijah: “Then the disciples understood that he 
[Jesus] spoke to them concerning John the Baptist” (Matt 17:13).707 The Matthean Jesus at 
11:15 identifies John as Elijah: “If you are willing to accept [it], he [John] is Elijah who is to 
come.” Luke, interestingly, has a “mixed” portrayal of John and Elijah.708 In the infancy 
narrative, Luke associates John the Baptist with the “spirit and power of Elijah” (Luke 1:17). 
Luke also affiliates Jesus with Elijah (e.g., raising of the widow’s son—Luke 7:7–17 [cf. 1 
 
 703 See, e.g., Marcus, John the Baptist in History and Theology, 54. 
 704 Similarly, Harrington, The Gospel of Matthew, 215. 
 705 Dennert, John the Baptist, 244–45. Dennert’s ensuing claim that Matthew’s account thereby “paints 
Herod in a more negative light” (John the Baptist, 245), however, is overstepping. As the previous chapter 
argued, the Markan Herod’s positive appraisal of John and desire to protect him from Herodias heightens 
Herod’s lack of masculinity—he is ultimately unable to control the Herodian women. On the softening of the 
Elijah and Jezebel typology in the Matthean account, see, Harrington, The Gospel of Matthew, 214–18. 
 706 In this respect, the reduction of the Elijah-typology in Matt 14:1–12, as Dennert, John the Baptist, 
244, remarks, is “somewhat surprising.” This mysteriousness is compounded in light of Matt 17:12–13 where 
John and Elijah are associated together in connection with John’s death. 
 707 Erickson, “The Jailing of John,” 457: “Matthew improves on Mark by actually interpreting Elijah as 
John the Baptist (Matt 17:13).” 
 708 Marcus, John the Baptist in History and Theology, 47. At odds with the Synoptic Gospels’ 
portrayals is the Gospel of John’s depiction. At John 1:21, John the Baptist “issues his flat denial that he is 
Elijah,” to use Goodacre’s phraseology. See Mark Goodacre, “Mark, Elijah, the Baptist and Matthew,” 83. 
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Kgs 17:17–24]; fire from heaven—9:51–56 [cf. 2 Kgs 1:10–14]).709 Yet Luke also distances 
John from an Elijanic status. Luke omits certain traditions where Mark and Matthew make a 
connection between John and Elijah. The note on John’s clothing (Mark 1:6//Matt 3:4) that 
parallels the appearance of Elijah in 4 Kgdms 1:8 LXX has no Lukan counterpart. Nor does 
Luke recount the descent from the transfiguration where Mark 9:9–13 implies John is Elijah 
and Matt 17:9–13 makes this identification explicit. In this light, the absence of a Lukan 
counterpart to Mark 6:17–29//Matt 14:3–12 may reflect a redactional impulse to moderate 
Elijanic associations with John.710 
 John’s relationship to Elijah, therefore, varies from one Gospel to the next. The 
Baptist’s identity as Elijah is significant in the reception history of John’s death, particularly 
in Justin Martyr’s Dialogue with Trypho. As we will see, the matter of Elijah stands at the 
heart of the competitive Christology that characterizes Justin’s social context. For Justin, 
John’s beheading is indicative of his Elijanic identity. Establishing John’s Elijanic identity is 
crucial if Justin is to assert the superiority of his version of Christology over competing 
versions. To Justin we now turn. 
 
3. John’s Beheading in Justin Martyr’s Dialogue with Trypho 
 
 709 See further, Goodacre, “Mark, Elijah, the Baptist and Matthew,” 83; James A. Kelhoffer, The Diet 
of John the Baptist: “Locusts and Wild Honey” in Synoptic and Patristic Interpretation, WUNT 176 (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 129–32.  
 710 Likewise, the Gospel of John’s distancing of John from Elijah (John 1:21) may also explain the 
absence of a Johannine counterpart to Mark 6:17–29//Matt 14:3–12. For alternative theories on this Lukan and 
Johannine omission, see Marcus, John the Baptist in History and Theology, 213–14, n. 1. See also, Janes, “Why 
the Daughter of Herodias Must Dance,” 456: “Luke’s motive for deleting the story seems to be its misogyny.” 
For a study that argues that Luke portrays John as Elijah, see Jaroslav Rindos, He of Whom It Is Written: John 
the Baptist and Elijah in Luke, ÖBS 38 (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2010). For a rebuttal of Rindos, see Clare K. 
Rothschild, review of He of Whom It Is Written: John the Baptist and Elijah in Luke, by Jaroslav Rindos, RBL 
[http://www.bookreviews.org] (2012): “[Rindos] never considers the possibility that attributing only Elijah’s 
spirit and power to John denies him Elijah’s identity, as does Luke’s omission of (1) John’s clothing, (2) John’s 
diet, (3) Jesus’ statement that John was the Elijah who was to come (Mark 9:11–13||Matt 17:10)” (italics 
original). Rothschild’s rebuttal is reminiscent of Origen’s interpretation of Luke 1:17: “Luke does not say, ‘in 
the soul of Elijah,’ but, ‘in the spirit and power of Elijah.’ Power and spirit dwelt in Elijah as in all the prophets 
and, with regard to his humanity, in the Lord and Savior as well” (Hom. Luc. 4.5, Lienhard). 
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Composed in the middle of the second century (c. 160 CE), Justin Martyr’s Dialogue with 
Trypho records a debate (spread out over two days) between a Christian philosopher (Justin 
himself)711 and a Jew named Trypho.712 This section will explore Justin’s contestation of 
John the Baptist’s beheading in this conversation (Dial. 49.4).713 Similar to the Gospel of 
Mark before him, Justin counterbalances the potential stigma of John’s bodily mutilation by 
vilifying “King Herod.”714 This contestation, however, takes on anti-Jewish layers in two 
 
 711 At Dial. 120.6 (cf. 2 Apol. 15.1) Justin identifies himself as of the Samaritan people. Throughout the 
debate he aligns himself with τὰ ἔθνη (“the Gentiles”) in distinction from “you” (Jews), as we will see. 
 712 Trypho identifies himself as a Hebrew refugee of the recent war (Dial. 1.3), a likely reference to the 
Bar Kokhba Revolt (c. 132–135 CE). According to Eusebius (Hist. eccl. 4.18.6), the debate occurred in the city 
of Ephesus. Together, these two pieces of evidence suggest a setting for the purported conversation in Ephesus 
around the end of the revolt (c. 135 CE). Written decades later (Dial. 120.6 refers to the First Apology [c. 153 
CE]), Justin’s account of the debate raises a number of critical issues that occupy scholarly attention. These 
issues include the question of the “historicity” of the episode, to what extent the conversation reflects “typical” 
interactions between Jews and Christians in the second century, how fairly Justin portrays Jewish polemics in 
such interactions, among other issues. Helpful introductions to Justin’s life and works include, e.g., Barnard, 
Justin Martyr; E. Glenn Hinson, “Justin Martyr,” in ER (2005), 7:5043–5045; Paul Parvis, “Justin Martyr,” 
ExpTim 120 (2008): 53–61; Denis Minns and Paul Parvis, eds., Justin, Philosopher and Martyr: Apologies, 
OECT (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 32–70; Denis Minns, “Justin Martyr,” in The Cambridge 
History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, ed. Lloyd P. Gerson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
258–69; David E. Nyström, The Apology of Justin Martyr: Literary Strategies and the Defence of Christianity, 
WUNT 462 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2018), 1–18. See also the various contributing essays in Sara Parvis and 
Paul Foster, eds., Justin Martyr and His Worlds (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007). For an excellent review of 
previous scholarship on Justin’s Apologies and the Dialogue with Trypho, see, Michael Slusser, “Justin 
Scholarship: Trends and Trajectories,” in Justin Martyr and His Worlds, ed. Sara Parvis and Paul Foster 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007), 13–21. For a review focused on Justin’s Apologies, see, Nyström, The 
Apology of Justin Martyr, 8–10. 
 713 In this study, I employ the Greek text and versification of Justin Martyr’s work provided by the 
following critical edition: Edgar J. Goodspeed, Die ältesten Apologeten (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1914). For a critical edition of Justin’s Dialogue with Trypho with a French translation, see, Philippe Bobichon, 
Justin Martyr, Dialogue avec Tryphon: Édition critique, traduction, commentaire, 2 vols. (Fribourg: Academic 
Press, 2003). For a history of the manuscript and print traditions of Justin’s works, see, Minns and Parvis, 
Justin, 3–31. 
 714 The exact referent of “King Herod” in Dial. 49.4 is not immediately clear. The royal appellation 
could reflect Justin’s dependence on Markan tradition, since the Gospel of Mark characterizes Antipas as 
“King” (Mark 6:14–29; see also, Matt 14:9). But establishing such dependence on the basis of a shared 
designation is tenuous; an overlap does not necessarily indicate causation. Further, Justin’s narration of the story 
of John’s head on a platter (Dial. 49.4) is truncated in comparison to Mark and Matthew, making it difficult to 
ascertain his knowledge of the Markan and Matthean versions of the tradition. See, Hoehner, Antipas, 123, who 
notes that in Dial. 49.4 “only twelve words out of fifty-six … have verbal correspondence with Matthew and 
Mark. All twelve words appear in both synoptic accounts.” The royal designation could also reflect Justin’s 
impression that Herod the Great (Antipas’ father) reigned during the death of John the Baptist. After all, Justin 
does not specify this “King Herod” in Dial. 49.4 as “Antipas.” According to Josephus, Herod the Great did hold 
the title “King of the Jews” (Ant. 14.381–385), whereas Antipas did not. As Frank E. Dicken, “Herod as Jesus’ 
Executioner: Possibilities in Lukan Reception and Wirkungsgeschichte,” in Characters and Characterization in 
Luke-Acts, ed. Frank E. Dicken and Julia A. Snyder, LNTS 548 (London: T&T Clark, 2016), 203–05, suggests, 
Justin may anachronistically indicate at Dial. 52.3 that Herod the Great, was ruling when Jesus was crucified. 
But, elsewhere Justin shows an awareness that King Herod (the Great) who had slaughtered the innocents (Dial. 
77–78; cf. Matt 2:16–18) was a different “King Herod” than the one to whom Pilate sent Jesus (cf. Luke 23:6–
12) prior to the latter’s crucifixion (Dial. 103.3–4). If Justin thought that John the Baptist died during the same 
Herodian reign that Jesus died under, then it is probably best to conclude that “King Herod” in Dial. 49.4 refers 
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respects. First, simultaneous to his vilification of Herod, Justin assigns “King Herod” a 
Jewish identity by aligning him with “you (Jews).” Herod becomes another example of 
Jewish maltreatment of God’s prophets. In so doing, Justin perpetuates a motif of the Jews as 
those who kill God’s prophets. Second, Justin combats the adoptionistic Christology of his 
Christian rivals by aligning his competitors’ ideology with Jewish ideology (which held that 
Elijah would anoint the Christ). In other words, Justin makes denigrating Jewish ideology an 
essential component of his establishing the superiority of own version of Christian identity 
over competing versions. 
 
3.1. Contextual Observations 
 Two features of the literary context of Justin’s Dialogue with Trypho are significant 
for the present discussion: the sustained differentiation between the first and second person 
and the coming of Elijah before the Christ. Both features stand at the heart of how Justin’s 
contestation of John’s beheading takes anti-Jewish turns.  
 
3.1.1. “We/Us” and “You” 
 The first feature is the sustained differentiation between “we/us” (Christians) and 
“you” (Jews) throughout the dialogue. Bobichon is right to assess the relationship between 
Christians and Jews in the Dialogue with Trypho in this way: “L’image des juifs est liée à 
celle des chrétiens par un rapport d’antithèse univoque et définitif : Justin oppose 
constamment les uns et les autres sur le plan intellectuel, moral et religieux, sans prendre en 
compte aucune particularité susceptible d’atténuer son propos.”715 This antithetical 
 
to Herod Antipas, the ruler of Galilee during Jesus’ death. Regardless of the precise referent, however, the 
important point for this chapter’s argument is that Justin vilifies “King Herod.” 
 715 Bobichon, Justin Martyr, 90–91. “The image of the Jews is linked to that of Christians through an 
unambiguous and definitive antithetical relationship: Justin constantly opposes one and the other on the 
intellectual, moral, and religious plane, without taking into account any particularity that might mitigate his 
purpose” (translation mine). 
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relationship in the discourse is achieved on the threshold of the first and second person. In 
large measure, both Justin (the Christian) and Trypho (the Jew) employ (1) the first-person 
plural to self-define themselves (and those who belong to their group of thought) and (2) the 
second-person plural to distance themselves from one another (and the larger group whom 
the other represents).  
 For Justin, the first and second person serves as a chief threshhold of his anti-Jewish 
ideology. From his perspective, “you” (plural) consists of non-Christian Jews (like Trypho) 
who “are the sources of evil prejudice” against Christ and Christ-followers (Dial. 17.1),716 
killed/crucified the Christ,717 killed or caused God’s prophets to suffer,718 regard “Christians” 
(Χριστιανῶν) as advocates of a “godless heresy” (Dial. 17.1), do not understand the 
Scriptures and/or prophets,719 are unwise and foolish children,720 have uncircumcised 
hearts,721 have no memory of worshipping God,722 are without prophetic gifts,723 “sacrifice 
your own children to the demons” (Dial. 19.6; 133.1),724 and do not repent.725 
 
 716 Cf. Dial. 133.6. 
 717 E.g., Dial. 14.8; 16.4; 17.1; 32.2; 133.6. See also, Dial. 72.3 where Justin is explicit in his 
specification that “(the) Jews” (Ἰουδαῖοι) determined to crucify the Christ. Cf. Dial. 40.4 (“the elders of your 
people [τοῦ λαοῦ ὑμῶν] and the priests laid hands on him and put him to death”). 
 718 E.g, Dial. 16.4; 39.1; 112.5; 120.5; cf. 1 Apol. 49.1–5. 
 719 E.g., Dial. 29.2; 120.5; cf. 1 Apol. 31.5. See, Wendel, Scriptural Interpretation, 184: “Justin … 
aligns his differentiation between those who understand the Jewish scriptures and those who do not with a 
distinction between Jews and non-Jews, as if these two types of contrasts were complementary.”  
 720 E.g., Dial. 32.5. 
 721 E.g., Dial.16.1. 
 722 E.g., Dial. 46.6. 
 723 E.g., Dial. 82.1. 
 724 Similarly, in Dial. 46.6 Justin claims that Isaiah rebuked you (ὑμᾶς) for sacrificing “your (ὑμῶν) 
children to idols” (cf. Isa 57:5). 
 725 E.g., Dial. 133.6. 
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 Conversely, “we/us” largely refers to Gentile Christians whose identity revolves 
around a proper regard of the Christ,726 and who may be regarded as the true Israelite and 
Judahite.727 As Wendel maintains:  
 Justin attempts to claim Israel’s identity and inheritance for Gentile Christ-believers. 
 The corollary of this assertion appears to be a denunciation of the Jewish nation. 
 According to Justin, ethnic Israel rightfully incurred punishment in the destruction of 
 the temple in 70 C.E. and after the Bar Kokhba revolt (Dial. 16.1–4, 25.5, 108.3; 1 
 Apol. 47–49); their culpability, especially in killing Christ, led to their ultimate 
 disinheritance.728 
 
Justin asserts that God “is well pleased toward the Gentiles (τὰ ἔθνη) also, and receives the 
sacrifices from us (παρ᾽ ἡμῶν) more glady than from you (παρ᾽ ὑμῶν)” (Dial. 29.1). “We 
rejoice (χαίρομεν) even though we die, because we believe God will raise us (ἡμᾶς) up 
through his Christ and make [us] incorruptible, unfeeling, and immortal” (Dial. 46.7). The 
prophetic gifts “formerly among your (ὑμῶν) people” “were transferred to us (ἡμᾶς)” (Dial. 
82.1). Additionally, in a passage cited above, Justin denies Jews of their ownership of the 
Scriptures and reclaims it: “Do you recognize (ἐπιγινώσκεις) them, Trypho? They are 
contained in your (ὑμετέροις) Scriptures, or rather not in yours (ὑμετέροις) but in ours 
 
 726 In addition to the ensuing discussion, two caveats undergird this definition of Justin’s use of 
“we/us” as “largely” Gentile Christians who hold a specific Christology. First, Justin indicates his awareness of 
some contemporary Jews who are “leaving the way of error” and becoming disciples of Christ (Dial. 39.2). 
According to Dial. 47.3, Justin remains open to receiving Jews into the ranks of “us” as long as they do not 
compel Gentile Christians to be circumcised or to keep the Sabbath. And, in the closing chapter, Justin prays 
that Trypho and Trypho’s companions would believe “like us” (ἡμῖν ὅμοια) that “ours is the Christ of God” 
(Dial. 142.3). Thus, Wendel, Scriptural Interpretation, 184, is right that “even though Justin recognizes that 
some Jews believe in Jesus, he frequently contrasts non-Jewish Christ-believers with Jews, as if these two 
designations served as fitting labels for insiders and outsiders to the Christ-believing community, respectively.” 
Second, Justin distinguishes “us” who are “the disciples of the true and pure teaching of Jesus Christ” from 
those who “confess themselves to be Christians (Χριστιανούς)—and confess the crucified Jesus as both Lord 
and Christ—and do not teach his doctrines, but the [doctrines] of the spirits of error” (Dial 35.2). Thus, for 
Justin, “we/us” is not a shorthand inclusive of all Christians (whether Jewish or Gentile). Rather, it consists 
predominately (but not exclusively) of Gentile Christians and excludes those “Christians” whom Justin regards 
as teachers of error. 
 727 E.g., Dial. 11.5; 123.6–9; 125.5; 135.3. 
 728 Susan Wendel, “Interpreting the Descent of the Spirit: A Comparison of Justin’s Dialogue with 
Trypho and Luke-Acts,” in Parvis and Chilton, Justin Martyr and His Worlds, 95. Similarly, Frédéric Manns, 
“Justin’s Dialogue with Trypho,” in The Beginnings of Christianity, ed. Jack Pastor and Menachem Mor 
(Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi Press, 2005), 365–75; Bruce Chilton, “Justin and Israelite Prophecy,” in Parvis and 
Chilton, Justin Martyr and His Worlds, 82–84. See also Rajak, The Jewish Dialogue with Greece and Rome, 
514, who claims that the dialogue’s “militant supersessionism undoubtedly contributed to the construction of the 
fence between Judaism and Christianity.” 
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(ἡμετέροις). For we (ἡμεῖς) trust in them, but you (ὑμεῖς), although you read [them], you do 
not understand (νοεῖτε) the mind in them” (Dial. 29.2). In this passage in particular, 
moreover, Justin’s seamless shift from the second-person singular ἐπιγινώσκεις in addressing 
Trypho to the second-person plural shows that he views Trypho as representative of a larger 
group identity, one that departs from Justin’s.  
  Justin’s employment of the second-person plural does not derive merely from the 
presence of Trypho’s companions in the conversation. It would indeed be odd for Justin to 
accuse only Trypho and his companions of crucifying Jesus, considering Jesus died 
approximately one-hundred years prior to this apparent dialogue. It is also preferable to view 
Trypho as (for Justin) typical of a broader collectivity because Justin tends to incorporate 
Trypho (and Trypho’s companions presumably) into a collective frame of reference. 
Repeatedly, Justin draws on Jewish Scripture and tradition to identify disobedient Israel there 
spoken of with “you” (plural) who reject Jesus as the Christ.729 Justin relates the suffering of 
“you” Jews after the Bar Kokhba Revolt, including their exclusion from Jerusalem, to the 
disobedient Israelites in Lev 26:40–41 whom God “will destroy in the land of their enemies” 
(Dial. 16.1).730 Again, Justin claims the Jews’ suffering derives from their treatment of their 
prophets and the Christ: “Therefore, these things rightly and justly have happened to you 
(ὑμῖν). For you killed (ἀπεκτείνατε) the righteous one and his prophets before him” (Dial. 
16.3–4). Justin contrasts the “you” (plural) who killed Christ and the prophets and who curse 
Jesus-followers “in your (ὑμῶν) synagogues” with “us” (ἡμῶν) on whom “you (plural) do not 
have (ἔχετε) authority to lay hands” (Dial. 16.4). Justin again brings the past to bear upon the 
present—and maps the present onto the past—in his appropriation of Isa 29:14 LXX in Dial. 
32.5: 
 
 729 By contrast, Justin identifies “us” who “have been led to God through this crucified Christ” as “the 
true spiritual Israelite and descendant of Judah, Jacob, Isaac, and Abraham” (Dial. 11.5). 
 730 See also, Lieu, Christian Identity, 82. 
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 And all these things which I was saying in digression I am speaking to you (ὑμᾶς), so 
 that you may be persuaded at length by that which has been spoken against you 
 (ὑμῶν) by God, namely, that you are (ἐστε) foolish children: “Therefore, behold, I 
 will proceed to remove this people (λαόν), and I will remove them, and I will take 
 away the wisdom of their wise ones and hide the understanding of their understanding 
 ones.” Will you stop (παύσησθε) deceiving both yourselves (ἑαυτούς) and those who 
 hear you (ὑμῶν), and [instead] learn from us (ἡμῶν) who were made wise from the 
 grace of the Christ? 
 
Justin thus identifies the Jewish “people” (λαός) God speaks against in Isa 29:14 LXX as 
“you” (plural) and contrasts this “you” with “us” whose identity revolves around Christ. In a 
similar vein, Justin classifies “you” (plural) who hate “us” as those Israelites who, according 
to Elijah in 1 Kgs 19:10, killed God’s prophets and altars.731 Justin identifies the Gentiles of 
Mal 1:11 as “us” who “bring to him sacrifices—the bread of the eucharist and the cup of the 
eucharist” (Dial. 41.3)—and draws on Mal 1:10–12 to contrast “us” with “you” who profane 
God’s name (Dial. 41.2–3). Numerous other examples could be discussed,732 but these 
suffice to demonstrate that Justin relates Trypho to a larger social network, one that he 
distances from his own.733  
 
 731 Dial. 39.1. 
 732 See e.g., Dial. 22.1–11; 46.6–7; 82.4; 133.1–6.  
 733 That Justin’s usage of the second-persona plural is capable of enveloping more than the co-present 
interlocutors is perceptible when we consider matters from Trypho’s perspective (or rather, Justin’s portrayal of 
Trypho’s perspective). Unlike Justin, Trypho has only one interlocutor present in the conversation, namely, 
Justin. Yet, Trypho will communicate to Justin in the second-person plural as well. Similar to Justin’s use of the 
second-person plural, Trypho’s use of the second-person plural is not due to the presence of Trypho’s 
companions. Trypho does not address them in his dialogue with Justin. The companions are clearly not 
Christians (see, Dial. 8–9). Trypho associates “you” with those whose identity revolves around the Christ. 
Speaking directly to Justin alone at Dial. 10.4, Trypho says: “If, therefore, you have (ἔχεις) a defense on these 
points and can show on what place you hope (ἐλπίζετε), even though you do not observe the law, this we will 
very gladly hear (ἀκούσαιμεν) from you (σου).” Trypho’s seamless shift between the singular verb ἔχεις, the 
plural verb ἐλπίζετε, and back to the singular pronoun σου indicates his perception that Justin’s ideology is 
representative of a larger group of thought. Moreover, the usage of the first-person plural verb ἀκούσαιμεν in 
opposition to the singular σου intimates that Trypho does not see himself (and Jews like him) as belonging to 
this other group’s ideology. This distinction is all the more perceptible when we observe that Trypho identifies 
Justin (and Justin-like Christians) in this pericope as not observant of the law. This identification is significant 
because elsewhere in the dialogue Trypho is an advocate for observing the law (Dial. 8.3–4; 10.1; cf. 47.1). At 
Dial. 32.1, Trypho similarly views Justin as representative of a larger group when he responds to Justin: “Oh 
person (ἄνθρωπε), these and such scriptures compel us to wait for the glorious and great one who, as Son of 
Man, receives the eternal Kingdom from the ancient of days. But this so-called Christ of yours (ὑμέτερος) has 
come without honor and without glory.” According to Dial. 77.1, Trypho urges Justin to show that Isa. 7:14 
refers to Justin’s Christ: “Carry on for us, then, so that we may see how you demonstrate (ἀποδεικνύεις) that 
[passage] speaks of this Christ of yours (ὑμέτερον).” With Trypho’s flunctuation between the second-person 
singular and plural, both Dial. 32.1 and 77.1 show that Trypho locates Justin’s individual thoughts within a 
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 It is vital to observe, finally, that this rhetorical distance between “you” and “we/us” 
is at work in the introductory unit—Dial. 49.1—that precedes Justin’s discussion of John the 
Baptist’s beheading.  
 
3.1.2. The Role of Elijah 
 The second feature of the literary context is the importance of Elijah in the 
competitive Christologies of Trypho and Justin: 
 Καὶ ὁ Τρύφων· Ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκοῦσιν, εἶπεν, οἱ λέγοντες ἄνθρωπον γεγονέναι 
 αὐτόν, καὶ κατ᾿ ἐκλογὴν κεχρῖσθαι, καὶ Χριστὸν γεγονέναι, πιθανώτερον ὑμῶν λέγειν 
 τῶν ταῦτα ἅπερ φὴς λεγόντων. καὶ γὰρ πάντες ἡμεῖς τὸν Χριστὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐξ 
 ἀνθρώπων προσδοκῶμεν γενήσεσθαι, καὶ τὸν Ἠλίαν χρῖσαι αὐτὸν ἐλθόντα. Ἐὰν δὲ 
 οὗτος φαίνηται ὢν ὁ Χριστός, ἄνθρωπον μὲν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενόμενον ἐκ παντὸς 
 ἐπίστασθαι δεῖ· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μηδὲ Ἠλίαν ἐληλυθέναι, οὐδὲ τοῦτον ἀποφαίνομαι εἶναι. 
 (Dial. 49.1) 
 
 And Trypho said: “Those who are saying he was a person, was anointed according to 
 choice, and became Christ seem to speak more credibly than you (plural) who are 
 saying these things which you (singular) are expressing. For, all of us also are 
 expecting the Christ to be a person of persons, and Elijah to anoint him, having come. 
 But if this one appears to be the Christ, it is necessary to understand [him] to be a 
 person of persons in everything. But, from the [fact that] Elijah has not yet come, I am 
 not declaring this one to be [the Christ].” (Dial. 49.1) 
 
As an initial observation, Trypho understands that Justin’s Christology is not idiosyncratic, 
but indicative of a larger group of thought. Hence Trypho portrays Justin (or rather, Justin 
portrays Trypho as portraying Justin) as singularly expressing (φής) what “you” (plural) 
claim (ὑμῶν … τῶν … λεγόντων). According to the previous chapter of the dialogue, Trypho 
describes Justin’s Christology in the following way: 
 Τὸ γὰρ λέγειν σε προϋπάρχειν Θεὸν ὄντα πρὸ αἰώνων τοῦτον τὸν Χριστόν, εἶτα καὶ 
 γεννηθῆναι ἄνθρωπον γενόμενον ὑπομεῖναι, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, οὐ 
 μόνον παράδοξον δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ μωρόν. (Dial. 48.1) 
 
 For you to say that this Christ pre-existed, being God before the ages, and then 
 endured to be begotten and become a person, and [was] not a person from a person 
 not only seems to me to be paradoxical, but also foolish. (Dial. 48.1) 
 
wider network. The larger network, moreover, is identified by a certain recognition of the Christ, one that 
departs from Trypho’s own social network of thought. 
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Justin’s three-fold belief that the Christ “pre-existed” as God, then was begotten and became 
a person, and was not “a person from a person” thus differs from those Christians to whom 
Trypho alludes using the third-person in Dial. 49.1. Whereas Justin holds to the pre-existence 
of the Christ as God, these Christians hold an adoptinistic Christology. They believe “he is a 
person,” “was anointed” (κεχρῖσθαι), and thus “became Christ.” Trypho specifies that he 
finds this adoptinistic Christology more persuasive than Justin’s viewpoint because it aligns 
well with Jewish opinion (“all of us”)734 that the Christ will be “a person of persons” and 
anointed (χρῖσαι) by Elijah (Dial. 49.1).735 In other words, Christ’s anointing by Elijah is 
bound up in and suggestive of his thoroughly human origin—not his pre-existence. His pre-
existence precludes the necessity of his anointing.736  
 
 734 The πάντες ἡμεῖς (“all of us”) is not inclusive of Justin, since Trypho has already indicated in Dial. 
48.1 that Justin does not believe Jesus is “a person of persons” (ἄνθρωπον ἐξ ἀνθρώπων). Justin himself states 
as much in Dial. 54.2: οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ Χριστὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπων (“The Christ is not a person of persons”). 
 735 This alignment is significant because, as Boyarin, Border Lines, 38, rightly argues: “Justin is a 
writer fighting, as it were, on two fronts, against heresy and against Judaism. Arguably in his writing as well, 
these two battles are deeply implicated in one another. Justin is obsessed with the question of those who call 
themselves Christians and are not (Dialogue 35:80). This work of self-definition is carried out through a 
contrast with something called Ioudaismos.” Likewise, more recent scholarship on Justin’s Dialogue with 
Trypho has departed from the traditional understanding of the work merely “as an extended argument for the 
superiority of ‘Christianity’ over against ‘Judaism’” (Matthijs den Dulk, Between Jews and Heretics: Refiguring 
Justin Martyr’s Dialogue with Trypho [London: Routledge, 2018], 2). In his 2018 monograph, den Dulk 
suggests that “virtually every topic in the Dialogue … is immediately pertinent to the contest between Justin’s 
kind of Christianity and those of his demiurgical rivals” (p. 5). Thus, for den Dulk, Justin’s rhetorical maneuver 
of casting Jewish ideology in an inferior light is intimately interwoven with his aim of asserting the superiority 
of his version of Christianity over competing versions. By implication, in making the Christology of “us” (Jews) 
resemble Justin’s competitors, Trypho enables Justin’s repudiation of Trypho’s position in Dial. 49.2–8 to 
implicate his other (Christian) competitors. Their ideology is inferior by association. That Justin’s rhetoric is not 
merely aimed at “Judaism” (so to speak) raises a potential objection to this chapter’s argument that, in the hands 
of Justin, John’s death perpetuates anti-Jewishness: should the Dialogue with Trypho be regarded as anti-Jewish 
if the “real” recipients of Justin’s rhetoric are Christians, not Jews? The answer is a resounding yes. Whether 
they are the envisioned recipients of Justin’s polemics or not, Justin makes denigrating the Jews a vital 
component of his argumentation. 
 736 This line of reasoning is confirmed by Trypho’s rhetoric elsewhere in the dialogue. According to 
Dial. 87.1–2, Trypho appeals to the Spirit empowering the Messiah in Isa 11:1–3 to question Justin’s belief in 
the pre-existence of the Messiah. See, Wendel, “Interpreting the Descent,” 97: “Trypho wonders why Jesus 
would need the powers of the Spirit to fulfill this messianic mission if he was in fact preexistent.” Jesus’ pre-
existence as the Christ, in other words, is at odds with the expectation that the Christ would be anointed with the 
Spirit. Justin’s rebuttal in Dial. 87.3–88.2 carefully avoids describing the descent of the Spirit upon Jesus as a 
messianic anointing. Wendel, “Interpreting the Descent,” 98, explains that the descent serves a different purpose 
in Justin’s reasoning: “Rather than presenting the descent of the Spirit upon Jesus as a messianic anointing by 
John, a Jewish prophet and type of Elijah, Justin asserts that the Spirit-baptism of Jesus had the effect of 
removing the Spirit from Jews and their prophets. In this way, the Spirit-baptism of Jesus represents a transfer 
of the very presence and powers of God from the Jewish people to Jesus.” See also, Wendel, Scriptural 
Interpretation, 268–71. 
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 This unit that introduces Justin’s discussion of John’s death, therefore, hints at three 
groups whose relationship is characterized by what we might call socio-religious contention. 
Put otherwise, the literary context speaks to a social context marked by competitive 
Christology. An integral element defining this contention is the idea that Elijah would 
precede the coming of the Messiah. For Trypho, moreover, the coming of Elijah was 
accompanied by Elijah’s action of anointing someone to become the Christ. Since Justin, 
however, held that Jesus already pre-existed as the Christ, the idea of Elijah coming and 
anointing someone to be the Christ represented a challenge to Justin’s Christology. The 
anointing directly opposed his belief in the Christ’s pre-existence.  
 Trypho’s argument in Dial. 49.1 continues. He entertains the notion of Jesus’ identity 
as the Christ by means of a third-class conditional statement. The protasis (“If this one 
appears to be the Christ”) assumes the reality of the premise for the sake of argument. The 
apodosis consists of two clauses, introduced by the correlative conjunctions μέν and δέ: (1) 
“it is necessary to understand [him] to be a person of persons in everything,” but (2) “from 
the [fact that] Elijah has not yet come, I am not declaring this one to be [the Christ].” The 
latter clause occupies our attention here. For Trypho, Elijah has not yet come; consequently, 
Jesus cannot be the Christ, even from an adoptionistic vantage point.737 Trypho’s objection to 
Jesus’ messianic identity rests on his expectation that Elijah would precede and anoint the 
Messiah, but has yet to do so. 
 The centrality of Elijah to the contention between Trypho and Justin is apparent also 
from the observation that the matter of Elijah arguably stimulates the entire dialogue. In the 
opening chapter, Trypho introduces himself to Justin as “a Hebrew of the circumcision, 
having fled from the recent war” (Dial. 1.3). Trypho, in turn, inquires as to Justin’s 
 
 737 Similarly, Oskar Skarsaune, The Proof from Prophecy: A Study in Justin Martyr’s Proof-Text 
Tradition: Text-Type, Provenance, Theological Profile (Leiden: Brill, 1987), 195. 
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philosophy.738 After a lengthy autobiographical account detailing his philosophical 
background,739 Justin finally reveals in chapter eight that he is a Christian philosopher.740 
This revelation sparks both Justin’s and Trypho’s attempts to convince the other of the truth 
of their viewpoints (Dial. 8.2–4). Significantly, Trypho’s objection to Justin’s position 
centers on Elijah: “But if Christ has become, and exists somewhere, he is unknown, nor does 
he yet know of himself, or have any power until Elijah comes to anoint him and make him 
manifest to all. But you, having received an empty report, fashion some Christ for yourselves, 
and for his sake you are being destroyed without purpose” (Dial. 8.4). As in Dial. 49.1, in 
Dial. 8.4 Trypho links his rejection of the actuality of the Christ’s advent to the apparent fact 
that Elijah has not yet come to anoint and empower him.  
 It is not the case that Trypho believes Elijah will precede the coming of the Christ and 
Justin does not. The first part of Justin’s response (Dial. 49.2) to Trypho’s objection (Dial. 
49.1) will illuminate this point: 
 Κἀγὼ πάλιν ἐπυθόμην αὐτοῦ· Οὐχὶ Ἠλίαν φησὶν ὁ λόγος διὰ Ζαχαρίου 
 ἐλεύσεσθαι πρὸ τῆς ἡμέρας τῆς μεγάλης καὶ φοβερᾶς τοῦ Κυρίου; Κἀκεῖνος 
 ἀπεκρίνατο· Μάλιστα. Ἐὰν οὖν ὁ λόγος ἀναγκάζῃ ὁμολογεῖν, ὅτι δύο παρουσίαι τοῦ 
 Χριστοῦ προεφητεύοντο γενησόμεναι, μία μὲν ἐν ᾗ παθητὸς καὶ ἄτιμος καὶ ἀειδὴς 
 φανήσεται ἡ δὲ ἑτέρα, ἐν ᾗ καὶ ἔνδοξος καὶ κριτὴς ἁπάντων ἐλεύσεται, ὡς καὶ ἐν 
 πολλοῖς τοῖς προλελεγμένοις ἀποδέδεικται, οὐχὶ τῆς φοβερᾶς καὶ μεγάλης ἡμέρας 
 τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι τῆς δευτέρας παρουσίας αὐτοῦ πρόοδον γενήσεσθαι τὸν Ἠλίαν νοήσομεν 
 τὸν λόγον τοῦ Θεοῦ κεκηρυχέναι; Μάλιστα, ἀπεκρίνατο. (Dial. 49.2) 
 
 And I again inquired of him: “Does not the word through Zechariah say Elijah is to 
 come before the great and terrible day of the Lord?” And he answered: “Certainly.” 
 “If, then,741 the word compels [you] to confess that two advents of the Christ to occur 
 were being prophesied—one in which [the Christ] will appear in suffering, without 
 honor, and without beauty, but the other in which [the Christ] will come in glory and 
 [as] judge of all (as has been shown by the many things that have been foretold)—
 [then] shall we not suppose [that] the word of God to have proclaimed [that] Elijah is 
 
 738 Dial. 1.6. 
 739 Dial. 2–7. 
 740 Dial. 8.1–2. 
 741 At first sight, Justin’s inference introduced by the conditional particle ἐάν and inferential 
conjunction οὖν appears to be logically fallacious. How does Trypho’s acknowledgement of Elijah to forerun 
the day of the Lord mean that he has agreed to the idea of two advents of the Christ? The answer is that it does 
not. Instead of building on the previous sentence, Justin appears to be drawing on their wider discussion in 
which Trypho has already conceded to Justin that the prophets speak of two advents of the Christ (Dial. 36.1; 
39.7).  
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 to be forerunner of the terrible and great day, that is, of his second advent?” 
 “Certainly,” he replied. (Dial. 49.2) 
 
With one exception, Justin does not introduce any new idea into his argument, but reiterates 
notions he and Trypho hold in common at this juncture in the debate. Trypho has already 
conceded to Justin’s claims that the prophets foretold two advents of the Christ—the first 
characterized by suffering, shame, and dishonor; the second by glory and honor (Dial. 36.1; 
39.7). And, as we have seen, Trypho indicates in Dial. 8.4 and 49.1 his belief that Elijah will 
forerun the Christ. The new supposition Justin builds toward is the assimilation of these 
elements.742 That Elijah will come as a forerunner more specifically of the second advent of 
the Christ (i.e. the day of the Lord), although perhaps not a radically novel idea at this point 
in the debate, is a new supposition Justin makes that Trypho is quick to affirm (“Certainly” is 
his response [Dial. 49.2]).743 Both Justin and Trypho believe Elijah will be the forerunner of 
the Messiah’s second advent.  
 Ideology regarding Elijah, therefore, is fundamental to Justin’s and Trypho’s 
respective Christologies and a key source of their disagreement concerning Jesus’ status as 
the Christ. For both, Elijah will come before the Messiah’s second coming. For Trypho, 
Elijah has not yet come ahead of the first coming. As a consequence, neither has the Christ 
arrived. Trypho thus calls into question Justin’s claim that Jesus is the Christ. At both Dial. 
36.1 and 39.7 Trypho follows up his acquiescence to the claims of two messianic advents by 
imploring Justin to prove that Jesus is the Messiah. Furthermore, in Dial. 49.1 Trypho issues 
his argument that the anointing of the Christ by Elijah is more compatible with an 
adoptionistic Christology. Navigating these tricky waters, then, becomes vital if Justin is to 
highlight the insufficiency of Trypho’s position, and correspondingly, the superiority of his 
 
 742 Grammatically, the culmination of Justin’s thought in this regard is apparent in that this new 
supposition constitutes the apodosis of a lengthy conditional construction, whereas the already-agreed-upon 
elements are relegated to the protasis. 
 743 Justin expects Trypho to affirm this new supposition, as the negative particle οὐχί at the beginning 
of the apodosis insinuates. 
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own Christology vis-à-vis his opponents. As we will see, in Dial. 49.4–5 Justin’s strategy is 
to harness John’s beheading to claim that Elijah has already come ahead of the Christ’s first 
advent but without also affirming that Elijah anointed the Christ. 
 
3.1.3. Summary 
 To summarize, self-definition and self-differentiation are intimately conjoined in the 
Dialogue with Trypho. The rhetorical distance between Justin-like Christians and non-
Christian Jews, inscribed through the recurring use of the first and second person, is a major 
nexus of the text’s anti-Jewish polemics. This distance constitutes the immediate literary 
context of Justin’s appropriation of John’s beheading. It is also evidence of a social context 
marked by competitive Christology. A key component of this social contention is the matter 
of Elijah. For Justin to convince Trypho the Jew of the “error” of his ways—his unbelief that 
Jesus is the Christ—Justin must provide proof of Jesus’ messianic status. An 
acknowledgement of John the Baptist as Elijah, then, becomes an integral piece of Justin’s 
aim of demonstrating the superiority of his position.  
 
3.2. Dialogue with Trypho 49.3–5: Contesting John’s Beheading 
 Since we have already examined Dial. 49.1–2, we will focus our attention now on 
Dial. 49.3–5: 
 49.3 Καὶ ὁ ἡμέτερος οὖν Κύριος, ἔφην, τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐν τοῖς διδάγμασιν αὐτοῦ 
 παρέδωκε γενησόμενον, εἰπὼν καὶ Ἠλίαν ἐλεύσεσθαι· καὶ ἡμεῖς τοῦτο ἐπιστάμεθα 
 γενησόμενον, ὅταν μέλλῃ ἐν δόξῃ ἐξ οὐρανῶν παραγίνεσθαι ὁ ἡμέτερος Κύριος 
 Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, οὗ καὶ τῆς πρώτης φανερώσεως κῆρυξ προῆλθε τὸ ἐν Ἠλίᾳ 
 γενόμενον Πνεῦμα τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἐν Ἰωάννῃ τῷ γενομένῳ ἐν τῷ γένει ὑμῶν προφήτῃ, 
 μεθ᾿ ὃν οὐδεὶς ἕτερος λοιπὸς παρ᾿ ὑμῖν ἐφάνη προφήτης· ὅστις ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰορδάνην 
 ποταμὸν καθεζόμενος ἐβόα· Ἐγὼ μὲν ὑμᾶς βαπτίζω ἐν ὕδατι εἰς μετάνοιαν· ἥξει δὲ ὁ 
 ἰσχυρότερός μου, οὗ οὐκ εἰμὶ ἱκανὸς τὰ ὑποδήματα βαστάσαι· αὐτὸς ὑμᾶς βαπτίσει ἐν 
 Πνεύματι ἁγίῳ καὶ πυρί. οὗ τὸ πτύον αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ χειρὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ διακαθαριεῖ τὴν 
 ἅλωνα αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὸν σῖτον συνάξει εἰς τὴν ἀποθήκην, τὸ δὲ ἄχυρον κατακαύσει πυρὶ 
 ἀσβέστῳ. 
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 49.4 Καὶ τοῦτον αὐτὸν τὸν προφήτην συνεκεκλείκει ὁ βασιλεὺς ὑμῶν Ἡρώδης εἰς 
 φυλακήν, καὶ γενεσίων ἡμέρας τελουμένης, ὀρχουμένης τῆς ἐξαδέλφης αὐτοῦ τοῦ 
 Ἡρώδου εὐαρέστως αὐτῷ, εἶπεν αὐτῇ αἰτήσασθαι ὃ ἐὰν βούληται. Καὶ ἡ μήτηρ τῆς 
 παιδὸς ὑπέβαλεν αὐτῇ αἰτήσασθαι τὴν κεφαλὴν Ἰωάννου τοῦ ἐν τῇ φυλακῇ· καὶ 
 αἰτησάσης, ἔπεμψε, καὶ ἐπὶ πίνακι ἐνεχθῆναι τὴν κεφαλὴν Ἰωάννου ἐκέλευσε. 
 49.5 διὸ καὶ ὁ ἡμέτερος Χριστὸς εἰρήκει ἐπὶ γῆς τότε τοῖς λέγουσι πρὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ 
 Ἠλίαν δεῖν ἐλθεῖν· Ἠλίας μὲν ἐλεύσεται καὶ ἀποκαταστήσει πάντα· λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν ὅτι 
 Ἠλίας ἤδη ἦλθε, καὶ οὐκ ἐπέγνωσαν αὐτόν, ἀλλ᾿ ἐποίησαν αὐτῷ ὅσα ἠθέλησαν.” καὶ 
 γέγραπται ὅτι “τότε συνῆκαν οἱ μαθηταὶ ὅτι περὶ Ἰωάννου τοῦ Βαπτιστοῦ εἶπεν 
 αὐτοῖς. (Dial. 49.3–5) 
 
 49.3 Therefore, in his teachings he handed on, our Lord was also saying this same 
 thing would occur, when he said Elijah is also to come. And we understand this is to 
 occur whenever our Lord Jesus Christ is about to appear in glory from the heavens, 
 whose first manifestation a herald—the spirit of God which was in Elijah—preceded 
 in [the person of] John who was a prophet among your (plural) people, after whom no 
 other remaining prophet has appeared with you (plural). He, while sitting by the 
 Jordan River, was crying out: “On the one hand, I baptized you (plural) in water for 
 repentance; on the other hand, the one stronger than me will come, whose sandals I 
 am not sufficient to carry. He will baptize you (plural) in the holy spirit and fire. 
 Concerning him, his winnowing shovel [is] in his hand. He will clean out his 
 threshing floor. He will gather the grain into the barn, but the chaff he will burn up in 
 unquenchable fire.” 
 49.4 And this same prophet your (plural) king Herod had shut up in prison. As the 
 birthday celebrations were finishing [and] the niece of Herod himself was dancing 
 suitably for him, he said to her to ask for whatever she wishes. And the mother of the 
 girl was instigating her to ask for the head of John who was in the prison. And after 
 she asked, he sent and commanded for the head of John to be brought in on a platter. 
 49.5 Therefore, our Christ had also said on earth at that time to those who were 
 saying  it was necessary for Elijah to come first: “On the one hand, Elijah will come 
 and restore all things. On the other hand, I say to you that Elijah already came and 
 you did not recognize him, rather they did to him as many things as they wished.” 
 And it is written: “Then the disciples understood that he spoke to them concerning 
 John the Baptist.” (Dial. 49.3–5) 
 
How Justin contests the shame of John’s death is quite intricate. We will break down our 
analysis by reading the passage on three intersecting levels.  
 
3.2.1. The Degradation of John’s Beheading 
 On one level, Justin implicitly acknowledges the degrading potential of John the 
Baptist’s beheading. As previously mentioned, throughout the Dialogue with Trypho Justin 
claims the prophets spoke of two advents of the Christ. In stark contrast to the second of 
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these,744 the first advent is described as inglorious, dishonorable, and full of suffering.745 
Before Trypho concedes this distinction,746 he utilizes the violent death of Jesus—the 
crucifixion—to argue that “this so-called Christ of yours was dishonorable and inglorious” 
(Dial. 32.1), thereby questioning Jesus’ identity as the Christ. Trypho’s underlying logic is 
that, since the Christ’s coming is to be full of honor and glory, Jesus’ crucifixion ipso facto 
discounts him from a claim to this status. Justin also readily acknowledges Jesus’ suffering 
and crucifixion as contemptible, but as a reflection of the shameful nature of his first advent 
and, therefore, an indicator of his messianic status.747 Just as Justin posits two advents of the 
Christ, so also, he expects Elijah to forerun the Christ at each advent.748 As a corollary, 
Elijah’s first advent, like Christ’s, is characterized as “inglorious” (Dial. 49.7). The 
identification in Dial. 49.3 and 49.5 of John the Baptist as the Elijah of the first advent, 
therefore, implicitly signals this characterization.749  
 In fact, this signaling is all the more evident in light of the connection Justin draws 
between Dial. 49.4 and 49.5. At Dial. 49.4 Justin’s reference to John’s death is truncated, at 
least in comparison to the parallel references in the Gospels of Mark and Matthew. 
Noticeably absent in Justin’s account are the following elements: (1) the speculation 
surrounding Jesus’ identity,750 (2) Herod’s or Herodias’ motivation for seeking John’s 
death,751 (3) the identity of the guests invited to Herod’s birthday banquet,752 (4) the conflict 
in Herod because of his oaths and invited guests,753 and (5) the tradition that certain disciples 
 
 744 E.g., Dial. 14.8; 31.1; 32.1–2; 35.8; 45.4; 54.1; 69.7; 110.2; 120.4. 
 745 E.g., Dial. 14.8; 31.1; 32.1–2; 36.1; 52.1; 121.3. 
 746 See, Dial. 36.1; 39.7. 
 747 See, Dial. 32.1–2; 40.1–5; 49.7–8; 110.2. 
 748 See, Dial. 49.3. 
 749 Similar to Dial. 49.3, Dial. 88.2 refers to John the Baptist as the “herald” (κῆρυξ) of the Christ’s 
advent and “forerunner” (προϊών) of “the way of baptism.” See also, Dial. 51.3 (cf. Matt 11:12–15//Luke 16:16) 
where John is identified as the Elijah to come. 
 750 Mark 6:14–16//Matt 14:1–2; cf. Luke 9:7–9. 
 751 Mark 6:17–20//Matt 14:3–5; cf. Luke 3:19–20; Josephus, Ant. 18.116–119. 
 752 Mark 6:21; cf. Matt 14:6. 
 753 Mark 6:26//Matt 14:9. 
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arrived and buried John’s body.754 Instead, Justin largely dwells on the violent treatment of 
John’s person, culminating in the public display of John’s decapitated head on a platter.755 
The inferential conjunction διό (“therefore”) that begins Dial. 49.5, then, makes it clear that 
Justin bases (at least in part) the identification of John the Baptist as the Elijah of the first 
advent in Matt 17:10–13 on John’s beheading. The public presentation of John’s severed 
head enables Justin to make this connection.  
 
3.2.2. Degradation Contested 
 On a second level, however, Justin contests the potential shame of John’s beheading. 
Just as Jesus’ crucifixion is a signpost of the Christ’s inglorious first coming in Justin’s 
reckoning, so also John’s beheading is a reflection of the shame of Elijah’s first forerunning. 
Put otherwise, rather than the shame of John’s beheading and Jesus’ crucifixion ipso facto 
discounting them from their respective identities (Elijah and Christ), Justin flips the script by 
making their violent ends essential reinforcements of their identities. Justin will go even 
further in Dial. 49.7–8 to argue that the first advent of Elijah and Christ only held the 
appearance of ignominy; the “concealed” reality is that God’s power was at work in the first 
advent. 
 More pertinent to the present discussion, however, is that Justin contests John’s 
beheading in such a way that its negative potential is brought into tension with other 
elements. Specifically, Justin pits a distance between John the Baptist and Herod by 
rendering them as positive and negative figures, respectively. In Dial. 49.3, he introduces 
John by describing him as “a prophet among your (plural) people” (ἐν τῷ γένει ὑμῶν 
προφήτῃ), inculcated with God’s Spirit (Dial. 49.3). Justin holds the Jewish prophets in high 
 
 754 Mark 6:29//Matt 14:12. 
 755 Although Dial. 49.4 does not specify the identities of the guests presumably present at Herod’s 
birthday celebration, the preposition prefixed to the infinitive ἐνεχθῆναι (“to be brought in”) suggests that the 
presentation of John’s head occurred in the midst of the celebrations, open to the gaze of those present. 
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esteem.756 They are “holy” (Dial. 82.1; 120.5757), “blessed” (Dial. 48.4; 112.3), and will 
inherit—alongside Christians—the Kingdom of God.758 And Justin implies in Dial. 8.1–2 
that his “affection for the prophets” was a factor that compelled him to become a Christian 
philosopher. Clearly, in labeling John a prophet, Justin positions the Baptist in a positive 
light.  
 In distinction from the Baptist, Justin positions Herod in a negative light. In Dial. 49.4 
Justin depicts Herod as rejecting and killing God’s prophet. The text draws particular 
attention to this phenomenon by fronting the adjectival construction τοῦτον αὐτὸν τὸν 
προφήτην in the independent clause “this same prophet (τοῦτον αὐτὸν τὸν προφήτην) your 
King Herod had shut up in prison.” In his employment of αὐτός (“This same prophet”), 
moreover, Justin brings his characterization of John the Baptist as God’s Spirit-endowed 
prophet in Dial. 49.3 to bear upon the sequence of actions Herod takes against the Baptist in 
Dial. 49.4. In so doing, John’s status as prophet reverberates throughout the passage and 
vilifies Herod as the one who had God’s prophet imprisoned and beheaded. Further, whereas 
Mark 6:25 and Matt 14:8 portray the daughter as urging the grisly supplement of John’s head 
“on a platter” (ἐπὶ πίνακι), Dial. 49.4 depicts Herod as commanding this addition. The 
Herodian women here merely ask for John’s head. Clearly, therefore, Justin creates a divide 
in his characterizations of the prophet John and Herod. 
 
 
 
 756 To be sure, Justin is also aware of “false prophets” alongside the “holy prophets” in Israel’s history 
(see, e.g. Dial. 82.1). He does not categorize John the Baptist, however, as a false prophet. Rather, he seems to 
count John among the holy prophets since the Baptist was instilled with “God’s Spirit which was also in Elijah” 
(Dial. 49.3). Elsewhere in the Dialogue with Trypho, Justin regards Elijah as one of God’s empowered prophets 
(Dial. 87.4) and not a false prophet (Dial. 69.1). 
 757 The adjective ἁγίοις in the prepositional phrase σὺν τοῖς ἁγίοις πατριάρχαις καὶ προφήταις (“with 
the holy patriarchs and prophets”) modifies “the prophets” and not merely the “the patriarchs.” This is evident 
from the observation that the article τοῖς governs both nouns (cf. Dial. 26.1 where each noun is governed by its 
own article: μετὰ τῶν πατριαρχῶν καὶ τῶν προφητῶν). Regardless, the prophets are paired in this text with 
Israel’s patriarchs who will partake in God’s “eternal kingdom.” 
 758 See, Dial. 26.1; 120.5. 
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3.2.3. Anti-Jewish Turns  
 On a third level, Justin’s contestation takes on anti-Jewish layers. He weaponizes the 
divide between John the Baptist and Herod by integrating it into his anti-Jewish polemics. As 
aforementioned, the literary context of the Dialogue with Trypho alludes to a socio-religious 
context marked by competitive Christology. Within this rivalry, Justin advances his anti-
Jewish rhetoric across the threshhold of “you” and “us.” It is not without significance, then, 
that Justin designates Herod in Dial. 49.4 as the Jews’ King: “Your (ὑμῶν) king Herod had 
this same prophet shut up in prison.” Justin maps John’s death onto the threshhold of “you” 
and “us” by closely aligning Herod with “you (Jews).” This alignment is especially 
conspicuous because the Herodian dynasty’s background as “Jews” was highly suspect from 
the first century onwards.759 And Justin demonstrates an awareness of this polemic.760 But, 
with this maneuver, Justin incorporates Herod into the vast network of actions characterstic 
of disobedient Israel. Herod, more precisely, becomes yet another example of the Jews who 
put their own—indeed God’s—prophets to death. Justin shifts the dehumanizing gaze of 
John’s death onto Herod and the Jews, making the latter bear the moral complexion of the 
former. 
 Justin also relates John’s death to a key component of his competitive social context: 
the matter of Elijah. Justin appeals to Matt 17:10–13 in Dial. 49.5 to establish that, contrary 
to Trypho’s viewpoint, Elijah has come. Indeed, the pronoun ἡμέτερος (“our”) qualifying the 
noun Χριστός (“Christ”) makes it clear that Justin aligns his ideology to that of Jesus (and 
Jesus’ disciples, Matt 17:13). Simultaneously, Justin elevates his position over that of Trypho 
and the Jews by distancing their Elijanic ideology from Jesus’. A brief analysis of his appeal 
to Matt 17:10, 12 in Dial. 49.5 will clarify this claim: 
 
 759 See, Josephus, J.W. 1.123; Ant. 14.9; Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 1.6. On this issue, see, e.g. Hoehner, 
Antipas, 5–6, n. 2. See also, Marcus, John the Baptist in History and Theology, 103–05. 
 760 See, Dial. 52.3. 
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 A. Matt 17:10, 12: τί οὖν οἱ γραμματεῖς λέγουσιν ὅτι Ἠλίαν δεῖ ἐλθεῖν πρῶτον; …. 
 [12] λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν ὅτι Ἠλίας ἤδη ἦλθεν 
 
 A. Matt 17:10, 12: “Why, then, are the scribes saying that it is necessary for Elijah to 
 come first?.… [12] But I say to you that Elijah already came.” 
 
 B. Dial. 49.5: διὸ καὶ ὁ ἡμέτερος Χριστὸς εἰρήκει ἐπὶ γῆς τότε τοῖς λέγουσι πρὸ τοῦ 
 Χριστοῦ Ἠλίαν δεῖν ἐλθεῖν …. λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν ὅτι Ἠλίας ἤδη ἦλθε. 
 
 B. Dial. 49.5: “Therefore our Christ had also said on earth at that time to those 
 who were saying it was necessary for Elijah to come first .… But I say to you that 
 Elijah already came.” 
 
  
Whereas in Matt 17:10 those who speak of the necessity of Elijah coming first are expressly 
classified as “the scribes” (οἱ γραμματεῖς), Dial. 49.5 anonymizes this specification. This 
anonymizing, however, allows Jesus’ claim that “Elijah already came” (Ἠλίας ἤδη ἦλθε[ν]) 
to speak directly to Justin’s present social framework—itself comprised of Jews (like 
Trypho) whose denial of Jesus’ identity as the Christ is based on their claim that “Elijah has 
not yet come” (μηδὲ Ἠλίαν ἐληλυθέναι) (Dial. 49.1). 
 The direct link Justin establishes between John and the prophet Elijah in Dial. 49.3–5, 
grounded on John’s decapitation (Dial. 49.4), does not merely serve to overcome the 
potential shame of John’s beheading. It also weaves his death into the intricate tapestry of 
Justin’s rhetorical aim of asserting the superiority of his ideology over his competitor’s 
Elijanic ideology. Justin presses John’s death into the present horizon of attacking the 
validity of his Jewish opponents’ ideology as part of his larger project of subverting the 
adoptionistic Christology of his Christian opponents. In other words, Justin makes refuting 
Jewish ideology integral to the construction of his own version of Christian identity. 
 At this juncture one might expect Justin to claim that Elijah not only came but also 
anointed Jesus with the spirit of God. “That would be a perfect answer to Trypho’s challenge 
in Dial. 8:3 and 49:1.”761 For Justin, however, admitting that John anointed Jesus would 
 
 761 Skarsaune, The Proof from Prophecy, 196. 
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support the adoptionistic Christology of his opponents and hinder his own. So, he stops short 
of making this contention. Instead, his strategy is to acknowledge the coming of Elijah but 
ignore the anointing. Justin will not ignore the descent of the spirit on Jesus altogether, 
however. Later in his argument, as Skarsaune rightly observes, Justin contends that Jesus’ 
reception of the spirit at his baptism signified, not the empowering of Jesus, but the removal 
of the spirit among the Jews: 
 The elaborate exposition about Elijah’s spirit being transferred to John (Dial. 49:3–8), 
 and the Jewish kings being anointed by the spirit present in the prophets—runs out 
 into nearly nothing in Dial. 52–54. There is no question of John anointing Jesus; on 
 the contrary, what happens is that Jesus does something to John: He makes him stop 
 prophesying and baptizing (Dial. 51:2; 52:3f)! …. Just as Jesus made John cease 
 prophesying and baptizing, so he puts an end to the distribution of the gifts of the 
 Spirit among the Jews.762 
 
While Justin attributes the cessation of prophecy among the Jews to Jesus’ baptism, Origen 
links the the cessation of prophecy to the beheading of John.763 To Origen we now turn. 
 
4. John’s Beheading in Origen’s Commentary on Matthew 
Origen (c. 186–255 CE) left Alexandria and took up residence in Caesarea Maritima in 232 
CE.764 “This was to be his only real home for the rest of his life.”765 By the end of the second 
century—and continuing through the third century—Caesarea had a thriving Jewish presence 
and was a major center of rabbinic study.766 Heine thinks it is probable that Origen had 
“contact and conversations” with Jews there, including Rabbi Hoshaya who had established a 
 
 762 Skarsaune, The Proof from Prophecy, 196, 197. 
 763 Similarly, Tertullian claims that John the Baptist possessed the spirit of God until the instant that 
Jesus was baptized. See, Edmondo Lupieri, “John the Gnostic: The Figure of the Baptist in Origen and 
Heterodox Gnosticism,” StPatr 19 (1989): 324. 
 764 For helpful studies and introductions on Origen’s life and works, see, e.g., Pierre Nautin, Origène: 
sa vie et son oeuvre (Paris: Beauchesne, 1977); Joseph W. Trigg, Origen, ECF (London: Routledge, 1998), 1–
66; John A. McGuckin, ed., The Westminster Handbook to Origen (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 
2004), 1–44; Henning Graf Reventlow, History of Biblical Interpretation. Volume 1: From the Old Testament to 
Origen, trans. Leo G. Perdue, RBS 50 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2009), 174–99; Ronald E. Heine, 
“Origen,” in The Routledge Companion to Early Christian Thought, ed. D. Jeffrey Bingham (London: 
Routledge, 2010), 188–203. 
 765 Trigg, Origen, 36. 
 766 Heine, Origen, 147. 
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rabbinic school in the city two years prior to Origen’s arrival.767 “In Caesarea Origen was 
forced to think theologically about the relationship between Jews and Christians in ways that 
he had not had to do in Alexandria.”768 While Origen’s anti-Jewish polemics are not as 
obviously abusive as other early church fathers (e.g. Melito of Sardis, Tertullian, John 
Chrysostom), his assessment of Jews and Judaism as inferior to Christians and Christianity 
“proved all the more dangerous for the future, in that it is so thoroughly argued, on a broad 
textual basis.”769  
 This section will analyze one such textual basis on which Origen advances anti-
Jewish polemics: the account of John’s beheading (Matt 14:1–12) in what is perhaps Origen’s 
final exegetical work in Caesarea, the Commentary on Matthew (c. 244–249 CE).770 The 
passage in question “rumbles with the undertones of the debate between the Church and the 
Synagogue.”771 Similar to his predecessors, Origen contests the potential shame of John’s 
beheading by vilifying the Herodian court. His vilification, like Justin Martyr’s, takes on anti-
Jewish overtones. He massages the Matthean account into an analogue of contemporary 
Jewish rejection of Christ, the prophets, and prophecy.772  
 
4.1. Commentary on Matthew 10.21–22: Contestation of John’s Beheading 
 In Comm. Matt. 10.21–22, Origen fixates on narrative elements in Matt 14:3–12 that 
hold the capacity to stress the humiliating circumstances of John’s beheading. The 
 
 767 Heine, Origen, 148. 
 768 Heine, Origen, 174. See, Trigg, Origen, 11, who claims that the Jewish presence in Alexandria 
during Origen’s time was apparently weak. Cf. Martens, Origen and Scripture, 135. 
 769 Joseph S. O’Leary, “Judaism,” in The Westminster Handbook to Origen, ed. John A. McGuckin 
(Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004), 135. See also, O’Leary, “The Recuperation of Judaism,” 373, 
where he claims that Christianity’s absorption, in Origen’s thought, of all facets of Jewish identity “had a more 
enduring negative effect than the ill-considered vituperations of a Chrysostom.” 
 770 For an argument claiming that Origen wrote the Commentary on Matthew after Contra Celsum, see, 
Ronald E. Heine, “Introduction,” in The Commentary of Origen on the Gospel of St Matthew, OECT (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2018), 24–28.  
 771 Heine, Origen, 227. 
 772 Cf. Jerome, Comm. Matt. 14.13: “After the head of the prophet was cut off by the Jews and by the 
king of the Jews, prophesying among them lost its tongue and voice” (Scheck, FC).  
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confinement of John in prison (Matt 14:3) mitigates the Baptist’s sense of self-control as he is 
no longer able to function “in freedom” (Comm. Matt. 10.21). The postmortem public display 
of John’s severed head during Herod’s birthday dinner (Matt 14:11) situates the head as an 
object of disdain.773 The beheading renders him perpetually “dead, divided, and not 
unbroken” (Comm. Matt. 10.22; cf. Matt 14:10–12).774 Although he dwells on the violent 
treatment of John’s person, Origen contests the degradation of it. He brings the degrading 
capacity of John’s death into tension with a thorough repudiation of the Herodian court. The 
following four sections will show how Origen accomplishes this moral indictment against the 
court. Thereafter, we will show that Origen redeploys this negative moral coloration in anti-
Jewish directions: he infuses contemporary Jews with the moral wretchedness of the 
Herodian court. 
 
4.1.1. John the Prophet 
 Origen casts John the Baptist in a positive light. Lupieri is right to insinuate that in 
this passage, John, and particularly his head, is a symbol of the prophecy of God among the 
Jewish people.775 Collectively, the adjective προφητικός (“prophetic”) and its cognates (the 
nouns προφήτης [“prophet”] and προφητεία [“prophecy”]; the verb προφητεύω [“I 
prophesy”]) occur in reference to—or in close association with—John no less than fifteen 
times in Comm. Matt. 10.21–22: 
1. “Just as ‘the law and the prophets (οἱ προφῆται) [were] until John,’ after whom the 
prophetic (προφητική) gift ceased from among the Jews” (Comm. Matt. 10.21) 
 
 773 Comm. Matt. 10.22: καταφρονεῖται δὲ προφητεία ἐπὶ πίνακι ἀντὶ ὄψος προσαγομένη (“[The people] 
despise prophecy which is brought on a platter instead of prepared food”).  
 774 I describe the division of John’s head and body as a perpetual state in order to bring out the sense of 
the present tense verb ἔχουσιν in Origen’s statement: “They have (ἔχουσιν) it [the prophetic word, i.e. John] 
dead, divided, and not unbroken.” 
 775 Lupieri, “John the Gnostic,” 325. 
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2. “Because the last of the prophets (τῶν προφητῶν) was executed lawlessly by Herod” 
(Comm. Matt. 10.21) 
3. “The binding and the locking up of the prophetic (τὸν προφητικόν) word/reasoning” 
(Comm. Matt. 10.21) 
4.  “Therefore, John, adorned with prophetic (προφητικῇ) boldness” (Comm. Matt. 
10.22) 
5. “Herod seized, bound, and put away John in prison, not daring to kill entirely the 
prophetic (προφητικόν) word/reasoning” (Comm. Matt. 10.22) 
6. “[Her] seemingly graceful movements … are the reason there is no longer a prophetic 
(προφητικήν) head/source among the people” (Comm. Matt. 10.22) 
7. “Concerning him [John] the savior says: ‘But why did you go out? To see a prophet 
(προφήτην)? Indeed, I say to you—and more than a prophet (προφήτου)’” (Comm. 
Matt. 10.22) 
8. “But we must give thanks to God because, although the prophetic (προφητική) gift 
was removed from the people” (Comm. Matt. 10.22) 
9. “But [the people] despise prophecy (προφητεία) which is brought on a platter instead 
of prepared food” (Comm. Matt. 10.22) 
10. “And the prophet (ὁ προφήτης) is beheaded because of oaths” (Comm. Matt. 10.22) 
11. “For the accusation of recklessness of making oaths, of breaking oaths because of 
recklessness, and the accusation of prophetic (προφητικῆς) execution in order to keep 
oaths are not the same” (Comm. Matt. 10.22) 
12. “And not for this reason only is he [John] beheaded, but also because of those 
reclining who wanted the prophet (τὸν προφήτην) to be executed rather than to live” 
(Comm. Matt. 10.22) 
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13. “Having locked up the prophetic (τὸν προφητικόν) word/reasoning in prison” 
(Comm. Matt. 10.22) 
This enumeration increases from fifteen to twenty if we include the five occurrences where, 
although not applying the terms directly to John himself, Origen is relating John to Jesus, the 
prophets, and prophecies, more generally: 
14. “But the Jews do not have the head/source of prophecy (τῆς προφητείας) because 
they deny the head/summation of all prophecy (προφητείας), Christ Jesus” (Comm. 
Matt. 10.22) 
15. “Not in openness do the present Jewish people deny the prophecies (τὰς προφητείας), 
but implicitly and in secret they deny them and are convicted by not believing them” 
(Comm. Matt. 10.22) 
16. “‘In the same way if they had believed the prophets (τοῖς προφήταις), they would 
have accepted the one being prophesied (τὸν προφητευόμενον)’” (Comm. Matt. 
10.22) 
The inventory continues to grow if one were to count the instances where the terms function 
as the grammatical antecedents of pronouns, as with τὰς προφητείας in numeral fifteen above 
(“in secret they deny them [αὐτάς] and are convicted by not believing them [αὐταῖς]”).776  
 As a prophet, John is “a herald of the truth” who criticizes Herod’s marriage to 
Herodias on account of its contrariness to the law (Comm. Matt. 10.21). At Comm. Matt. 
10.22, Origen evaluates John’s actions in this regard positively. He carefully describes John 
with a series of four participial clauses that emphasize that John’s criticism stems from his 
identity as God’s prophet: 
 Therefore, John—adorned (κεκοσμημένος) in prophetic boldness, not terrified 
 (καταπληττόμενος) of Herod’s royal position, nor passing over in silence 
 (παρασιωπῶν) so great a transgression (as if out of awe of death), full (πληρωθείς) of 
 
 776 I exclude one occurrence from this entire inventory: the appearance of the term προφητεία at the end 
of Comm. Matt. 10.22. Here Origen uses the term to introduce a “prophecy” (see John 19:36; Exod 12:46; Ps 
33:21) he understands as referring particularly to Jesus and emphatically not John.  
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 God’s will—was reasoning (ἔλεγε) to Herod: “It is not lawful for you to have her, for 
 it is not lawful for you to have your brother’s wife.” (Comm. Matt. 10.22) 
 
Undeveloped in Origen’s description are any hints of potential ramifications that rebuking a 
royal marriage could stimulate (e.g. political instability).777 Such ramifications could garner 
the reader’s sympathy for Herod if Origen were to stress them. Instead, Origen reinforces his 
understanding of John as “the prophetic reasoning” (τὸν προφητικὸν λόγον) who “was 
reasoning” (ἔλεγε) to Herod as such.  
 Origen’s comparison of Herod’s execution of John to Pharaoh’s execution of the chief 
baker in Gen 40:20–23 (see numeral seven above) makes Origen’s effort to showcase John in 
a positive light all the more apparent: 
 Ἄδικος γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐκείνου τοῦ Φαραὼ ὁ Ἡρώδης καὶ γὰρ ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου μὲν ἐν 
 γενεθλίῳ ἀρχισιτοποιὸς ἀναιρεῖται, ὑπὸ δὲ τούτου Ἰωάννης, οὗ μείζων ἐν γεννητοῖς 
 γυναικῶν οὐδεὶς ἐγήγερται, περὶ οὗ ὁ σωτὴρ λέγει Ἀλλὰ τί ἐξεληλύθατε; προφήτην 
 ἰδεῖν; ναὶ λέγω ὑμῖν, καὶ περισσότερον προφήτου. 
 
 For, more unrighteous than that Pharaoh [was] Herod. For, by the former, on the one 
 hand, the chief baker was executed on a birthday, but on the other hand, by the latter 
 John [was executed], concerning whom “no one greater among those born  of women 
 has arisen,” concerning whom the savior says: “But why did you go out? To see a 
 prophet? Indeed, I say to you—and more than a prophet.” (Comm. Matt. 10.22) 
 
Using two relative clauses, Origen carefully describes John as an exceptional figure. The first 
relative clause resembles Matt 11:11a//Luke 7:28a. Origen stops short of quoting Matt 
11:11b//Luke 7:28b (“But the least in the Kingdom of the Heavens/God is greater than he 
[John]”). This latter logion has enabled some scholars to understand Matt 11:11/Luke 7:28 as 
moderating John the Baptist’s prestige.778 In this excerpt, however, Origen makes use of 
those elements of Matt 11:7–11//Luke 7:24–28 that enhance the Baptist’s character. The 
second relative clause is an allusion to Matt 11:9//Luke 7:26 that bolsters John’s identity not 
 
 777 See, Marcus, John the Baptist in History and Theology, 103: “In a colonial system in which imperial 
authorities exercise their dominion through local client rulers, an attack on the religious validity of the client 
ruler’s marriage comes close to open sedition, since such rulers depend not only on imperial force but also on 
the support of a native populace strongly influenced by religion.” 
 778 See, e.g., Dunn, Jesus Remembered, 451–52; Marcus, John the Baptist in History and Theology, 90–
91. See also, Dibelius, Die urchristliche Überlieferung, 13; Turner, Matthew, 293. 
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only as a prophet, but also as someone greater than a prophet. Origen, moreover, appeals to 
an authority whose judgment is reliable in his estimation. That is, he is careful to place these 
words on the lips of “the savior.”779  
 Origen’s methodical characterization of John as prophet serves to underscore the 
gravity of the actions the Herodian court takes against him. John’s symbolism as the 
prophetic source situates the court’s character as the imprisoners, killers, and despisers God’s 
prophets. It also underscores that the Herodian court’s actions are motivated by something 
other than, indeed contrary to, “prophetic reasoning.” Origen casts a shadow over the 
Herodian court altogether: Herodias and her daughter, the dinner guests, and Herod. We will 
consider these figures in that order. 
 
4.1.2. Herodias and Her Daughter (Herodias) 
 After indicating that Herod imprisoned John the Baptist because of the latter’s rebuke 
of Herod’s marriage to Herodias (his brother Philip’s wife), Origen says: 
 Ὁ μὲν Ἡρώδης, κρατήσας τὸν Ἰωάννην, δήσας ἀπέθετο ἐν τῇ φυλακῇ, μὴ τολμῶν 
 πάντη ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν προφητικὸν λόγον καὶ ἀνελεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ λαοῦ. Ἡ δὲ τοῦ 
 βασιλέως τῆς Τραχωνίτιδος γυνή, πονηρά τις οὖσα δόξα καὶ μοχθηρὰ διδασκαλία, 
 θυγατέρα ἐγέννησεν ὁμώνυμον, ἧς τὰ δοκοῦντα εὒρυθμα κινήματα ἀρέσαντα τῷ 
 Ἡρώδῃ τὰ γενέσεως ἀγαπῶντι πράγματα, αἴτια γεγένηται τοῦ μηκέτι εἶναι ἐν τῷ λαῷ 
 κεφαλὴν προφητικήν. (Comm. Matt. 10.22) 
 
 On the one hand, Herod, having grasped and bound John, put [him] away in prison, 
 because he did not dare kill the prophetic word/reasoning entirely and remove it from 
 the people. On the other hand, the wife—who is evil glory and a wretched  teaching— 
 of the king of Trachonitis gave birth to a daughter who had the same name, whose 
 seemingly graceful movements—which pleased Herod who loves the matters of 
 birth—are the reason why a prophetic head/source is no longer among the people. 
 (Comm. Matt. 10.22) 
 
 
 779 We will return to Origen’s appropriation of Matt 11:7–11//Luke 7:24–28 below, where we will see 
that, instead of quoting Matt 11:11b//Luke 7:28b (“But the least in the Kingdom of the Heavens/God is greater 
than he [John]”) immediately after this present excerpt, he massages Matt 11:11b//Luke 7:28b into a symbol of 
the preeminence of Christians at the expense of Jews.  
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Two features of this pericope highlight that Origen characterizes the Herodian women 
negatively. First, Origen classifies Herodias as a “wretched teaching” (μοχθηρὰ διδασκαλία) 
before indicating that her daughter “had the same name.” According to Matt 14:6, however, 
the daughter’s name is not provided; she is merely called “the daughter of Herodias” (ἡ 
θυγάτηρ τῆς Ἡρῳδιάδος). Here, Origen rather appears to be harnessing the Markan tradition 
that claims the daughter’s name was Herodias (Mark 6:22).780 This biographical detail, 
moreover, is not a random piece of data. By claiming that Herodias and her daughter share 
the same name, Origen is making a not too clandestine assertion that the daughter also shares 
her mother’s wretchedness.  
 Second, the text pits a slight contrast—introduced grammatically via the correlatives 
μέν and δέ— between Herod, on the one hand, and Herodias and her daughter, on the other 
hand. Herod abstains (initially at least) from executing John although, as Origen implies, he 
likely entertained this notion as a possibility.781 For Origen, the daughter’s “movements” (an 
allusion to her dance in Matt 14:6) are the cause of the prophet’s decapitation. He refers to 
her dancing as “seemingly graceful.” The implication is that her graceful dance was only 
ostensibly so. His assessment is more direct two sentences later: “The dance of Herodias was 
contrary to holy dancing” (Comm. Matt. 10.22). Birthday celebrations are the occassions 
when those who dance are ruled by “lawless reasoning” (παρανόμου … λόγου); “their 
motions” seek to satisfy “that [lawless] reasoning” (ἐκείνῳ τῷ λογῷ) (Comm. Matt. 10.22).782 
Therefore, Origen’s initial depiction of the daughter’s movements as “seemingly graceful” 
constitutes an ironic moral indictment of the daughter.  
 
 
 780 Origen is clearly aware of the Gospel of Mark (see, e.g., Comm. Matt. 10.20).  
 781 That Herod imprisoned John “because he did not dare” execute him assumes that he wanted him 
dead (as Matt 14:5 claims) or that he at least considered killing him.  
 782 Origen does not object to all dancing. For Origen, the logion, “We piped for you and you did not 
dance” (see, Matt 11:17//Luke 7:32), supports the categorical existence of “holy dancing.” See, Comm. Matt. 
10.22.  
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4.1.3. The Dinner Guests 
 Similar to his assessment of the “wretched” Herodian women is Origen’s description 
of the dinner guests at Herod’s birthday celebration. After detailing that John was beheaded 
because of the oaths Herod made to the dancing daughter, Origen claims the guests wanted 
John to be executed: “And not for this reason only is he [John] beheaded but also because of 
those reclining, who want the prophet to be executed rather than to live. And those who 
celebrate his birthday recline and stand by with the wretched reasoning which was ruling the 
Jews” (Comm. Matt. 10.22). Whereas Mark 6:26 and Matt 14:9 do not explicitly identify the 
inner motivations of the dinner guests—only that Herod did not want to break his oath 
“because of those reclining”—Origen seems to presume that Herod’s reasoning was elicited 
by the dinner guests making their opinions known on the matter. 
 Origen presents the Herodian women and the dinner guests in a united front against 
the Baptist. Just as Herodias (and her daughter) is a “wretched teaching” (μοχθηρὰ 
διδασκαλία) and birthdays are the occasions “when lawless reasoning rules” (παρανόμου 
βασιλεύοντος λόγου) those—like the daughter—who dance, so also the guests participate in 
the festivities “with the wretched reasoning that rules (λόγῳ μοχθηρῷ βασιλεύοντι) the 
Jews.” (Herod too acts lawlessly: John categorizes his marriage to Herodias as contrary to the 
law, as we have already seen.) Thus, throughout Comm. Matt. 10.21–22, Origen formulates a 
striking contrast between John, the “prophetic reasoning” (τὸν προφητικὸν λόγον) who 
speaks to Herod in accordance with God’s will, and the Herodian court that acts in 
accordance with lawless, “wretched reasoning.”  
 
4.1.4. Herod 
 Origen devotes considerable attention to portray Herod negatively. (1) He interprets 
Herod’s imprisonment of John symbolically as maltreating prophecy: “Now, Herod bound 
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and put away John in prison, providing (insofar as in himself and the evil of the people) a 
symbol (σύμβολον) of the binding and locking up of the prophetic reasoning (λόγον τὸν 
προφητικόν) and of the prevention of it from remaining in freedom as a herald of the truth, as 
it had been formerly” (Comm. Matt. 10.21). (2) Origen is highly critical of Herod’s marriage 
to Herodias, but not for the same reason that others put forward:  
 On the one hand, some suppose that Herod married Herodias (the wife of the brother) 
 after Philip died and left behind a daughter, although the law permits marriage [only] 
 in the case of childlessness.783 On the other hand, having not found any clear 
 indication Philip had died, we consider Herod’s transgression to be greater still 
 because he took away the brother’s wife while he was even alive. (Comm. Matt. 
 10.21) 
 
Mark 6:18 and Matt 14:4 do not specify how Herod’s marriage to Herodias was unlawful, 
only that it was unlawful. Further, as I observed in chapter one, many manuscripts at Mark 
6:22 (א, B, D, L, Δ, 565) identify the daughter in this account as Herod’s daughter. Matt 14:6 
does not state who the daughter’s father is. Origen, however, makes a reference to others who 
apparently claim that Herod’s marriage to Herodias violated Deut 25:5–6 LXX, which 
permits a man to marry his brother’s wife insofar as the brother had died and had not 
produced a child with his wife.784 Origen uses this reference to exacerbate the severity of 
Herod’s “transgression.” Herod married his brother’s wife not only despite the fact that Philip 
had produced a child with Herodias, but also despite the apparent fact that Philip had not yet 
died.785  
 
 783 I follow Heine in supplying the word “only” in my translation, but place it in brackets to indicate 
that the word does not strictly appear in the Greek text. See, Heine, Commentary of Origen, 1:56. 
 784 Heine, Commentary of Origen, 1:56, n. 158: “If Philip had died and he and Herodias had only a 
daughter, then the marriage would have been acceptable according to the law in the Massoretic [sic] text of Dt 
25:5, which specifies not having a ‘son’ to continue the name of the brother. The LXX, however, which Origen 
read, has ‘seed’ instead of ‘son.’”  
 785 Caesarius of Arles, Serm. 218, similarly claims that John the Baptist repudiated Herod for taking 
“the wife of a man who was still living” (Mueller, FC). So also, Jerome, Comm. Matt. 14.3–4. Additionally, 
Origen specifies that the marriage was Herod’s “transgression” (παρανόμημα). Like the Herodian women and 
the dinner guests, therefore, Origen again identifies Herod as one who acts contrary to the law.  
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 (3) Herod is “more unrighteous” than the Pharaoh of Gen 40:20–23 precisely because 
of whom Herod killed: John, the one Jesus characterizes as “more than a prophet” (Comm. 
Matt. 10.22). We thus return to the alignment of the executions of John and the chief baker:  
 One of our predecessors, on the one hand, kept a written record in Genesis of 
 Pharaoh’s birthday and he explained that the base person—who loves matters of 
 birth—celebrates a birthday. But we on the other hand, having found this as an 
 opportunity from that predecessor, found in no scripture a birthday celebration being 
 led by a righteous person. For, more unrighteous than that Pharaoh [was] Herod. For, 
 by the former, on the one hand, the chief baker was executed on a birthday, but on the 
 other hand, by the latter John [was executed], concerning whom “no one greater 
 among those born of women has arisen,” concerning whom the savior says: “But why 
 did you go out? To see a prophet? Indeed, I say to you—and more than a prophet.” 
 (Comm. Matt. 10.22) 
 
“The base person,” for Origen’s predecessor, is one “who loves matters of birth” (τὰ 
γενέσεως ἀγαπῶν πράγματα). This designation immediately recalls Origen’s description 
earlier in Comm. Matt. 10.22 of “Herod” (τῷ Ἡρώδῃ) “who loves matters of birth” (τὰ 
γενέσεως ἀγαπῶντι πράγματα). By repeating this participial construction, Origen configures 
Herod as one such “base person.” He augments this negative portrayal by claiming that there 
is no scriptural precedent of “a righteous person” leading a birthday celebration.786 Origen is 
not about to depict Herod as an exception to this rule. (4) “Consider further that not with 
boldness (οὐ μετὰ παρρησίας) but secretly and in prison Herod murders John” (Comm. Matt. 
10.22).787 Herod’s lack of “boldness” (which Origen stresses by fronting it in its clause) with 
respect to John thus contrasts with the fullness of it in John, who was “adorned in prophetic 
 
 786 This augmentation is achieved grammatically via Origen’s use of the correlative conjunctions μέν 
(“on the one hand”) and δέ (“on the other hand”). See also, Jerome, Comm. Matt. 14.6: “We have found that no 
other people observed their birthdays except Herod and Pharaoh. Thus, there was a single feast day for those 
whose impiety was on the same level” (Scheck, FC). 
 787 This is the only occurrence of the verb φονεύω (“I murder”) in Comm. Matt. 10.21–22. Thus, 
Origen here departs from his preference to use the verbs ἀποκεφαλίζω (“I behead”), ἀφαιρέω (“I cut off”), or 
ἀναιρέω (“I execute/take away”) in referring to John’s execution/decapitation (the verbs ἀποκτείνω [“I kill”] 
and ἀποτέμνω [“I behead”] are used only once each). Coupled with the recognition that Origen is offering a 
thorough critique of Herod in Comm. Matt. 10.21–22, which includes the recurring theme of Herod’s 
lawlessness in particular, this departure more likely than not reflects an attempt on Origen’s part to depict Herod 
in violation of the Decalogue. After all, φονεύω occurs in both Exod 20:15 LXX (Exod 20:13 MT) and Deut 
5:18 LXX (Deut 5:17 MT): “You shall not murder (οὐ φονεύσεις).” But, since Origen does not specifically 
invoke the Decalogue, this contention remains an informed guess. At minimum, however, Origen’s word choice 
is evocative of the Decalogue. Cf. Matt 14:10: “He beheaded (ἀπεκεφάλισεν) John in prison.” 
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boldness” (προφητικῇ παρρησίᾳ κεκοσμημένος) while criticizing Herod (Comm. Matt. 
10.22). 
 (5) Origen views Herod’s beheading of John as a crucial event in that it marks a shift 
in the political power that Herod’s royal position wielded:  
 When Herod contrary to the law, destroyed (ἀναιρεθέντος) the last prophet, the king 
 of the Jews was deprived (ἀφῃρέθη) of the authority to take a life. For if Herod had 
 not been deprived of this authority, Pilate would not have condemned Jesus to death; 
 Herod, with the council of the chief priests and elders of the people, would have 
 sufficed for this action.788  
 
Heine’s translation aptly conveys the political reversal that the participle ἀναιρεθέντος and 
finite verb ἀφῃρέθη signify. However, his rendering fails to capture adequately that Origen is 
using language that plays on the severing of John’s head.789 A more fitting translation would 
draw out Origen’s coarse phraseology: “When the last of the prophets was executed lawlessly 
by Herod, the king of the Jews was cut off of the authority to execute.” Thus, although John is 
the one who lost his head, Herod too underwent a type of beheading: the removal of his 
power to authorize executions. Furthermore, since Herod lawlessly executed “the last of the 
prophets,” this excerpt also reinforces Origen’s portrait of Herod who acts in accordance with 
wretched reasoning and kills God’s prophets. 
 (6) Finally, Origen casts a shadow over Herod on account of his oaths (see Matt 14:7–
9). Origen argues that Herod was under obligation to break his oath rather than to kill John:  
 And the prophet is beheaded because of oaths, concerning which it was necessary 
 rather to break the oaths than to keep [them]. For the accusation of recklessness of 
 making oaths, of breaking oaths because of recklessness, and the accusation of 
 executing a prophet in order to keep oaths are not the same.… Now, you may at 
 times make elegant use of the [following] saying with respect to those who swear 
 oaths recklessly and who want to uphold [their] oaths that were taken in lawlessness: 
 not every keeping of oaths is fitting, just as Herod’s oath [was] not. (Comm. Matt. 
 10.22) 
 
 
 788 Origen, Comm. Matt. 10.21 (Heine, OECT). 
 789 Parthenius, Suffering in Love, 8.9 (Lightfoot, LCL), for example, employs ἀφαιρέω to refer to the 
severing of a head from its body: καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν αὐτῆς ἀφαιρεῖ (“And he cut off her head”). The same verb 
occurs in Triple Tradition material to refer to the “cutting off” of an ear (Matt 26:51//Mark 14:47//Luke 22:50). 
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In this text in particular, moreover, the normative dimensions of commemorative activity 
come into focus. To re-articulate points made in chapter two, many violent events impose 
themselves upon social memory. Violence ruptures the presumed normalcy of the everyday. 
It forces individuals and collectives to restore a sense of moral intelligibility to the violence 
experienced or perceived. Rememberers cast perpetrators and victims in terms of “good” 
and/or “bad,” “right” and/or “wrong,” and “positive” and/or “negative.” Commemorative 
activity can forge these characterizations into paradigms of (in)appropriate behavior in a 
group’s present social horizon. Stated otherwise, “social memory has an indelible ethical 
colouration; its images of archetypal persons and events embody a community’s moral 
order.”790 Origen, we have shown, remembers Herod in largely negative terms throughout 
Comm. Matt. 10.21–22. The present passage forges and promotes Herod as a didactic frame 
of reference to deter erroneous behavior in Origen’s present social context. Origen thus 
brings the past to bear on the present. He harnesses the negative example of Herod to 
perpetuate an oath ideology that differentiates between circumstances that require one to keep 
an oath or that obligate one to break it. 
 
4.1.5. Summary 
 Underlying Comm. Matt. 10.21–22 is the contest over the memory of John the 
Baptist’s beheading. Origen recalls those circumstances of John’s death that are consistent 
with the socio-political methods of decapitation in the ancient world that often emphasize the 
degradation of the one beheaded: the destruction of the integrity of the body and the public 
display of the previously severed head. Origen distances John from the Herodian court. In so 
doing, he constructs a moral evaluation on John’s death, exonerating John and damning his 
attackers as morally wretched killers of God’s prophet. Origen invests Herod in particular 
 
 790 Kirk, Memory and the Jesus Tradition, 31. 
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with normative significance by promoting him as a negative didactic example. In so doing, 
Origen begins to shift the stigma of John’s beheading away from John and onto his attackers. 
Origen, however, is not finished in this project of contestation. He will also redeploy the 
tradition in anti-Jewish directions.  
 
4.1.6. Anti-Jewish Turns 
 
 The contest over the memory of John’s death underlying Comm. Matt. 10.21–22 takes 
on anti-Jewish layers. For Origen, the Herodian court functions as a symbol of “the Jews” (οἱ 
Ἰουδαῖοι).791 Coupled with our prior observation that John symbolizes the presence of 
prophecy among the Jews, the court’s actions as well as the repercussions of those actions are 
emblematic of (1) contemporary Jewish activity and (2) the consequences contemporary Jews 
incur vis-à-vis prophets and prophecy. Christians, by contrast, are the beneficiaries of Israel’s 
self-inflicted wounds. Origen thus harnesses the negative portrayal of the Jews as a foil to 
bolster a positive portrayal of Christians. Further, Origen’s integration of the Jews into the 
actions of the Herodian court infuses them with the moral character of those who kill God’s 
prophets: they are driven by “wretched reasoning.” Origen views John’s death as just one 
example among others when the Jews are at fault for the death of one of the prophets. Thus, 
Comm. Matt. 10.21–22 perpetuates an image of contemporary Jews as those who reject and 
kill the prophets of God by pairing them to a known script.792 Five passages in Comm. Matt. 
10.21–22 collectively illustrate these dynamics. 
 The first passage concerns Origen’s comments on Matt 14:3 and establishes a 
baseline for understanding some of these anti-Jewish dimensions more clearly: 
 Ἔχει δὲ οὕτως ἡ τοῦ Ματθαίου λέξις · Ὁ γὰρ Ἡρώδης κρατήσας τὸν Ἰωάννην, 
 ἔδησεν αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ φυλακῇ. Εἰς ταῦτ᾽ οὖν δοκεῖ μοι ὅτι, ὥσπερ ὁ νόμος καὶ οἱ 
 προφῆται μέχρι Ἰωάννου μεθ᾽ ὅν ἔληξεν ἡ προφητικὴ ἀπὸ Ἰουδαίων χάρις, οὕτως ἡ 
 
 791 Lupieri, “John the Gnostic,” 325: “In Origen’s view, Herod, as the king of the Jews, was a symbol 
for all of them.” 
 792 On “the Jews” as killers of God’s prophets in Origen’s writings, see e.g., Cels. 5.43; Comm. Matt. 
10.18; 16.3. See also, de Lange, Origen and the Jews, 76–81. 
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 τῶν βασιλευσάντων ἐν τῷ λαῷ ἐξουσία μέχρι τοῦ ἀναιρεῖν τοὺς νομιζομένους ἀξίους 
 θανάτου αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχουσα ἕως Ἰωάννου ἦν, καὶ ἀναιρεθέντος τοῦ τελευταίου τῶν 
 προφητῶν παρανόμως ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἡρώδου ἀφῃρέθη ὁ Ἰουδαίων βασιλεὺς τῆς τοῦ 
 ἀναιρεῖν ἐξουσίας.… Τάχα δὲ καὶ ἀφῃρέθησαν τὴν ἐξουσίαν ταύτην Ἰουδαῖοι, τῆς 
 θείας παρασχούσης προνοίας τῇ τοῦ Χριστοῦ διδασκαλίᾳ ἐν τῷ λαῷ νομήν, ἵνα, κἄν 
 κωλύηται ὑπὸ Ἰουδαίων αὕτη, ἀλλὰ μὴ μέχρι ἀναιρέσεως τῶν πιστευόντων χωρῇ, 
 δοκούσης κατὰ νόμον γίγνεσθαι. (Comm. Matt. 10.21) 
 
 Now, the word of Matthew has it thusly: “For Herod, having grasped John, bound him 
 in the prison.” Therefore, in reference to these things, it seems to me that just as “the 
 law and the prophets [were] until John,” after whom the prophetic gift ceased from 
 the Jews, in this way the authority (up to the execution of those thought to them 
 worthy of death) of those ruling among the people was existing until John. When the 
 last of the prophets was executed lawlessly by Herod, the king of the Jews was cut off 
 of the authority to execute.… Perhaps the Jews also were cut off of this authority 
 because divine foresight allowed the teaching of the Christ spreading among the 
 people so that even if this [the teaching] was hindered by the Jews, it would not reach 
 the point of the execution of the believers, thinking to act according to the law. 
 (Comm. Matt.  10.21) 
 
Several observations are in order. First, Herod’s imprisonment of John temporally marks the 
cessation of “the prophetic gift” (ἡ προφητικὴ χάρις) among “the Jews” (Ἰουδαίων). Origen 
relates Luke 16:16 (“the law and the prophets [were] until John”) to Matt 14:3 in this 
regard.793 Second, Origen draws a parallel conclusion: the beheading of John temporally 
marks the end of Herod’s political power to authorize executions.  
 Third, Origen asserts that “the Jews” (Ἰουδαίοι) likewise were deprived of this same 
political power.794 Thus, the Jews are integrated into the consequences that Herod’s execution 
of the Baptist incurred. Origen makes this assertion using language that specifically invokes 
John’s beheading. Just as Herod “was cut off” (ἀφῃρέθη), so also the Jews “were cut off” 
(ἀφῃρέθησαν) from possessing this power. In this respect, although John is the one physically 
executed, Origen divests his beheading of its symbolic potential by reallocating it. In 
Origen’s reasoning, it is Herod and the Jews that undergo a self-inflicted beheading.  
 
 793 Cf. Matt 11:13 (“For, all the prophets and the law until John were prophesying”).  
 794 In other words, if Herod was deprived of the power to authorize executions, the Jewish populace at 
large was accordingly deprived of the impulse to approach Herod specifically to execute those they wanted 
dead. Hence, Origen goes on to say, Jesus was condemned to death by Pilate. The logic, in Origen’s thought, is 
that Roman avenues of execution would not have been needed in Jesus’ case if Jewish avenues had still been 
authorized. Cf. John 18:31. 
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 Fourth, God passes a moral judgment on the Jews, suspecting them by divine 
foresight of lawlessly executing “the believers.” Origen speculates that the removal of power 
from the Jews was rooted in divine foreknowledge to enable the “spreading” of “the teaching 
of the Christ” while safeguarding “believers” from the risk of death. Thus, Origen suggests 
the removal of power from the Jews was designed by God to protect Christ-followers.795 The 
protection of believers, ensured by divine foresight, implies that God assumed the worst of 
the Jews. If their authority had been left in place, they would execute believers, erroneously 
“thinking” (δοκούσης) they acted “according to the law” (κατὰ νόμον).796  
 Many of these observed phenomena place Jews in an inferior light. Origen aligns the 
Jews with Herod and both undergo a self-inflicted “beheading.” Origen renders the Jews’ 
moral legitimacy dubious in that they would execute “believers” if they continued to enjoy 
the same political authority they possessed prior to John. It would be imprecise, however, to 
call the eradication of Jewish power in this regard an act of divine restriction on “Jews” to the 
benefit of “Christians.” That is to say, this restriction is not anti-Jewish in the sense of 
placing non-Christian Jews in an inferior position to non-Jewish Christians. On this particular 
issue, Origen is commenting on the immediate political consequences this restriction had 
within Jewish circles in the first century. For Origen, the removal of the power from the Jews 
to execute perceived criminals was an intra-Jewish phenomenon, one that protected Christ-
following Jews from other Jews.797  
 
 795 In grammatical terms, the genitive absolute construction—τῆς θείας παρασχούσης προνοίας τῇ τοῦ 
Χριστοῦ διδασκαλίᾳ ἐν τῷ λαῷ νομήν—seems to be indicating a causal circumstance (“because divine foresight 
allowed the teaching of the Christ spreading among the people”) under which the main verb ἀφῃρέθησαν (“they 
[the Jews] were cut off”) takes place, not merely a temporal circumstance (“when divine foresight allowed the 
teaching of the Christ spreading among the people”). 
 796 Origen’s depiction of the Jews “thinking” their execution of Christ-following Jews would occur 
“according to the law” is an ironic indictment of their reasoning. The implication in Origen’s rhetoric is that 
such hypothetical executions would in reality not be in accordance to the law (even if legally sanctioned by 
Jewish authority). The irony here parallels another instance we already alluded to in our analysis: Origen’s 
characterization of the daughter’s dance movements as “seemingly (δοκοῦντα) graceful” but in reality driven by 
“lawless (παρανόμου) reasoning” (Comm. Matt. 10.22). 
 797 The present pericope indicates that the removal of this political authority occurred in the context of 
“the teaching of Christ” disseminating “among the [Jewish] people” (ἐν τῷ λαῷ). The purpose of the removal, 
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 What makes this specific phenomenon take on dangerous anti-Jewish overtones is that 
it is expressed in a third-century social context where boundaries between “Christians” and 
“Jews” as such were more readily recognizable than they were in Jesus’ first-century Jewish 
context. For Origen to perpetuate a demeaning configuration of “the Jews” that questions 
their moral legitimacy—and positions them as those whose power is fatal to “believers” if 
left unchecked—holds the dangerous capacity to inculcate and map (1) the characterization 
of these Jews onto Jews in his own social context and likewise (2) the characterization of 
“believers” onto Christians. As B. Lincoln says: “Invocation of an ancestor [is] 
simultaneously the evocation of a correlated social group.”798 Such a fusion of separate 
groups in the past and separate groups in the present contains the dangerous potential to 
aggravate social estrangements, animate conflict, and inscribe attitudes that legitimize 
conflict. 
 Similarly, that John’s death is equated with the cessation of prophecy among the Jews 
is not necessarily an anti-Jewish claim in itself. Jewish sources propagate the idea of the 
absence of prophecy, even if only a temporary absence.799 If Matt 11:13 (“For all the 
prophets and the law were prophesying until John”) has any semblance to sentiments the 
Jesus of history expressed, assigning John temporal significance as the “last of the prophets” 
is a maneuver that originates in Jewish ambits. But, Origen’s development of this theme 
elsewhere in Comm. Matt. 10.21–22, as we will show, takes on anti-Jewish characteristics in 
four respects. First, Origen expressly aligns the Jews with Herodian actions of removing 
prophecy from the people. The Jews are portrayed as the killers of God’s prophet. Second, 
that the Jews are a people without “the gift” (ἡ χάρις) of prophecy rhetorically lowers their 
 
then, was “so that” (ἵνα) Christ-following Jews—“believers” (τῶν πιστευόντων)—would not face the 
suppression of their ideology to the extent that they would be physically killed. On Origen’s general use of the 
terms Ἰουδαῖος (“Jew”), Ἑβραῖος (“Hebrew”), and Ἰσραηλίτης (“Israelite”), see de Lange, Origen and the Jews, 
29–33. 
 798 Lincoln, Discourse and the Construction of Society, 20 (italics original). 
 799 See, Frederick E. Greenspahn, “Why Prophecy Ceased,” JBL 108 (1989): 37–49. 
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social position. Third, this degradation of the Jews is set in contrast to the elevation of 
Christians who possess “the [gift] greater entirely than that [gift]” (ἡ πάσης ἐκείνης μείζων). 
Christian prestige is bolstered at the expense of the Jews. Fourth, and relatedly, whereas with 
the removal of Jewish political authority Origen does not explicitly draw a parallel between 
first-century Jews and Jews in his own social context, on the issue of prophecy he is explicit 
in mapping the degradation of first-century Jews onto contemporary Jews and vice versa.  
 The second passage concerns the dance of Herodias’ daughter in Matt 14:6. Our 
earlier analysis of her dance demonstrated that Origen’s portrayal constitutes an ironic moral 
indictment of the daughter. Her “seemingly graceful movements” (τὰ δοκοῦντα εὔρυθμα 
κινήματα) prove to be (1) motivated by “lawless (παρανόμου) reasoning” and (2) the reason 
why “a prophetic head/source is no longer among the people” (μηκέτι εἶναι ἐν τῷ λαῷ 
κεφαλὴν προφητικήν) (Comm. Matt. 10.22).800 Origen then says: “And until now, I suppose, 
the seemingly lawful movements (τὰ δοκοῦντα κατὰ τὸν νόμον κινήματα) of the Jewish 
people (τοῦ λαοῦ τῶν Ἰουδαῖων) turn out to be not anything other than Herodias’ daughter” 
(Comm. Matt. 10.22). Origen expressly activates his portrayal of Herodias’ daughter in his 
present social context (“And until now”). He extends the same ironic indictment of Herodias’ 
dance “movements” to the Jews’ “movements.” Thus, he condenses Jewish actions to “not 
anything other than Herodias’ daughter.” With these maneuvers, Origen draws a direct line 
between Herodias and contemporary Jews. He inscribes the latter with the moral 
incompetence of the former and incriminates the Jews in the beheading of the prophet 
 
 800 As Heine, Commentary of Origen, 1:56, n. 161, suggests, Origen is playing on the word κεφαλή 
(“head” or “source) “since Herod had ‘beheaded’ John and sent his head to Herodias.” 
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John.801 Origen thereby insinuates that Jews from the time of John’s death to the present time 
continue to cause the absence of prophecy among the Jewish people.802  
 While the second passage emphasizes the Jews’ status as a people without the gift of 
prophecy, the third passage contrasts this absence with the presence of a greater gift among 
Gentile Christians. The pericope in question follows Origen’s comparison of Herod and 
Pharaoh. Herod was “more unrighteous” than the Pharaoh of Gen 40:20–23 because he 
executed the greatest person ever born, John, who was “more than a prophet” (Comm. Matt. 
10.22; see Matt 11:11a//Luke 7:28a). Immediately thereafter, Origen reacts to John’s 
beheading by keying it to Jesus’ crucifixion: 
 Ἀλλὰ εὐχαριστητέον τῷ θεῷ ὅτι, εἰ καὶ ἡ προφητικὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ λαοῦ ἦρται χάρις, ἡ 
 πάσης ἐκείνης μείζων ἐξεχύθη εἰς τὰ ἔθνη διὰ τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ, ὅς ἐγένετο 
 ἐν νεκροῖς ἐλεύθερος. Ἐι γὰρ καὶ ἐσταυρώθη ἐξ ἀσθενείας, ἀλλὰ ζῇ ἐκ δυνάμεως 
 θεοῦ. (Comm. Matt. 10.22) 
 
 However, we must give thanks to God because, although the prophetic gift was taken 
 away from the people, the [gift] greater than that [gift] entirely was poured out on the 
 Gentiles through our savior Jesus, who became free among the dead. For although he 
 was crucified in weakness, he lives in the power of God. (Comm. Matt. 10.22) 
 
Instead of citing Matt 11:11b//Luke 7:28b (“But the least in the Kingdom of the 
Heavens/God is greater than he [John]”) after quoting Matt 11:11a//Luke 7:28a, Origen 
symbolically charges the methods of the two deaths by contrasting their respective outcomes. 
John’s beheading is tantamount to the loss of the presence of prophecy among the Jews (“the 
 
 801 Origen also invests the dinner guests with the moral incompetence of the Jews. He writes: “And 
those celebrating his birthday recline and stand by with the wretched reasoning (λόγῳ μοχθηρῷ) that rules the 
Jews (Ἰουδαίων)” (Comm. Matt. 10.22). 
 802 Just as the daughter’s movements are the reason for the absence of prophecy, that Jewish 
movements are Herodias’ daughter implies, therefore, that Jewish actions continue to be the reason for the 
absence of prophecy. That Origen is making this implicit suggestion is further corroborated by the fact that he 
develops this idea in the remaining passages we will analyze below. Cf. Comm. Matt. 16.3 (see Matt 16:20–21) 
where Origen claims that the Jews continue to crucify Jesus in Jerusalem: “But if, according to a certain way of 
signifying things, humans are the city, even now Jesus is delivered in Jerusalem (and by Jerusalem, I mean those 
people whose hopes are centred on this earthly place) to the Jews who claim to be serving God. And those who 
are high priests, as it were, and the scholars, who boast that they interpret the divine Scriptures, condemn Jesus 
to death by their evil speech against him. They are always handing Jesus over to the Gentiles, mocking him and 
his teaching among themselves, and tongue-lashing the worship of God through Jesus Christ. They themselves 
crucify him by their anathemas and their desire to destroy his teaching” (Origen, Comm. Matt. 16.3 [Heine, 
OECT]).  
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prophetic gift was taken away [ἦρται] from the people”).803 Jesus’ crucifixion, on the other 
hand, constitutes the gain of a superior gift for the Gentiles (“the [gift] greater than that [gift] 
entirely was poured out [ἐξεχύθη] on the Gentiles through our savior Jesus”).804 Thus, 
whereas Matt 11:11b//Luke 7:28b mitigates the Baptist’s prestige in relation to those who 
enter the Kingdom, Origen harnesses the symbolism of beheading and crucifixion to assert 
the preeminence of Christians—who possess a superior gift—at the expense of Jews. In this 
respect, Origen does not distract attention from the degradation of John’s beheading: he 
weaponizes it to underscore the superiority of Jesus’ crucifixion.  
 The superior gift Origen alludes to here is the outpouring of God’s spirit in Acts 2:1–
41. Peter’s address to the Jewish crowd in Acts 2:17–18 twice specifies that the outpouring 
enables prophesying: “And in the last days it will be, God says, that I will pour out (ἐκχεῶ) of 
my spirit on all flesh and your sons and your daughters will prophesy (προφητεύσουσιν).… 
In those days I will pour out (ἐκχεῶ) of my spirit, and they [male and female slaves] will 
prophesy (προφητεύσουσιν).”805 Whereas Acts 2:1–41 presents this outpouring of the spirit 
on Christ-following Galilean Jews in Jerusalem (and Diaspora Jews visiting Jerusalem), 
 
 803 Origen’s word choice of ἦρται (“was taken away”) is puzzling. On the one hand, its basic meaning 
of “take up/away” evokes the physicality of the method of John’s death: his head is taken up and away from his 
body. On the other hand, the verb αἴρω is a hapax legomenon in Comm. Matt. 10.21–22. Not only does this 
word depart from Origen’s preferred language in describing John’s beheading/execution (ἀποκεφαλίζω, 
ἀφαιρέω, and ἀναιρέω), it is also the same word used in Matt 14:12 in reference to the removal of John’s 
headless body for burial (so also Mark 6:29). Matthew 14:12, moreover, comprises the only occurrence of αἴρω 
in the Matthean account of John’s death (so also in Mark 6:14–29). Origen’s word choice, therefore, presents 
the interpreter with three general ways of understanding this saying: (1) as a reference to John’s beheading-
proper, (2) as alluding to the removal of John’s body for burial, or (3) a combination of both ideas and thus a 
reference to the totality of John’s death. I prefer the third option because it makes the contrast with Jesus’ death 
more pointed: John was beheaded and his body buried, whereas Jesus “was crucified” (ἐσταυρώθη) “yet lives” 
(ἀλλὰ ζῇ). 
 804 Origen is converging two images in this text. First, the verb ἐκχέω (“I pour out”) alludes to the 
outpouring of God’s spirit in Acts 2:1–41. Second, given (1) Origen’s emphasis on John’s beheading throughout 
Comm. Matt. 10.22, and (2) the explicit mention of Jesus’ crucifixion in this passage (ἐσταυρώθη “he was 
crucified”), it is difficult not also to see in this saying an allusion to the image of Jesus’ blood shed on the cross. 
Elsewhere, moreover, Origen utilizes ἐκχέω in reference to Jesus’ “blood” (αἷμα) that “was poured out” at his 
crucifixion (Cels. 8.42; cf. 1 Clem. 7.4). Hence, my emphasis on Origen charging Jesus’ crucifixion by stressing 
its outcome is intended to capture Origen’s marriage of these two images in the passage. 
 805 Cf. Joel 2:28–29 LXX, where the verb προφητεύω occurs once. 
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Origen describes the outpouring “on the Gentiles” (εἰς τὰ ἔθνη).806 He further heightens the 
contrast between Jews and Gentiles by mapping his present social horizon onto the past: the 
outpouring is accomplished through the agency of “our (ἡμῶν) savior Jesus.” Moreover, 
John’s incomparability—as the greatest person ever born and “more than a prophet”— serves 
to enhance the preeminence of this “greater gift” that Gentile Christians enjoy. The death of 
this incomparable figure amplifies the austerity of the Jews’ present condition. Overall, 
therefore, the pairing of John’s and Jesus’ deaths in this excerpt is less analogical than it is a 
foil that elevates Gentile Christians—who have the presence of prophecy—at the expense of 
Jews, who are void of it. 
 The fourth passage concerns the public presentation of John’s severed head on a 
platter (Matt 14:11):  
 Ἔτι δὲ ὅρα τὸν λαὸν παρ᾽ ᾧ καθαρὰ μὲν καὶ ἀκάθαρτα ἐξετάζεται βρώματα, 
 καταφρονεῖται δὲ προφητεία ἐπὶ πίνακι ἀντὶ ὄψου προσαγομένη. Τὴν δὲ κεφαλὴν τῆς 
 προφητείας Ἰουδαῖοι οὐκ ἔχουσι, τὸ κεφάλαιον πάσης προφητείας Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν 
 ἀρνούμενοι. (Comm. Matt. 10.22) 
 
 But consider further the people who, on the one hand, examine food [to see whether it 
 is] clean or unclean, but on the other hand, despise prophecy which is brought on a 
 platter instead of prepared food. And, the Jews do not have the source/head of 
 prophecy, because they deny the summation/head of all prophecy, Christ Jesus. 
 (Comm. Matt. 10.22) 
 
Origen’s remarks here are striking. Matthew 14:3–12 identifies Herod’s dinner guests only as 
“those reclining” (τοὺς συνανακειμένους) (Matt 14:9). The Matthean account does not 
identify them as Jews. Nor does the Gospel of Matthew identify Herod Antipas, Herodias, or 
Herodias’ daughter as Jewish.807 Origen superimposes a Jewish identity onto these figures: 
they are “the people” (τὸν λαόν) who scrutinize their sustenance to observe if it is “clean” 
 
 806 Of course, the outpouring of the Holy Spirit on Christ-following Jews in Acts 2:1–4, followed by 
their speaking to Diaspora Jews “from every nation” in their respective languages (Acts 2:5–13), anticipates 
Luke’s emphasis on the mission to the Gentiles. See, Craig S. Keener, Acts: An Exegetical Commentary. 
Volume 1. Introduction and 1:1—2:47 (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2012), 780–837. 
 807 See, Matt 14:1, 3, 6, 9, 11. As we noted previously in this chapter, the Herodian dynasty’s identity 
as Jews was a matter of dispute from the first century onwards.  
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(καθαρά) or “unclean” (ἀκάθαρτα). Introduced by the correlative conjunctions μέν (“on the 
one hand”) and δέ (“but on the other hand”), Origen contrasts their concern for cleanliness, 
with their disregard for prophecy: the severed prophetic head of John on a platter is the object 
of their contempt. Further, Origen portrays their actions against John as prototypical. “The 
Jews” (Ἰουδαῖοι) continue to be a people without prophecy “because they deny the 
summation (τὸ κεφάλαιον) of all prophecy, Christ Jesus.” Origen, therefore, aligns the Jews’ 
treatment of John and Jesus, making their treatment of one reflective of their response to the 
other.808 
 The final passage concerns the setting of John’s execution “in prison” (Matt 14:10). 
 Ἔτι δὲ πρόσχες ὅτι οὐ μετὰ παρρησίας, ἀλλὰ κρύφα καὶ ἐν φυλακῇ φονεύει τὸν 
 Ἰωάννην ὁ Ἡρώδης καὶ γὰρ οὐ μετὰ παρρησίας ἀρνεῖται ὁ νῦν Ἰουδαίων λαὸς τὰς 
 προφητείας, δυνάμει δὲ καὶ ἐν κρυπτῷ αὐτὰς ἀρνεῖται καὶ ἐλέγχεται αὐταῖς ἀπιστῶν. 
 Ὥσπερ γὰρ εἰ ἐπίστευον Μωσῇ, τῷ Ἰησοῦ ἐπίστευσαν ἄν, οὕτως εἰ ἐπίστευον τοῖς 
 προφήταις, προσήκαντο ἄν τὸν προφητευόμενον. Ἀπιστεῦντες δὲ τούτῳ κἀκείνοις 
 ἀπιστοῦσι καὶ ἀποτέμνουσιν ἐν φυλακῇ κατακλείσαντες τὸν λόγον τὸν προφητικόν, 
 καὶ ἔχουσιν αὐτὸν νεκρὸν καὶ διαιρεθέντα καὶ μηδαμοῦ ὑγιῆ ἐπεὶ μὴ νοοῦσιν αὐτόν. 
 Ἀλλ᾽ἡμεῖς ὁλόκληρον ἔχομεν τὸν Ἰησοῦν, πληρωθείσης τῆς περὶ αὐτοῦ λεγούσης 
 προφητείας, Ὀστοῦν αὐτοῦ οὐ συντριβήσεται. (Comm. Matt. 10.22) 
 
 Consider further that not in openness but secretly and in prison Herod murdered John. 
 For also, not in openness are the present Jewish people denying the prophecies, but 
 in power and in secret they are denying them, and they are convicted by their 
 disbelieving in them. For just as if they had believed Moses they would have 
 believed Jesus, so also if they had believed the prophets, they would have accepted 
 the one who was prophesied. And because they do not believe this one, they 
 disbelieve those [prophets] and they behead [them], having locked up the prophetic 
 word in prison. And they [the Jews] have it [the prophetic word] dead, divided, and 
 not unbroken, because they do not understand it [the prophetic word]. But we 
 [Christians] have Jesus whole, since the prophecy which says about him “A bone of 
 him will not be broken” has been fulfilled. (Comm. Matt. 10.22) 
 
This passage contains several moving parts. Of principal importance is Origen’s fusion of the 
horizons of the past and the present. He unequivocally manipulates the beheading in his 
present social framework (“the present Jewish people” [ὁ νῦν Ἰουδαίων λαός]), so that it is 
 
 808 Likewise, Jerome in the late fourth century writes concerning Matt 14:11: “But down to the present 
day we discern in the head of the prophet John the fact that the Jews destroyed Christ, who is the head of the 
prophets” (Comm. Matt. 14.11 [Scheck, FC]). 
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emblematic of contemporary Jewish denial of “the prophecies.” For Origen, the manner and 
location of John’s death—“not in openness but secretly and in prison” (οὐ μετὰ παρρησίας, 
ἀλλὰ κρύφα καὶ ἐν φυλακῇ)—signals the nature of the Jews’ denial: “not in openness” (οὐ 
μετὰ παρρησίας) but rather “in power and in secret” (δυνάμει καὶ ἐν κρυπτῷ).809  
 One naturally asks: how do the Jews secretly reject “the prophecies” in Origen’s 
reasoning? Origen is not suggesting that the Jews affirm prophecies in public settings but 
deny them in private. His next comments build on John 5:46 (“For if you had believed 
Moses, you would believe me”) and provide an answer: the Jews’ manifest unbelief in Jesus 
is an implicit (i.e. secret) denial of the prophets/prophecies. Because Origen envisages an 
essential link between the prophets and Jesus, patent unbelief in the latter inherently involves 
a covert denial of the former.  
 The rest of the passage provides a bleak assessment of the “the present Jewish 
people.” Origen contrasts the different methods of John’s and Jesus’ deaths in this respect. 
For Origen, the irreparable damage of a head divided from its body makes John’s death more 
degrading than Jesus’ death which left the latter’s body fully intact.810 However, Origen 
massages this portrayal into a picture of Jews and Christians writ-large. The Jews have the 
prophetic word “dead, divided, and not unbroken” (νεκρὸν καὶ διαιρεθέντα καὶ μηδαμοῦ 
ὑγιῆ). “We” (ἡμεῖς), however, “have Jesus whole (ὁλόκληρον).” In this respect, Origen does 
not so much negate the degradation of John’s beheading so much as he harnesses it, 
reallocates it to underscore the austerity of the Jews, and thereby bolster the preeminence of 
Christians. Lupieri’s summary works well in this regard: “In cutting off John’s head, the Jews 
separated the prophecy of God from their religious body: the Jews lie down, now, as a 
 
 809 Cf. Caesarius of Arles, Serm. 218: “John remained in chains and in a prison. The law, too, was kept 
locked up in the minds of the Jews as though in places of condemnation, and spiritual understanding was 
restrained by the letter of the law as in a hidden, secret place” (Mueller, FC). 
 810 On Jesus’ unbroken body, see John 19:31–37 (cf. Exod 12:46 LXX; Ps 33:21 LXX). 
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headless corpse, while the Christians can worship Jesus, the totality of revelation, of whom 
not even a bone had been broken!”811 
Conclusion 
To summarize, the memories of John’s beheading in the first three centuries are the loci for 
self-definition. The Synoptic Gospels, Justin Martyr, and Origen all showcase 
commemorative operations designed to transform a negative past into a positive present. 
Moreover, for Justin, John’s beheading is integral in proving that the Elijah of the first 
messianic advent had indeed come. Origen’s Herod takes on normative signification. Origen 
promotes Herod as a negative didactic frame of reference in his bid to impart a particular oath 
ideology in his own social horizon. Yet, the memory of John’s beheading also came to 
perpetuate anti-Jewishness. The identification of John with Elijah enables Justin to assert the 
superiority of his version of Christology over and against competing versions. Justin aligns 
his Christian competitors with Jewish ideology, thereby making Jewish ideological inferiority 
part and parcel with his own Christian ideological preeminence. As “the ways begin to part,” 
so to speak, Justin and Origen weaponize the negative portrayals of the Herodian court 
(particularly Herod) in their social contexts. Across his intricate threshold of the first and 
second person, Justin activates the differing characterizations between John and Herod, 
affiliating “you Jews” with the actions of Herod against John that led to the prophet’s death. 
Origen massages those elements that hold the capacity to stress the humiliation of John’s 
beheading into symbols of Jewish confining, despising, rejecting, and killing God’s 
 
 811 Lupieri, “John the Gnostic,” 325. As a final note, Origen bases his evaluation of the Jews on the 
claim that “they do not understand it [the prophetic word]” (μὴ νοοῦσιν αὐτόν). With this assertion Origen 
comes full circle in his argument in this passage: (a) the Jews do not believe Jesus, nor as a corollary, the 
prophets, (b) the Jews behead the prophetic word, (c) the Jews have a headless prophetic word, because (d) the 
Jews do not understand the prophetic word. The progression of Origen’s rhetoric reveals a close association 
between Jewish (a) unbelief in Jesus and (d) misunderstanding of the prophets. Thus, at work in this passage is 
akin to what de Lange, (Origen and the Jews, 82), refers to as “Origen’s principal complaint” against his Jewish 
contemporaries, namely, misunderstanding because of their adherence to a literalist understanding of scripture. 
Origen intimately links “Jewish rejection of Jesus” “with the literal interpretation of the law” (de Lange, Origen 
and the Jews, 83). See also, Martens, Origen and Scripture, 107–60 (quotation, p. 107), who argues that 
Origen’s “charge of literalism” was “profoundly doctrinal” and not a “procedural” criticism of Jewish exegesis.  
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prophet(s) and prophecy. This treatment of prophecy, moreover, is related by Origen to 
contemporary Jewish rejection of Jesus. The reception of John’s beheading in Justin and 
Origen in particular, therefore, are the sites of a complex interaction between the past and the 
present. John’s death is pressed into the service of their presents while their presents are 
simultaneously mapped onto the past. The dangerous upshot of this commemorative activity 
is that the Jews are inscribed as killers of God’s prophet(s) by two prominent and influential 
early Christian thinkers.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
“John’s career … was meteoric. Suddenly he appeared upon the horizon, and quite as 
suddenly he was gone again.”812 The same cannot be said of the impact of his beheading in 
the early centuries following his death. It reverberated in the ever-shifting horizon of the 
present. His impact, I have argued, is characterized by a dangerous synchroneity: (1) the 
beheading of John the Baptist constituted a salient image that individuals and groups 
harnessed to organize and sculpt their identity. Mark 6:14–29 contests the degradation of 
John’s beheading: the beheading is keyed to Jesus’ crucifixion and the Herodian court is 
infused with the moral complexion of those whose “will” do not accord with God’s “will.”  
 Herod is emasculated in Mark’s portrayal as he is controlled by the Herodian women. 
His apologetic posture toward John in Mark 6:20 heightens the portrayal of his emasculation 
as he is ultimately unable to control his subjects. Herod’s doubt regarding the efficacy of 
John’s beheading (“He whom I beheaded, John, has this one been raised?” Mark 6:16) shows 
him as a paranoid figure who entertains the impossible notion of a decapitated person’s 
resurrection. (Alternatively, Herod’s affirmation that John overcame his violent death [“He 
whom I beheaded, John, this one has been raised!” Mark 6:16] depicts him as a figure 
paranoid about John’s improper burial [Mark 6:27–29].) According to Luke 9:9, John’s 
beheading clearly distinguishes John the Baptist and Jesus as two different figures. For both 
the Gospel of Mark and the Gospel of Matthew, John’s beheading is indicative of his identity 
as the Elijanic forerunner of Jesus (Mark 9:9–13//Matt 17:9–13). The Gospel of Luke, 
however, distances John from this role (Luke 9:37). And the Gospel of John denies John this 
identity altogether (John 1:21).  
 
 812 Kraeling, John the Baptist, 94. 
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 Justin Martyr and Origen, furthermore, contest the degradation of John’s beheading. 
Both authors accentuate John’s identity as God’s prophet and position Herod as the killer of 
God’s prophet. John’s severed head on a platter, for Justin, makes John’s identity as Elijah 
apparent—a particularly important component of Justin’s Christology as it proves that Elijah 
had come (Dial. 49.4–5). John’s death takes on normative significance in Origen’s usage as 
he harnesses the negative example of Herod to advance an oath ideology that does not make 
oath-keeping an absolute requirement. Moreover, for Origen, John’s beheading temporally 
marked the end of Jewish power to authorize criminal executions and the end of the prophetic 
gift among the Jewish people. 
 However, (2) John’s beheading was also a significant image that early recipients 
utilized to construct Christian identity over and against Jewish identity. The emergence of 
anti-Jewish turns in the tradition-history is particularly evident in Justin Martyr’s Dialogue 
with Trypho and Origen’s Commentary on Matthew. Both recipients utilize the beheading in 
the context of “Jewish-Christian relations” and infuse contemporary Jews with the moral 
coloration of Herod (or in Origen’s case, the moral wretchedness of the Herodian court 
altogether). While the Synoptic Gospels merely identify Herod Antipas as a “king” or a 
“tetrarch,” Justin renders Antipas as a royal symbol of “you (Jews)” who kill God’s prophets 
(Dial. 49.3–5; see also Dial. 16.4; 39.1; 112.5; 120.5; 1 Apol. 49.1–5). Justin also combats 
the adoptionistic Christology of his Christian rivals by aligning their ideology with Jewish 
Elijanic ideology. Thus, he navigates Christian controversy by making Jewish inferiority an 
integral part of his rhetoric.  
 Origen, like Justin, makes Herod a symbol of “the Jews” (οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι). As such, 
Herod’s imprisonment and beheading of John in prison correspond to contemporary Jews’ 
(“the present Jewish people” [ὁ νῦν Ἰουδαίων λαός]) treatment of the prophets and prophecy 
(Comm. Matt. 10.22). Unlike Justin, however, Origen extends this symbolism to the entire 
 217 
Herodian court. The “wretched reasoning” that (1) motivated Herodias, (2) inspired the 
daughter’s dance “movements,” and then (3) resulted in the loss of prophecy among the Jews 
is likened to contemporary Jews: “And until now, I suppose, the seemingly lawful movements 
(τὰ δοκοῦντα κατὰ τὸν νόμον κινήματα) of the Jewish people (τοῦ λαοῦ τῶν Ἰουδαῖων) turn 
out to be not anything other than Herodias’ daughter” (Comm. Matt. 10.22). Origen thus 
insinuates that contemporary Jews continue to be a people adverse to and in opposition to 
God’s prophets and prophecy. This symbolism even encompasses the dinner guests present at 
Herod’s birthday party. Whereas Matt 14:9 identifies the guests as “those reclining” (τοὺς 
συνανακειμένους), Origen claims that they shared the “moral wretchedness” of the Jews and 
wanted John killed: “And not for this reason only is he [John] beheaded but also because of 
those reclining, who want the prophet to be executed rather than to live. And those who 
celebrate his birthday recline and stand by with the wretched reasoning which was ruling the 
Jews” (Comm. Matt. 10.22). 
  Finally, while Origen frequently shifts the gaze of John’s degrading beheading onto 
the Herodian court to highlight the moral wretchedness of contemporary Jews,813 Origen is 
also content to affirm the degradation of John’s beheading when it can be used to underscore 
the austerity of the Jews in comparison to the preeminence of Christians. That is, John, as the 
symbol of prophecy among the Jews has a dual function in regard to his beheading: (1) his 
positive moral coloration accentuates the gravity of the Jews’ moral ineptitude in putting the 
prophet(s) to death; (2) the degradation of his beheaded—and thus broken—body reveals the 
superiority of Christ (whose body is “whole”) and Christians (who possess “the [gift] greater 
 
 813 “But consider further the people who, on the one hand, examine food [to see whether it is] clean or 
unclean, but on the other hand, despise prophecy which is brought on a platter instead of prepared food. And, 
the Jews do not have the source/head of prophecy, because they deny the summation/head of all prophecy, 
Christ Jesus” (Comm. Matt. 10.22). 
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entirely than that [gift]”), while symbolizing the brokenness of Jews (who have the prophetic 
word “dead, divided, and not unbroken”) (Comm. Matt. 10.22). 
 Together, therefore, Justin and Origen turn John’s beheading into (1) a moral 
indictment of contemporary Jews—the killers of God’s prophets—and (2) a picture that 
demonstrates the superiority of Christians. Such sentiments, expressed in the context of 
“Jewish-Christian relations,” had the immediate dangerous potential of inflaming hostilities 
between estranged social groups—provoking, animating, and condoning conflict. Such 
sentiments also, of course, perpetuated into the future the hazardous motif of the Jews as 
prophet-killers.814 What impact, then, did John’s beheading have in its reception? Insofar as it 
enabled the advancement of anti-Jewish ideology in the context of “Jewish-Christian 
relations,” and inscribed it for the future, John’s severed head had a dangerous impact: the 
memory of his violent end became invisibly violent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 814 See, e.g., Jerome, Comm. Matt. 14.11. 
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